Geopolitical pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM

This article argues that the 12 states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are evenly divided into two groups that are grouped around Russia and Ukraine. The emergence of these two groups, one of which is decidely pro‐Western and pro NATO ‐GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) ‐is a sign of what Brzezinski defined as early as 1994 as geopolitical pluralism has finally emerged in the former USSR. US policy, he argued, should be the consolidation of this geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union as the means by which a non‐imperial, ‘normal’ Russian nation‐state would emerge with whom a ‘genuine American‐Russian partnership’ could be secured. Brzezinski signalled that Ukraine was the key state that prevented the revival of a new Russian empire and therefore aided the consolidation of Russian democracy. One could add that GUUAM, as an organization led by Ukraine, should also therefore play a central role in US and Western policy towards the former USSR.     

The Russian case for military intervention in Georgia: international law,norms and political calculation

Abstract

The Russian military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 has raised significant questions about Russian thinking and practice on the legitimate use of military force abroad, especially in relation to neighbour states. The arguments advanced by Russia to justify this campaign show how Russian interpretations of customary international law as well as norms related to the use of force have served as an instrument of state policy, rather than being rooted in any broader international consensus. The Russian discourse in this context about sovereignty, self-determination and the legitimacy of recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as states appears similarly to be strongly influenced by political self-interest and Russian views about its entitlement within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Among Russian claims, Moscow's commitment to support its ‘citizens’ abroad has been particularly controversial. This article examines these issues and also the possibility that, through its justifications for waging war against Georgia, Russia is more broadly contesting the interpretation of certain international norms, that it regards as essentially constructed by Western states. Some potential implications of these legal and normative arguments for future Russian policy in the CIS region, including Ukraine, are also examined.     

EU Civil–Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organised Crime: Lessons to be Learned from the Bosnian Example

Abstract

Civil–military coordination between missions with the same top end of command and belonging to the same organization should increase the effectiveness of both missions even more than in a traditional interaction between military and civilian organizations. Nevertheless, the two EU missions in Bosnia, EUPM and EUFOR, which were both engaged in the fight against organized crime, had to undergo a difficult process until a decent level of cooperation was achieved. The article tries to describe the problems encountered and to address key factors, such as different concepts of operation, problems in the chain of command, a lack of accountability and—most importantly—the human factor, that hampered this cooperation.     

Limits to cooperation: Iterated graduated games and the arms race

The arms race is often modeled as mutual defection in a Prisoner's Dilemma game and arms control as reciprocal cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, while Chicken and other games are used to represent different aspects of superpower rivalry. This paper develops a model of the macro‐structure of superpower rivalry in which each of these games occur at different levels of military expenditures or other measures of military effort. In this iterated graduated game model the two rival states repeatedly select from an ordered sequence of policy options, and each state experiences tradeoffs among the desire to gain an advantage over the rival, the dangers of escalation, and the intrinsic benefits and opportunity costs of military expenditures. Analysis of numerical examples demonstrates that equilibrium in this model corresponds to the intermediate levels of cooperation and conflict characteristic of superpower rivalry. A concluding discussion indicates that this model is also consistent with the existence of policy competition among domestic groups with conflicting interests.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.     

Buying treaties with cigarettes: Internal side‐payments in two level games

Two‐level games models predict that domestic division within a state can alter the extent to which that state is able to reach agreements with other states, and also alter the content of any agreement that is reached. I extend the model by introducing internal side‐payments composed of unrelated domestic issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation most when the executive and median legislators are in relative agreement about other salient domestic political issues. Domestic opposition to an international agreement will inhibit cooperation least when the executive and median legislators are in relative disagreement about other salient domestic political issues. U.S. ratifications of the NAFTA and the Chemical Weapons Convention illustrate that not all types of domestic division inhibit international cooperation—some can facilitate it     

Foreign Policy Activism in Saudi Arabia and Oman. Diverging Narratives and Stances towards the Syrian and Yemeni Conflicts

Abstract

Amid growing animosity and security concerns in the Middle East, the Gulf region appears to be on the way to becoming the new centre of gravity of regional equilibria. The increasingly active foreign policy postures of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is a key aspect of the new regional order in the making. Saudi Arabia and Oman are two examples of this trend. Their involvement in the Syrian and Yemeni conflicts reveals important differences regarding the aims, narratives, political and military postures, strategies and alliances pursued by Riyadh and Muscat and casts a shadow over the future of GCC cooperation and integration.     

The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

Diversity Management: Regionalism and the Future of the International Order

Abstract

The ongoing redistribution of power on the international stage points to a more decentred international system featuring a multiplication of governance arrangements. A larger range of pivotal countries have the capacity and the confidence to pursue different priorities, a development that questions the prevalent post-Cold War expectation that the liberal international order would grow both wider and deeper. The central challenge for the future of the international order is managing diversity in ways that minimise conflict and leverage the benefits of interdependence. The evolution of regionalism and regional orders will be a critical dimension of the realignment of power, interests and normative agendas at the global level. Both more competition and more cooperation are likely to take place at the regional level, with the mix changing in different parts of the world. Provided that it is not merely a cover for coercive hegemonic aspirations and that it is designed to complement other levels of cooperation, regionalism can play an important role in preventing a more polycentric world from becoming a more fragmented and unstable one.     

Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers,Democracy, and Trade

Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007.     

Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention

Abstract

Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.     

Informal governance and participation in non-democratic international organizations

This article uses the informal governance framework to elucidate the connection between regime transition and participation in regional international organizations (IOs). In particular, this study focuses on non-democratic regional IOs and examines the empirical case of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We investigate how the level of regime transition of each CIS member state affects its participation in the CIS. The paper utilizes an original dataset that contains information regarding the number of CIS-related agreements that have been signed by each CIS member state during the 1991–2010 time period, which can be used to measure the level of participation of each state in the CIS. We find that states with a lower level of democratization and a higher level of marketization are more likely to participate in agreements within the CIS. The paper contributes to the wider application of informal governance framework by demonstrating the usefulness of these theories for understanding the nature and dynamics of regional IOs, such as the CIS.     

Coalition Quality and Multinational Dispute Outcomes1

Multinational military coalitions are an increasingly common phenomena in international conflict, presumably because coalitions are more likely to secure their conflict aims than single states. Yet what makes a coalition more or less likely to succeed is poorly understood. We argue that the quality of multinational military coalitions—in terms of the coalition’s skill, coordination, and legitimacy—can provide better strategic decisions, more harmonious relations within the coalition, and thus a greater chance of securing conflict aims. Empirical testing reveals that elements of coalition quality do in fact affect the probability of military success: a history of success, both alone and with the same coalition partners, predicts military success. Moreover, increasing a coalition’s legitimacy via more diverse members has a weak effect, indicating that diversity comes at the expense of coordination and cooperation challenges. Last, we find that elements of coalition quality affect initiating and defending coalitions differently.     

The Future of Chemical Weapons: Implications from the Syrian Civil War

Abstract

With chemical weapons (CW) use in Syria raising questions about the health of the CW norm, this article analyzes whether the Syrian case will lead to further proliferation and use of chemical weapons by states. We examine the use of chemical weapons at Ghouta in 2013 and on the Hama Plains in 2014 and find that: first, chemical weapons have demonstrated limited military utility in Syria, either tactically or as a tool of civilian victimization; second, the costs of use have been repeatedly demonstrated by the international reaction to their use; and third, the use of sarin—a nerve agent—has attracted a stronger international response than the use of chlorine, a less lethal agent. Consequently, we conclude that the Syrian case is unlikely to lead to significant proliferation and use of chemical weapons; any that does occur is most likely to involve states already outside the CW norm.     

US-Arab Gulf Relations amidst Regional and Global Changes

Abstract

The Arab Gulf has long enjoyed privileged relations with the United States. Being home to the world’s largest oil reserves, the US saw it in its strategic interest to keep Arab Gulf states in its camp during the Cold War. The relation developed over the years to include other areas of cooperation such as in the military, economic and even academic fields. However, many factors today challenge this relationship. In the face of the US’ evident retrenchment from the region, the Arab Gulf is showing more inter-GCC cooperation, and Saudi Arabia is trying to forge alliances independently from the US. At the same time, Arab Gulf countries are intensifying their lobbying efforts in the US.     

Unity in the face of threat? Exploring the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and public support for a common European army in Germany

ABSTRACT

Perceptions of threat from Russia’s military activities in Ukraine and President Trump’s critical attitude towards NATO have put the idea of a common European army on the agenda of European politics. Do these strategic threat perceptions also influence public support for the creation of a common European army? Previous research has largely overlooked strategic threat perceptions as individual-level determinants of public support for a common European army. This article explores the empirical relationship between strategic threat perceptions and support for a common European army at the individual level of analysis with representative German survey data from 2018. The multivariate analysis shows that perceiving Russia’s military activities in Ukraine as a threat to Germany’s security, and U.S. foreign and security policy as a threat to the cohesion of NATO significantly increases support for the creation of a common European army, even when the influence of numerous other determinants is controlled for. The findings highlight the importance of considering strategic threat perceptions in future analyses of public opinion on European defence cooperation and integration.     

Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS1

Abstract

The article discusses the emergence of a Russian version of the Bush doctrine in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian officials’ conceptual stretching of the strategic culture embodied in the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine (MD) from 2000 onwards. While these documents seem to cherish multilateralism and United Nations (UN) primacy in questions of global and regional security, terrorist attacks on Russia proper have engendered a more assertive approach to regional security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia and brought Russian officials to consider unilateral pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases. In the case of the Caucasus, Russia has been striking against terrorist bases on Georgian territory and contributed to constructing a failed state, whereas in the Central Asian case, Russia has sought to revitalise the defunct CIS security framework and pledge assistance to ‘allies’ in the fight against terrorism. The article argues that the war against terrorism has given Russia a new footing in the CIS. The issue of security is more salient, as is the reliance on military force to facilitate it.     

Parting the Black Sea (Region): Geopolitics,Institutionalisation and the Reconfiguration of European Security

Abstract

This article examines critically one of the most active regional dynamics of European security, centred on the Black Sea. Recently, the Black Sea region has received increased attention from a variety of political actors, who seek to increase the profile of the region in order to develop a common regional identity and an integrated approach to the security problems of the Black Sea region. This resurgence of the Black Sea region can be understood as the combined product of local interests, European integration and the ‘global war on terror’. The main argument of the article is that Black Sea security integration is characterised by a fundamental contradiction between two different logics of security—geopolitical and institutional. Three other problems—transposition, fragmentation, and duplication—are also discussed. In the conclusion, the article examines the significance of the efforts to build the Black Sea region for the future of regional integration in European security.