Legislative Control of Powers Delegated to the Executive: The Case of the EU

How can legislators derive the benefits of delegation without unduly empowering the executive? This article investigates how this dilemma is met in the European Union (EU) political system where executive power is delegated to the Commission. The argument is that the European member states have found a unique solution. They install committees of member state representatives to monitor the EU Commission, the so‐called comitology committees. However, the extent to which comitology committees are installed and their exact competence vary considerably across policy areas. This article uses a delegation perspective to understand this variation. An analysis of comitology provisions in 686 directives and regulations shows that institutional conflict and issue complexity, well‐known factors from the delegation literature, are important predictors of comitology control of the Commission. The findings support one of the two prevailing images of comitology—comitology as a control mechanism, not deliberative democracy.     

Comitology: Little procedures with big implications

Comitology refers to a collection of procedures by which various committees of national experts moderate the Commission's powers of implementation under EU legislation. These procedures establish the rules which inform front‐line administrative operations and embrace a dimension of the implementation activity which has been largely ignored by the academic literature. The nature and incidence of the comitology procedure seriously challenge the notions of competence transfer and national interest which inform the key debates in integration theory. Comitology suggests a complexity and issue specificity to Union politics which confound the institutional determinism of both neo‐functionalism and neo‐realism, and support more recent integration theory derived from public management and international political economy which concentrate on policy outcomes, rather than institutional processes.     

To Scrutinise or Not to Scrutinise? Explaining Variation in EU-Related Activities in National Parliaments

There is an on-going debate in the literature as to whether national parliaments can and do play an active role in EU policy-making. The main reason for persistent disagreement is the lack of comparative empirical data on parliamentary behaviour in EU affairs. The article aims to contribute to this debate by presenting the first comparative quantitative data on European affairs activities of national parliaments and by explaining the empirical variation. The development of a unique dataset including all 27 national parliaments allows a series of explanatory variables to be tested for the level of parliamentary activity at both the committee and the plenary levels. The analysis shows that institutional strength in EU affairs plays an important role. Overall, however, EU activities can be better explained with a mix of institutional capacities and motivational incentives. The specific combinations vary for different types of activities.     

How to Measure the Europeanisation of a National Legislature?

While there is no shortage of research on national parliaments and European integration, empirical studies on the impact of EU on domestic legislatures are lacking. This article contributes to the literature by discussing the challenges involved in measuring the Europeanisation of national parliaments and through suggesting several hypotheses and indicators – EU-related national laws, the use of control instruments (confidence votes and parliamentary questions) in EU matters, and the share of committee, plenary and party group meeting time spent on European matters – that can be used in subsequent comparative research. Evidence from Finland shows the differentiated impact of Europe: while the share of domestic laws related to EU is smaller than often argued, particularly committees are burdened to a much larger extent by European matters.     

The Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union Committee System

This article investigates both the operation and the democratic legitimacy of the European Union committee system. This vast but rarely studied system is an important site of European governance, exercising an increasing amount of policy responsibility while also providing the essential arenas necessary for supranational problem solving. Despite their contribution to the success of the “European project,” committees are increasingly coming under attack, notably for their lack of democratic credentials. The article employs original empirical research based on interviews and internal documentary evidence to answer a timely question: does the EU committee system strike an appropriate balance between the values of system effectiveness and democratic legitimacy? Following the application of a set of democratic principles to EU committees, the article finds that a poor balance has been struck between effectiveness and democracy. The article concludes with some operational suggestions for improving this balance in the short‐to‐medium term.     

Who Controls National EU Scrutiny? Parliamentary Party Groups,Committees and Administrations

The article addresses the question of how parliamentary actors, namely parliamentary party groups, parliamentary administrators and committees, interact with each other in the new post-Lisbon institutional environment. On the basis of assessing scrutiny of EU proposals in the spheres of pensions and labour migration in the parliaments of Sweden, the Czech Republic and Romania, the article comes to the conclusion that despite existing opportunities for parliamentary administrators and committees to obtain greater leverage, parliamentary party groups continue to play a crucial role in defining the outcomes of the scrutiny process. Parliamentary party groups tend to focus on the division of competences between the EU and member states even when they have electoral incentives to address the content of EU proposals.     

Multiple Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Government Officials

The questions posed in the current study are (1) whether, and (2) how, participation within Commission expert committees and Council working parties of the European Union (EU) affects the coordination behaviour of the participants. Based on organizational theory arguments, the coordination role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is arguably weakened by institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert committees. The opposite is argued to be the case within Council working parties. Empirically, this study is based on 160 questionnaires and 47 face-to-face interviews with Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish domestic government officials attending EU committees. Secondly, this study also includes answers from 49 officials at the permanent representation to the EU of these three Scandinavian countries. Being excluded from attending Council working parties, Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission expert committees are shown to coordinate considerably less with the foreign ministry than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. Notwithstanding these observations, this study also reveals how the coordination behaviour evoked by national civil servants reflects their domestic institutional affiliations. In addition to showing how EU committees affect coordination behaviour among the participants, the current analysis also shows how responses to integration requirements are filtered – and even conditioned – by a prior state of affairs at the domestic level of governance.     

Analysing the Links between National Capitals and Brussels in EU Foreign Policy

The article contributes to the study of EU foreign policy decision-making processes by analysing the links between national officials working in the committees of the Council of the EU and their capitals. Through an original dataset of 138 questionnaires (and 20 interviews) with national representatives, it explores the micro-foundations of the formulation of EU foreign policy. It first shows how, even in this most intergovernmental field, diplomats in Brussels play a very important role in the policy process: only 30 per cent claim to always have a mandate and half state that they do not feel constrained by their capital. Next, it reveals that if (larger) member states attempt to retain control of CFSP/CSDP negotiations, the effective discretion/autonomy these officials enjoy depends on the experience accumulated in the decision-making process, and knowledge of the (formal and informal) links between Brussels and the home department.     

Committee bias in legislatures with a high degree of party cohesion: Evidence from Danish municipalities

The institution of committees in democratic legislatures has for years been said to bias policy making because the preferences of committee members differ from, and are more alike than, those of other legislators due to self‐selection to the committees. Based on an analysis of United States Senate committees, Hall and Grofman suggested in 1990 that the preferences of committee members primarily diverge from, and are more alike than, those of non‐committee members on policy issues that are salient to constituencies or at least to an easily definable segment of constituencies. This article argues that the logic of Hall and Grofman should in fact be reversed in legislatures characterised by highly cohesive parties. Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that in such legislatures the preferences of committee members are more likely to be alike than those of non‐committee members in the committees that work with policy issues of less salience to constituencies. Using a large‐scale comparative design comprising data collected in 2008 on the spending preferences of 1,348 Danish local politicians, evidence is found supporting this hypothesis. This finding points to the importance of considering the role of parties when assessing committee bias.     

大国干部调配:中国省级党委常委的来源

地方领导干部的来源不仅能够反映其本人的政治职业特征,也能够反映上级党委及政府选人用人的基本特征。以时下350名省级党委常委为观察对象,通过描述性统计分析发现:省级党委常委的来源类型包括本省选拔、外省调入和中央下派,且以前二者为主,后者为辅;不同来源类型的省级党委常委各自所担任的职务存在明显差异,外省调入和中央下派的常委大多担任更为重要的职务;不同来源类型的省级党委常委在不同地区所占的比例也存在差异,经济越发达或政府治理能力越高的地区,本省选拔的省级党委常委的平均比例也越高,反之,则外省调入的省级党委常委的平均比例越高;不同来源类型的省级党委常委的职务来源也并不相同。当前省级党委常委来源类型的整体分布与地域分布,显示了中央在搭建优势互补、更具政治整合性的省级党委常委领导班子上所做的努力。     

Committee choice and the core under supramajority rule: Results from simulation of majority choice in 2-dimensional space

While simple-majority choice by committees is generally unstable, supramajority rule has been demonstrated to yield nonempty sets of stable outcomes: outcomes in the core. This paper reports results of a computer simulation of majority choice by committees under supramajority rule. The object is to explore the transition from unstable to stable committee choice with increasing supramajority rules. The findings are that supramajority rule limits the instability of committee choice; that stable committee choice is no more predictable than unstable committee choice; and that an optimal supramajority rule can be specified which minimizes instability and maximizes the predictability of committee choice. In all of the results, simple-majority rule plays virtually no role.     

Who gets what and why? Committee assignments in the German Bundestag

Although committee assignments have been researched in various parliaments, findings are inconclusive. This article contributes to the debate by analysing the allocations to specialised committees in the Bundestag, a legislature that establishes strong committees despite having strong parliamentary party groups. Studying assignments in this legislature can, therefore, help us to solve the present disjunction between ‘European’ and ‘American’ experiences regarding committee research. The study uses the congressional theories of legislative organisation as heuristic devices but explicitly highlights the strong involvement of parliamentary party groups. The hypotheses are tested with a multiple membership multilevel model across several legislative periods (1990?2013) and backed up with evidence from 51 interviews with German legislators. The results show that next to constituency demands and the influence of regional factions, there is strong evidence for a reassignment pattern and that a legislator’s occupational background and connections to interest groups matter in the assignment process.     

Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union

Delegation in the European Union (EU) involves a series of principal‐agent problems, and the various chains of delegation involve voters, parties, parliaments, governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament. While the literature has focused on how government parties attempt to monitor EU affairs through committees in national parliaments and through Council committees at the EU level, much less is known about the strategies opposition parties use to reduce informational deficits regarding European issues. This article argues that the European Parliament (EP) offers opposition parties an arena to pursue executive oversight through the use of written parliamentary questions. Using a novel dataset on parliamentary questions in the EP, this article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) ask questions of specific Commissioners. It transpires that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to ask questions of Commissioners. Questions provide these parties with inexpensive access to executive scrutiny. This finding has implications for the study of parliamentary delegation and party politics inside federal legislatures such as the EP.     

The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting

Congress confronts two major organizational problems that affect the behavior of legislators, party leaders, and groups doing business with congressional committees: The costly nature of monitoring and the absence of explicit mechanisms for upholding agreements. The problem of monitoring implies that party leaders will have a difficult time influencing decisions made in decision-making arenas where the actions of legislators are less visible, as in congressional committees. While legislators can evade leadership monitoring of their actions within committees, once an issue leaves a committee, the costs of monitoring decline, and leadership influence increases. The absence of mechanisms for assuring that legislators keep their bargains means that groups will place an emphasis on dealing with reliable legislators — those who can be counted upon to uphold their end of a bargain. Thus, party leaders are more effective in influencing floor voting because of their better ability to monitor legislator behavior; however, obligations to important interest groups will be more immune to leadership influence because of the incentives for committee members to adhere to their bargains.     

The analysis of Scottish Parliament committee influence: Beyond capacity and structure in comparing West European legislatures

Abstract.  The Scottish Parliament was set up in the hope that strong committees would foster consensus, with an emphasis on reducing partisanship and adopting a pragmatic approach to the detailed study of draft legislation. However, few empirical studies exist that assess the value of the committee process. This flaw is common within the West European literature. The comparative literature on legislative influence is lacking in detailed empirical studies (in part because of the dominant assumption within the literature that parliaments are peripheral to the policy process). Most studies provide impressionistic discussions of the capacities of committees and the constraints to their effectiveness. They do not follow this through with an analysis of committee 'outputs'. This study of the amendments process in the Scottish Parliament addresses the gap. It uses data from a four-year study of legislative amendments to develop indicators of parliamentary outputs. While the results confirm that the committee system operates at the heart of the 'new politics' in Scotland, further such individual country studies are necessary to supplement much broader comparative analyses.     

Appointments to boards and committees via lottery,a pathway to fairness and diversity

• Public appointments for committees or boards can be controversial due to cronyism or pandering to demands of noisy or powerful interest groups. One relatively unexplored method for selecting committee or board members is random selection which has advantages beyond interrupting cronyism. This paper canvasses the strengths and weaknesses of an unusual selection method and makes a case for the use of a lottery as a robust process that will lend legitimacy and credibility to committee or board governance.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees

This article explains why parliamentary groups invite interest groups to the parliamentary arena. It argues that interest groups’ access to committees not only reflects policy-makers’ need for information and expertise but also party preferences and institutional factors such as the type of government, parliamentary committee structure and committee agenda capacity. Results show that interest groups’ access to the parliamentary arena increases under minority governments, in the case of highly conflictual issues, and when the number of permanent committees increases. Also, results demonstrate that parliamentary groups invite interest organisations following different logics – problem-solving or confrontation logic – depending on the type of functions they have to perform – legislative and oversight activities. The article uses a novel, comprehensive database with information on the appearances of all interest groups in the Spanish parliament from 1996 to 2015.     

Women on the Sidelines: Women's Representation on Committees in Latin American Legislatures

This article explores how new groups can be marginalized after they gain representation in the legislature. We use data from six Latin American legislatures to examine the effect of institutional and political factors on how traditionally dominant male political leaders distribute scarce political resources—committee assignments—to female newcomers. In general, we find that women tend to be isolated on women's issues and social issues committees and kept off of power and economics/foreign affairs committees as the percentage of legislators who are women increases, when party leaders or chamber presidents control committee assignments, and when the structure of the committee system provides a specific committee to deal with women's issues. Thus, to achieve full incorporation into the legislative arena, newcomers must do more than just win seats. They must change the institutions that allow the traditionally dominant group to hoard scarce political resources .     

Committee structure and political preferences: The case of Norwegian local government

Abstract.  In Norway, as in the other Nordic countries, sector-based policy making in local government is considered a problem as it is alleged to take place at the expense of a more integrated approach. Inspired by American rational choice theories on committee power, this article first sets out to establish whether the distributive rationale of the present committee system actually does promote sector-orientation among local politicians. This approach is challenged by alternative theories on committee power, focusing on the informational rationale in specialisation and the relevance of partisanship . The findings suggest that all the three theories explain in part committee member' preferences, but partisanship is most important for explaining both spending preferences and preferences on organisational forms. The article goes on to explore whether recent local council reforms, intended to replace the sector-oriented system with strong committees by a new de-specialised system with weaker committees, are likely to curb the effect of sector on committee members' preferences. The conclusion here is not easy to draw, but it is clear that sector-orientation is not encouraged by the reforms; in fact, the opposite seems to be the case. What local councils may have overlooked, however, is the influence of the informational rationale on committees and their members. The analyses are based on data obtained from a random sample of 119 of Norway's 435 municipalities.     

Committee Assignment Politics in the Danish Folketing

Committees are the backbone of nearly every modern legislature. Yet there is relatively little knowledge about how committee assignment politics occur in the multiparty parliaments with minority coalition governments that so often are the case in many European countries. Is there a pattern to which MPs are assigned to which committees? In this article the Danish case is used to address this question. A dataset of all committee assignments in the Danish Folketing from the period 1994–2007 has been collected; added to this are data on each MP. The data are analysed using a quantitative approach, and drawing on the literature on committee assignments in the United States Congress and the European Parliament, complementing the vast qualitative studies, and updating the few quantitative studies, of the Danish parliamentary committees. The results show that which variables have an influence on committee assignments varies across parties and that no uniform pattern is found.