Yellow sea economic zone: Vision or reality?

This article provides a brief review of Sino-South Korean economic relations in the 1980s, and discusses domestic and international factors that are likely to influence economic relations between the two countries in the 1990s. Two possible scenarios are discussed for future Sino-South Korean economic relations: increasing trade and economic interaction within limited political relations; active economic cooperation across the Yellow Sea with normalized relations. Anticipating expanding economic ties between China and South Korea, the article discusses potential areas for cooperation such as trade and industrial relations, tourism and services, infrastructure development and transportation linkages, and institutional support.     

The China model of Korean reunification

Like Germany's reunification, essentially the annexation of East Germany by West Germany, Korean reunification looms as most likely, ultimately and largely entailing South Korea's annexation of North Korea. The awesome cost borne by West Germany for reunification has been instructive to South Korea, particularly in recognition that the material and ideological gaps between North and South Korea are far greater than those which existed between East and West Germany. A possible solution to the negative implications of cataclysmic reunificationmay rest in gradual reunification of the Koreas, with an interim industrialization of North Korea by South Korea, based on the model of the economic development zones in southeastern China; hence, the “China Model”. In such a scenario the investors in North Korea's gradual industrialization would be (primarily) the huge conglomerate South Korean corporations chaebol which seek cheaper labor pools abroad. Investment by such corporations, in cooperation with the South Korean government, and possibly supplemented by western and Japanese capital investment, would presumably raise levels of productivity and the standard of living in the economically and agriculturally ravished North. The North-South gaps would thus be gradually reduced as would the financial and other burdens South Korea would otherwise have to bear for cataclysmic reunification.     

South Korea-China economic relations: Trends and prospects

Since the establishment of official diplomatic ties in 1992, bilateral economic relations between Korea and China have rapidly improved. The economic dynamism in China is expected to continue in the future. As continued economic development of China gains momentum, the economic relationship between the two countries will further be strengthened. However, future bilateral economic cooperation will take a path that differs significantly from the past. Both the quantity and quality of economic relations will increase and improve. In particular, Korea’s investment in China, which tends to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, will broaden out to nonmanufacturing sectors, with the strategic motive of gaining access to China’s huge domestic market. His publications includeNortheast Asian Economic Cooperation: Perspectives and Challenges (KIEP, 1991).     

Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea

This paper examines China’s role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea’s behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China’s indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing’s ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea’s behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China’s indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China’s emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation.     

The future of coastal development in the Yellow Sea Rimlands

With its strategic location in East Asia, the Yellow Sea Rim is becoming an important economic region, where the socialist economies of China and North Korea and the market economies of Japan and South Korea interact and exchange for their mutual benefit. In light of the recent rapprochement among Northeast Asian countries, the article describes the emerging pattern of development in the Yellow Sea Rim. It assesses the potential gains of opening up the region by assuming a complete or partial removal of political barriers. Anticipating the future of cooperative regional development in the Yellow Sea Rimlands, the article discusses regional strategies and key issues involved in cooperation, in particular between China and South Korea.     

Trade between Bohai of China and Korea: An international perspective

This article investigates the current state and future prospects of trade between South Korea and China, with a focus on China's Bohai region. First, it compares basic economic profiles, including trade patterns of China, Bohai, and Korea. Then, it explores trade prospects between these economies using the aid of the indices, such as export similarity and trade complementarity. The article also examines the trade creation and diversion effects of trade between Korea, China, and Bohai during the last decade, and, finally, presents alternative future trade projections. Editor's Note: The three articles in this section were originally prepared for and presented at an international conference on Regional Development in the Yellow Sea Rim, in February 1991, in Seoul, Korea. The conference was part of a two-year collaborative study on regional development in the Yellow Sea Rim, involving researchers from China, South Korea, the United States, and Japan. The study was organized by the East-West Population Institute of Hawaii and supported by many research institutions and government agencies in China and the Republic of Korea. In particular, the State Science and Technology Commission of China and the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements are acknowledged for their generous support.     

Economic Interdependence and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Abstract

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies.     

Future dynamics in Sino-Korea relations

This article argues that the basic interests of the major actors involved in the Korean problem converge on the cross-recognition and “two Koreas” formula. Seoul’s diplomatic normalization with Moscow, and North Korea’s ongoing negotiations with Tokyo, testify to this trend. Because of its sensitivity to North Korea’s dilemma and carefully measured policy, China has succeeded in sustaining North Korea’s trust while improving its ties with South Korea. Shaken by the changes in the international system and threatened by the rapidly growing economic capability of the South, North Korea’s overall foreign policy objective is shifting from unifocation to accepting the existing status quo, a movement toward a direction that China has been advising. A mostly likely breakthrough to the stalemate in Korea will come from the Pyongyang-Tokyo bilateral relations. Ironically, when the South feels more confident than ever before about the possibility of unification under its terms, the rest of world is moving toward the cross recognition it has advocated. Whether the two Koreas with over-lapping diplomatic relations with all four major powers surrounding the peninsula will be able to achieve the unification that all Korean people desire will largely depend on how the regimes manage inter-Korean relations in coming years.     

Sino-South Korean economic cooperation: An analysis of domestic and foreign entanglements

One of the most explicit manifestations of post-Mao China’s pragmatic foreign policy has been the significant shift in Beijing’s position vis-à-vis Seoul from a “non-policy” todefacto economic diplomacy. Despite the extent of cooperative endeavors, Sino-South Korean economic relations have been circumscribed by various domestic and external factors. While a further intensification of the cooperative relationship is projected for the second decade of Sino-South Korean economic diplomacy, the actual materialization of such prospects depends on how China and South Korea are going to maintain economic complementarity. More importantly, it also depends on when and how China is going to accommodate politically its economic relations with South Korea by resolving the issue of “two Koreas,” thus maximizing the potential benefits from its ties with Seoul and simultaneously minimizing the negative effects from the entanglements of various domestic and foreign factors.     

Asian workers in the Gulf states of the Middle East

One of the most conspicuous developments in recent years in the Korean political economy is the enormous increase of Korean investment in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. In particular, since the appreciation of the Korean currency (won) in 1987 and the rapid increase of industrial action by Korean workers, more Korean foreign direct investment (FDI) has been carried out by small-and medium-sized firms, particularly in the manufacturing sector. However, many of the Korean firms in the region have already experienced various problems. This article examines the determinants of the new phase of Korean FDI. It also discusses the possible consequences of Korean FDI in Indonesia.     

North Korea’s nuclear issue

Given the unpredictability of North Korea’s leadership, and its capability to develop nuclear weapons, the North Korean nuclear issue has become one of the most important concerns in the region in the last few years, particularly for the United States, Japan, and, of course, South Korea. Up until January 30, 1992, when North Korea finally concluded the fullscope safeguards agreement, the focus of concern was the very fact that North Korea repeatedly had refused to conclude the obligatory agreement for more than six years since December 12, 1985, when it signed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).     

Is institutionalization of the six-party talks possible?

During 2003 and 2004, after having successfully hosted two six-party talks and a round of working-group level meetings on the North Korean nuclear crisis, China pushed to institutionalize the talks. Such an initiative coming from China was a shock to the world, since it has long maintained a passive, negative and defensive posture against multilateral cooperative security arrangements. This article declares that China's idea to utilize the six-party talks as a steppingstone toward a multilateral cooperative security arrangement is premature. It argues that the first priority is to address the failure of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea—what was, then, believed to be the solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis. This article dissects the failure and identifies one critical factor for the viability of any future peaceful resolution—the economic sanctions that the US has placed against North Korea for the past half-century. The authors argues that if the issue of sanctions is not addressed, the current six-party talks will not be successful.     

21世纪中国地方政府在中韩关系中的作用

随着中国改革开放的深入和中韩关系的发展,中国地方政府开始在中韩关系中发挥日益重大的作用。本文以山东省、上海市、广东省、湖北省为案例,分析了21世纪中国地方政府在中韩关系中的作用。这种作用体现为以下三个方面：中国地方政府与韩国的经贸关系为中韩关系发展注入了强大的经济动力;中国地方政府与韩国的外事活动为中韩关系发展奠定了坚实的政治基础;中国地方政府与韩国的文化交流为中韩关系发展营造了友好的民意支撑。展望未来的中韩关系,本文得出的相关政策启示在于：对于中国地方政府而言,要为韩国企业入驻创造良好的投资环境;对于中国中央政府而言。需要给予地方政府在发展中韩关系中适当的授权和分权;对于韩国政府而言,需要积极应对中国经济发展方式的重大转变;2012年韩国丽水世博会将是进一步密切中国地方政府与韩国关系的重要契机。     

The Cheonan Incident and East Asian Community Debate: North Korea’s Place in the Region

The East Asian community debates project the region as one integral unit. Rapidly shifting landscapes explain the tension between the old order and emerging hierarchy where North Korea plays a crucial role. This paper analyzes North Korea’s place in the East Asian community debates by examining the regional governments’ reactions to the Cheonan incident. The responses and circumstances of South Korea, Japan and North Korea to the sunken ship incident demonstrate three dynamics. First, domestic political needs of the regional government supersede normative Community rhetoric. Second, manageability of the North Korean regime will determine the next regional hegemon. And third, the community debates need to include North Korea for viability.     

Security,Nationalism and Popular Culture: Screening South Korea’s Uneasy Identity in the Early 2000s

By examining the cultural representations of the South Korean notion of the Self/Other in relation to its major traditional enemy — North Korea — this article aims to capture a picture of South Korea’s discursive economy of the North, and to problematise the South Korean identities implicated in that economy in the early 2000s. To achieve these aims, this article focuses on representations of a successful popular South Korean film which was released in 2000, just a few months after the first inter-Korean summit: Joint Security Area JSA. By analytically reading JSA, it is revealed that, in South Korea, the traditional discursive practices based on the Cold War thinking have been eroded. For the South, the North is part of the Self (Korean-ness; love for the North as the same nation) and, at the same time, is an Other (South Korean-ness; contempt for the North as an inferior state). Related to this, South Korea appears to be the uneasy Self without a firm Other in between Korean-ness and South Korean-ness.     

东盟区域经济合作的投资效应研究

在2002年东盟自由贸易区建成之际,学术界用各种指标深入分析了其贸易效应。但东盟发展的目标却是要成为一个具有竞争力的投资区。因而要更好地理解和评价东盟区域经济合作,必须对其直接投资效果也进行分析。本文通过回顾20世纪90年代以来东盟吸收FDI的变化,考察了东盟区域经济合作的直接投资效应,并重点分析了其投资效应不显著的原因在于其对东盟综合区位优势的改善不明显,并没有有效地提高东盟区域整体竞争力。     

North Korea’s foreign relations: Diplomacy of promotive adaptation

Dramatic changes in East Europe and the Soviet Union resulted in North Korea’s doubling its effort to shield and defend itself from disturbances emanating from the outside. Yet, President Kim Il Sung of North Korea has also opted for new diplomatic moves of realignment in existing ties with China and the Soviet Union and is also seeking new rleations with Japan and the United States. North Korea’s diplomatic adaptation in 1990–91, such as its balancing diplomatic acts vis-à-vis the major allies and adversaries, is examined, and so is the North Korean dilemma of reconciling national interests and ideology. While Pyongyang’s nonaligned nations diplomacy is temporarily stalled, its Un diplomacy is likely to be activated as a result of the simultaneous entry into the United Nations with South Korea in 1991.     

The political economy of capital flows and capital controls in Malaysia

This paper explains the neo-liberal reform measures – foreign direct investment (FDI) policies, financialisation and labour market reform – of the Korean economy following the 1998 economic crisis. It investigates how they have influenced a process identified as the bipolarisation of Korea. Although the increase in FDI inflows has contributed to the economy by overcoming balance of payments difficulties, it has led to increased income inequality. As a result of labour market reforms that targeted labour market flexibility, the number of non-regular/non-standard and part-time workers has increased significantly over the past decade. Labour market reform and financialisation aggravated the bipolarisation.     

The Possibility of Economic Reform in North Korea

This article argues that North Korea can achieve an economic catch-up after decades of economic isolation and stagnation by promoting an economic opening focused on foreign trade and investment in a sustained manner. An analogy is been made with the case of Fujian Province in China, which has accomplished economic catch-up, mainly due to Taiwanese investments. To realise its potential, it is argued that North Korea treats its foreign direct investment (FDI) from South Korea as intra-Korean investment. The article also discusses the diverse modes of engagement with foreign capital that are available for North Korea, considering its own capability (absorption or management capabilities), rivalry among possible foreign investors, implications for market structure (monopoly or more competition), the nature of target technologies or facilities, opportunity for learning and transfer, and so forth. Finally, the article discusses the economic and political preconditions for such and economic catch-up.     

From distrust to mutual interests?: Emerging cooperation in Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia, historical legacies, a lack of common identity and great power politics impeded political cooperation and economic integration. However, China, Japan and South Korea have exhibited a growing interest in political and economic cooperation since the late 1990s. This article examines how the three Northeast Asian countries have developed political and economic cooperation by using the concept of ‘multilayered intergovernmentalism’. It argues that despite political tensions between China and Japan, regional cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea has been promoted by talks and bargains among the heads of state and government who strengthened incentives for closer cooperation. Moreover, multilayered frameworks formed at the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) level, through the Track II mechanisms, and in issue-specific areas have provided valuable input into advancing regional cooperation initiatives. Whereas the APT framework offered incentives and opportunities to exchange views and information for closer trilateral cooperation, the outcomes of the research at the Track II were incorporated into the leaders' cooperative initiatives. The existence of issue-specific frameworks stirred talks and negotiations at the summit level.