Assessing the statistical rarity of wars between democracies

The ‘small numbers objection’ to the democratic peace claims that the relative rarity of militarized conflict between democracies is due to their small numbers coupled with the infrequency of violent interstate conflict, not to an alleged pacifying effect of democracy. This study assesses this objection directly by treating the number of militarized disputes between democracies as a random variable. Since the historical record provides only one observation for this variable, full estimation of its distributional characteristics requires repeated simulation of the process by which dyads are ‘selected’ for conflict We employ Monte Cario techniques to carry out this process. The simulation results indicate no support for the small numbers objection. The results remain stable when important control variables are introduced and when the analysis employs a weaker definition of democracy. Finally, the simulation enables a precise identification of the point within the 1816–1992 temporal domain when the democratic peace moved from an apparent statistical artifact to significant phenomenon.     

Socioeconomic Inequality and Communal Conflict: A Disaggregated Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008

This article examines the role of economic inequality in influencing the risk of armed conflict between communal groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that socioeconomic inequality can generate intergroup grievances, which, due to the exclusionary legitimacy of the African state and elite incentives to engage in competitive mobilization of communal groups, precipitate violent communal conflict. To examine this argument, we rely on a series of household surveys to construct subnational inequality measures. For each region, we calculate measures of inequality in terms of household welfare and education between individuals (vertical inequality) and between ethnic groups (horizontal inequality). Combining the inequality data with new georeferenced data on communal conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1990–2008, we find that regions with strong socioeconomic inequalities—both vertical and horizontal—are significantly more exposed to violent communal conflicts. More specifically, regions in which the largest ethnic group is severely disadvantaged compared to other groups are particularly prone to experience communal conflict.     

Strategies,capabilities, and demands: Explaining outcomes in violent intrastate nationalist conflicts

The study of nationalist and ethnic conflict has undergone considerable growth since the end of the Cold War. Much of the effort has been focused on ascertaining the nature and origins of such conflicts, and less on their process and termination. Those studies that do focus on conflict termination have generally done so using case‐study or idiosyncratic methods. Hence, we do not yet have much large‐N or statistical evidence that might suggest broad trends in how such conflicts end, or even much experience in measuring the relevant concepts in a manner conducive to such methods. This paper will address these questions by introducing a theoretical framework that seeks to explain the outcomes of violent intrastate nationalist conflicts. It will discuss measurement issues for relevant independent variables, and present data for a group of 75 violent, intrastate nationalist conflicts from 1945–1996. This data will then be used to test propositions derived from the model. The aim is to provide a useful building block for the study of the process and outcome of conflicts which political scientists now recognize to be some of the most important for the coming century.     

The Effects of Oil Production and Ethnic Representation on Violent Conflict in Nigeria: A Mixed-Methods Approach

A large qualitative literature on violent conflict in Nigeria has identified the importance of oil production and ethnicity as salient factors in understanding violence, especially in the oil-rich Niger Delta. This resonates with the broader literature on natural resources, ethnic exclusion, and conflict. This article advances existing research by providing the first highly disaggregated statistical analysis of oil, ethnicity, and violence for Nigerian Local Government Areas (LGAs). We test whether oil production in a weak state environment, and local groups’ access to governmental power, affect the level of violence in Nigeria. We employ unique disaggregated data on violent conflict events, proprietary data on oil production, and newly collected information on local ethnic groups’ access to the federal government for 774 LGAs. We find strong evidence that LGAs with oil infrastructure experience significantly more violence than others, while access to the federal government significantly reduces violence. We complement these findings with a qualitative investigation of violent conflicts in Nigeria.     

Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992

This article studies the management of territorial claims using an issue-based approach that reconceptualizes processes of interstate conflict and cooperation as reflecting contention over issues. Hypotheses on issue management techniques are tested using newly collected data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) research project. Empirical analysis of territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere supports the general model, with issue salience and past issue interactions systematically affecting states' choices between peaceful and militarized techniques for managing or settling their contentious issues. In particular, action over territorial claims is most likely when more valuable territory is at stake, in the aftermath of militarized conflict, and when recent peaceful settlement attempts have failed. Third parties are more likely to become involved in nonbinding activities when the claim appears more threatening to regional or global stability, and submission of claims to binding third-party decisions is most likely between adversaries that have begun to build up a legacy of successful agreements. The article concludes with a discussion of directions for future research on territory and on other issues.     

Refugee Flows,Ethnic Power Relations,and the Spread of Conflict

Why do some refugee flows cause conflict in the host state and others do not? Drawing on bargaining models of war, I argue refugees are especially likely to cause conflict when they alter the host state's ethnic balance of power. More specifically, I explain why multiple informational and commitment problems arise when refugee flows produce a rapid shift in relative power between ethnic groups. As an empirical strategy, I examine a unique controlled comparison made possible by the influx of Kosovar refugees into Albania and Macedonia in 1999 that eliminates over a dozen competing explanations for civil conflict. I then use process tracing to demonstrate how a change in relative power between ethnic groups fostered violence in Macedonia, whereas the preservation of the ethnic balance facilitated a peaceful refugee flow into Albania. This evidence, though tentative, indicates that a refugee flow's effect on the host state's ethnic balance of power can help explain whether the state experiences peace or conflict.     

Do Religious Factors Impact Armed Conflict? Empirical Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa

Theoretically, the “mobilization hypothesis” establishes a link between religion and conflict by arguing that particular religious structures are prone to mobilization; once politicized, escalation to violent conflict becomes more likely. Yet, despite the religious diversity in sub-Saharan Africa and the religious overtones in a number of African conflicts, this assumption has not yet been backed by systematic empirical research on the religion–conflict nexus in the region. The following questions thus remain: Do religious factors significantly impact the onset of (religious) armed conflict? If so, do they follow the logic of the mobilization hypothesis and, if so, in which way? To answer these questions, this article draws on a unique data inventory of all sub-Saharan countries for the period 1990–2008, particularly including data on mobilization-prone religious structures (e.g., demographic changes, parallel ethno-religious identities) as well as religious factors indicating actual politicization of religion (e.g., inter-religious tensions, religious discrimination, incitement by religious leaders). Logit regressions suggest that religion indeed plays a significant role in African armed conflicts. These findings are compatible with the mobilization hypothesis, and stress the impact of conflict-prone religious structures, and particularly, the fact that overlaps of religious and ethnic identities are conflict-prone. Future research should investigate the religion-ethnicity-nexus in more detail.     

International Conflict,International Security Environment,and Military Coups

Why do some countries repeatedly experience military coups while others seem immune? Are countries more prone to military coups when faced with external threats? The answers to these questions still remain contested: While several scholars hold that countries facing external threats are more vulnerable to coups, others argue that such countries are actually more secure from coups. I argue that by failing to distinguish between immediate and acute threats, caused by wars and militarized conflicts, and chronic threats from a state’s international security environment, the existing literature ignores the possibility that these two types of external threats differently affect the likelihood of coups. I propose that wars and militarized conflicts, infrequent and often short lived, decrease coup propensity, while a threatening security environment increases coup risk. I find strong supporting evidence that the presence of chronic international threats increases the likelihood of coups while acute international conflicts lower that likelihood.     

Bogus Refugees? The Determinants of Asylum Migration to Western Europe

This article analyzes the determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe. Potential asylum seekers balance the costs of staying versus the costs of migrating. Estimation results confirm that economic hardship and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities lead to higher flows of asylum seekers. However, political oppression, human rights abuse, violent conflict, and state failure are also important determinants. Migration networks and geographical proximity are important facilitators of asylum flows as predicted by theory and colonial experience, religious similarity, and casual contact with the developed world (aid, trade, and tourism) are not. Natural disasters and famines are also not statistically significant determinants. These events are typically short term and unexpected, whereas asylum migration to Western Europe requires preparatory planning. If Western European countries want to tackle the root causes of asylum migration, then they need to undertake policy measures that promote economic development, democracy, respect for human rights, and peaceful conflict resolution in countries of origin.     

U.S Domestic Regulation of Global Conflict Resources

The violent conflicts in developing countries during the 1990s too often were blamed on rebel groups fighting for natural resource loot. Yet, the natural resources do not cause conflict, which is often rooted in deep-seated and historically contingent sets of grievances. For this reason, we should not expect regulations to end conflict or consolidate peace. Rather, we must look for opportunities for reconciliation, cooperation and confidence building, as well as greater inclusion of individuals and communities in decisions about natural resources.     

Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict

This paper makes two arguments. First, the political and economic institutions of a state affect that state's foreign policy preferences. Second, dyads with similar political and economic institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyads. After developing the logic of these arguments, I create measures of political and economic institutional similarity and test the hypotheses against the empirical record. The empirical analysis supports the argument that dyadic institutional similarity reduces the likelihood of conflict. The most noteworthy finding is that economic institutional similarity, even when the political institutions in a dyad are dissimilar, reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict.     

The Chicken or the Egg?: A Coevolutionary Approach to Disputed Issues and Militarized Conflict

Is state behavior influenced by the context in which it occurs, or does context arise because of the way in which states behave? I investigate these questions in the context of international disputes over issues and states’ militarized behavior. The prevalent assumption in interstate conflict research is that disputed issues are exogenous to militarization patterns. I question the validity of this assumption, arguing there are reasons to suspect certain states self-select into disputes. I use a coevolution modeling strategy to allow the existence of disputes and states’ behavior to mutually affect one another. I find disputes are not exogenous to states’ militarized behavior. States that resort to militarized behavior are more likely to dispute an issue than peaceful states. I also find evidence of behavioral contagion among states engaged in disputes: Militarized behavior begets militarized behavior.     

Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs

Does World Bank aid to countries damaged by civil conflict meet its stated goals of speeding economic recovery and reducing the risk of conflict recidivism? We contend that the Bank’s success depends on its ability to bolster and signal the credibility of politicians’ commitments to peaceful politics and tailor its programs to the post-conflict environment. In the first systematic evaluation of World Bank post-conflict assistance, we estimate selection-corrected event history models of the effect of Bank programs on recovery and recurrence using an original dataset of all World Bank programs in post-conflict environments. Among key results, we find that the Bank tends to select aid recipients according to their pre-existing probability of conflict recurrence and that, once we control for this non-random selection, the Bank has no systematic effect on either conflict recurrence or economic recovery.     

The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model

Many statistical studies in international relations investigate the claim that democracies do not fight one another. Virtually all of these studies employ a single-equation design, where the dependent variable measures the presence or absence of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID). A separate group of studies argues that conflict affects democracy and that its effect could be positive or negative. By and large, these two bodies of literature have not incorporated one another's insights. We argue that democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other significantly and that statistical models that ignore the reciprocal nature of these effects may make incorrect inferences. To test this argument, we develop a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict. Our sample includes all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992. We find that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy and joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. Compared with the single-equation estimates in the literature, the absolute effect of joint democracy in our paper is smaller while in relative terms, the effect is similar in size. The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous ones. The effects of a number of control variables in the MID equation are also found to differ from those reported previously in single- equation–based studies.     

Beyond rwanda and kosovo: The interactive dynamics of international peacekeeping and Ethnic Mobilisation

Within the past few decades there has been a significant increase in multilateral interventions in ethnic conflicts in the name of peacekeeping. Most hope that these operations will assist in conflict resolution and reduce violence. However, recent examples indicate that this may not always be the case. This paper explores why international efforts to contain, curtail and resolve ethnic conflicts may not prove successful and even backfire. This enquiry is addressed by employing a cross-national comparative analysis of the involvement of peacekeeping operations in two recent ethnic conflict situations. A sociological model of mobilisation is systematically applied to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Rwanda (1994) and NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo (1999) to determine whether international actors addressed the primary components that led to mobilisation of the contentious parties. This work argues that the key to successful peacekeeping is to address the primary components of violence. The paper synthesises conflict studies with work on social mobilisation theory and research on peacekeeping, offering both theoretical and policy-relevant contributions to understanding the nexus between effective peacekeeping and factors leading to violent mobilisation.     

Unwelcome Neighbors: Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict During the Cold War

This article assesses the role of ethnic demographics and domestic ethnic rebellion in promoting international conflict. Three of the variables introduced examine dyads within which a common ethnic group exists. These variables are coded to distinguish the presence of a trans-border ethnic group that exists as a majority in both states; a majority in one state and a minority in the other; or a minority in both states. The pooled dataset, which covers the years 1951–1991, is analyzed using different types of data to account for both broad and narrow conceptions of ethnicity. The results indicate a strong and significant increase in dyadic conflict when two states share an ethnic group and an ethnic majority exists in at least one of the states. Ethnic rebellion is also found to significantly harm interstate relations when an ethnic diaspora is involved. Associations found between ethnicity and international conflict are most pronounced when international disputes involve fatalities.     

Determinants of Foreign Aid: Rivalry and Domestic Instability

Foreign aid is usually seen as a form of international cooperation. Thus, the expectation is that states engaged in international rivalry with one another should be unlikely to provide each other aid. However, they do provide their enemies aid. We consider how situations of uncertainty influence aid transfers between states. We argue that states may provide each other aid to limit uncertainty from potential regime changes that could lead to war. Such uncertainty is particularly bad for rivals who are prone to militarized conflict. We find that rivals may provide one another foreign aid when one of the countries is experiencing regime-threatening levels of domestic instability. We compare these results to the behavior of nonrivals and find that: Rivals are likely to provide their enemies aid in times of uncertainty; rivals are no less likely to give aid to each other than are nonrivals; and rivals provide more aid during times of instability than do nonrivals.     

Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict

We know, most notably through Ted Gurr's research, that ethnic discrimination can lead to ethnopolitical rebellion–intrastate conflict. I seek to discover what impact, if any, gender inequality has on intrastate conflict. Although democratic peace scholars and others highlight the role of peaceful domestic behavior in predicting state behavior, many scholars have argued that a domestic environment of inequality and violence—structural and cultural violence—results in a greater likelihood of violence at the state and the international level. This project contributes to this line of inquiry and further tests the grievance theory of intrastate conflict by examining the norms of violence that facilitate a call to arms. And in many ways, I provide an alternative explanation for the significance of some of the typical economic measures—the greed theory—based on the link between discrimination, inequality, and violence. I test whether states characterized by higher levels of gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict. Ultimately, the basic link between gender inequality and intrastate conflict is confirmed—states characterized by gender inequality are more likely to experience intrastate conflict, 1960–2001.     

Contextualising and theorising economic development,local business and ethnic cleansing in Myanmar

ABSTRACT

After Myanmar ended military rule in 2011, significant foreign investment arrived to facilitate a profitable transition to an integrated regional economy, and under the promise that foreign actors can help facilitate peaceful long-term development. However, these firms have also tacitly supported an ethnic cleansing committed by the government that most have partnered with or funded. This article builds theory on economic opening, development and conflict, using research from Myanmar to forward three arguments about business actions in fragile, at-risk countries. First, international-led regulatory reform has had little impact on endemic corruption at the micro- or meso-levels, as local elites and international businesses remain the primary beneficiaries. Second, ‘development’ is a contentious topic, defined locally not as broad societal growth but the unjustified picking of winners and losers in society by foreign entities. Third, business ventures are exacerbating ethnic tensions through a liberal peace-building mentality that is unresponsive to either local conflicts or local communities. The article closes by offering three ways that these findings open future research avenues on business engagement as peace-builders and development agents in developing yet fragile states.