台商投资大陆之新格局

世纪之交,台商掀起了第三波投资大陆的热潮,海峡两岸经济合作与经贸关系进入一个新的发展阶段。随着大陆经济发展与开发重心的转变,台商投资大陆的格局也出现新的变化,呈现出以下几种趋势: 首先,投资主体由中小企业主导发展为大企业主导。台商投资大陆初期主要限于隐蔽和零星的中小     

台商投资大陆状况调查

台商对大陆的投资,早期皆以外销为主,因此投资地点都以开放较早、交通便利的沿海地区,如福建和广东。随着大陆对外开放幅度与范围不断扩大,经济发展重心逐渐北移,台商在大陆投资地域分布趋势也逐渐扩散至华东及华中地区,尤其以     

长三角台商投资新动向

大陆是台商投资最多的地方。2003年台商在大陆投资的金额占台商在台湾以外投资的50％以上,2004年更已提高到60％,而且这一比例还将增长。2004年1-6月,在长江三角洲地区投资的台商企业占投资大陆总数的近70％。台商在大陆及长三角地区投资总额的增长,说明台商投资热仍在升温,并出现新的特点。     

台湾企管专家王义信先生谈:台商投资大陆连锁经营策略(上)

近年来,随着到大陆投资台商人数的增多,投资领域的扩大,台商所面临的这样那样的困扰与疑惑也有所增加。为了更好地为投资大陆的台商服务,本刊从这一期开始,特辟“台商咨询台”专栏,就台商普遍关心关注的一些问题延请海峡两岸有关专家予以解答。这也是部分台商对本刊的期待。本期首先请台湾辅导专家协会常务理事、信泰企管顾问股份有限公司总经理王义信先生分析台商投资大陆连锁经营的策略。这是他本人的研究心得,限于篇幅,分两期刊出。欢迎读者提出新的问题,我们将尽力满足读者的要求。     

为台商提供融资贷款的意义

继开发银行300亿元人民币的台商专案贷款之后,华夏银行承诺未来5年将提供给台商人民币200亿元的融资额度,并承诺不需担保品。我们可以从这一现象得出两点推论:一是大陆方面极其重视台商在大陆的投资经营活动,千方百计地为台商解决包括融资在内的问题和困难;二是台商投资大陆模式中“大陆出资”成分日益加重,台商投资大陆的模式越来越多地向“台商搞管理、大陆搞配套”方向发展。大陆方面真心实意为台商办事、解台商燃眉之急截至2006年5月,大陆累计批准的台商投资项目已达69900个,这些投资项目普遍需要金融支持,对此大陆一直十分重视。目前,…     

台商投资与两岸贸易互动效应的实证分析

台商对大陆投资与两岸贸易之间存在密切的互动与互补关系,台商投资对两岸贸易的驱动效应是不平衡的,对大陆是逆差效应,明显大于两岸贸易对台商投资的诱发效应,在两岸贸易中,对台出口较自台进口,具有更显著的台商投资倾向。由台商投资驱动的两岸贸易,以及由两岸贸易诱发的台商投资,所共同形成的两岸经贸关系新局面、新格局,符合两岸同胞的根本利益,反映了两岸经济融合的强劲趋势。     

“总量管制”是“戒急用忍”的翻版

前些日子，台湾有关方面提出要对赴大陆投资的台商课征“国家安全税”，立即遭到广大台商的强烈反对，认为这种做法不但抹杀了台商的贡献，也侮辱了台商的尊严。台湾各界人士都纷纷提出质疑和强烈抗议。这个风波刚刚过去，最近台湾“经建会”和“经济部”又宣布将采取“总量管制”来规范大陆投资，规定台商赴大陆投资不能超过岛内生产毛额（即 GDP） 2％；还规定台商赴大陆投资应是其全球布局的一部分，如果台商仅是“外移大陆”，并非进行全球化布局，“政府”就不准其赴大陆投资。这是继李登辉 1996年 8月提出“戒急用忍”之后，又一次…     

交流·感恩·发展——首届上海“台商庙会”见闻

台商也有庙会71这可是前所未闻的新鲜事。沿袭中国千年的传统，每年大陆各地的各种庙会可谓多矣。可由台商与政府部门共同主办“台商庙会”，这不要说在上海，就是在整个大陆也称得上是第一回。中秋前夕．被称为首届“台商庙会”的“2006台商产品展览会暨投资资源交流会”在上海汽车会展中心举行。     

台商大陆投资趋势开始发生重要变化——2007年两岸经济交流与合作回顾

在大陆经济大环境迅速变化以及相继出台一系列关于加工贸易、税收、劳动等涉外经贸政策的情况下，大陆台资企业与台商对大陆投资格局出现新的变化。逐步进入新一轮的调整与重新洗牌，台商大陆投资趋势正在发生前所未有的重大变化。     

台商在大陆投资新趋势

广东省是台商在大陆较早、也是最集中的投资地区之一;台商在广东省投资动向的变化在相当程度上反映出台商在大陆的总体发展趋势.台商在广东省投资状况台商在广东省投资情况同以前相比,出现一些新的发展动向.主要表现在:(一)劳力密集型与“三来一补”形式的投资趋于减少.早期,台商看重广东毗邻港澳、方便出口的优势,形成台商投资中以“三来一补”形式居多,深圳、东莞一带尤为突出,这是其他任何省份不可相比的.但自1994年开始,该类投资趋于减少.上半年,全省台商“三来一补”形式投资项目160家,较上年同期的246家下降了35%;协议金额1.43亿美元,较上年同期下降25.5%.原来“三来一     

台湾制造业投资大陆的产业集群分析

台商大陆投资呈现明显的集群特征。本文从分析产业集群的相关理论入手,运用地理集中度的衡量指标,以台湾制造业为例,对台商不同产业在大陆投资的空间集聚进行计量,然后根据相关理论对大陆台商形成产业集群的原因进行剖析。指出台商在大陆的集聚既受大陆政策的影响,又受大陆经济的影响;同时地区的市场需求条件、知识资源及基础设施、人文区域环境、产业关联效应等都是吸引台商集聚的重要因素。     

论台湾居民信用卡“恶意透支”犯罪之防控

近年来,台湾居民恶意透支我国大陆信用卡后逃回台湾的案件呈日趋增多的势头,然而由于两岸刑事法律规范对此行为规定存在差异,台湾地区并未将此类行为界定为犯罪,由此给大陆司法机关办理此类案件造成极大困扰。因此,只有建构台湾籍大陆银行信用卡持有人实施“恶意透支”信用卡的防控机制,才能有效遏制这一犯罪行为。     

西部开发中台资缺位的成因分析——基于扩展的跨国公司区位选择理论

台资在大陆的区域布局虽与祖国大陆的区域发展战略指向保持了一定的正相关性,但台资对西部开发战略的反应相对较为缓慢。西部开发战略实施前,台商投资以加工出口型为主,空间与心理因素是台商东部投资的决定性因素;2000年以来,台商投资逐渐转向市场占领型和技术密集型,台资西部缺位的主要因素在于西部相比于东部的经济阶段差、产业集聚差、基础设施差、市场化制度差。随着西部综合区位优势的增强,台资在西部阶段性缺位后呈现的将是较长时期的大规模投资浪潮,主要投资领域将是先期投资东部的劳动密集型制造业以及可与西部特定区域、资源对接的高技术产业。     

大陆台商投资地区的空间关联性与影响因素分析

本文利用空M分析方法对台商投资大陆的53个台商超过百家的城市和31个省市自治区进行空间测度表明,台商大陆投资区域具有显著的空间聚集特征。其原凶主要是市场容量、劳动力成本、基础设施和沿海内陆差异等因素所致,台商投资在FDI中有其独特之处。我们认为保持区域经济的持续增长是吸引台商投资大陆的关键;通过政策促进人力资本的积累、引导大陆台资企业转型升级,是消减劳动力工资上升对台商大陆投资负面影响的有效手段;不断完善基础设施建设是改善投资环境、吸引台资的重要途径;拓宽经济区的空间范围,有利于发挥台商投资的空间聚集效应,从而最大限度地吸引台商投资。     

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.     

The Democratic Concepts Held by Local Elites on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait: The perception of political participation,economic equality,and conflict reconciliation

The research results given here show that Taiwanese local elites, in terms of breadth of political participation, support the common people's right of participation more than those in Mainland China. In terms of depth, local elites on neither side support having people with special family backgrounds as leaders, but the Taiwanese do not narrowly define the qualifications of leaders or managers, requiring, for example, a certain degree of capability. Mainland Chinese local elites are more conservative in this respect. On the issue of economic equality, the concept of establishing a limit on income varies greatly on the two sides. The percentage of those in favor of such a limit is lower in Taiwan, yet the Taiwanese endorse more the idea of taking care of the poor and correcting unequal income distribution. The overall perspective on conflict resolution is quite the same for both sides' local elites. That is, they all strive to maintain harmony and avoid conflict, even at a price of sacrificing plans for local development. The most probable factor behind these trends is the great difference between the two sides' politico-economic systems, the process of their development and the status quo. Thus, there are differences between the two sides, either on certain perspectives on the three dimensions of the concept of democracy, or on other possible factors, which affect these perspectives. Elites on both sides are especially similar in their efforts to avoid conflict and their tendency to respect experts, showing the effect of a relatively homogeneous culture as we compare such attitudes internationally, but such cultural tastes might hinder future democratization on both sides. Other possible inferences, including the prospects for the development of democracy on both sides, will be dealt with briefly in this paper.     

Involuntary Migrants,Political Revolutionaries and Economic Energisers: a history of the image of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia

Along the contemporary migration history of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, three distinctive images have been constructed through the interaction between the overseas Chinese and Mainland China. First, the image of involuntary migrant, formulated by their migration activity and the continuous remittance they sent back to their hometowns, closely linked to the political and social-economic disturbances in the early years of the twentieth century. Second, the image of the overseas Chinese as political revolutionary was heavily politicised by the revolutionary policies of Mainland China in the 1950s and 1960s. Third, through the operational means of foreign direct investment, the overseas Chinese image of economic energiser was re-focused and mirror-imaged with the imperative of the economic reform of Mainland China in the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, the images of involuntary migrant, political revolutionary and economic energiser of the Southeast Asian overseas Chinese describe their situational status. On the other hand, these images also reflect the contemporary historical development of Mainland China.     

两岸农业贸易和投资协作之研究

过去较长时期台湾岛内民心或政治取向与经贸走向“相悖”。“相悖”是现象,“相符”是实质:由于不能依据市场规律、农业产品和要素比较优势差异建立实现双赢的合作机制,台湾中南部农民从与大陆经贸往来中受益不多。鉴于此,大陆应加强两岸农业贸易和投资协作,让利于台湾小农,扭转岛内关于“大陆农产品是造成台湾农业困境根本因素”的错误认识,彻底打破政经相悖的格局。本文提出:在尊重市场规律和借鉴现代发达经济扶持农业惯例的前提下,放开台湾优势农产品进入大陆市场;创造条件帮助台湾小农西进大陆创业,用其农业要素上的比较优势来抵消产品上的比较劣势。     

大陆经济转型与台商投资演变趋势——以昆山市为例

本文基于对大陆经济发展转型的内涵及空间格局的理论分析,结合对大陆台资企业的总体特点及昆山个案分析,讨论和分析大陆台资企业面临的问题及因应策略,从而力图揭示大陆台资企业的发展演变趋势。     

Emergence of the Greater China Circle Economies: Cooperation versus competition

The integration of the so-called greater China economies among Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is one part of the global trend of regionalism. The significance of integration in terms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment demonstrates not only rapid growth but also diversity, ever since Mainland China pursued her open door policy of economic reform in 1979. For instance, the combined volume of Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for as much as 74.1% of Mainland China's capital utilization in 1993, which in turn contributed to the rapid economic growth of Mainland China over the last two decades. The membership of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO, as expected by the end of 2001, will facilitate a more official arrangement of intergovernmental coordination within these Triangle Economies. However, the government of Taiwan will continue to evaluate the cross-strait relations in the context of the nation's overall political and economic security as long as the government of Mainland China does not renounce the use of military force against Taiwan.