Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and accessibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues.     

Science and Politics in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in Brazil

This paper analyzes the regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in Brazil, focusing on the debates that preceded the enactment in 2005 of the current Biosafety Law and the factors (both domestic and international) that influenced the policy‐making process. More specifically, it identifies the social and governmental actors that influenced the congressional debates, showing how their interests and agenda were translated into two different institutional frameworks. Here, the policy outcome was what we call a “hybrid” and “conciliatory” regulatory model, which formally acknowledges the importance of both technical/scientific and social/political considerations in the evaluation of GMO biosafety and engages most of the stakeholders in the regulatory process. The new policy regime also establishes a middle ground between the conflicting demands of promoting agricultural development and protecting the country's biodiversity.     

Reform Politics through the Creation of Inefficient Political Institutions: The Case of the 2007 Danish Administrative Reform

This article poses the question of whether reform politicians' pursuit of institutional goods may, under certain circumstances, lead to the creation of inefficient political institutions. The theory of weakening political actors through the creation of inefficient political institutions, as elaborated by Terry M. Moe, is applied in a comparative analysis of two main elements in the recent Danish administrative reform: the consolidation of 270 municipalities into 98 larger ones, and the creation of five new macro regions with special responsibilities. In contrast to the coherent institutional structure of the municipalities, the level of coherence in the regional reform elements is inappropriate and inefficient. The article shows that the different institutions in the municipalities and the regions can be interpreted as an attempt by the (national) reform parties to prevent other political actors from gaining access to future substantial, as well as institutional, goods.     

The Politics of Regulation: A Comparative-Historical Study of Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in Australia and the United States

Australia and the United States adopt radically different approaches to occupational health and safety regulation, even though their ultimate objectives in this policy area are effectively the same. The US regulatory style is more centralised, legalistic and adversarial, in contrast to Australia's state-based and more consensual approach. This difference in regulatory approach dates from the 1970s: for the 100 years prior to that, workplace health and safety regulation in both countries took a similar legal, institutional and administrative form. The reasons for the contemporary regulatory divergence lie in the distinct national configurations of state and societal institutions in the two countries and the different constellation of political actors involved in regulatory design and reform.     

Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Corporatism: The Impact of Market and Technological Change on the Dutch Polder Model

This article describes how market and technological change can be conceived to affect corporatist politics in the area of waste management. The article adopts a political economy approach to institutional change, and seeks to trace the impact of market and technological change on established political and regulatory institutions. The article demonstrates that the main impact of marketization of waste services and the introduction of ISO 14001 environmental management systems was to expand the range of choices for companies and regulators to engage in regulatory interaction concerning environmental waste management practices. The main purpose of the article is to demonstrate exactly how the emergence of regulatory choices for both companies and regulators is likely to open up new avenues for regulation in the environmental field that, once pursued, systematically reduce incentives for corporate and regulatory actors to engage in associational politics.     

Corporate governance and political impediments to regional harmonization: cases from East Asia

Abstract

Is the harmonization of financial regulatory regimes possible in East Asia? Focusing on corporate governance, which many see as a critical part of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and which is also seen as unresponsive to calls for change, this paper argues that such harmonization is possible, but that it will not be according to the standards advocated by the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and other international organizations. At present, actors generally feign compliance with these international rules and standards. The pattern of noncompliance is reflective of two types of regulatory models at work in East Asia, which correspond to democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The manner by which these political institutions mediate the influence of key actors determines corporate governance outcomes. Three cases illustrate the key dynamics: Singapore (nondemocracy), South Korea (democracy), and pre- and post-World War II Japan (change from nondemocracy to democracy). By identifying the key actors that determine regulatory outcomes, this paper points to a more realistic regulatory framework. This alternative framework is a compromise between the standards advocated by international organizations and the domestic political realities of East Asia.     

Regulating finance after the crisis: Unveiling the different dynamics of the regulatory process

It is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.     

Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission

Credible commitment problems arise whenever decisions made according to short‐term incentives undermine long‐term policy goals. While political actors can credibly commit themselves to their long‐term policy goals by delegating decisions to independent regulatory agencies, the member states of international institutions rarely sacrifice control over regulatory decisions. Against the backdrop of the United Nations Compensation Commission established by the Security Council to settle claims on damage from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, we present an institutional arrangement that promises to credibly commit member states to their previously defined interests without excluding them from the decision process. It separates the stages of rulemaking and rule application, and is reinforced by conditional agenda‐setting of an advisory body. We probe the theoretical claim with evidence from a unique data set that shows that the Commission settled compensation claims in a remarkably consistent way. The arrangement provides a blueprint for comparable regulatory tasks in many areas of international, European, or domestic politics, in which independent regulation is not feasible.     

From developmental to regulatory state? Japan's new financial regulatory system

Abstract

Recent financial reforms in Japan and elsewhere in Asia represent, for various authors, a fundamental shift in financial governance and in state–business relations in the region. The old ‘developmental’ state in East Asia has supposedly made way for a neoliberal ‘regulatory’ state, with its emphases on agency independence and the non-discretionary enforcement of rules. I show in this paper that this interpretation exaggerates the extent of the transformation in the important case of Japan. Although the outward institutional forms of economic governance in Japan, as with many Asian developing countries, has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s, discretion still remains at the core of economic and financial policy. In the area of Japanese banking regulation and supervision, I show how this highly discretionary application and enforcement has been consistent with domestic political pressures. The result is a substantial divergence between superficial convergence upon international regulatory standards and underlying behaviour. I also give reasons why globalization does not mean that this hybrid regulatory model is unsustainable.     

CAPITAL MOBILITY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, and FRENCH MONETARY DIPLOMACY

This article evaluates the role of increased capital mobility, sectoral interests, and domestic institutions in bringing about policy change in French capital markets. Capital mobility played an indirect role by making it more costly for French governments to pursue inflationary economic policies. But it was domestic politics, not capital mobility, that led governments to achieve lower inflation by stabilizing the exchange rate. The key domestic political factor was institutional change to regulatory practices, while financial markets reduced bank lending to industry and internationalized French finance, breaking the strong ties and comon monetary diplomacy interests of bankers, industralists, and policymakers, and thereby weaken the political priority of promoting domestic growth and industrial competitiveness.     

To enforce or not to enforce? Judicialization,venue shopping,and global regulatory harmonization

The regulation of intellectual property rights takes place in a range of international venues. This proliferation of international venues greatly enhances the potential for venue shopping. We argue that different levels of domestic regulation and differing degrees of judicialization account for actors' preferences over institutional venues. We take into consideration two scenarios. Conceiving of judicialization as the delegation of adjudication to an independent third party and the enforcement through multilaterally authorized sanctions, we show that: (i) upward regulatory harmonization leads actors preferring weak regulatory intellectual property rights standards to strive for venues with low degrees of judicialization, whereas those favoring stringent intellectual property rights protection prefer highly judicialized venues; and (ii) downward harmonization leads to the opposite constellation of institutional preferences. We show how these expectations hold by way of in‐depth case studies of two instances of global intellectual property rights regulation: the regulation of plant genetic resources and intellectual property rights for medicines.     

Still a poster child for social investment? Changing regulatory dynamics of early childhood education and care in Denmark and Sweden

This paper investigates the regulation of publicly organized early childhood education and care (ECEC) in Denmark and Sweden, through the regulatory welfare state (RWS) framework. The analysis focuses on how alterations in funding and quality of care are shaped by governmental and nongovernmental actors at national and local levels of government. Through focused structured analysis, we examine how various actors have shaped the funding and quality of childcare in Denmark and Sweden, from the early 2000s to 2020, with special attention to the period during and after the 2008 financial crisis. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, concerns about quality in care were raised on the political agenda by various actors in both countries, leading to decisions to improve the quality of care. Yet, the regulatory dynamics differ: In Denmark, the debate led to a decision in 2019, to implement a minimum statutory requirement of regulatory quality standards. From an RWS perspective, this outcome can be qualified as “double expansion,” because regulatory quality standards, and public funding for childcare increased. In Sweden, the debates about quality of ECEC led, in 2016, to political guidelines about quality standard, but with no additional national funds, and no mandatory regulatory quality requirements. Analytically, this can be qualified as “regulatory-led expansion,” that is requirements for quality standards, although the lack of additional national funds suggests that it will be difficult to improve ECEC quality substantially. The RWS perspective, which focuses on national and municipal levels of governance, also gives insights into hidden inequalities between municipalities regarding funding and quality of ECEC, which are more pronounced in Sweden than in Denmark.     

Gorillas in the closet? Public and private actors in the enforcement of transnational private regulation

This paper examines to what extent the background presence of state regulatory capacity – at times referred to as the “regulatory gorilla in the closet” – is a necessary precondition for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation. By drawing on regulatory regimes in the areas of advertising and food safety, it identifies conditions under which (the potential of) public regulatory intervention can bolster the capacity of private actors to enforce transnational private regulation. These involve the overlap between norms, objectives, and interests of public and private regulation; the institutional design of regulatory enforcement; compliance with due process standards; and information management and data sharing. The paper argues that while public intervention remains important for the effective enforcement of transnational private regulation, governmental actors – both national and international – should create the necessary preconditions to strengthen private regulatory enforcement, as it can also enhance their own regulatory capacity, in particular, in transnational contexts.     

The IMF's Rethink of Global Banks: Critical in Theory,Orthodox in Practice

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new financial interconnectedness agenda, developed in response to postcrisis calls from G20 to better understand systemic financial institutions, deploys a critical approach that stresses the spatial, political, and institutional dimensions of cross‐border financial networks. It portrays global banks as key nodes in those networks, “super‐spreaders” of systemic risk through complex business models that involve yield search, regulatory and tax arbitrage. Yet this critical view does not translate into its policy advice at country level. In regular surveillance of developing countries, the IMF remains committed to a benign view of transnational banking, even when confronted with growing cross‐border fragilities. During crises of cross‐border banking, the IMF tailors its conditionality to minimize domestic regulatory challenges to cross‐border banking models and to propose crisis measures that create new profit opportunities for transnational banks.     

Understanding the rise of the regulatory state of the South*

This paper, and the special issue it introduces, explores whether, and how, the rise of the regulatory state of the South, and its implications for processes of governance, are distinct from cases in the North. With the exception of a small but growing body of work on Latin America, most work on the regulatory state deals with the US or Europe, or takes a relatively undifferentiated “legal transplant” approach to the developing world. We use the term “the South” to invoke shared histories of many countries, rather than as a geographic delimiter, even while acknowledging continued and growing diversity among these countries, particularly in their engagement with globalization. We suggest that three aspects of this common context are important in characterizing the rise of the regulatory state of the South. The first contextual element is the presence of powerful external pressures, especially from international financial institutions, to adopt the institutional innovation of regulatory agencies in infrastructure sectors. The result is often an incomplete engagement with and insufficient embedding of regulatory agencies within local political and institutional context. A second is the greater intensity of redistributive politics in settings where infrastructure services are of extremely poor quality and often non‐existent. The resultant politics of distribution draws in other actors, such as the courts and civil society; regulation is too important to be left to the regulators. The third theme is that of limited state capacity, which we suggest has both “thin” and “thick” dimensions. Thin state capacity issues include prosaic concerns of budget, personnel and training; thick issues address the growing pressures on the state to manage multiple forms of engagement with diverse stakeholders in order to balance competing concerns of growth, efficiency and redistribution. These three themes provide a framework for this special issue, and for the case studies that follow. We focus on regulatory agencies in infrastructure sectors (water, electricity and telecoms) as a particular expression of the regulatory state, though we acknowledge that the two are by no means synonymous. The case studies are drawn from India, Colombia, Brazil, and the Philippines, and engage with one or more of these contextual elements. The intent is to draw out common themes that characterize a “regulatory state of the South,” while remaining sensitive to the variations in level of economic development and political institutional contexts within “the South.”     

Regulatory Competition and the Politics of Financial Market Reform in Britain and Japan

This article examines the impact that the internationalization of jnance has had on the regulation of domestic securities markets in Japan and Britain. In particular, it seeks to explain the apparent incompatibility of two distinct trends: deregulation (and state retreat) on the one hand, and increased regulation and state involvement in markets on the other.
Much of the literature about the efects of internationalization on domestic policymaking has drfjculty explaining these two distinct regulatory frends. First, there has been no uniform "competition in regulatory laxity." Second, the United States does not appear to have exerted hegemonic influence over outcomes. Finally, domestic-level explanations which deny the importance of systemic-level influences on domestic policy choices are unable to explain the similarity of policy choices undertaken by governments with very different regulatory traditions.
I argue instead that regulatory reforms have been undertaken primarily for the benefit of a particular set of private economic actors—mobile consumers of financial services, including both holders of liquid investment capital and large multinational borrowers. Internationalization has systematically strengthened their influence over the policymaking process by making "exit" from one political marketplace to another a more realistic and more potent bargaining strategy than the alternative of exercising "voice."     

Domestic drivers of transgovernmental regulatory cooperation

Transgovernmental cooperation among domestic regulators has generated considerable interest among scholars and policymakers. While previous research has focused on describing such regulatory networks, we know very little about what drives individual jurisdictions to join them. The question of membership is important because it determines the reach of rules and standards promulgated by a given network, and because it is logically prior to understanding the rulemaking dynamic within a network. We develop a set of hypotheses that highlight the role of domestic political factors in shaping network membership. Our empirical analysis, using an original data set for transgovernmental cooperation in securities and insurance regulation, finds that the institutional form of domestic market regulation, as well as the relative domestic weight of the industry, are closely correlated with membership. All else equal, jurisdictions with independent regulatory agencies and those where the industry in question represents a large share of gross domestic product are much more likely to join the respective network than jurisdictions without these characteristics. The paper underscores the important interactions between domestic and international factors for informal cooperation, an issue that has become increasingly central to global governance.     

Do Political Similarities Facilitate Interlocal Collaboration?

This research examines the extent to which political similarities—that is, homophily between political actors at the local level—affect patterns of interorganizational collaboration in an emergency response situation. While the field of emergency management has focused on implementation‐oriented arrangements among key stakeholders, few studies have systemically investigated the creation and development of interorganizational collaborations led by political actors, especially following catastrophic events. The analysis reveals that a dyadic tie with political homophily boosts local responders’ ties with other agencies during emergencies. Findings indicate that political solidarity, formulated by chief elected officials of municipalities and council members, can broaden the scope of interorganizational collaboration by mitigating institutional collective action problems at the local level. This research presents a critical recommendation for emergency managers that interlocal collaboration for timely response to a disaster is attributable to political similarities that facilitate frequent interlocal interactions through formal and/or informal agreements.     

Local effects of the new land rush: How capital inflows transformed rural Russia

Rising global prices for agricultural commodities have led to the inflow of capital to rural economies and to transfers of land ownership to new agricultural operators (NAOs) in developing and post‐Soviet countries. How capital inflows affect rural communities is often explained with the variable of institutional strength, an explanation aligned with the good governance approach to economic development: Capital inflows have positive developmental effects, if strong domestic institutions vet land deals and regulate NAOs. Contra the focus on institutional parameters as exogenous variables, this article highlights the role of political projects in shaping local outcomes and driving institutional change. Evolving political priorities are important to understand domestic rural transformations because they lead to interventions that privilege some actors as agents of change, while others are sidelined—hence transforming local economies. This theoretical suggestion is based on a study of Russia's rural transformation that followed a significant influx of capital.     

沿海十省（市）药品监管机构能力之比较研究

在构建社会主义和谐社会的当代中国,药品的安全性和有效性正日益引起人们的关注,而药品监管机构能力的建设与评估也开始成为社会监管领域的重要问题.通过回顾国内外已有的对政府能力概念和要素的研究,借用Nelissen的潜在能力和现实能力理论,结合世界银行2003年《世界发展报告》中对机构现实能力的要素分析和"行政储备"理论对机构潜在能力的要素分析,构建起药品监管机构能力的结构模型,并提出一套评估的指标体系.对数据进行标准化处理后,通过统计排序对沿海十省(市)药品监管机构能力进行评估和比较,进而利用最小二乘法(OLS)建立回归模型,分析潜在能力中的财力和人力因素对现实能力的贡献率.研究发现:地区财力对监管机构现实能力的影响较之人力因素要大,这在理论和实践中都可以得到证实;各地药品监管机构的潜在能力与现实能力之间存在较大差异,就那些现实机构能力较低的地区而言,现阶段有必要把工作重点放在医药企业生产经营行为的监管和农村地区医药监管基础设施的建设上;而对于潜在机构能力较低的地区来说,从"专业化、程序化和独立性"等方面提升机构整体的人力资源是当务之急.