Putting power into practice: Administrative and political capacity building in the European Parliament's Committee for International Trade

As the formal powers of the European Parliament have increased with successive treaty changes, its committees' administrations have seen a parallel growth. We argue that such administrative capacity is necessary but not sufficient for acting on formal treaty powers. Administrative capacity has to be combined with political capacity in order to muster policy impact in European Union decision‐making. By differentiating between intra‐institutional administrative and inter‐institutional political capacity, we offer a fine‐grained conceptualization of policy capacity while broadening the theoretical and empirical understanding of the European Parliament's administration as an organizational structure of formal and informal working practices, intra‐institutional coordination and inter‐institutional relations. Based on expert interviews, document analysis and participant observation, the case of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership illustrates how societal politicization of a specific policy issue triggered the European Parliament to exploit the latent potential of its post‐Lisbon administrative capacity by transforming it into a more readily deployable political capacity.     

The dilemmas of market socialism: Capital market reform in China ‐ part II: Shares

This two‐part article analyses the attempts to reform the socialist financial system in China by diversifying financial assets and introducing capital markets. The approach used is that of political economy, in the sense of elucidating the interplay between political and economic interests, actors and issues in the reform process.

Part I discusses the issue of bonds by governments and enterprises. Although the reform era has seen gradual progress towards something resembling a bond ‘market’ in terms of a diversification of bond types and growing competition between bond issues, there is no evidence that this has improved allocative efficiency in the economy. Rather, bonds have functioned as one instrument in a complex struggle for resources between political, institutional and economic actors in the context of a continuing ‘shortage economy’. This competitive system falls far short of a true ‘market'; rather it embodies powerful systemic factors reflecting the basic structural and institutional features of a semi‐reformed socialist economy.

One of these systemic factors is the institution of social ownership of the means of production which has been called into question by the emergence of shares and share markets, a process we discuss in Part II. Share issues have in the event been economically unimportant but politically important since they challenge the ideological and institutional underpinnings of a ‘socialist’ economy. The key to the future of this form of financial liberalisation depends not merely on further progress in complementary areas of economic reform policy, but also on a resolution of these fundamental political issues.     

DEVON COUNTY COUNCIL: A CASE STUDY OF A HUNG COUNCIL

Discussions on coalition politics have tended to see the phenomenon as a feature of European national systems offering a contrast to the British tradition of (largely) single-party government. However, the 1980s saw the rise of English local governments where highly politicized party groups were forced to compromise their political programmes in order to attain a share of power; between 1985–89, half of the English county councils were hung. This situation has particular significance in Devon, where four distinct political groups were negotiating for control. This study analyses the process of administrative formation, maintenance and breakdown in Devon, using the insights of the actors involved. While icy closeness is a crucial factor in the formation of administrations, the initial distribution of office portfolios plays a critical role in the later demise of the co-operation between the Alliance and Labour. The study also highlights the importance of considerations such as past history, personal relations, institutional structures, and even geography to the formation and maintenance of political agreements. Devon's experience of hungness is interpreted using a 'multi-method' approach, with reference to both studies of hung councils and developments in coalition theory.     

Merging county administrations – cross-national evidence of fiscal and political effects

ABSTRACT

While many central governments amalgamate municipalities, mergers of larger county administrations are rare and hardly explored. In this article, we assess both fiscal and political effects of county mergers in two different institutional settings: counties act autonomously as upper-level local governments (Germany), or counties being decentralised branches of the state government (Austria). We apply difference-in-differences estimations to county merger reforms in each country. In both cases, some counties were amalgamated while others remain untouched. Austrian counties (Bezirke) and German counties (Landkreise) widely differ in terms of autonomy and institutions, but our results are strikingly similar. In both cases, we neither find evidence for cost savings nor for staff reductions. Instead, voter turnout consistently decreases in merged counties, and right-wing populists seem to gain additional support. We conclude that political costs clearly outweigh fiscal null benefits of county merger reforms – independent of the underlying institutional setting.     

EXPLAINING DECISION‐MAKING IN GOVERNMENT: THE NEO‐DURKHEIMIAN INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In understanding styles of political judgement in government decision‐making, explanatory limitations of rational choice, prospect theoretic, historical institutional, groupthink, and other approaches suggest that there is space for developing other frameworks. This article argues that the neo‐Durkheimian institutional theoretical framework deserves serious consideration. It shows that it offers a powerful causally explanatory framework for generating theories of decision‐making in government which can be examined using historical comparative research designs. The value of the concept of a ‘thought style’ for understanding political judgement is demonstrated, and contrasted sharply with ideology. The theory argues that informal institutions explain thought styles. Well‐known cases from the Cuban missile crisis, and the Wilson and Heath governments illustrate the argument. The article rebuts criticisms offered of the neo‐Durkheimian institutional framework in the literature. Finally, it identifies recent developments and innovations in the approach that make it especially suited to explaining political judgement in government decision‐making.     

A Tale of Two Cities: Bureaucratisation in Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Municipalities

This paper presents a theory that predicts under what circumstances self-interested politicians ‘bureaucratise’ their administrations, in the sense that they delegate the powers to hire, fire and promote public employees to autonomous bodies (like civil service commissions). The main testable proposition is that, in polities with a higher concentration of powers, politicians will bureaucratise their administrations to overcome time inconsistency problems in their relationships with public employees. This prediction is tested with data drawn from US municipalities, where two main types of local governments co-exist: mayor-council and council-manager. Results show that municipal governments with a higher concentration of powers (i.e. mayor-council) tend to have more bureaucratised administrations.     

Multilevel governance and problem‐solving: Towards a dynamic theory of multilevel policy‐making?

In this article, we suggest that the governance of problems shapes the institutional dynamics of multilevel governance (MLG) polities. MLG arrangements—processes and institutions that enable policy‐making across different jurisdictional levels wherein both public authorities and non‐state actors are involved—can or cannot succeed in solving policy problems and at the same time they could create new problems. We argue that the problem‐solving capacity and problem‐generating potential of multilevel arrangements can result in further, downwards, upwards or sideways delegation of political authority, which in turn reconfigure the multilevel architecture of the political system following either centripetal or centrifugal tendencies. We illustrate our point with a stylized account of the dynamics of MLG in the European Union (EU) since the early 1990s. We conclude with some remarks about developing a more general theory of multilevel policy‐making.     

THE NATIONAL COORDINATION OF EU POLICY IN HUNGARY: PATTERNS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Although European Union (EU) membership generates similar functional pressures for national administrations, member states developed institutional arrangements that show marked cross‐country variation in the coordination of EU policy. This article examines and assesses the institutions and mechanisms established in Hungary for formulating policy positions on the domestic level. In line with the general features of central government, the system is highly centralized and hierarchical, and has been characterized by a comprehensive coordination ambition from its inception. The case confirms the primary importance of national institutional factors for shaping coordination systems, but also the relevance of more actor‐centered explanations for accounting for changes in the top decision‐making tier. At the same time, the Hungarian experience also draws attention to power relations within governing parties and prime ministerial involvement as important variables so far relatively neglected in the literature.     

Citizen Participation in German and Spanish Local Governments: A Comparative Study

In recent decades, citizens have become more and more disenchanted with the traditional institutions of representative government, detached from political parties, and disillusioned with old forms of civic engagement and participation. This has favored a renewed interest in citizen engagement and citizen participation and a growing re-emergence in academic and political discourse of ideas and values of community, localism, and citizen participation. This article analyzes the main objectives and the actual implementation of citizen participation initiatives in the local governments of two European Continental countries, Germany and Spain. The aim is to find out the factors that affect the possible decoupling between the objectives and the “real” uses of citizen participation. Our results show that most local governments in these two countries are using citizen participation only to increase the level of perceived legitimacy or to comply minimally with legal requirements, without really taking advantage of citizen participation to enhance decision-making processes. These findings confirm that institutional theory becomes the rationale to explain the implementation of citizen participation in these two European Continental countries.     

The parliamentary scrutiny of euro area national central banks

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) involves several core principles for the organization of participating national central banks (NCBs/CBs), including their independence from political institutions. Early studies show that the level of national parliamentary scrutiny over euro area NCBs varied (Lepper and Sterne 2002). In this context, our article examines the extent to which parliaments make use of four distinct control mechanisms to hold CBs accountable. We explain the very different levels of parliamentary scrutiny over NCBs in Germany, France and Belgium during the 2013–16 period. We find that the level of scrutiny depends principally on the presence of a longstanding tradition of CB independence—and specifically the manner in which independence has been politicized and interpreted by the political class. We argue that the strength of the parliament can also explain some variation.     

Social Capital and Institutional Trust: Evidence from Bolivia's Popular Participation Decentralisation Reforms

This article uses Bolivia's emblematic process of decentralisation (Popular Participation) to explore the elusive relationship between interpersonal and institutional trust, as central components of social capital. The evidence corroborates the notion that basic social interaction and more complex institutional settings are strongly co-related, such as the trust that individuals place in their governments and institutions. The data also shows that social capital has a direct effect on civic activism and political behaviour at the individual level. The notion of social capital is present throughout the analysis as this type of capital allows observing and measuring changes in social structures that affect more complex institutional arrangements.     

THE JOINT-DECISION TRAP: LESSONS FROM GERMAN FEDERALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Compared to early expectations, the process of European integration has resulted in a paradox: frustration without disintegration and resilience without progress. The article attempts to develop an institutional explanation for this paradox by exploring the similarities between joint decision making ('Politikverflechtung') in German federalism and decision making in the European Community. In both cases, it is argued, the fact that member governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that there is a de facto requirement of unanimous decisions, will systematically generate sub-optimal policy outcomes unless a 'problem-solving' (as opposed to a 'bargaining') style of decision making can be maintained. In fact, the 'bargaining' style has prevailed in both cases. The resulting pathologies of public policy have, however, not resulted either in successful strategies for the further Europeanization of policy responsibilities or in the disintegration of unsatisfactory joint-decision systems. This 'joint-decision trap' is explained by reference to the utility functions of member governments for whom present institutional arrangements, in spite of their sub-optimal policy output, seem to represent 'local optima' when compared to either greater centralization or disintegration.     

Forming government elites in a new democracy: The case of Poland

In this article we describe a study of the construction of governments in Poland by concentrating on the recruitment of individuals to government positions. (1) We therefore consider social, political, and institutional factors in the construction of the government's cabinets. (2) We examine the question of the path to the highest government positions—where did the people exercising power come from and what qualifications do they have? Finally, we discuss the results in the context of institutionalization of political life in Poland.     

DEVOLVED RESPONSIBILITY AND CENTRALIZATION: EFFECTS OF EEC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The European Community is still a community of nation states in the sense that the obligations created by Community legislation fall on the member states who then have to implement them.
A point much commented upon is that this involves a loss of sovereignty or power for national parliaments and governments. What is less frequently noticed is that it can also centralize into a national government's hands some powers that had previously been devolved to local and other authorities. Since the Community deals largely with national governments, what had previously been local functions have to become national government functions the moment they fall within a Community policy.
This process can be seen at work as a result of the Community's environmental policy. In Britain a variety of administrative agencies have exercised considerable discretion in handling pollution matters. Some functions are handled by district councils, some by county councils, some by specialized regional authorities, eg water authorities, and some by specialized national agencies, eg the Industrial Air Pollution Inspectorate. As a result of the Community's environmental policy, the central government now has greater powers. If the erosion of the tradition of devolved responsibility is not to be resented, it must be justified on the grounds that some larger purpose is being served.     

RESTRUCTURING WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY: COMPARING MANAGERIAL REFORMS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In much of the international public administration literature, New Public Management (NPM) already appears to be bogged down in a quagmire of critical revisions and assessments. Although some criticisms are well founded, there can be no doubt that NPM represents a trend which has considerably affected public‐sector decision‐making worldwide. This article takes the examples of the Southern European bureaucracies, where NPM‐inspired reforms were introduced later than in the English‐speaking world, but have nevertheless played a decisive role in the political agenda of both socialist and conservative governments. The paper presents the results of a comparative study of administrative reforms in five European countries as well as the USA during the 1980s and 1990s. The comparison is based on three specific dimensions (central bureaucracies’ formal structure; civil service organization; administrative processes), enabling us to systematically measure and compare the progress of the various countries subsequent to the cycle of managerial reforms.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.     

MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN EU REGULATORY POLICY

In this conceptual article, we explore mechanisms of conflict management in European Union (EU) regulatory policy‐making. We build on J.G. March's distinction between aggregation and transformation as the two strategic options to deal with inconsistent preferences or identities that are at the source of social conflict. While this distinction is helpful in mapping conflict management mechanisms, the rigid association of these two options with the rival paradigms of rationalism and constructivism respectively has led political scientists to neglect conflict management strategies that work at the edges of aggregation and transformation. We show the potential of these latter strategies as intelligent ‘in‐action’ hybrids that emerge from ground‐level policy‐making praxis of actors navigating a complex institutional and policy environment. Specifically, we discuss five strategies: issue‐based aggregation; arena‐based aggregation (arena‐shifting and arena‐creation); socialization; re‐framing; and proceduralization, their underlying mechanisms and related scope conditions. The theoretical implications of this discussion lead us towards ‘strategic constructivism’. In the conflict management mechanisms that are of most interest, norms and ideational structures matter, but they are related to strategic actors who draw on and orchestrate ‘ideas’ in pursuit of political goals.     

DISTINCTIVENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN GREECE,ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEXT,ADMINISTRATIONS AND REFORMS

This article, the final part of the symposium, concentrates on the common characteristics of Southern European states and administrations that can explain the distinctiveness of the reforms there. First, we briefly consider the theoretical aspect of the country papers, that is, historical institutionalism. We then briefly review some common features of contextual factors such as welfare state, economy and civic culture. This is followed by a discussion of some typical characteristics of Southern European administrations: legalism, politicization and clientelism. Finally, we discuss some common features of reform in Southern Europe. Reform in the region encompasses not only new public management; other reforms have also occurred. However, political polarization means these countries lack the stability necessary to implement and carry out reform effectively. In terms of improvement in quality, efficiency and client orientation of public service provision, the far‐reaching politicization of the civil service gives a distinctive twist to any such claims.     

Changes in the dimensions of political competition in Europe and their impact on citizens’ engagement via Facebook

ABSTRACT

This article focuses on a little-explored area of research, seeking to explain how political changes influence the participation of citizens in the social networks of local governments. In the context of the recent upsurge of anti-system movements and political parties in the European Union, we analyse a new set of data on participation via local governments’ Facebook pages during a turbulent period in European politics. The results obtained show that when a local government is affected by changes in political competition there is a greater degree of citizens’ engagement through social networks. Our analytical framework shows that this increased engagement is directly associated with the vulnerability of political parties, especially when the governing party loses its absolute majority and is constrained or prevented from carrying out political initiatives.     

Monetary policy in europe: towards a european central bank and one european currency

Most alternative blueprints for European Monetary Union (EMU) differ in their opinions about convergence requirements or the need for binding fiscal rules and controls of individual national governments' debt policies, but there is, if not complete consensus, widespread agreement that the European Central Bank (ECB) should be independent of political control from both European Community (EC) institutions and national governments. The main argument for an independent European central bank is empirical: those countries in which central banks are insulated from the political process and charged with maintaining price stability have experienced the lowest and most stable inflation rates in recent decades. The present paper reviews and critically evaluates this political economy literature which relates inflation performances to the constitutional features of central bank statutes. Based on this assessment the draft statutes of the ECB and the constitutions of the individual European national central banks are discussed in terms of the independence they grant central bank board members from partisan influences. Furthermore, concrete country-specific suggestions for enhancing central bank independence during stage two of the gradual transition to EMU, which is to be completed by 1999, are made. It is argued that in some countries laborious constitutional reforms of central bank statutes are overdue and must be implemented in order to make these institutions fit for an anti-inflationary EMU.