Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

俄格冲突与俄罗斯独联体政策的未来

俄格军事冲突是冷战后俄格矛盾的一次释放.透过这一事件,独联体建设的诸多问题凸显出来.独联体未来的命运成为人们关注的焦点,俄罗斯未来政策的转变将对此起决定性作用.为了使独联体这一组织形式更具吸引力和更具效力,俄罗斯有必要改变其对独联体国家关系的行为方式,加强独联体组织功能建设,健全联合治理机制,提供更多的公共物品,承担力所能及的责任.唯有如此,独联体组织机制的功能才会被激活,并最终有利于俄罗斯国家实力的全面提升.     

GUUAM and the future of CIS military cooperation

This study analyses the establishment and development of the GUUAM cooperation and offers an assessment of the future implications of this regional grouping for the CIS military alliance. It presents three key arguments. First, that the GUUAM members have bandwagoned with western states at the system level and balanced against Russia at the regional level. Second, that there is a dialectical relationship between these two policies, with one getting added momentum from the other. And finally, that on this background we should expect to see increased future balancing by the GUUAM states — and possibly by other CIS members as well — causing a further undermining of the CIS military cooperation.     

Evidence of Russia's Bush Doctrine in the CIS1

Abstract

The article discusses the emergence of a Russian version of the Bush doctrine in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Russian officials’ conceptual stretching of the strategic culture embodied in the National Security Concept (NSC) and the Military Doctrine (MD) from 2000 onwards. While these documents seem to cherish multilateralism and United Nations (UN) primacy in questions of global and regional security, terrorist attacks on Russia proper have engendered a more assertive approach to regional security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia and brought Russian officials to consider unilateral pre-emptive strikes against terrorist bases. In the case of the Caucasus, Russia has been striking against terrorist bases on Georgian territory and contributed to constructing a failed state, whereas in the Central Asian case, Russia has sought to revitalise the defunct CIS security framework and pledge assistance to ‘allies’ in the fight against terrorism. The article argues that the war against terrorism has given Russia a new footing in the CIS. The issue of security is more salient, as is the reliance on military force to facilitate it.     

Geopolitical pluralism in the CIS: The emergence of GUUAM

This article argues that the 12 states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are evenly divided into two groups that are grouped around Russia and Ukraine. The emergence of these two groups, one of which is decidely pro‐Western and pro NATO ‐GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) ‐is a sign of what Brzezinski defined as early as 1994 as geopolitical pluralism has finally emerged in the former USSR. US policy, he argued, should be the consolidation of this geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union as the means by which a non‐imperial, ‘normal’ Russian nation‐state would emerge with whom a ‘genuine American‐Russian partnership’ could be secured. Brzezinski signalled that Ukraine was the key state that prevented the revival of a new Russian empire and therefore aided the consolidation of Russian democracy. One could add that GUUAM, as an organization led by Ukraine, should also therefore play a central role in US and Western policy towards the former USSR.     

Russia’s Neorevisionist Challenge to the Liberal International Order

Abstract

A conventional opinion is that Russia is trying to destroy the liberal international order. Russia indeed defies it, but also justifies its foreign policy with the liberal order’s normative frameworks and reproaches the West for not standing up to these norms. Moreover, Moscow does not present any alternative vision. Russia complains about the internal contradictions of the liberal order: sovereignty vs. intervention, pluralism vs. universality, US hegemony vs. equality and democracy, although it also exploits these contradictions. In fact Russia demands an adjustment of the liberal order rather than its eradication and should, therefore, be classified as a neorevisionist power. Two elements underlie Russia’s at times aggressive foreign policy conduct. The first one, its feeling of being ill-accommodated in the present order, predefines the direction of the policy. The second, the prioritisation of foreign policy over domestic reforms, explains the intensity of Russian discontent and its occasional aggressive manifestations. Russia’s domestic consensus regarding its foreign policy, including views on the liberal international order, facilitates this aggressiveness. Three policy conclusions can be drawn: acknowledging that Russia uses the inherent contradictions of the liberal international order opens up possibilities for dialogue and an eventual overcoming of the crisis; the survival and strengthening of the liberal order depends on its embrace of all major players, including Russia, and hence, the need for some adjustments to the order itself; and finally such adjustments presuppose Russia’s readiness to shoulder responsibility for the (reformed) liberal international order.     

梅德韦杰夫外交:特点、原因及前景分析

梅德韦杰夫执政以来,其外交特点是:重视独联体,调整政策但区别对待;重视东方,中印平衡;对西方继续强硬但不破裂,进而改善,对美欧有所区别;利用俄优势,重视能源外交、体育外交、军事外交和大国外交;对国际事务提出很多新观点、新建议,使政府在实施俄罗斯外交政策的分量加重。其原因既有俄罗斯国力上升,也有国内的梅普组合因素,还有国际上的美国因素和中国因素。今后梅德韦杰夫外交将更加重视经济安全、能源外交和军事发展。对华将继续友好,战略借重加大,但发展空间有限,必须寻求新的增长点。在对西方关系上,在继承普京时期强硬外交的基础上进一步调整、改善、缓和与西方的关系。     

NATO expansion and Russian national interests

The article centres on the debate in Russia about NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and how expansion affects re‐emergent Russian national interests post‐Madrid. The author examines official Russian arguments against expansion as well as the views of policy‐makers and political commentators, assesses the impact of NATO's plans on Russian‐Western Security and disarmament arrangements and analyses Russia's relations with her neighbours in CEE, the CIS and Asia.     

独联体与俄联邦标准概况

独联体或俄联邦的标准,就是经独联体或俄联邦的标准化机构批准的规范性文件。现行有效的独联体跨国标准都是逐步由前苏联标准转化而来,还有一部分是由国际标准"修改"后转化的标准。俄联邦的国家标准是俄罗斯联邦标准化委员会制订的标准。大体上有10000多件标准。     

The OSCE and ethnic conflicts in Estonia,Georgia, and Tajikstan: A search for sustainable peace and its limits

This article analyzes some of the experiences of the OSCE in Estonia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. Conflicts in these three countries followed the demise of the Soviet Union and had basic aspects in common: actual and potential border claims; the presence of a large number of national minorities whose ethnicity is shared with neighbouring kin‐ethnic states; as well as conflicting claims of national self‐determination and territorial integrity. By comparing and contrasting these cases, this article discusses the implications of the OSCE's approach and its limits in the context of the former Soviet Union, and offers some policy recommendations for the future OSCE's activities in this region. The central arguments are as follows: the OSCE has played a significant role in building a sustainable peace in the former Soviet Union where few European institutions have attempted to intervene; and that while being heavily influenced by Russian policies, the OSCE's activities in the CIS were not simple reflections of Russian interests.     

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN RUSSIA AFTER 9–11

Can military reform in Russia become a reality, or is it doomed forever to the status of oxymoron? The answer to this question will have as much to do with US-Russian relations as with internal Russian politics and finance. Despite a warm personal friendship between Presidents Putin and Bush, polls show the Russian people remain highly ambivalent about US policies and intentions toward Russia and the CIS. Many inside and outside the military believe the United States will use the war in Afghanistan and its foothold in Central Asia to encircle and weaken Russia. This thinking has spilled over into attacks on Putin for his attempts at military reform, particularly his decision to de-emphasize the strategic nuclear forces. While Putin has made some courageous moves to stem corruption and bring the military to heel, in other cases he has been forced to back off in order to avoid a political backlash. As a result, military reform continues to proceed in fits and starts, still more oxymoron than reality.     

Justifying Inequality as Equality: Germany and the Reform of Voting Weights in the Council of the European Union

ABSTRACT

Weighted voting institutionalises inequality in international organisations. How is it possible that states accept rules that formally privilege some over others even though this contradicts the sovereign equality of states and norms of democratic decision-making? This contribution to a special issue about global stratification shows that arguments about equality can actually serve to justify inequality in international institutions. This can be seen in moves by the German government to justify its proposals for a reform of voting in the Council of the European Union (1995–2008). Successive German governments focused on arguments about democracy based on the equality of states and of citizens to justify their push for a more privileged position for Germany in the Council. Efficiency also figured as a justification but was clearly less prominent.     

俄罗斯新版国家安全战略评析

2021年7月2日,俄出台新版《俄罗斯联邦国家安全战略》,其中有许多新变化值得关注.俄认为,当前国际形势动荡不安,地缘政治紧张局势日益加剧,武力仍是解决国家间冲突矛盾的重要手段.俄当前国家安全面临的主要威胁是美西方针对其进行的"混合战争",具体包括军事威胁、经济制裁和政治施压.为此,新战略提出的基本战略目标是维护国内、...     

Reviving the Russian empire: the Crimean intervention through a neoclassical realist lens

Although many policy-makers and scholars maintain that international norms have altered the motivations underlying state behaviour, this article argues that states continue to pursue national self-interest, but in ways that remain understudied. While traditional realist assumptions explain a great deal of state behaviour, they have not been widely used to account for important alternative tools of state intervention, such as economic and normative strategies. Focusing on the case of Russia's 2014 intervention in Ukraine, this article offers insights into how, and under what circumstances, these tools are used to accomplish traditional state objectives. Guided by the tenets of neoclassical realism, the article argues that in the case of Russia, military force is no longer the sole, or even the primary, means used to accomplish traditional security goals. Such dynamics have significant theoretical and policy implications for contemporary international relations.     

19世纪中叶朝鲜人向俄国远东移民原因探析

19世纪60年代,俄国远东地区出现了第一批朝鲜移民。朝鲜人向俄国移民的初期,移民得到积极安置,此后每年都有大批朝鲜人迁入俄国,他们逐渐成为俄国远东地区的主要劳动力。朝鲜人向俄国远东地区移民,不仅受东北亚国际关系的影响,更取决于俄国、朝鲜乃至中国的国内状况,它是在国内外综合因素作用下所引发的一种国际移民现象。     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Russian Orthodox Church and Nuclear Command and Control: A Hypothesis

Abstract

The Russian Orthodox Church plays an immense role in current Russian national security policy. The intertwining of the church and the strategic community is nowhere more visible than in the nuclear-weapons complex, where the priesthood has penetrated all levels of command, been involved in operational activities, and positioned itself as a provider of meanings for, and guardian of, the state’s nuclear potential. The first work to highlight the phenomenon of the Russian church-nuclear nexus, this article focuses on the ecclesiastical impact on Russian nuclear command and control. The findings suggest that it is not inconceivable that the Russian military clergy—like the Soviet political officers and contrary to chaplains worldwide—might become future participants in decision making on matters of national security, and that de facto there might be two parallel chains of command authority emerging in Russia, with potential tensions between them. The article outlines the causes of this overlooked singularity and its implications for the theory and practice of international security.     

Russia's economic and strategic interests in North-East Asia

  Since the middle of the 1990s and especially after Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency Russia started to pursue an active foreign policy in North East Asia, an area considered vital for Russian national political, economic and strategic interests. While continuing to use every available method to conduct this policy Moscow placed special emphasis on promoting economic cooperation with the neighboring states, not in the least because of the development needs of Siberia and the Russian Far East. The current trends on the world energy market as well as the growing energy requirements of Russia's neighbors help to make at this stage exploration of Russian rich energy resources in East Siberia and around the Sakhalin Island to be one of the most attractive areas of regional economic cooperation. Even though these developments help to meet some of the current Russian requirements in foreign investments and modern technologies Russia is clearly interested in extending the scope of regional cooperation to other areas as well. In particular, Russia is interested in promoting its industrial exports. Another prospective area of its cooperation with regional states may cover joint transport projects – from construction of international gas and oil pipelines to linking Russian and Korean railway systems.     

俄罗斯的独联体劳动移民及相关问题分析

随着独联体经济一体化进程的逐步推进,劳动移民已成为独联体内部移民的主流,且劳动移民的流动具有单向性,即主要流向俄罗斯。俄罗斯境内独联体劳动移民规模的不断扩大引发了一系列经济和社会问题,独联体劳动移民问题成为困扰俄罗斯的一大难题。俄罗斯对独联体劳动移民的接收与拒绝的矛盾心态将构成其对独联体劳动移民政策的基础,限制性劳动移民政策将是其具体表现形式,且限制的内容将有所扩大。