Does It Matter If the House of Lords isn't Reformed? Perspectives from a Symposium at Trinity Hall,Cambridge

In May 2011 the Coalition government published a draft bill for reform of the House of Lords, proposing an upper chamber composed of 80% elected and 20% appointed members serving for single 15‐year terms. These plans reflect aspects of the stated positions of the main political parties, votes in the House of Commons, and broader political and scholarly debates over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is significant opposition from across the political spectrum, and there is a significant possibility that the proposed reforms will not be enacted before the next general election. This article draws on the views of participants (including three current peers) in a Symposium at Trinity Hall, Cambridge to argue that the likely failure of the reforms may be less disastrous than many suppose. Especially since the 1999 reforms, the House of Lords is in many ways a more active and legitimate chamber than is commonly realised.     

‘Respect for Law and Sausages’: How Parliament Made Section 31 of the Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013 on the Sale of Employment Rights

The Parliamentary debates on the clause which became section 31 of the Growth and Enterprise Act 2013 (allowing employees to agree to sign away employment rights for shares in the employing company) show that scrutiny by the House of Commons is very poor, and that scrutiny by the House of Lords is intense and very well‐informed. If the Government loses the argument on a Bill in the House of Lords, it will lose the vote. However, during Parliamentary ping‐pong (the back‐and‐forth process of amendment of a Bill between the two Houses) the Commons, and the Government, will normally get their way, however weak the policy proposal, provided that concessions on detail are made, unless the issue is regarded by the Lords as one of fundamental principle.     

Lords Reform: Some Inconvenient Truths

The failure of the Coalition government's attempt to reform the House of Lords has by no means taken further reform off the political agenda. The commitment to installing an elected upper chamber is still widely shared across the political spectrum, on the basis of perceptions that the House of Lords lacks democratic legitimacy. Against this view, this article considers recent literature upon non‐electoral representation, deliberative democracy and bicameralism, which together highlight the possibility of an unelected second chamber playing a legitimate role within a wider (democratic) system of government. The article then considers the House of Lords from this perspective, reflecting on changes in the upper chamber since the 1999 reforms and evaluating its role within the wider political system. The paper concludes by suggesting that political debate should focus upon small‐scale reforms to ensure that the Lords becomes more effective, representative and legitimate, within the constraints of its present role.     

House of Lords Reform: Are We Nearly There Yet?

Twelve years after coming to office, Labour has still not achieved the second stage of House of Lords reform that was promised in 1997. In July 2008 a White Paper—the government's fifth on the subject—was published, setting out plans for an 80 or 100 per cent elected upper house. This article reviews its prospects. It concludes that although the government is now apparently more in line with the views of its supporters, there are many other obstacles. Fundamental differences remain both within and between the political parties, and several key principles remain unresolved. Progress is therefore unlikely.     

Reforming the Conventions Regarding Parliamentary Scrutiny of Ministerial Actions

Parliamentary scrutiny of government ministers is limited by the convention that one house of parliament cannot compel a member of the other house to appear before it. This convention limits the Senate's capacity to examine ministers who are members of the House of Representatives. It has its origins in UK parliamentary practice, and is given alleged legal force in Australia by virtue of section 49 of Australia's constitution. That section effectively says that Australia's current parliamentary powers, privileges and immunities are those of the UK House of Commons in 1901.
However analysis of UK practice prior to the twentieth century reveals a surprising picture. Far from protecting members of one house from the other house's inquiries, it would seem that invitations issued by one chamber to a member of the other were never refused, an element of 'custom and practice' now conveniently overlooked. Furthermore, the purpose of the powers had nothing to do with protecting ministers. On the contrary, their origins He in a desire to ensure the strength of parliamentary accountability. If modern Australian practice is to be true to historical House of Commons practice, consideration should be given to ensuring that each chamber does have guaranteed access to ministers of the other house.     

Elected Second Chambers and Their Powers: An International Survey

In May 2011, Britain's Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government published proposals for reform of the House of Lords. In a White Paper and draft bill they set out detailed plans for a largely or wholly elected second chamber. These marked the latest stage in a long‐running debate on Lords reform. The government's proposals aim to change the composition of the second chamber, suggesting that there will be no change to its powers or the conventions governing relations with the House of Commons. But this expectation has been disputed. The House of Lords presently does not make full use of its powers, and many anticipate that it would if its members became elected. This paper reviews the composition of all second chambers internationally, showing that wholly directly elected chambers make up the minority, and that both mixed chambers and indirect election are common. It then reviews the formal powers of all largely and wholly elected chambers. This shows that amongst parliamentary systems the formal powers of the House of Lords are relatively great. But second chamber powers, as well as their composition, vary widely.     

The Parliamentary Party

The Conservative parliamentary party will fulfill three important functions for any incoming Conservative government: it will be the focus of attention for the national media; it will be the bulk vote that will deliver its legislative programme; it will form the talent pool from which members of any incoming government will be recruited. A majority Conservative government could see a majority of its MPs newly elected, with more Conservative women and ethnic minority MPs than ever before (although there will be little change in the socio-economic background of their MPs). These new MPs will present problems in terms of party management, although they will be less likely to rebel than longer-serving MPs. There are also relatively few signs of discontent among incumbent Conservative MPs (the article identifies the most rebellious Conservative MPs). Any new Conservative government will also have to deal with a reformed House of Lords, in which it will no longer have a majority.     

A Proposal for Simultaneous Reform of the House of Commons and House of Lords

The disproportional electoral system of the House of Commons is increasingly contested, while the undemocratic composition of the House of Lords has been criticised for a century. I first argue that simultaneous reform of both chambers creates the opportunity for far more optimal outcomes than possible under attempts to reform just one chamber. I then argue that bicameralism should continue so that the UK can be represented in two, currently convoluted, ways: as a singular polity in partisan terms and as both an aggregate of constituencies and union of nations, in geographic terms. The former would best take place in a reformed House of Commons, responsible for government formation, and composed of around 300 MPs elected by ‘pure’ proportional representation. The latter would best take place in a reformed House of Lords of around 300 peers, elected by plurality voting from single-member constituencies. Together, these reforms would improve governance, representation, legitimacy, accountability and the robustness of the union, while retaining celebrated facets of the status quo such as simplicity and the direct constituency link.     

The House of Lords: A Deliberative Democratic Defence

This article defends the idea of an appointed House of Lords using deliberative democratic theory. The analysis suggests that while one might well think that current appointment procedures leave much to be desired, a reformed but still appointed House of Lords would be better at maximising the deliberative democratic qualities of inclusiveness and the scrutiny of arguments than a fully elected one; indeed, that election might do actual damage. It suggests that the debate thus far has been focused too narrowly on an outdated account of democracy, and too narrowly on the peculiarities of the House of Lords in isolation from its institutional context.     

The House of Lords: The Working of the Electoral Process in the 1999 Act of Parliament

This article investigates the working of the 1999 Act of Parliament in relation to the electoral process. One of the more controversial measures in the 1999 Act was the preservation of the representation of the hereditary element in the House of Lords. In the 2007-2008 session of Parliament, Lord Avebury introduced the House of Lords (Amendment) Bill, to repeal this electoral process, and Lord (David) Steel of Aikwood introduced the House of Lords Bill, which had provisions to the same effect as Lord Avebury's Bill. The working of this electoral process is therefore likely to be a topic of debate in the 2008-2009 session of the House of Lords. We suggest that there are three possible options to deal with the likely future issues for this electoral process. These we present as a contribution to a wider debate on the way forward for this constitutional issue.     

Modes of UK Executive–Legislative Relations Revisited

Anthony King's 1976 article ‘Modes of executive–legislative relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany’ is a classic in legislative studies. It argued that it is simplistic to analyse relations between ‘the executive’ and ‘the legislature’ in parliamentary systems, because parliaments are complex organisations comprised of competing actors. Instead, we must consider the various ‘modes’ through which these actors can interact to challenge the executive. As King pointed out, the classic view of the British Parliament was of a dominant ‘opposition mode’ and yet, in fact, the most important relationship was the ‘intraparty mode’: between the government and its own backbenchers. Other options, such as the ‘non‐party mode’ or ‘cross‐party mode’ were considered weak in Britain. This article revisits King's modes in the light of changes at Westminster during the intervening forty years. Developments such as the establishment of the select committee system and a more confident and party‐balanced House of Lords require significant changes to his conclusions. But his central insights, encouraging readers to focus on the multiple relationships inside legislatures, including those within political parties, remain fundamentally important.     

Safe as Houses? Conservative Social Policy,Public Opinion and Parliament

Social policy is of key importance to contemporary society, accounting for two thirds of public expenditure and, through provision such as the NHS, pensions, benefits, schools, universities and social care, touching on the lives of much of the population on a daily basis. It has also been one of the areas where the Conservative party have sought to change their image, and to some extent policies, under David Cameron. Drawing upon a range of evidence, including interviews with more than ten per cent of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, this article examines the potential challenges for a Conservative government of either stance, focusing on the extent of possible support for the Conservatives' approach to social policy amongst three key groups: the public, MPs, and members of the House of Lords.     

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal‐agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi‐experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives—as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions.     

Syposium comment: Improving economic development strategies

There is an old bromide, often associated with former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill, that says “all politics is local.” The papers under review here implicitly raise the question of whether all (or at least a good portion) of economic development is local, and what sort of strategies state and local governments should pursue in fostering healthy economic development.     

House prices and tourism development in Cyprus: A contemporary perspective

This study investigates the nexus between tourism development and house prices in the Republic of Cyprus over the period spanning from 2005Q1 to 2016Q4. Tourism indicators vis‐à‐vis tourism arrivals along with other explanatory variables (the domestic credit, the land area per person, and the consumer price index) are employed in a multivariate autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)‐bound test model. The empirical results indicate a significant evidence of cointegration. Indicatively, an observed adjustment of about 44% from short‐run to long‐run implies that the model is not relatively slow to adjust to disequilibrium. Importantly, a percent increase in tourism arrivals is observed to cause a rise in house price by about 37%. Expectedly, it is statistically observed that as the land area per person decreases, it is accompanied by a hike in house price. Also, the impacts of domestic credit offered to private enterprises and the consumer price index are different from the results in previous studies. As a policy guide, the government of Cyprus and stakeholder in the tourism and housing sectors should outline a strategy that will ensure the social welfare of people such that housing availability is not hampered by tourism activities.     

Still Causing Trouble: The Conservative Parliamentary Party

There have been relatively few backbench rebellions on the Conservative benches in the Commons since 2001, but division manifested itself on three significant occasions: over the Children and Adoption Bill (when the leadership insisted on applying a whip to a vote that many thought should have been 'free'), over Lords reform (where on a free vote a majority of Conservative MPs voted against their leadership's preferred position) and over Iraq (where the divisions were smaller than on the Labour side of the House but where there was a qualitative dimension to the rebellion). Most importantly of all, the events of October 2003, when Iain Duncan Smith was removed as party leader, showed how much power remained with Conservative MPs: they initiated the vote of confidence, in which they alone participated, and the emergence of Michael Howard as the 'unity' candidate meant that the grassroots were denied any role in the change of leadership.     

Issues and Institutions: "Winnowing" in the U.S. Congress

“Winnowing” is the pre‐floor process by which Congress determines the small percentage of bills that will receive committee attention. The vast majority of proposals languish in this vital agenda‐setting stage, yet our understanding of winnowing is nascent. Why do some bills move forward while most fail? I examine that question here by developing and testing a theoretical framework of winnowing grounded in bounded rationality, which includes institutional and sponsor cues and also incorporates the unique issue milieu. A heteroskedastic probit model is utilized to analyze the winnowing fate of all bills introduced across five issue areas in the House and Senate from 1991 to 1998. The findings counter much received wisdom and suggest that the process is indeed cue based. The majority party helps structure this critical process in both chambers, though party effects appear stronger in the House. Contrary to recent work on the rise of Senate individualism, the seniority of the sponsor has significant effects in both the Senate and House, but again exhibits a stronger effect in the House. Surprisingly, presidential proposals are no more likely to survive than typical bills. The findings further suggest that the entrepreneurial efforts of bill sponsors breathe life into this process.     

A NEW PARLIAMENT HOUSE — A NEW PARLIAMENTARY ORDER*

Abstract: The physical design and location of the existing Parliament House has influenced the evolution of Australia's parliamentary system. The new Parliament House will exert a new set of influences. The Executive will assume an entrenched position within its own enclave and Ministers will be physically more remote from backbenchers. The physical arrangements of the Executive entrance and the Prime Minister's suite will encourage a presidential-style status in the office. But the architecture also emphasises the public's access to Parliament in the spirit of Burley Griffin's original conception. There is likely to be a strong “congressional” impetus arising from the prominence given to committee room space and backbencher facilities. Tensions between the Executive and Parliament will be exacerbated. Changes to procedures and to parliamentary administration are also likely to flow from the new layout and facilities. The new building will provide an impetus for widespread parliamentary reform.     

The Polarization of American Environmental Policy: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Senate and House Votes, 1971–2013

The partisan polarization of environmental policy is an important development in American politics, but it remains unclear how much such polarization reflects voter preferences, as opposed to disagreements between partisan elites. We conduct a regression discontinuity analysis of all major environmental and energy votes in the Senate and the House, 1971–2013. In total, we have 368,974 individual roll call votes by senators and House Representatives. The causal effect of electing a Democrat instead of a Republican in close elections on pro‐environmental voting is large: when a Democrat wins, pro‐environmental voting increases by over 40 percentage points. Because of the quasi‐experimental research design, this difference cannot be attributed to the median voter's preferences. Next, we test hypotheses concerning possible explanations for the elite partisan conflict. The Democrat–Republican gap is the widest when fossil fuel interests make contributions exclusively to Republicans and when state‐level public opinion is polarized.     

Bidding behavior in the department of defense's commercial activities competitions

From 1978 to 1994, the Department of Defense conducted more than 2,000 competitions in which private contractors and the government's in‐house team bid to provide a service performed in‐house before the competition. A three‐equation model is constructed, which is used to estimate the in‐house bid, the minimum contractor bid, and the in‐house team's baseline cost. The model accounts for the fact that the in‐house bid is constrained not to exceed its baseline cost. The estimates are used in simulations of the savings from the completed competitions ($1.55 billion annually, 35 percent of the baseline cost) as well as the savings from various alternative policies, including competitively tendering all the functions on the Department of Defense's list of potential candidates ($7.58 billion annually). © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.