The Taiwan strait crisis of 1996: Implications for US security policy

The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 was the greatest challenge to Sino‐American relations in several decades. This study examines the crisis and its implications for US security policy. It outlines US policy toward the defense of Taiwan, discusses the US response to Beijing's military intimidation of Taiwan and analyzes several of the major lessons gleaned from the crisis. The paper suggests that, while China's aggressive behavior should not lead to a dramatic shift in the American position toward Taiwan's defense, some modest adjustments in policy may be warranted.     

The Role of the Military in the PRC Taiwan Policymaking: A case study of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996

This article examines the role of the military in the structure and process of PRC policy formulation on Taiwan through a case study of the military's involvement in, and influence on, Beijing's policymaking in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996. The military has its own vital interests in Taiwan policy, which are embodied in three aspects: preservation of the military's political privilege, military build-up for modernisation drives, and more budgetary resources for defence. This article proposes that the PRC leadership succession problem together with the military's leverage accounted for the outbreak of the crisis. Under pressure, Jiang Zemin had to accept the plan of physically intimidating Taiwan to gain the military's support in consolidating his position as Deng Xiaoping's successor.     

Between Identity Quest and Risk Aversion: lessons from the Chen Shui-bian presidency for maintaining cross-strait stability

This article argues that how President Chen Shui-bian's provocative initiatives have impacted cross-strait stability since 2003 generates crucial lessons, not available in the past, for understanding the propelling and constraining dynamics of a cross-strait military conflict in the long run. The lessons are grounded in three interrelated sets of interactive logic: between the Chen Administration and the Taiwan electorate; between Taiwan people's aspiration for an exclusive national identity and their risk-averse proclivity in the face of China's military threat; and between Washington's and Beijing's acts of signaling toward Taipei. Specifically, this article demonstrates that Taiwan's voters at first backed the Chen Administration's provocative initiatives in order to seek a national identity instead of de jure independence, and that such popular support receded dramatically once such initiatives came to be perceived, amidst domestic and international developments, by the voters as drifting away from the identity quest and toward evoking their choice between the status quo and independence. The risk-averse voters turned away from the altered character of the initiatives and thus restrained the reckless politicians, largely because of both Washington's signaling which highlighted the change and the ensuing risk of war, and Beijing's refraining from saber rattling toward Taiwan. The voters' decisions foiled the 2004 and 2008 referenda, and forestalled the DPP in 2004 from acquiring a parliamentary majority necessary for legislating its provocative initiatives such as renaming the country and creating a new constitution.     

Southeast Asia and cross‐strait relations: The policy of separation of politics and economics

During the periods of July‐August 1995 and mid‐March 1996, China initiated a series of missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, and the mainland for many was considered responsible for the rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait. But, Southeast Asian countries held Taiwan responsible for stimulating the mainland's military actions because of the island's claim for independence. Why? There are three different theoretical arguments on this issue, i.e. those of political primacy, economic determinism, and the separation of politics and economics. This paper contends that the principle of separation of politics and economics is the policy that Southeast Asian countries pursue in developing their relations with the PRC and the ROC, i.e. maintaining official and full‐scale relations with the PRC, but keeping unofficial and economic links with Taiwan. Therefore, for Southeast Asian countries, the PRC's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait were a political and not an economic problem, and one between the mainland and Taiwan. This is the key factor in explaining attitudes in Southeast Asian nations toward the Taiwan Strait crisis.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

US‐China relations and the Taiwan factor

With the diplomatic warming of US‐China relations, the recent resumption of the Koo — Wang meeting and Taiwan's elections for legislators, mayors, and city councilors, cross‐Taiwan Strait relations are at another historical turning point. While the improvement of US‐China relations tends to relieve both sides from rhetoric exchanges of ‘China threat’ and ‘US‐Taiwan conspiracy’, Clinton's oral declaration of the ‘Three No's’ has raised serious concerns in Taiwan. With such a background, a group of experts and policy‐making participants from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China gathered again at a conference on ‘US‐China Relations and the Taiwan Factor’ in Washington, DC in mid‐October 1998. This was the second episode in a series of symposia on US‐China relations sponsored by the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS). The symposium attempts to provide a free, intimate, and long‐term forum for a group of influential experts with different perspectives from the US, Taiwan and Mainland China. As a result, a deep understanding of common interests has been reached and clear differences have also been recognized through direct dialogue and frank exchange of ideas.     

Emergence of the Greater China Circle Economies: Cooperation versus competition

The integration of the so-called greater China economies among Mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong is one part of the global trend of regionalism. The significance of integration in terms of foreign trade and foreign direct investment demonstrates not only rapid growth but also diversity, ever since Mainland China pursued her open door policy of economic reform in 1979. For instance, the combined volume of Hong Kong and Taiwan accounted for as much as 74.1% of Mainland China's capital utilization in 1993, which in turn contributed to the rapid economic growth of Mainland China over the last two decades. The membership of Mainland China and Taiwan to the WTO, as expected by the end of 2001, will facilitate a more official arrangement of intergovernmental coordination within these Triangle Economies. However, the government of Taiwan will continue to evaluate the cross-strait relations in the context of the nation's overall political and economic security as long as the government of Mainland China does not renounce the use of military force against Taiwan.     

台湾“两岸族”的现状、心态与社会融入情况

随着两岸交流交往20年来的累进累积以及祖国大陆经济实力等各方面的进步与发展,居留祖国大陆的台湾同胞越来越多,从原来以"台商"为主向多样化发展,并呈现出新的特点,即出现了所谓的"两岸族",这对两岸社会及两岸当局的政策也造成了一定的影响与冲击。这些"两岸族"在大陆的生活、融入状况及其在两岸的联结功能表明他们是两岸沟通的桥梁。当然,目前"两岸族"的一些微妙心态和两岸间的一些形势表明这种沟通的功能还有待发展。     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

Beyond Power Politics: institution-building and Mainland China's Taiwan policy transition

Facing the ever-growing interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, Mainland China's strategy towards Taiwan is undergoing a profound change, that is, transcending the staunch realpolitik mentality and turning to an institutional arrangement in policy making. Especially since President Hu Jintao took up his position, the Mainland has endeavored to improve cross-Strait relations through the institutionalization of a series of sensitive issues, such as the proposals and signatures of some long-term accords aiming to advocate economic cooperation, promote social exchanges, weaken political opposition and foster mutual trust. By taking the Mainland's national development strategy shift, Taiwan's domestic reality and ‘institution deficit’ in cross-Strait relations into consideration, this paper analyzes the reasons, efforts and features of the Mainland's recent institutional-orientated policy transition.     

两岸军事互信机制：理论建构与实现路径

国民党在岛内重新执政后，两岸关系和平发展的局面正在不断形成，随着两岸互信的不断积累和共识的不断增加，两岸之间建立军事互信机制的可能性也在增长。对于海峡两岸来说，两岸军事互信机制的建立不仅可以增加双方的政治互信，而且有利于长久维护台海地区的和平与稳定。     

Beijing's new thinking on security strategy

Beijing is refocusing its foreign strategy in the Asian Pacific region. This article examines Beijing's new thinking on security strategy in the post‐Cold War Asian‐Pacific region. Drawing from the recent strategic debate in China, the author discusses three defining areas in the new security strategy: military strategy, defense development strategy, and foreign policy and security strategy. It is argued that thinking in security strategy has become more regional oriented, sophisticated and compatible with foreign policy. The implication of China's defense modernization for regional security is controversial. In the short run, China's military posture will not change balance of power at the regional level, but it will significantly affect outcomes of future territorial conflicts on China's periphery. In the long run, Beijing's role in Asian‐Pacific security remains uncertain.     

1949年以来金门在两岸关系中的地位与作用

1949年以来，金门在两岸关系中的地位和作用随着两岸关系互动态势的起伏而变迁。在20世纪50年代至70年代末两岸军事对峙时期，两岸在金门及其附近海域展开了激烈的冲突和对抗，也因此型塑了金门长期以来的战地角色。随着两岸关系的缓和，金门的战地角色逐渐褪去，随之产生了金门该如何在两岸关系中定位的问题，金门地方政府和民众也开始从自身的发展和利益出发争取在两岸关系中的适当定位，但与台湾当局存在诸多矛盾和冲突。“小三通”实施以后，金门成为两岸交流交往的先行者和试验者，在两岸关系中具有独特的地位和优势，但是由于台湾当局的重重限制，“小三通”对于金门地方的发展而言其实是象征意义多于实质意义。随着两岸三通直航进程的推进，金门未来只有跟祖国大陆，尤其是福建省、厦门市建立更加密切的联系，才能实现经济的发展和繁荣。     

台海危机管理:战略险情与模式选择--以陈水扁当政时期为例

台湾问题长期以来是中国国家安全面临的一个巨大战略挑战。陈水扁执政时期，由于民进党当局顽固坚持激进的分离主义路线，“台独”分裂活动给两岸关系带来了极大的战略险情，使台海局势多次走到爆发危机的危险边缘。本文全面分析民进党八年执政期问，陈水扁当局的“台独”分裂活动对两岸关系的破坏，以及中国政府管理台海危机的模式选择。     

Ambiguity,Economic Interdependence,and the US Strategic Dilemma in the Taiwan Strait

As tensions across the Taiwan Strait have risen in recent years, some have argued that the US policy of strategic ambiguity—under which Washington leaves unclear if and how it would intervene in a cross-Strait conflict—has outlived its usefulness because ambiguity may foster dangerous misperceptions about US intentions and hence contribute to future crises. In this essay I critically examine strategic ambiguity, and conclude that ambiguity remains the best policy available to Washington given current US goals in the Taiwan Strait. I argue that ambiguity remains essential both to deterring a Chinese attack and to restraining Taiwanese moves toward independence, but that it nonetheless carries with it inherent risks of conflict. I further argue, however, that these additional risks triggered by ambiguity per se are likely small, and hence are overshadowed by the strategic obstacles faced by the alternatives to an ambiguous policy. Moreover, I show that growing economic interdependence between Mainland China and Taiwan further reduces the risk that ambiguity itself would be a contributing factor to war in the Taiwan Strait. As such, the relative attractiveness of ambiguity has likely increased, rather than decreased as argued by its critics, over the past decade.     

两岸对“和平协议”的立场与前瞻

台海和平环境的建立，是两岸当局与人民自1949年内战之后一直的期待。两岸对和平远景的期待可以理解，但从理想走向实际却需要一段漫长而且曲折的过程。本文共分五个部分，包括前言、两岸创议“和平协议”的历史背景介绍、两岸终止敌对状态协议设计与推行、两岸对“和平协议”解读的相互冲突，以及两岸“和平协议”签署的展望，来解析两岸对此一问题的立场与要求，并整理出双方对此事件的不同解读，以及彼此尚无法“跨出门槛”的症结所在。     

海峡两岸刑事司法互助中的证据问题

证据在诉讼中的有效性是海峡两岸刑事司法互助中难解的困局。两岸不同的证据制度和证据规则反映了对刑罚权程序正当性的不同认识,这种差异日益影响到两岸司法互助的效果。法律程序的"演示性"功能能够提升司法互助证据的公信力与证明力。海峡两岸应互信合作,借鉴与其他法域司法协助的成功经验,尽早细化《海峡两岸共同打击犯罪及司法互助协议》的证据条款,使证据的取得与转换具有可视性和操作性,提升司法互助的成效。     

论台湾居民信用卡“恶意透支”犯罪之防控

近年来,台湾居民恶意透支我国大陆信用卡后逃回台湾的案件呈日趋增多的势头,然而由于两岸刑事法律规范对此行为规定存在差异,台湾地区并未将此类行为界定为犯罪,由此给大陆司法机关办理此类案件造成极大困扰。因此,只有建构台湾籍大陆银行信用卡持有人实施“恶意透支”信用卡的防控机制,才能有效遏制这一犯罪行为。     

Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: opportunities and challenges

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability.     

Divergent Popular Support for the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Movement, 2000–2012

Mainstream views in China tend to believe that lower popular support for the DPP shown in the 2008 presidential election indicates parallel declining support for the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM). However, this study shows that during the DPP administration of 2000–2008, popular support for the DPP and the TIM has become divergent: at the aggregate level, popular support for the DPP has generally declined since 2000, but that for the TIM has actually increased and then remained stable; at the individual level, Taiwanese people's dissatisfaction with the DPP administration significantly reduced their support for the DPP in 2008, but had no independent effect on their nationalist sentiment. Further analysis of the TIM's support base shows that the supposedly pro-status-quo pan-blue camp actually provided an increasing number of Taiwanese nationalists, which stabilized popular Taiwanese nationalism and weakened the DPP's monopoly of it.