Democracy's Effect on Terrorist Organizations: Regime Type and Armed Group Behavior in Chile

How does democracy influence terrorism? The regime-responsive school argues that lack of representation in autocracies motivates violence; the regime-permissive school posits that individual liberty in democracies allows it. The schools thus disagree about the democratic feature to which violence responds—representation or individual liberty. These arguments are problematic in two ways. First, neither accounts for the potentially competing effects of different democratic features. Second, treating terrorism as a set response to operating context ignores the operational processes behind violence, described in organizational theories of terrorism. This article develops a bridge between the regime-responsive and regime-permissive schools by applying organizational theories of terrorism to their key arguments. I argue that representation and individual liberty have independent, and sometimes competing, effects on armed groups' missions, hierarchies, and membership—collectively organizational capacity, the ability to survive and influence the environment. This explains the mixed effects of democracy on terrorism: both high-functioning democracy and repressive autocracy weaken organizational capacity, but decreased representation in a democracy or higher individual liberty in an autocracy removes organizational stresses. New research on Chile between 1965 and 1995—representing five government periods, with four armed groups operating—acts as an initial test of these relationships.     

The Cost of Terrorism: The Relationship Between International Terrorism and Democratic Governance

After Al Qaeda's destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, many democracies reacted to the event, and to international terrorism in general, by passing laws restricting civil liberties and political rights, raising questions about the balance between security and liberty. Such laws have produced alarms among civil libertarians, worldwide. Are the alarms justified? In this article we analyze the relationship between the yearly number of international terrorist attacks in 24 countries from 1968–2003 and (a) measures of civil liberties and political rights as provided by Freedom House, and (b) levels of democracy as measured in the Polity IV scales. We take the number of international terrorist events, by country, from data provided by the Memorial Institute of the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) http://www.tkb.org/Home.jsp. Our analysis indicates that there is, generally, no relationship between the number of international terrorist events and the levels of civil rights, political rights, or democracy as measured by the Freedom House and Polity IV indicators. When there is a statistically significant relationship, it is negative, opposite to what is predicted by the tradeoff hypothesis.     

Horizontal accountability and the challenges for democratic consolidation in Africa: evidence from Liberia

Why are most African emerging democracies failing to consolidate and reach the two-turnover test? Most scholars attribute this to the poor quality of elections and limited institutionalization of vertical accountability, overlooking some important variables. This article challenges this conception both theoretically and empirically by focusing on the quality of horizontal accountability illustrated by observations of comparative interest in Liberia's emerging democracy. Since the end of Liberia's bloody civil war in 2003, two successive and successful democratic elections (2005 and 2011) have been organized, putting Liberia on the path towards democratic consolidation. When analysing the electoral mechanism of vertical2016 accountability, many scholars have been enthusiastic about the prospects of democratic consolidation in Liberia, most of them neglecting the horizontal accountability processes that are also crucial for the quality and durability of democracy. This article analyses the processes and challenges of democratic consolidation in Liberia by focusing on key institutions of horizontal accountability. It argues that although the country has made some progress towards democratization since 2005, the domination and centralization of executive power, weak and dependent institutions of horizontal accountability (legislature, judiciary, national elections commission, general auditing commission, and anti-corruption commission) are major challenges to the consolidation of democracy. These findings have important implications for our understanding of horizontal accountability and democratic consolidation in African emerging democracies.     

Perils of parliamentarism? Political systems and the stability of democracy revisited

Parliamentary systems are generally regarded as superior to presidential ones in democratic sustenance. This article contributes to the debate on the relationship between systems of government and the survival of democracy by bringing in a new perspective and analysing the experiences of 131 democracies during 1960–2006. We argue that systems of government do matter, but their effects are indirect; they exert their influence through societies' prior democratic records. Confirming the conventional argument, our data analysis shows that uninterrupted parliamentary democracies face significantly lower risks of a first breakdown than their presidential counterparts. Contrary to the common understanding, however, we find that the risk of a democratic breakdown can be higher for parliamentary regimes than for presidential regimes among the countries whose democracy has collapsed in the past. Furthermore, the risk of a previously failed democracy falling again grows as (the risk of) government crises increase(s). Hence our study questions the common belief that parliamentary systems are categorically more conducive to democratic stability than presidential ones.     

Destabilizing Effects of Terrorism on Party System Stability

In democracies with stable party systems, voters can more easily trace policy decisions from parties and representatives within the government to specific policy outcomes. Consequently, party system stability (PSS) has been reportedly linked to a variety of factors including economic conditions, democratic performance, political institutions, and socioeconomic cleavages. While informative, these lessons offer precious little insight into other factors that can destabilize a party system. In this work, we surmise that terrorist attacks have important implications for two commonly used measures of PSS. The results of a pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis confirm our hypothesis: deadly attacks proximate to elections destabilize party systems, even when controlling for multiple standard controls. In addition, the level of democratic consolidation within states also influences the degree that fatal terrorist attacks affect party system stability. These findings are based on terrorism data collected from the Global Terrorism Database and from PSS data compiled by the authors.     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

Regime Age and Terrorism: Are New Democracies Prone to Terrorism?

One of the earlier empirical studies of the relationship between regime type and terrorism published in International Interactions determined that while established democracies were significantly less likely to experience terrorist attacks than were nondemocratic countries, newly established democracies were highly vulnerable to terrorism. Subsequent empirical studies have routinely controlled for both regime type and age, but scholarly understanding of the effect of regime longevity on terrorism remains underdeveloped. This study revisits the relationship between terrorism and regime type and regime age using updated data, analytical techniques, and time-series and finds that while young democracies experience more terrorism than older democracies, dictatorships of any age experience less terrorism than any other type of regime.     

Perceived human rights and support for new democracies: lessons from Mexico

Political elites in emerging democracies are likely to promise improvements on human rights. From an empirical perspective, however, emerging democracies tend to perform rather poorly in this domain. Given this tension between elite rhetoric and performance, it is important to examine the extent to which citizens in emerging democracies evaluate democracy and new democratic leaders' performance on the bases of their perceptions of respect for human rights. This topic remains largely unexplored and conventional wisdom suggests that economic satisfaction, not human rights concerns, drives individuals' support for democracy. We aim to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the extent to which specific and diffuse political support is related to individuals' perceptions of respect for human rights in the context of an emerging democracy. Taking advantage of two representative survey data sets from Mexico from 2003 and 2010, our empirical findings suggest that citizens are more likely to support their president, their government and democratization when they believe that human rights are respected. By examining the relationship between democracy and human rights protections at the individual level, our research is a pioneering effort to better explain the interaction between the prospects of democratic consolidation and perceptions of human rights.     

How Democracies Respond to Terrorism: Regime Characteristics,Symbolic Power and Counterterrorism

While the academic study of counterterrorism has gained momentum in recent years, it still suffers from major theoretical weaknesses. One of the most prominent shortcomings is an absence of theories that can effectively explain the factors that shape the counterterrorism policies of democratic regimes. The present study attempts to fill this theoretical void in two ways. First, it proposes an analytical framework for a classification of counterterrorism policies. Second, it presents a theoretical framework that strives to uncover the factors that have influenced the struggle against domestic terrorism in democratic regimes. The analyses, which have used a unique and comprehensive dataset that documents counterterrorism policies in eighty-three democracies, show that the robustness of the regime's democratic foundations as well as the symbolic effect of terrorism are major forces in shaping the democratic response to it, while the direct impact of terrorism is less influential than assumed in the literature.     

War and Democratization: Lessons from the Portuguese Experience

The literature on democracy suggests that new democracies should have difficulty emerging during war or in the aftermath of armed struggle, yet Portugal's current democracy emerged simultaneously with the end of the nation's unsuccessful war in Africa. This article addresses the reasons and argues that democracy triumphed not simply in spite of the war but also, in part, because of it. The costs and geography of the war itself, the capacity and rootedness of the state that waged the war, the political culture of the regime's military officers, and the war-related timing of Portugal's first elections all helped prevent the emergence of an anti-democratic coalition and contributed to ensuring a successful transition to democracy. The article ends with three ideas that merit closer examination: that different sorts of wars leave different legacies for democracy; that wars that leave state bureaucracies intact or stronger are more likely to be followed by lasting democracy than those which do not; and, finally, that the ideologies of military elites are pivotal to the outcome of post-war democratic transitions.     

Defending democracy with international law: preventing coup attempts with democracy clauses

In recent decades many regional inter-governmental organizations have adopted agreements committing all member states to maintain democratic governments, and specifying punishments to be levied against member states that revert to authoritarianism. These treaties have a surprisingly high enforcement rate – nearly all states subject to them that have experienced governmental succession by coup have been suspended by the relevant IGO(s). However, relatively little is known about whether these treaties are deterring coups. This article offers an original theory of how these international agreements could deter coups d’état, focusing on the way that a predictably adverse international reaction complicates the incentives of potential coup participants. An analysis of the likelihood of coups for the period of 1991–2008 shows that states subject to democracy were on average less likely to experience coups, but that this finding was not statistically significant in most models. However, when restricting the analysis to democracies, middle-income states with democracy clauses were significantly less likely to experience coup attempts. Moreover, the African democracy regime appears to be particularly effective, significantly reducing the likelihood of coup attempts for middle-income states regardless of regime type.     

Arab national security in the 1980's. Threats and strategies

Scholars increasingly are accepting the empirical generalization that democracies almost never go to war with each other, and infrequently even engage in militarized disputes with each other. It has not been clear, however, whether the rarity of conflict between democracies is caused by some aspect of being democratic, or whether it is caused by some other variable or variables that may be correlated with democracy. Using data on all independent states for the period 1946–1986, we examine the effects of political system type, distance, wealth, economic growth, alliances, and political stability. The results suggest that, although most of the other variables do have an effect, as hypothesized, there still seems to be an independent effect of political system type: democracies engage in militarized disputes with each other less than would be expected by chance. The effect may be enhanced by political stability; that is, states which can be perceived as stable democracies are less likely to be involved in disputes with other democracies.     

Terrorism and democracy: What recent events disclose

This paper is the second in a series of analyses which explore relationships between terrorism and democracy. In this instance, the authors use the Rand‐St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism for 1994, as well as the US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism collection of events for 1995. The authors use these data sets to determine if there is a linkage between the occurrence of terrorist attacks and the type of incumbent political regime in the countries where they are perpetrated. The two classifications of political regimes were drawn from Robert Wesson's 1987 study Democracy: a Worldwide Survey and the Freedom House Publication Freedom in the World for 1984–85 and 1994–95, in order to evaluate the impact of regime change on the incidence of terrorist events. Our principal finding, consistent with earlier work, is that terrorist events are substantially more likely to occur in free and democratic settings than in any of the alternatives. We do discover, though, that change in and of itself makes a difference. Countries which underwent regime change in the period under consideration were more likely to experience terrorism than countries which did not.     

Towards a universal framework for democracy assessment

Assessing the state or quality of a country's democracy has become an increasingly widespread undertaking over the past ten years, whether to construct league tables of democratic attainment, to explore correlations between democracy and economic condition or performance, or to identify likely recipients and projects for international aid. This article reports on a civil society-based programme and framework for democracy assessment in which the author has been involved, whose purpose is to contribute to public debate about a country's democracy, to monitor its progress over time, and to identify pressing areas for reform. Distinctive features of the methodology are the derivation of assessment criteria from clearly articulated democratic values, its relevance to new and established democracies alike, and the comprehensiveness of the assessment framework, covering citizen rights and the rule of law, institutions of representative and accountable government, civil society and participation, and international dimensions of democracy. The article explores the intellectual underpinnings of the assessment methodology in the universal validity of democratic norms and a common imperative for democratization in developed as well as developing countries; and argues for the framework's usefulness in teaching as well as research. It concludes with a brief report on the comparative findings from pilot assessments undertaken with in-country partners in eight countries from across the world.     

Ideological radicalism and democratic experience in new democracies

In comparing publics’ ideological self-placements between established and new democracies, it has been observed that there is a higher proportion of citizens who express radical views in the latter countries. This is likely due to sharp differences with regard to evaluations of past authoritarian rule, the legitimacy of the new regime, or new institutional arrangements governing the distribution of power when countries embark on democratic transition. Studies on the attitudinal aspect of democratic consolidation lead one to expect a decrease in extreme views in new democracies with the passage of time, as questions of regime principles and institutions are settled, and citizens come to accept democracy as the “only game in town”. The present article investigates whether this proposition is applicable to “Third Wave” new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia by examining longitudinal public opinion data from 23 countries. In addition to the length of democratic regimes, We also analyse the impact of economic performance, quality of governance, and electoral systems on the proportion of radical citizens. Results show that while longer democratic experience does contribute to reducing extremist leanings, factors such as the level of corruption, rule of law, and plurality electoral rules play a more substantive role.     

Representative Democracy and Fighting Domestic Terrorism

Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.     

Global Patterns and Postcommunist Dynamics

Many of the new democracies that have been formed since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 lack what had long been understood as preconditions for the democratic project: an earlier history of democratic politics, high personal incomes, a large middle class, and/or settled borders. The most distinctive aspects of this wave of democratic transitions are rapid regime change and the rise of democracies that exhibit a mixture of both authoritarian and democratic elements. This article explores what these new democracies can teach us about the factors that seem to encourage a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and what factors seem to contribute to its sustainability and institutionalization.     

De-idealizing the democratic civil peace: on the political economy of democratic stabilization and pacification in Argentina and Ecuador

In the liberal concept of a ‘democratic civil peace’, an idealistic understanding of democratic stabilization and pacification prevails: democracy is seen to guarantee political stability and social peace by offering comprehensive representation and participation in political decisions while producing outcomes broadly in accordance with the common interest of society. This contrasts with the procedural quality and the material achievements of most, if not all, really existing democracies. South America is paradigmatic. Here, the legitimation of liberal democracy through both procedure and performance is weak and yet ‘third wave democracies’ have managed to survive even harsh economic and political crises. The article presents a conceptual framework to analyse historically specific patterns of democratic stabilization and pacification. Analyses of the processes of socio-political destabilization and re-stabilization in Argentina and Ecuador since the late 1990s show how a ‘de-idealized’ perspective on the democratic civil peace helps explain the viability of democratic regimes that systematically deviate from the ideal-type conditions for democratic survival that have been proposed in the literature.     

Institutions of Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America's Presidential Democracies

The crisis of representative democracy in Latin America became apparent in a wave of constitutional reforms during the 1990s. A striking feature of these reforms was the incorporation of institutions of direct democracy (IDD) into most post-transitional Latin American constitutions. Despite the shortage of efficient mechanisms of accountability and its concomitant weakening of democratic consolidation in the region, the potential of IDD to bolster accountability in the representative structures of presidential democracies has not yet received systematic scholarly attention. To fill this theoretical gap, the article presents a typology designed to assess the accountability potential of IDD, which is used to classify the constitutional provisions for direct democracy in Latin America's 18 presidential democracies. After juxtaposing the findings of constitutional analysis to the actual record of direct democracy in the region, the article concludes that there is a considerable discrepancy between constitutional accountability potential and the empirical evidence. Whereas the adoption of IDD has hardly affected the vertical dimension of accountability, the practice whereby presidents use referendums to bypass legislative opposition has worked to the detriment of the horizontal dimension of accountability.