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1.
This analysis surveys Al Qaeda's employment of denial and deception (D&D) and shows that it uses D&D on tactical and operational levels in order to achieve strategic results. It defines denial and deception and explains how they relate to Al Qaeda, overviews Al Qaeda's changing network structure and seeks to summarize how Al Qaeda employs D&D throughout its operations. This paper is structured to show that denial and deception are institutionalized factors that manifest themselves through all aspects of bin Laden's organization and that the traditional conception of D&D—that nonstate actors are incapable of employing deception as an element of grand strategy—is incorrect.  相似文献   

2.
In recent years, statements by al Qaeda leaders have included references to topics often associated with global-governance proponents’ critique of the state. This article examines the organization's attitude toward symbols of global governance, giving particular attention to its view of the United Nations as the foundation for global governance, and to the manner in which al Qaeda approaches the central questions of environmental threats and human rights. The organization is seeking to insert itself into the discourse of global governance and use it in an instrumental manner; it focuses on anti-Western narrative and seeks to expose the existing order as designed by Western powers, particularly the United States, for self-serving reasons. However, the article argues, notwithstanding al Qaeda's reputation for sophistication in manipulating public opinion, the organization's references to global governance underscore the limitations its rigid ideology imposes on its messaging efforts. Even though adopting the global governance discourse is in line with the group's effort to improve its image, al Qaeda's extremist ideology limits its ability to take full advantage of the benefits this discourse offers.  相似文献   

3.
The current age of technology, mass communication, and globalization makes networks analysis an especially useful tool for understanding cell-based terrorism. Some concepts from traditional networks analysis may be especially relevant. The Strength of Weak Ties hypothesis (SWT) is particularly promising and will be used here to demonstrate the usability of traditional networks analysis for studying modern terrorism. The findings suggest that the strength of weak terrorist ties may improve Al Qaeda's operational capabilities despite the group's decentralization following the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan beginning in 2001.  相似文献   

4.
The United States has used unmanned, aerial vehicles—drones—to launch attacks on militants associated with Al Qaeda and other violent groups based in Pakistan. The goal is to degrade the target's capacity to undertake political and violent action. We assess the effectiveness of drone strikes in achieving this goal, measuring degradation as the capacity of Al Qaeda to generate and disseminate propaganda. Propaganda is a key output of many terrorist organizations and a long-standing priority for Al Qaeda. Unlike other potential measures of terrorist group activity and capacity, propaganda output can be observed and measured. If drone strikes have degraded Al Qaeda, their occurrence should be correlated with a reduction in the organization's propaganda output. The analysis presented here finds little evidence that this is the case. Drone strikes have not impaired Al Qaeda's ability to generate propaganda.  相似文献   

5.
昝涛 《西亚非洲》2012,(1):128-138
土耳其革命史把1919~1923年间在安纳托利亚发生的革命斗争定性为一场为了建立土耳其共和国而进行的民族独立运动。这种革命意识形态主导下的史观忽略了当时历史情形的复杂性,带有很强的革命目的论色彩。在安纳托利亚的革命阵营中,存在着对奥斯曼王朝、伊斯兰教或土耳其民族等不同身份的忠诚,以及对所有这些忠诚的混合;更多人是忠于苏丹-哈里发的,并非一开始就有建立独立的土耳其国家的明确目标。以凯末尔为首的共和主义者为了其革命目的和统一战线的需要,不得不暂时与强大的保守势力妥协。  相似文献   

6.
This article examines the transformation of the Chechen conflict from a predominately nationalist to jihadist struggle, and compares the similar changes that took place in the Kashmiri insurgency. Using global jihadist strategy and ideology, and the accompanying influence of Al Qaida, both conflicts are shown to have taken on a new ideology and to have expanded beyond previous areas of operation. In both instances, the political leadership wrapped themselves in the mantle of political Islam (Islamism) as ensuing violence led to rapid socioeconomic transformation and social breakdown, thus allowing foreign jihadists to exert power and take up/divert the cause. In the past few years, two main groups originating in Chechnya and Kashmir have taken on Western targets and become more indoctrinated in Al Qaida's global jihadist ideology: the Caucasus Emirate (CE) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The opportunist franchising strategy of Al Qaida could come to play a role in the future of both groups, especially if the CE is able to coalesce into a more unified front. More importantly, the global jihadist attributes of the CE must begin to garner the same attention in the Western world as that of LeT.  相似文献   

7.
The article explores ideological fault lines among Sunni Muslim militants (jihadists) in Europe since the mid-1990s. It argues there have been disputes among the militants about whether to prioritize local struggles or Al Qaeda's global war, and about the legitimacy of launching terrorist attacks in European states offering political asylum to Muslims. It concludes that Europe's militants have become more ideologically unified in conjunction with the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Mohammed drawings, seeing European countries as legitimate and prioritized targets, and identifying with Al Qaeda.  相似文献   

8.
The U.S. government's new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific represents a bold strategic choice that could animate U.S. national security policy for years to come. Yet the United States must balance its rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the volatility that still exists in other areas of the world. The United States should pivot to the Asia-Pacific—but to protect its vital interests, it should also hedge against threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. To implement a “Pivot but Hedge” strategy, the U.S. government should do three things. First, it should exercise caution when cutting the defense budget. Second, it should give the military services greater leadership roles in specific regions: naval and air forces should lead in the Asia-Pacific, while ground forces should lead in the greater Middle East. Third, it should maintain expansible, capable, and well-trained ground forces as a hedge against global uncertainty.  相似文献   

9.
American counterterrorism strategy defines as “moderate” or “mainstream” any Muslim who does not support the jihadi extremists, which sets the bar very low and does not consider the question of how widespread such support actually might be. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is not the lunatic fringe of Sunni Islam—it is the fanatic core of Sunni Islam, and shares much of its ideology with other organized Islamic groups and, for that matter, much of the Muslim faithful. “Moderate” Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are moderate only in relative terms, are mostly antidemocratic, and are more correctly considered nonviolent enemies of the U.S. This being the case, a democratic opening in the Muslim Middle East is all too likely to bring to power profoundly antidemocratic groups that are virulently and possibly violently hostile to the U.S. A possible alternative strategy is one stressing good government, with gradual democratization as societies decompress.  相似文献   

10.
Islam's diversity is a direct result of centuries of schism and factionalism, and presents a challenge to the original spirit of unity as envisaged by its founder, the Prophet Mohammed. Rivalry within Islam undermines the precedent notion of unity through communal belonging (tawhid and ummah). Yet in the twenty-first century this diversity is ignored, and political Islam is represented as being more of a monolith than a spectrum of ideas and aspirations. Generally, the materialization of new Islamist groups is a challenge to those who hold that unity is all. In the Gaza Strip, specifically, the dominant Islamist actor, Hamas, is facing internal challenges from other Islamist elements. These rival Islamists are also influenced by events across their border in post-revolutionary Egypt where a plethora of new Islamist actors are vying for political space and power. This article deals with Hamas's Islamist rivals, and the effects they have had on Hamas's governance of the Gaza Strip, and political and religious legitimacy within it. It will focus on ideological and violent disputes between the Islamist elements in Gaza, and the means by which Hamas and its security elements have tackled newly emerging rivals.  相似文献   

11.
This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our—and our allies'—attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities—that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives—along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized “bunches of guys” as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.  相似文献   

12.
Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I use a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In Iranian politics specifically, it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key constitutional positions and pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics.  相似文献   

13.
ABSTRACT

Why did the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)—two groups that shared similar ideological preferences and were both initially part of the Al Qaeda network—take different paths in the Syrian conflict? Part of the answer lies in the fact that JN is primarily a Syrian organization, whereas Iraqis lead ISIS. A jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile (the two are not always the same) helps to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior. Yet no method of categorization based on jihadist-state relations exists. I fill this gap by theorizing an explanatory typology based on a jihadist group’s relationship with its country of origin and/or domicile. This typology consists of two tiers. The first classifies jihadist organizations based on whether they are nationally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether they are based in their country of origin, exile, or multiple locations. The second tier categorizes groups based on the nature of their engagement—collaborative, belligerent, or neutral—with a state. This new typology enables the generation of multiple hypotheses and has practical implications given that most U.S. counterterrorism efforts require cooperation from partner nations.  相似文献   

14.
Although scholars focused on Soviet–American relations during the Cold War, the greatest number of conflicts for the U.S. occurred in the Third World, and most of these were with revolutionary states. Could U.S. policies toward the new revolutionary states have prevented the almost universal collapse in relations? Two dominant explanations for this breakdown are (1) American hostility toward revolutionary change and (2) Stephen Walt's variant of the spiral model. Using the comparative case approach and selecting "hard cases," this article disputes these explanations and offers a new theory based on the externalization of domestic conflict in the revolutionary states. Given their ideological goals, the radicals externalized their domestic conflicts with the moderates, who had transnational ties with the U.S., by fomenting tensions with Washington. To demonstrate that this theory can be generalized, this article varies the dependent variable and shows through a critical case that its lack of conflict can best be explained by the absence of the conditions that lead to externalization. The foreign policies of both the U.S. and revolutionary states are explained by classical realism as opposed to Walt's structural realism, which fails to account for the foreign policies of Third World states.  相似文献   

15.
Abstract

In the beginning faith was the alpha and omega of revolutionary dreams and terrorist actions. This article will examine case studies among the Peoples of the Book—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—for religious terrorism is not the product of one faith. It argues that the cultural resonance of each movement examined offers a blank slate on which contemporary seekers, dreamers, and fighters may write. The title, borrowed from a popular novel, is the leitmotif of this form of violence. By all objective forms of analysis, the movements chronicled in these pages are a parade of seemingly stupid ideas held by idealists, fools, and fanatics who dreamed that, with God at their side, they could bring perfection to a fallen world. In such a cause, antinomian violence is inevitable and genocide its logical outcome. Yet these early movements are not to be despised, for together it was they, not the huddled masses cowering before the powers that be, that created the modern world.  相似文献   

16.
This paper proposes a model for explaining shifts and variations in U.S. grand strategy. The model is based on a distinction between four ideal-type grand strategies or ideational approaches to security according to the objectives and means of security policy: defensive and offensive realism, and defensive and offensive liberalism. While the four approaches are continually present in the U.S. policy community, it is the combination of two systemic conditions—namely the distribution of capabilities and the balance of threat—that selects among the competing approaches and determines which grand strategy is likely to emerge as dominant in a given period. Great power parity is conducive to realist approaches. In contrast, a situation of hegemony encourages the emergence of ideological grand strategies, which focus on ideology promotion, according to the ideology of the hegemon. In the case of a liberal hegemon, such as the United States, liberal approaches are likely to emerge as dominant. In addition, a relative absence of external threat encourages defensive approaches, while a situation of high external threat gives rise to offensive strategies. Thus, various combinations of these systemic factors give rise to the emergence of various grand strategies. This model is tested in two cases of the two most recent shifts in U.S. grand strategy following 1991. In accordance with the expectations of the model, a change in the distribution of capabilities with the end of the Cold War made possible a change from realist to liberal strategies. In the benign environment of the 1990s the dominant strategy was defensive liberalism, while the change in the balance of threat after 9/11 gave rise to the grand strategy of offensive liberalism.  相似文献   

17.
《国际相互影响》2012,38(3):243-248

The purpose of this paper is to develop a formal model of the arms export process that incorporates the complementary ideas of a fuzzy decision‐making goal and a fuzzy decision‐making constraint. The model is formulated as a control problem: The decision‐making actor—in this case, a hegemonic exporter—will attempt to control the evolution of its political relationship with a prospective importer by choosing, over time, a sequence of arms transfer strategies. The exporter's strategic choices will be influenced by its fuzzy goal (a fuzzy set of political relations outcomes between the two states that the exporter seeks to maximize) and its fuzzy constraint (a fuzzy set of arms options that the exporter is constrained to choose by virtue of the preferences of the importer's neighbors). The solution to the control problem is the exporter's optimal policy sequence, and this is uncovered via the dynamic programming optimization technique. The model is illustrated by the multistage decision‐making of the U.S. for Egypt in the years 1968–1971 and 1974–1977.  相似文献   

18.
《Orbis》2016,60(4):609-631
The particular difficulties that Taiwan's new administration faces are paradoxical, for their origin no longer has to do with ensuring the continuing existence of the state. That seems assured. Rather, the challenges arise because U.S. and China's diplomacy in the 1970s assumed that Taiwan was going to disappear, but it failed to do so. This fact created an embarrassing—and probably insoluble—long-term problem for China. To be sure, much commentary still suggests that if not on the verge, Taiwan and China are at least on a one-way road to unification, shadowed by the concern that China will not wait forever, ready to “impose” unity when it is finally fed up.  相似文献   

19.
The present article first traces Ambassador Steinhardt's career from his days at Columbia University (1909–1915) to his successful legal career as a partner at Guggenheimer, Untermyer & Marshall in New York City. It then studies Steinhardt's diplomatic career that commenced in 1933, when President Roosevelt sent him as U.S. minister in Sweden. This was followed by appointments—as U.S. ambassador—in Peru and the Soviet Union. His wartime service as U.S. ambassador to Turkey is examined closely since the lessons learned there would have been applicable at his next post, Prague, Czechoslovakia.  相似文献   

20.
A 2008 poll of 430 Ottawa Muslims found predominantly negative views of the U.S. war on terrorism, including the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan. This poll also assessed approval of Western powers (U.S., Canada, Israel, United Nations) and challengers of Western power (Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizballah, government of Iran). Surprisingly, attitudes of Ottawa Muslims toward militant Muslim groups were unrelated to their attitudes toward Western governments. Discussion suggests that this pattern, if confirmed in other Muslim polls, would mean that the war of ideas against radical Islam must address not one target but two: favorable opinions of militants and unfavorable opinions of the U.S. Muslims who come to like the West more may not like Muslim militants any less.  相似文献   

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