试论基础四国在后哥本哈根气候谈判中的立场和作用

基础四国是由中国、印度、巴西和南非四个主要发展中国家组成的气候谈判集团,鉴于其成员在发展中国家和世界上的影响力,该集团在国际气候谈判中备受关注。在构建2012年后国际气候机制的谈判中,基础四国的立场表现出了很高的协调性,但也存在一定的差异。总体而言,基础四国的出现和协调行动推动了国际气候谈判在公约框架下展开,有利于后京都气候安排的达成,但也可能促使国际气候谈判集团,特别是G77加中国的分化和重新组合。基础四国气候谈判集团出现时间尚短,其最终能够在构建后京都气候机制中发挥何种作用将取决于基础四国在应对气候变化中如何对待联合国渠道与其他渠道的关系、敦促发达国家减排的决心和能力以及是否能够保持G77加中国内部的团结性等。     

South Africa’s Inclusion in BRICS: Challenges and Prospects for Development in Africa

Abstract

The forming of alliances on the international scene has reflected a provisional arrangement in the world economy. Amongst such alliances was the formation of BRICS by the five world economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa into what is commonly known as BRICS. BRICS is considered a joint initiative, aimed at shifting conventional norms in international economic and political cooperation to create a new trans-continental platform for these actors. Each member country in BRICS has, in one way or another, reflected growth either through its economy foreign policy, and developmental pursuit. However, South Africa is portrayed by some researchers as lagging behind, when compared to the other member countries. Hence, this study sought to analyse the potential mediumand long-term implications of South Africa's inclusion in BRICS. The study also aimed to underscore the benefits and risks associated with South Africa's membership in the alliance in the area of development; specifically poverty reduction, foreign policy, trade, and global partnership. The researchers collected secondary data to analytically critique the inclusion of South Africa in the BRICS alliance, its benefits, and shortcomings for development in South Africa, and in Africa as a whole. We argue that as a global player under BRICS, South Africa has opened a new vista of opportunities, including transnational gateways to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with the attendant inflow of infrastructural and developmental investments, enriching educational exchanges and technology transfers. The article concludes by stressing the need for South Africa and other African countries to formulate policies that will drive meaningful development in their respective countries. The authors recommend that African leaders should come up with innate policies that are Africa-centred, that would incite development internally.     

Foreign policy without the policy? South Africa and activism on sexual orientation at the United Nations

Although South Africa led the UN to adopt its first resolution on sexual orientation in 2011, in recent years, South Africa has made various sharp foreign policy reversals on issues related to sexual orientation and human rights. This article discusses five such policymaking episodes over the period 2010–2016 and considers the wider implications of South Africa's flip-flopping. For one, South Africa's recent behaviour on international sexual orientation issues suggests that the foreign policymaking environment in South Africa is weak, unstructured and porous. Moreover, the sexual orientation issue exposes the limited scope South Africa has to act as a representative of Africa, as a leader in the developing world and as a bridge-building middle power.     

South Africa’s multiple faces in current climate clubs

Climate clubs emerged as a concept to revitalise the international climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and mitigate the free-riding problem. The underlying idea suggests that countries committed to reducing emissions can advance a stable coalition in the form of a club with other countries. As a result, more countries would put forth targets for more ambitious emissions reductions. This article analyses South Africa’s memberships in current climate related clubs. We contextualise South African climate club governance in its wider geopolitical and national context of low-carbon development. The purpose of the analysis is to identify if and how South Africa can possibly contribute to advancing ambition for change within climate clubs. Furthermore, it advances ideas about possible design options for climate clubs that may appeal to developing countries.     

TRIPS and the Primacy of Public Health

The 1984 Uruguay round of trade negotiations was criticized by many as discriminating against developing countries. On the issue of intellectual property, the contentious issue was that of the patent protection given to the drugs manufacturers, mostly based in developed countries. In this article, Shinzo Kobori, distinguished research fellow at the Institute for International Policy Studies, explores the issues surrounding the dilemma: the drugs need to be provided for many people in the developing world but, on the other hand, adequate compensation needs to be given to pharmaceutical companies producing the medicine. Focusing on pharmaceutical patents of anti-AIDS/HIV drugs, he examines the barriers to access to essential drugs in developing countries. Kobori goes on to scrutinize the various policy options including compulsory licensing and parallel imports, and describes the potential hurdles facing global drug companies in light of the challenges from Brazil, South Africa and the US.     

Jihad: a South African perspective

The India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) established in 2003 brings together three like-minded, democratic, market economies of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character, sharing a broadly similar economic, political and development situation. At the time of its formation IBSA was widely regarded as representing a novel form of South-South cooperation, transcending older models rooted in the logic of North-South confrontation in the post-colonial, Cold War world. However, now, as the respective countries prepare for their tenth anniversary summit in India, the forum seems to face a growing sense of irrelevance, perhaps even an existential crisis. There has been a proliferation of other forums—notably BRICS and the G20—which means that IBSA needs to differentiate itself if it is to endure. This paper suggests a common vision for IBSA, based on the concept of international liberalism, implying an open international market, well-regulated capital markets and tailored domestic policies such as social policy, health policy and education policy, may well increase the weight IBSA can gain in different international forums.     

Leveraging South–South cooperation for Africa's development

Optimising the development opportunities presented by emerging powers' growing interest in trade, investment and diplomatic engagement in Africa seems a priority for the continent in the context of a changing global system in which power is more diffuse. Taking into account a reconceptualisation of aid effectiveness as development effectiveness, this paper focuses on the manner in which African states understand and approach new opportunities for cooperation with emerging powers, especially China, India and Brazil, including the crucial issue of whether they seek joint development initiatives with both traditional partners and emerging powers. The central argument is that South–South cooperation, which is value-neutral although rhetorically reflecting the principles of solidarity and mutual benefit, must be part of an effective strategy to draw emerging economies into the national or regional development objectives of African states and the continent at large.     

Building bridges? South African foreign policy and trilateral development cooperation

As questions concerning international development climb the international agenda, so countries find themselves drawn into a burgeoning number of negotiations on issues ranging from the future shape and direction of the post-2015 development agenda to ‘aid effectiveness’ and international development cooperation. Moving from the position of a ‘beneficiary’ state in the traditional donor–recipient aid hierarchy, South Africa is looking to define its own niche within the wider development diplomacy context as a development partner. This paper provides an assessment of South Africa's evolving approach towards international development cooperation, with a particular focus on trilateral development cooperation, and what this means for Pretoria's foreign policy in bridging the divide between developed and developing country positions within the international development regime.     

Africa–India nuclear cooperation: Pragmatism,principle, post-colonialism and the Pelindaba Treaty

The United States–India nuclear agreement, announced in 2005, was a first step in the process to normalise India's international nuclear relations despite the fact that India is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Africa is largely seen as a uranium supplier rather than nuclear power producer in the world nuclear order. The position that African states take towards Africa–India nuclear cooperation, uranium supply to India in particular, is informed by two seemingly contrasting factors, namely economic and political pragmatism on the one hand, and non-proliferation imperatives and norms on the other. The African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, also referred to as the Pelindaba Treaty, prohibits uranium and nuclear-related exports to states without comprehensive safeguards of their nuclear facilities, but the case of India is still open for interpretation. Africa and India's shared post-colonial consciousness, manifesting in their historical ties, membership of the Non-Aligned Movement and South–South cooperation, is often regarded as another factor facilitating Africa–India nuclear relations. A more critical view points to the different notions of post-coloniality in Africa and India, resulting in different approaches to nuclear non-proliferation that constrain their nuclear relations.     

Coercive Diplomacy: Israel,Transjordan and the UN—a Triangular Drama Revisited

The Arab states suffered humiliating defeats at the hands of Israel during the first Arab–Israeli war. Immediately following the war, Israel made brilliant and shrewd use of diplomacy to achieve its goals at the negotiating table, much as it had previously used armed force. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab negotiation team, preferring to isolate the states, picking them off one after the other. The Israeli–Transjordanian talks differed radically from the other armistice negotiations. Here, two parallel tracks were followed. At Rhodes, the two countries negotiated openly under UN auspices, while in Jerusalem and at King Abdullah's palace in Transjordan, representatives of the two countries held secret bilateral talks. Israel masterfully used the context of these talks to maximise its gains, using military operations to create ‘facts on the ground’, combined with direct coercion in the shape of blackmail, while taking full advantage of international power structures and abusing the trust that King Abdullah had placed in personal relations. The UN Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche, was aware of the secret back channel, where the clearest cases of coercion took place. Physically and mentally exhausted by the protracted negotiations, he allowed the secret talks to progress despite his dislike of the outcome. The British government, at the time the protector of Transjordan, was unable to assist its client for fear of falling out with the USA, while the US government, in many ways the protector of Israel, maintained an equally ‘hands off’ stance because the talks concerned only an armistice, not a peace treaty. Already at this early stage in their relations, the power asymmetry between Israel and the Arab states was the main reason the parties could not arrive at a peaceful, sustainable solution. This article reinvestigates this diplomacy by using a combination of US, Israeli, British and UN archives, as well as the almost untouched Ralph Bunche diary.     

The China–South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty: National rule of law versus international rule of law

This article analyses the primary provisions of the China–South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and illustrates that this BIT differs in many ways from South Africa’s BITs with Western countries. Given current shifts in international investment policy and law in both South Africa and China, this article suggests that it is necessary to carefully consider the future of the China–South Africa BIT, ultimately arguing that South Africa should adopt differential policies towards the China–South Africa BIT by maintaining or updating the existing BIT between these two nations. An updated BIT could act as a model for future South–South BITs and should integrate new elements which are in line with the development of international investment law, maintain a balanced interest between the host state and foreign investors, and conform to the fundamental realities of the partner countries.     

“No Colonial Baggage”: Imagining a Decolonised Australia-Africa Relations

As part of its strategy to win African votes for election to the UN Security Council (2008–12), Canberra sought to leverage its soft power potential by presenting Australia as having “no colonial baggage” in Africa while framing Australia as “a country from the Global North, located in the Global South,” and one that would “work with other small and middle powers.” Ultimately, the campaign was successful, including up to 50 of Africa's 54 countries voting for Australia. This paper considers this framing in the context of a shared but differentiated colonial history, including its contradictions, given that Australians fought several wars on African soil on behalf of the British Empire, supported white minority regimes and anti-communist movements on the continent, and maintained the white Australia policy until the 1970s. The paper deploys decoloniality theory to engage Australia's lack of a neat fit within a historicised articulation of a “coloniser-colonised” relationship between Europe and Africa. We show that, despite this lack of fit, Australia's relations with the countries of Africa reinforce long-standing of patterns of knowledge, power, and being associated with colonialism. Accordingly, the paper makes three recommendations for cooperation and innovative thinking in foreign policy and diaspora diplomacy between Africa and a more independent and multicultural Australia based on the “equality of being.”     

Documents

South Africa's contemporary foreign policy cannot be understood outside an explanation of its post-apartheid political transition. Its actors, the ideas they express, the interests they represent and the institutions they craft are all crucially influenced and impacted upon by the democratic transition and how it has evolved. This democratic transition is defined by two foundational characteristics. First, as one of the last of the ‘anti-colonial’ transitions led by an African nationalist leadership, it is driven with a focus on achieving racial equality in both the domestic and global context. Second, the transition has occurred when a particular configuration of power prevailed in the global order that not only established the parameters which governed its evolution, but also determined which interests prevailed within it. The former's imprint on the foreign policy agenda is manifested in South Africa's prioritisation of Africa, its almost messianic zeal to modernise the continent through a focus on political stability and economic growth, and its desire to reform the global order so as to create an enabling environment for African development. It is also reflected in South Africa's insistence not to be seen to be dictated to by the West, especially in the fashioning of its economic policies and its approach to addressing the Zimbabwean question. The latter manifests itself not only in how corporate interests take centre stage in South Africa's foreign policy interactions, but also in how transnational alliances like India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) are being fashioned to challenge big powers and their interests in global forums and in the international system. These thematic concerns are the subject of investigation in this paper.     

Diplomatic Objectives in Trade Politics: The Development of the China-Japan-Korea FTA

This article seeks to analyze the development of free trade agreement (FTA) policies adopted by China, Japan, and South Korea with particular interests in the trilateral FTA. It seeks to address what the determinant factors that have conditioned the development of the trilateral FTA are. While the three governments began the informal joint study of the trilateral FTA in 2003, they pursued diverse trade strategies that disturbed a shift to formal negotiations. However, China's strategy to hedge against the US influence in East Asia became a catalyst in shifting from the long-lasting study stage to the launching of negotiations. Moreover, Japan's strategy to participate in TPP negotiations as a soft balancing against China through closer political linkages with the United States weakened China's and South Korea's willingness to engage in the trilateral FTA positively. Thus, the three countries’ commitments to the trilateral FTA were primarily confined by their specific diplomatic objectives responding to the political-economic evolutions in the Asia-Pacific region.     

Social challenges and progress in IBSA

The India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum was launched in June 2003 to push for these countries' bids for a place on the United Nation' Security Council, but IBSA's attention has shifted over time towards development and economic reform. This article discusses the progress in addressing social development challenges within the member countries of IBSA. It examines the social achievements of IBSA members, in the context of their economic performance and the Millennium Development Goals. It also assesses the forces which propel these societies' social policies, especially the influence of civil society, and whether there has been benefit in this regard in their collaboration within the IBSA forum. Their experiences show the critical importance of civil society in design and execution of programmes directed towards the poor, an important factor to be kept in mind by multilateral and bilateral agencies involved in poverty alleviation projects in developing countries. The three nations could cooperate to share ideas for effective social welfare programmes, and join together in multilateral forums to form a powerful voice for change.     

From Bandung to Brasilia: IBSA and the political lineage of South–South cooperation

This article aims to trace South–South cooperation political lineages connecting the Non-Aligned Movement and the IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Forum. In order to determine whether IBSA could be considered the ‘heir’ to Bandung's principles, we analyse the concepts of ‘Third World’ and ‘Global South’ as well as their current applicability, the interpretations provided by existing literature on the IBSA grouping, and its member countries' shared views on different issues of the international agenda. The article also considers the historical evolution of ‘Southern’ diplomatic thought and actions. IBSA's actions and history, as well as its members, are studied to grasp how they are related to the Third World movement in the Cold War.     

Peacekeeping in Africa: A global strategy

Since its first contribution to a UN peacekeeping force in Africa in 1960, India has been one of the biggest contributing countries to peacekeeping missions on the continent. Sushant K Singh traces the evolution of India's engagement with Africa at this level and highlights the issues raised, particularly with regard to the country's standing in the international community.     

IBSA's trilateral constellation and its development fund: Valuable pioneers in development cooperation?

With a changing geopolitical landscape following the Northern-induced global financial meltdown, stagnation on global governance reform and failure to reach agreement on issues ranging from trade (Doha Development Round) to climate change (United Nations Convention on Climate Change), the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum finds itself at the proverbial crossroads. At this point, with no summit having taken place since 2011, the future of IBSA is uncertain in part because the three IBSA partners have allowed ambivalence and lack of leadership to hold sway. Yet the current fluidity in the international environment has ironically meant that IBSA is more relevant and needed than ever before. IBSA is well placed to play a vital role in arresting the current trajectory of the global governance architecture, particularly when it comes to concerns of development. As this article argues, it is in the area of development cooperation that IBSA has found its niche in demonstrating the possibilities that development diplomacy and South–South cooperation avail, while challenging traditional norm conceptions when it comes to the future of international development financial institutions. Yet the question remains as to how this will be used going forward, as there is little strategic discussion between the trilateral partners on the future of development diplomacy and the IBSA Fund.     

One global deal from Paris 2015: Convergence and contestations on the future climate mitigation agenda

This article analyses the 2015 Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, with a focus on mitigation. The history of climate negotiations and the mitigation agenda shows the divide between developed and developing countries, with the latter insisting that the former, having caused the problem, need to do more to reduce carbon emissions to address climate change. However, as some emerging economies had continued to emit more carbon, there were calls to treat these as developed countries, requiring increased mitigation measures. The article examines the record of these emerging economies, and establishes that there was some convergence in Paris, a positive element that resulted in a single global climate treaty. However, the Paris negotiations also witnessed contestations, with the final agreement insufficient to keep global warming within advised limits, and in any case only partly legally binding, leaving its implementation success to good will.     

Asian Tiger Enters the Land of Diversity: Cultural Adaptations for South Korean Businesses in India

‘Come, Make in India’, India’s Prime Minister has invited global firms to invest and manufacture in India and also to promote exports. As with this campaign, India has given a scope of promising growth to the companies which is also been seen to solve India’s multiple economic problems. Many countries have shown their interest to invest in India and one of them is South Korea. Now the question arises whether companies from South Korea in this competitive environment can mark their presence in India—a nation of cultural diversity, which can affect the initial start-ups, if ignored. Apart from the historical cultural ties, there are cross-cultural differences between South Korea and India. So, this paper aims to build up a study that brings together the parity and cross-cultural differences between South Korea and India. The paper opens with the discussion about the various historical, cultural and poetic relations to describe the scenario between the two countries, whereas for the analysis, a macro-meso-micro framework has been used to answer the research question. The three-level analysis helps this paper to see the overlooked influence of culture from a broader perspective. The results of the study reveal a list of cultural adaptations suited for South Korean start-ups to run businesses in India by avoiding the cultural threats and contribute to the existing literature. The study findings could be used by companies, marketers and practitioners to devise and re-vamp their strategies in India, and it will also serve as a cultural guide for them.