A Fair Return to Farmers

This address by the tobacco representative for S. Rhodesia wasgiven, under the Chairmanship of Mr. A. D. Dodds-Parker, M.P.,on the 27th July.     

ORGANIZATION AND NATIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION SERVICES

Existing literature on the internal functioning of the European Commission services indicates that officials'nationality does have an impact on their policy-making behaviour. Students of western national administrations on the other hand, have found the geographical and social backgrounds of officials to be highly insignificant. However, given the unresolved tension between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in the European Union, this seeming inconsistency may be understandable. In this article, an effort is made to specify some of the organizational and policy-related conditions under which nationality might be particularly important in order to understand decision behaviour. Interview data gathered from 38 Norwegian officials who had been seconded to the Commission are used to make an explorative appraisal of the assumptions put forth.     

ANTECEDENTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION: THE DIFFUSION OF NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT INTO DANISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The relation between leadership, the context in which it takes place and the adoption of organizational innovations associated with New Public Management (NPM) is explored in an empirical analysis of Danish local government. Two different strategies for conceptualizing NPM are contrasted: (1) treating NPM as one phenomenon; and (2) acknowledging important differences between organizational innovations associated with NPM. Management's preferences and perceptions of work relations, role in change processes, daily work priorities and rejection of traditional bureaucratic roles as well as the electorate's ability to formulate clear goals are found to be significantly related to the adoption of NPM innovations. Organizational size is found to be the most important contextual antecedent for the adoption of NPM innovations. Distinctions between marketization‐type NPM innovations and generic managerial‐type NPM innovations and the timing of their introduction are made, unveiling significant differences between the antecedents of different types of NPM innovations.     

WHY STRONG COORDINATION AT ONE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH STRONG COORDINATION ACROSS LEVELS (AND HOW TO LIVE WITH IT): THE CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union (EU) inherited ‘indirect administration’ from classical international organizations: policies adopted by the international organization are subsequently to be implemented nationally by member states themselves, and not by bodies owned by the international organization. This arrangement has often led to legislation being incorporated and applied rather differently across countries. In order to harmonize implementation practices within the EU, we have witnessed a development from ‘indirect administration’ to more ‘direct administration’ in the sense that national agencies work closely with the European Commission, EU agencies and sister agencies in other member states, partly bypassing national ministries. Thus, stronger coordination across levels may counteract strong coordination at the national level. This ‘coordination dilemma’ seems to have been largely ignored in the literatures on EU network governance and national ‘joined‐up government’, respectively. The ambition of this article is twofold: first, the coordination dilemma is theoretically and empirically illustrated by the seeming incompatibility between a more direct implementation structure in the multilevel EU administrative system and trends towards strengthening coordination and control within nation states. Second, the article discusses organizational arrangements that may enable systems to live with the coordination dilemma in practice.     

Political Leadership and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Effects of Agencification

Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards to the robustness of these findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials' rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables all have an independent effect on officials' attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time, spanning two decades and shifting administrative doctrines.     

Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice: The Case of Administrative Policy

The discipline of public administration could play a more constructive role in the field of administrative policy if the gap between empirical-theoretical research and the professional role of political scientists in governments were bridged. This article outlines an instrumental or "action-oriented" model which provides a theoretical framework through which to focus on formal organizational, demographic and physical structures of institutions as the possible instruments, or "steering factors" in organizational design. The model emphasizes empirical observations of the relationships between the instrumental indendent) variables and actual decision behavior (dependent variables). The author draws on studies conducted in the central governments of several countries.     

NATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE SPACE: GOVERNMENT DRIVEN,COMMISSION DRIVEN OR NETWORKED?

In terms of national agencies in the European administrative space, case studies indicate that national governments may be partly split so that national (regulatory) agencies operate in a ‘double‐hatted’ manner when practising EU legislation, serving both ministerial departments and the European Commission. Applying large‐N questionnaire data, this article follows up these studies by investigating how important various institutions are with respect to influencing national agencies when they are practising EU legislation. How discretion is exercised at this stage of the policy process is not trivial; we demonstrate that, in addition, this activity is highly contested. Our main conclusion is that implementation of EU policies at the national level is neither solely indirect via national governments (as the standard portrayal says), nor solely direct (through Commission‐driven national agencies), nor solely networked (through transnational agency clusters). Implementation is instead compound with several sources of power represented more or less simultaneously.