马来西亚政府金融干预的经验与启示

本文主要探讨马来西亚政府对金融部门的干预措施及其对社会经济发展的作用。马来西亚政府的金融干预政策在促进本国金融深化、推动社会均衡发展方面成效显著;但在支持本国支柱产业的建设、促进工业化进程方面效果欠佳。这主要与马金融体制的局限性及其金融租金的分配有关。马政府对金融部门干预的实践给中国及其他发展中国家提供不少有益的启示。     

德国与英国政策性银行的绿色金融实践比较及其启示

近年来,促进绿色金融发展,填补绿色经济资金缺口,成为世界主要经济体政府面临的共同任务,而政策性银行发挥的引领性作用越来越受到重视。本文聚焦于绿色经济领域扮演关键角色的欧盟国家政策性银行的典型代表——德国复兴信贷银行(Kf W)和英国绿色投资银行(GIB),基于现阶段发展绿色金融的主要障碍与困难构建了一个简明的分析框架,进而梳理对比两者承担的绿色金融功能。分析表明,作为本国绿色金融体系的"龙头"机构,德国复兴信贷银行和英国绿色投资银行分别以独特的方式承担着为绿色项目提供资金、拉动私人投资以及从技术和规则层面推动本国构建与完善绿色金融体系的重要功能。比较而言,英国绿色投资银行发挥的政策信号作用更加明确,而德国复兴信贷银行在可投资金规模上更有优势。这两家银行在投资方式和所有权上的差异还体现了德国和英国在发展绿色经济过程中平衡政府与市场关系的不同路径。上述发现对中国构建绿色金融体系具有借鉴意义。     

东亚发展中国家的政策金融及其启示

政策金融作为一种金融手段,在东亚一些发展中国家经济发展过程中曾发挥过重要的作用.但作为一种政府干预经济增长的政策手段,这种政策金融在其发展过程中也存在不少问题,如政策性资金运用过于集中,造成产业结构畸型发展;资金运用效益不高,最终成为导致金融危机的重要因素.本文主要分析东亚发展中国家政策金融形成的特点和存在的问题,及其对发展我国政策金融的启示.     

德国中小企业的发展及政府的金融支持

经济全球化和知识经济使各国大公司在全球竞争中的先驱和中坚地位更加突出。同时也使中小企业在本国劳动就业、技术创新、社会经济协调发展和结构变迁中的重要作用日趋明显，从而各国政府都更加关注和重视中小企业的发展，进一步改善和加强中小企业政策来促进其稳定和健康发展、这里拟就德国中小企业的发展及政府的金融支持作一点述评。 一、德国中小企业的发展现状 德国如同其他发达工业国家一样，对中小企业并无统一的概念和标准。根据“波恩中小企业研究所”（Ｉｎｓｔｉｔｕｔ ｆｕｒ Ｍｉｔｔｅｌｓｔａｎｄ－ｆｏｒｓｃｈｕｎｇ Ｂｏ…     

发展型金融——以韩日农村金融发展为核心的分析

二战后，日本、韩国相继实现经济起飞，与此同时韩日也实现了农业的高速发展。在韩日农业发展中，其农村金融体系功不可没。韩日两国的农村金融体系属于发展型金融，将政府、社会与市场相结合，在推动农村再组织化的同时充分运用金融资源，并且借助包括成立相关金融机构、提供借贷、建立农业保险制度、出台相关支持政策等金融手段，促进了其农村金融与农业的发展。韩日两国的农村金融体现了发展型国家的理念，是发展型金融的成功范例。     

新时代背景下地方政府智慧政务建设路径研究——以云南省为例

党的十九届四中全会为地方政府加强和创新社会治理、推进社会治理现代化、提高社会治理效能和水平提供了行动遵循。我国地方政府应从强化资源整合、设立协作平台、优化第三方合作等方面进行路径探索,推动我国地方政府在新时代背景下的智慧政务建设,营造发展新格局。     

桑戈尔的社会主义观:探索、实践与认知:从大非洲联邦构想的失败到塞内加尔国家治理经验

20世纪中期,随着第二次世界大战的结束和战后世界秩序的重塑,世界各国都经历着从经济到政治文化等社会全方位、多阶层的巨变,一些大国如美国、苏联等都逐步在世界范围内扩大自己在意识形态和地缘等方面的影响力,而一些发展中国家也逐渐开始推动本国民族独立、国家解放进程,其中一些受教育程度较高、民族意识较强且有一定社会影响力的社会领袖结合当时世界先进制度建设理论及个人、团体对社会的观察和思考在本国进行了一些社会制度及生产组织等方面的探索。这些探索有的颇有成效,时至今日仍被一些国家沿用,有的基于当时当地的生产水平和社会情况来看并不十分适用,但这些探索都极大丰富了社会发展理论研究,为后世各国制定政策、学者深入研究、社会各行各业了解国家导向提供了宝贵的经验教训。     

国家安全视角下的英国气候政策及其影响

目前,国际社会已经就气候变化及其对人类社会的影响基本达成共识,但很少有国家将气候变化问题提升到国家安全层面,更不用说采取实质性行动应对气候安全问题。英国在这方面走在了绝大多数国家前面,它不仅将气候变化问题纳入《国家安全战略》,而且还在实践中通过对外援助等方式,增强发展中国家特别是相对贫困的国家应对气候变化的能力。虽然其中不乏出于保障本国贸易和能源安全等方面的考虑,但不可否认,英国的行动和努力为推动国际社会重视气候变化与安全的关系问题发挥了重要作用。     

日本的政策性金融

政策性金融,一般是指政府的金融机构按照一定的政策意图所进行的金融活动。其本质是政府对金融市场的干预,或是对金融市场缺陷的补充。它是随着政府职能的转化,对经济干预的增长而产生和发生起来的。     

马来西亚的政治金融及其对金融改革的影响

本文分析了马来西亚政治金融的形成及其对本国金融发展与改革的影响     

2002年东亚经济的前景

2001年世界各地经济大多陷入或迈向衰退,东亚各地除中国、越南等外亦陷于深度的衰退与停滞之中.2002年下半年或晚些时候,随着美国经济逐步走向复苏,亚洲各地经济亦将逐步恢复与反弹.然而由于美国资讯科技投资过度,"后遗症"的化解尚需时日,使得东亚各地今后必须更多地依靠内部需求,自力自强,加强合作,步向经济稳定增长的轨道.     

2002年亚太地区形势讨论会在京举行

20 0 2年 1 2月 2 6日 ,中国社会科学院亚太研究所 2 0 0 2年亚太地区形势讨论会在北京举行。来自各研究机构及政府部门的 4 0余位专家学者参加了会议。与会的专家学者们对亚太地区政治经济形势进行了回顾与展望 ,并就一些地区的热点问题进行了深入的讨论。关于地区经济形势 ,学者们认为亚太地区的经济形势总体较好。尽管在亚太地区经济中占比重最大、影响面最广的美国经济持续波动 ,第二大经济体日本的经济处于停滞状态 ,但在高速发展的中国经济的带动下 ,亚太地区的经济复苏趋势仍较为明显。学者们认为 2 0 0 3年的国际形势虽存在一些不稳…     

美国的农村金融体制及借鉴意义

本文对美国农村金融体制进行考察,对其农村金融组织体系及配套的扶持政策进行评介,并通过与中国农村金融的比较,指出中国农村金融体制改革应积极发挥市场机制的导向作用,建立农村资金良性循环机制,同时政府应承担主导作用,建立多层次、全方位的农村金融体制。     

The Nakba in Palestinian Memory in Israel

Changes in the international, regional and domestic arenas in the late 1990s resulted in discursive change with regard to interpretation of the Al Nakba in the political and civil societies of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel. Apart from fuelling a discursive challenge to the Israeli dominant discourse about the 1948 events, this reinterpretation allowed the Palestinian Arab citizens to discuss the historical roots of the problems they experienced within the Israeli political and civil societal spheres. This article analyses the nature and significance of discursive change of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel on the Nakba by referring to its impact on their identity politics as well as their political and civil societal activities.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

近年越南的外商投资

受亚洲金融危机的影响,越南外商投资减少.由于越南政府调整了外资政策,外资出现回升势头,投资来源结构、投资产业结构也发生了变化.估计今明两年越南外商投资会继续增长.     

2002年东亚经济回顾

东亚经济在 2 0 0 2年保持了较快的增长。这主要归功于出口迅速增长 ,内需保持强劲 ,适度宽松的财政货币政策的刺激等因素。但是 ,东亚内部仍存在产业结构调整滞后、金融和公司部门的重建尚未完成、公共部门债务负担加重等问题 ,这些问题如不能很好解决 ,可能阻碍中长期经济增长。虽然面临着许多不确定的因素 ,各大机构对 2 0 0 3年的东亚经济增长仍然抱有较为乐观的预期。