Selling to Both Sides: The Effects of Major Conventional Weapons Transfers on Civil War Severity and Duration

Civil wars are primarily fought with small and light arms, but the availability of major conventional weapons to states and rebels can alter the nature of the war being fought. This study explores the impact of major conventional weapons transfers on civil war severity and duration. By using a recipient based approach to arms transfers, I find rebel acquisition of major conventional weapons from international sources leads to conflict escalation and deadlier conflicts. State importation of major conventional weapons is associated with longer conflicts. These findings provide researchers a means to account for rebel capabilities in civil war research and policy makers insight to limit the destructiveness of civil wars.     

Mortgaging Security for Economic Gain: U.S. Arms Policy in an Insecure World

Similar to other consumer sectors of the global economy, the transfer of advanced conventional weapons and military technologies has entered the globalization process, a process that has qualitatively and quantitatively altered the composition and structure of U.S. national security policymaking. By injecting the decisionmaking process governing arms transfers into the global market place, U.S. policy makers must now reconcile maintaining economic competitiveness within the global system without jeopardizing U.S. national security interests. By subordinating national security interests to global economic imperatives, U.S. decisionmakers are at risk of mortgaging the political, societal, and security welfare of its citizenry for profit.     

The first casualty in the war against terror: the fall of NATO and Europe's reluctant coming of age

In 2003, hardly a keynote speech goes by without Western leaders stressing that the transatlantic bond is as important as ever. This is perhaps true – a timelier question is whether the same can be said for the perception of common values and common threats that used to define this partnership and its sole institutional link: NATO. This essay explores five security policy conundrums that point towards a revised burden-sharing and power-sharing in the transatlantic strategic partnership: the UK's ambiguous role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); the blocking of the formal bond between NATO and the EU; the implications of a change in US policy towards Europe; NATO's improbable move into soft security and, finally, NATO's invocation of Article 5 in the wake of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington.     

全球安全治理视域下的自主武器军备控制

随着人工智能的飞速进展，不断智能化的自主武器日益显现出伦理和安全风险，使得限制或禁止自主武器成为全球安全治理领域的新兴议题。相比其他军控对象，自主武器军控进程在过去几年中获得较快推进，其中《特定常规武器公约》会议已决定设立政府专家组专门探讨自主武器问题。文章系统梳理了自主武器军备控制的概念、伦理和安全争议，旨在通过这种梳理更好地理解自主武器军控进程发展的动因，并对这一进程的未来走向做出预测。当前，自主武器军备控制的主要动因集中在道德层面，特别是让机器自主决策杀伤引发的伦理忧虑。而从安全层面看，自主武器蕴涵的安全风险在其他新兴技术领域同样存在，而发展和使用自主武器带来的战略红利依然显著，这使得主要国家推动自主武器军控的意愿并不强烈。在权力政治与道德政治的博弈下，自主武器军控在可预见的时期内将难以形成实质性成果，稍有可能的是通过“软法”等非约束性方式塑造一定的国际规范。在这个过程中，中国可以发挥更加积极主动的作用，在确保战略利益的同时营造有利的大国形象。     

Rivalry, Reaction, and Weapons Proliferation: A Time-Series Analysis of Global Arms Transfers

This article analyzes the competitive dynamics in global arms transfers from 1951 to 1995. I discuss the enduring forces behind the proliferation of military capability during the Cold War and other historical periods, and then consider the competitive dynamics characteristic of the superpower rivalry itself. The process of military-technological advance, along with the dynamics of enduring interstate rivalry, lead us to expect certain patterns in quantitative data representing arms-transfer levels over time. Concepts in time-series analysis—cointegration and error correction—are helpful for understanding competitive arms-transfer policies during the Cold War, and I apply the relevant analytical tools to test for the hypothesized patterns in the empirical data. American and Russian, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact, arms transfers are examined at three levels of regional aggregation: the Third World as a whole, the Middle East security complex, and the Persian Gulf subcomplex. The evidence shows that arms transfers by the Cold War rivals moved together in patterns consistent with competitive policy making in an environment of military-technological change, and that one or both sides adjusted their supply policies to correct for deviations from a moving equilibrium. This describes an action-reaction process, but a loosely coupled one deriving from military-technological uncertainties, the complexities of regional security dynamics, and the multidimensional character of the Cold War competition.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

The enemy within: rethinking arms availability in sub-Saharan Africa

Over the past decade small arms and light weapons availability has been singled out as one of sub-Saharan Africa's highest profile challenges. Yet the construction of the threat of arms availability as one of authorised trade and illicit trafficking across international borders has resulted in a narrow focus on regulating lawful exports and imports and brokers. While these are real and legitimate concerns, the authors contend that small arms and light weapons availability should be re-evaluated as a complex social phenomenon involving dynamic supply and demand dimensions. A limited emphasis on controlling authorised transfers to war zones glosses over the challenges of illegal markets, the gradual emergence of national arms production capacities across Africa and the systematic diversion of weapons and ammunition surplus from the domestic stocks of security services into civilian hands. It also obscures a more dynamic landscape of armed violence across the continent which extends beyond war zones. Whilst the conventional interpretation of arms availability is favoured by African diplomats and international arms control experts, such a reading potentially obscures the weaknesses of security governance and the myriad motivations and means shaping small arms and light weapons acquisition and misuse amongst armed groups and civilians.     

The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century

The neat dividing lines between hard and soft, civil and military security are rapidly dissolving, requiring far more flexibility and causing much confusion as allies and partners have disagreed significantly about how to manage such complexity. Many Europeans continue to recognize only as much threat as they can afford. For them “soft” security often means no security commitment at all. Whilst America needs the European allies for its excessively “hard” security policy to work effectively, it refuses to recognize the extent of that need because of the implications such a recognition would have for control over security outcomes. Therein lies a dilemma, brought to public attention in the fight against catastrophic terror and the war in Iraq. This article explores how both sides of the transatlantic divide might begin to cope with this new set of problems, with a new set of relationships in a new set of ways.     

Has-Been,Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy

In December 2003, the European Union presented its “security strategy”, endorsed by all member states, to provide guidance for Europe’s common foreign security and defense policy. In substance, this document is not an expression of a growing strategic rift between Europe and the United States. One of the purposes it serves, however, is defining Europe’s own, separate “identity”. It reflects the increasing awareness that Europeans need to employ their power more effectively in the service of international peace and security, as much as politically possible. Disagreements on key issues remain in Europe, however, and the practical implications of the security strategy still need to be worked out.     

THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES

A good part of Western Europe has been united in a military alliance for more than 50 years, and grown into an economic union with a single market and a new, common currency. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is adding another facet of coordination and cooperation among countries which are already highly integrated. Defense and security have lagged behind other areas of integration, with arms procurement and production particularly fragmented. One of the new instruments for increased integration related to ESDP development, is the Framework Agreement, which regulates important aspects of joint arms production among major Western European producers.     

The US–Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany

Abstract

The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP procedure are examined through John Ruggie's theoretical observations. The second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications of heightened US–Russian bilateralism for Germany. Authors' findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the contrary process, namely Germany's strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are concluding remarks.     

Forever young: START and aftermath

Abstract

The New Strategic arms reduction treaty nuclear arms control agreement signed by US President, Barack Obama, and Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2010 is likely to achieve ratification in both Washington and Moscow, but it is too early to break out the champagne or vodka. Even successful ratification of this agreement is, at best, an important but incremental part of the US–Russian policy ‘reset’ and the larger agenda for both states with respect to arms reduction and nonproliferation. Further reductions in both states’ inventories of strategic nuclear weapons are a necessary preface toward credible leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear arms – especially in the looming test cases of Iran and North Korea. In addition, both states have to decipher a policy-strategy nexus for emerging missile defense technologies: in particular, whether missile defenses should be seen as possible means of cooperative security, as between NATO and Russia, or whether they are firewalls in the way of further progress in offensive nuclear arms reductions.     

When All Roads Lead to Beijing. Assessing China’s New Silk Road and its Implications for Europe

The Belt and Road, unveiled by President Xi Jinping in late 2013, is China’s most ambitious geo-economic and foreign policy initiative in decades, combining a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and a sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road which connect China to Europe. With this grandiose initiative, Beijing seeks to tackle industrial overcapacity at home and acquire political influence abroad through investment. Sitting at the end-point of the maritime Silk Road, Southeast Europe and the Mediterranean have been the main focus of investment in infrastructure projects so far. If managed successfully by both sides, China’s Belt and Road could be a great opportunity for a European continent that is still struggling to recover from the crisis. What is urgently needed in Europe is a comprehensive response to China’s new initiative, with the focus not only on the economy and trade, but also on the monetary and financial aspects of the Belt and Road, including discussion of the political and security implications of Beijing’s inroads into Europe and its neighbourhood.     

HAVE THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES PUT ARMS CONTROL ON THE BACK BURNER?

The disarmament experienced during the last decade is over and the world seems poised for a new arms race. While the US government shows an open disinterest in negotiated arms control and bases its policy on a strong military posture, European governments also seem to have put arms control on the back burner. Governments and experts argue about the perceived gap in military capability between the US and Europe while in reality the actual important gap exists between NATO and the rest of the world. Several suggestions are made in this article how governments in Europe can take initiatives to foster disarmament and arms control.     

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20^th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.     

Rethinking small arms control in Africa: it is time to set an armed violence reduction agenda

Policy-makers and practitioners concerned with small arms control have traditionally focused narrowly on ‘supply-side’ forms of regulation and containment. Concerned that excessive arms availability might destabilise fragile and post-war countries, they typically advance a host of activities such as weapons embargoes, export and import controls, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes and weapons collection schemes. These initiatives often achieve fewer dividends than expected. This article argues for a broader conceptualisation of ‘availability’ that accounts for both supply and demand dimensions. Availability would thus extend from arms production and diverse forms of weapons circulation to the manifold factors shaping acquisition and the multiple ways arms are used and misused. A broad spectrum treatment directly acknowledges the many faces of armed violence and allows for more sophisticated diagnosis, treatment and cure. This article considers how a host of ‘second generation’ armed violence prevention and reduction activities might enhance efforts to promote security in the aftermath of Africa's wars.     

Promoting Stability or Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries,1950–1991

There has not been much formal or empirical research on the impact of ColdWar–era arms transfers on regional subsystems, and the work that has been undertaken is inconclusive: arms transfers appear, in some cases, to promote stability, but in other situations they are shown to be destabilizing. This study confronts the issue directly by developing and testing both stability and instability models of Superpower (U.S. and USSR) and third-country arms transfers. The models examine the effects of exported arms on the political and military relationships between three sets of rival importers—India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, and Ethiopia-Somalia—during the 1950–1991 period. Tests of the models with recently released arms trade data reveal that the weapons shipments of the U.S. and USSR were profoundly destabilizing, while those of third parties generally had little impact on subsystem political and military relationships. An intriguing exception to these patterns is the weaponstransfers of the PRC, specifically to Pakistan: these are found to have lessened the military imbalance between Pakistan and India, suggesting that the PRC's reputation as an irresponsible exporter deserves further review.     

Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government

This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British foreign policy that emerged under the current Labor government will be managed in the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and European security may be in the longer run. The article will examine how the change that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role, and, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives. The article will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European military capabilities, the continued reliance on the US has meant that British strategic culture has displayed remarkable continuity rather than fundamental transformation.     

日本化学武器军控政策研究

日本自上世纪初形成生产、使用化学武器,并在侵华战争中大量使用了化学武器.1945年日本战败后,大量化学武器遗弃在中国境内,对我国居民造成了直接伤害.战后,日本政府热衷国际化学武器军控事业,积极寻找、销毁本国老化学武器,但在处理遗弃在华化学武器问题上推诿拖沓.这种鲜明的反差,受到国际和国内多重因素的影响.除非日本的外交战略、防务政策发生重大变化,近期内日本的化学武器军控政策不会轻易改变.     

Cooperation in EU disaster response and security provision: circulating practices

There is a profound disconnect between the practice and scholarly study of security in Europe. The 2010 Internal Security Strategy added disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, and floods to the list of European Union (EU) internal security concerns, expanding on the more traditional anxieties over militaries, border protection, and the effects of poverty. This article explores how evolving practices of disaster response, a policy area once separate from EU security discourse, have become part of the EU's wider security provision and with what implications. Based on interviews conducted at the Directorate-General (DG) for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), it provides a detailed study of three EU disaster response practices – monitoring, training, and information co-ordinating – and their circulation to the wider field of EU internal security provision. It uses this case to outline that new understandings of what it means to “voluntarily co-operate” in European security projects have been radically under-theorized.