Culture,Institutions and Campaign Effects: Explaining the Outcome of Malta's EU Accession Referendum

This survey examines the background to and the campaign preceding Malta's EU accession referendum. The result of the referendum, which was held on 8 March 2003, and which was the first of the EU accession referendums of 2003, was a 53.65% vote in support of membership, on a turnout of close to 91%. Explaining both the relatively low support for EU accession and the high turnout on referendum day involves weighing up the relative impact of distinctive features of Malta's political culture and institutional framework against more immediate campaign effects. While the conclusion is that the high turnout in the Maltese EU accession referendum can be traced to Malta's political culture, the relatively low but positive vote in favour of membership can only be fully understood by focusing on a range of factors, including campaign-related factors, such as the credibility of the arguments presented by the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps and the balance of resources available. The most important factor explaining the result of the Maltese referendum are, however, the cues provided by the political parties prior to and over the course of the referendum campaign.     

EU Accession and the New Slovak Consensus

In May 2003, Slovakia produced the highest percentage of ‘yes’ votes ever in an EU accession referendum, although turnout was only just above the 50 per cent necessary for it to be valid. After deep political polarisation in the 1990s, a consensus had been formed on the overriding need for EU membership, which was supported by all parliamentary political parties. It was the first Slovak referendum ever where not only the answer to the question, but also the propriety of holding the referendum, were not the subject of bitter political argument. However, despite impressive civic voter participation campaigns in the two previous national elections, a low level of contestation made it hard to mobilise all pro-EU voters yet again for the referendum. Lack of leadership, and the hope that turnout would drop below 50 per cent, also encouraged the Eurosceptic minority to abstain.     

A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003

The Czech Republic's 13–14 June 2003 referendum on accession to the European Union was the seventh of nine held in candidate states due to join the EU on 1 May 2004. Despite the presence of two strong Eurosceptic parties and the perceived Euroscepticism of Czech public opinion, the pro-accession camp scored a convincing victory. This account analyses the historical, political and institutional context of the referendum and the campaign. It concludes that despite high elite contention over the EU and the overwhelming resources advantage of the ‘Yes’ camp, Czech voters were minimally influenced by the campaign. Rather, they took their cue from longstanding positive linkages of ‘Europe’ with democracy, market reform and Czech identity.     

Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns: The power of the anti‐EU side

European Union (EU) referendums provide unique opportunities to study voters’ attitudes toward a distant level of governance. Scholars have long tried to understand whether EU referendum results reflect domestic (dis‐)satisfaction with the incumbent governments or actual attitudes toward the Union. Finding evidence supporting both domestic and European factors, the recent focus has thus turned to referendum campaigns. Recent studies emphasise the importance of the information provided to voters during these campaigns in order to analyse how domestic or European issues become salient in the minds of voters. These studies nonetheless overlook the asymmetrical political advantage in such campaigns. The broader literature on referendums and public opinion suggest that in a referendum, the ‘No’ side typically has the advantage since it can boost the public's fears by linking the proposal to unpopular issues. This article explores whether this dynamic applies to EU treaty ratification referendums. Does the anti‐EU treaty campaign have more advantage than the pro‐EU treaty campaign in these referendums? Campaign strategies in 11 EU treaty ratification referendums are analysed, providing a clear juxtaposition between pro‐treaty (‘Yes’) and anti‐treaty (‘No’) campaigns. Based on 140 interviews with campaigners in 11 referendums, a series of indicators on political setting and campaign characteristics, as well as an in‐depth case study of the 2012 Irish Fiscal Compact referendum, it is found that the anti‐treaty side indeed holds the advantage if it engages the debate. Nonetheless, the findings also show that this advantage is not unconditional. The underlying mechanism rests on the multidimensionality of the issue. The extent to which the referendum debate includes a large variety of ‘No’ campaign arguments correlates strongly with the campaigners’ perceived advantage/disadvantage, and the referendum results. When the ‘No’ side's arguments are limited (either through a single‐issue treaty or guarantees from the EU), this provides the ‘Yes’ side with a ‘cleaner’ agenda with which to work. Importantly, the detailed data demonstrate that the availability of arguments is important for the ‘Yes’ side as well. They tend to have the most advantage when they can tap into the economic costs of an anti‐EU vote. This analysis has implications for other kinds of EU referendums such as Brexit, non‐EU referendums such as independence referendums, and the future of European integration.     

Hungary: Unpicking the Permissive Consensus1

Hungary's was the only referendum on EU membership held in Western or East-Central Europe by the time of the Union's 2004 enlargement in which less than half the electorate participated. The ‘yes’ result was high, reflecting broad pro-accession sentiment but also low participation, a relationship linked to the status of EU membership in the post-communist context. This analysis focuses on explaining the low referendum turnout. It finds that most non-participation was due to longstanding features of Hungarian electoral behaviour and public attitudes to the EU which feature in Szczerbiak and Taggart's model, namely low levels of participation in elections in general and referendums in particular, low contestation of EU membership at elite and mass levels, and a low intensity of EU-related preferences. It also suggests that the kind of anti-government partisanship which in non-post-communist settings might be translated into ‘no’ positions, in the Hungarian case primarily contributed further to abstention.     

Referendums on Membership and European Integration 1972–2015

There are many myths about referendums. The most common one is that voters are inherently sceptical and tend to vote no when given the opportunity. This article analyses some of the commonly held ‘truths’ about referendums on EU matters. Based on a statistical analysis of all forty‐three EU‐related referendums since 1972, it shows that governments tend to lose referendums if they have been in office for a long time, that emotive words on the ballot paper are correlated with a high yes vote and that a high turnout is correlated with a vote against European integration, but campaign spending is inconsequential. Based solely on statistical evidence from the previous forty‐three referendums, the opponents of EU membership will win the Brexit referendum.     

Denmark's referendum on the euro: The mouse that roared ... again

Just as they had almost a decade earlier, Danish voters on 28 September 2000 went to the polls and sent Shockwaves through the European Union by rejecting a government‐sponsored referendum on joining the EU's single currency, the ‘euro’. Danes said ‘Nej’ to the embattled currency, casting new doubt on their country's commitment to the European project and emboldening eurosceptics throughout the continent and across the English Channel. The decision to remain outside the eurozone is notable for the humiliation it caused Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his government, as well as for the impetus is gives to a two‐tier EU. The ‘yes ‘ camp's failure to keep the campaign based on economic rather than political logic, the euro's precipitous decline, and the EU's sanctions against Austria contributed to the referendum's dramatic outcome.     

History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum

This analysis explains why Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU and how the 50% turnout requirement was achieved fairly easily. It argues that most Poles appeared to accept the historical significance of the referendum and de-coupled the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in an extremely unpopular government. This occurred because most key political and social actors, including the opposition parties, called for a Yes vote, while, at the same time, a vigorous campaign by pro-EU civic organisations presented a ‘non-political’ face to the campaign. Although the No camp made tactical errors and had difficulties staying focused on its main arguments, lack of both access to the public media and a convincing or attractive alternative made it extremely difficult for them to mount an effective campaign. At the same time, the stability of the opinion polls in the years leading up to the referendum suggested that most Poles had already made their minds up about the issue well in advance. In spite of the low levels of trust in political parties, partisan cues appeared to be a better predictor of referendum voting behaviour than socio-economic and demographic factors.     

UK Euroscepticism and the Brexit Referendum

This article shows that key to understanding the referendum outcome are factors such as a profoundly eurosceptic public, high levels of citizen uncertainty, divided mainstream political parties on the EU and lack of unity within the ‘Leave’ campaign. The Brexit referendum is more than just about domestic issues and government approval. Utilitarian concerns related to economic evaluations of EU integration coupled with support of or opposition to EU freedom of movement are very likely to influence vote choice. Those campaigns that focus on rational utilitarian arguments about the costs and benefits related to EU membership as a whole but also to EU freedom of movement are expected to swing voters.     

Who's European? Scotland and England Compared

In the Brexit referendum in 2016, Scotland voted 62 per cent Remain, and England 53 per cent Leave. This article explores whether this came about because more people in Scotland considered themselves ‘strongly European’ compared with people in England. Analysis of Scottish and British Social Attitudes survey data for 2017 shows that people in Scotland are significantly more inclined to say they are ‘strongly European’ (45 per cent) than in England (34 per cent), a finding that holds true across the spectrum of socio‐demographic and political variables. Nevertheless, the key predictors of being strongly European are similar in both countries: having liberal values, high levels of education, political party support, as well as being British, while in Scotland supporting the Scottish National Party and being in favour of independence are important. ‘Being European’ has taken on different meanings in Scotland and England as the aftermath of the Brexit referendum works its way through the political process.     

Rebels without a Cause? The Irish Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty

The Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty follows a pattern of class-voting also seen in the 2005 referendums on the European Constitution. However, the poll differed in other respects. Polling in the wake of the vote suggested that the main reason given for voting no was a lack of knowledge about the treaty (22 per cent of no voters holding that view). A further 40 per cent of the voters voted no because they claimed not to understand the Treaty. This is in contrast to referendums in 2005 in Spain and the Netherlands where, respectively 70 and 51 per cent, of those with a self confessed 'very limited ' knowledge of the Constitution voted yes.     

Balancing Democratic Civilian Control with Effectiveness of Intelligence in Romania: Lessons Learned and Best/Worst Practices Before and After NATO and EU Integration

This article reviews Romania's intelligence reform after 1989. Specifically, it looks at intelligence reform before and after Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004, and the European Union (EU) in 2007. It finds that Romania has made considerable progress in intelligence reform. That is because Romania, which expressed its desire and commitment to join NATO/EU after 1989, has worked hard to comply with these organizations’ membership demands (including intelligence reform). After NATO/EU integration (when demands on balancing control and effectiveness virtually vanished), despite continued openness efforts made by agencies, control/oversight diluted. Thus, post-NATO/EU, while effectiveness is being strengthened, democratic control lessens.     

Buying into Myths: Free Movement of People and Immigration

The way in which free movement of people has become the central issue of the British government's renegotiation and referendum campaign on the UK's relationship with the European Union (EU) risks obfuscating at least three central issues: why immigrants are coming to the UK; what impact EU migrants are having on the UK; and what can be done to effectively regulate such inflows. It is, however, not just the eurosceptics and the British government, but also ‘in campaigners’ and other EU member states, who risk perpetuating a number of widely held misconceptions about free movement and immigration for political reasons. Buying into such myths risks undermining attempts to have a more honest and more evidence‐based debate about immigration and migrant integration.     

Resurgent Remain and a Rebooted Revolt on the Right: Exploring the 2019 European Parliament Elections in the United Kingdom

The 2019 European Parliament (EP) election took place against the backdrop of the vote for Brexit and the failure of Parliament to agree on a withdrawal agreement. Nigel Farage’s new Brexit Party topped the poll and the pro‐Remain Liberal Democrats, which called for a second referendum on EU membership, returned from electoral obscurity to take second place, while other pro‐Remain parties similarly performed well. In sharp contrast, the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, recorded their lowest combined vote share since they became the main representatives of the two‐party system. In this article, we draw on aggregate‐level data to explore what happened at the 2019 EP election in Great Britain. Our evidence suggests Labour suffered from a ‘pincer movement’, losing support in its mainly white, working class ‘left behind’ heartlands but also in younger cosmopolitan areas where Labour had polled strongly at the 2017 general election. Support for the new Brexit Party increased more significantly in ‘left behind’ communities, which had given strong support to Leave at the 2016 referendum, suggesting that national populists capitalised on Labour’s woes. The Conservatives haemorrhaged support in affluent, older retirement areas but largely at the expense of the resurgent Liberal Democrats, with the latter surging in Remain areas and where the Conservatives are traditionally strong, though not in areas with younger electorates where the party made so much ground prior to the 2010–2015 coalition government. Lastly, turnout increased overall compared with 2014, but individuals living in Leave areas were less motivated to vote. Overall, our findings suggest that those living in Remain areas were more driven to express their discontent with the Brexit process and more inclined to support parties that offer a second referendum on Britain’s EU membership.     

England,Englishness and Brexit

In the 1975 referendum England provided the strongest support for European integration, with a much smaller margin for membership in Scotland and Northern Ireland. By 2015 the rank order of ‘national’ attitudes to European integration had reversed. Now, England is the UK's most eurosceptic nation and may vote ‘Leave’, while Scotland seems set to generate a clear margin for ‘Remain’. The UK as a whole is a Brexit marginal. To understand the campaign, we need to make sense of the dynamics of public attitudes in each nation. We take an ‘archaeological’ approach to a limited evidence‐base, to trace the development of attitudes to Europe in England since 1975. We find evidence of a link between English nationalism and euroscepticism. Whatever the result in 2016, contrasting outcomes in England and Scotland will exacerbate tensions in the UK's territorial constitution and could lead to the break‐up of Britain.     

Elite Collusion and Public Defiance: Sweden's Euro Referendum in 2003

In a referendum held on Sunday, 14 September 2003, the Swedish electorate rejected membership of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). After a campaign characterised as heated by Swedish standards, and the murder of Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, the referendum delivered a clear ‘No’ majority. In this article, it is argued that while the 2003 EMU referendum may not have compromised the use of referendums as an occasional complement to representative democracy, it did indicate a substantial gap between citizens and the political elite.     

Referendum Campaigns,Framing and Uncertainty

Research on campaign dynamics and voting behaviour in direct democracy suggests that referendum campaigns can be seen as processes of learning. This finding stems from two assumptions: (1) information has mediating effects – the more voters know about the issue at stake, the stronger the effect of issue preferences in their decision-making; (2) campaign volatility and framing effects are linked to weak campaigning and voters’ lack of information. The aim of this article is to suggest the limitations of this approach and discuss the effects of framing in referendum campaigning. It is argued that campaign volatility as well as framing effects are not always related to voter ignorance and information-weak campaigns but rather to qualitative shifts in the underlying value interpretation linked to referendum proposals. These shifts are possible no matter how well-informed voters are. The expectancy-value model, commonly used in psychological research, is used to make sense of framing effects in volatile as well as stable referendum campaigns.     

The generational decay of Euroscepticism in the UK and the EU referendum

A prominent feature of media coverage during the UK’s referendum on European Union (EU) membership was the stark difference between the pro-EU young and their Eurosceptic elders, widely assumed to reflect a generational divide. The positive relationship between age and hostility towards the EU is well established in academic research, however only Down, and Wilson [(2013). “A rising generation of Europeans? Life-cycle and cohort effects on support for ‘Europe’.” European Journal of Political Research 52: 431–456] have considered whether this reflects a generational or life-cycle effect. While their research confirms that there is such a generational effect, their capacity to explain it is limited. This study utilizes data from Britain and builds on previous attempts to identify and explain generational trends in Euroscepticism, bridging it with studies on individual-level determinants of hostility towards the EU, providing the most detailed assessment of the extent and causes of generational differences in Euroscepticism to date. The results confirm that today’s young people are the most supportive generation of EU membership, caused by a combination of factors including their experience of the EU during their formative years, their relationships with domestic political institutions, and their access to education.     

‘What do we have to lose?’: Local economic decline,prospect theory,and support for Brexit

The Brexit referendum confronted British voters with a choice that could have profound consequences for the British economy in a context of high uncertainty. Drawing on important lessons from prospect theory, I argue that citizens who were in the domain of economic losses were more likely to take a risk and vote in favor of Brexit. On the contrary, I hold that citizens who were in the domain of economic gains tended to be more risk averse and were more likely to support ‘Remain’ in the referendum. Using data from several waves of the British Election Study 2014–2019 Internet Panel, I find strong support for these theoretical expectations. British voters who lived in declining areas were significantly more likely to think that leaving the EU would lead to improvements in the national economy. These prospective economic evaluations (captured about a month prior to the referendum) in turn are related to the ‘Leave’ vote in the Brexit referendum.     

A tale of firsts: the 2019 Austrian snap election

Abstract

The 2019 Austrian snap election, held on 29 September 2019, was preceded by a series of scandals. Most prominent among them was the so-called ‘Ibizagate’ involving the former Vice-Chancellor and FPÖ party leader, Heinz-Christian Strache. The scandal eventually led to the collapse of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in May 2019 and the formation of a caretaker government. The election day in September brought a clear victory for the ÖVP with an increase of almost six percentage points, compared to its vote share in the 2017 election. The second big winner was the Green party which scored the best result in the party history with 13.9 per cent of the vote. Amid scandals, the FPÖ saw its support fall to only 16.2 per cent; the election also resulted in an all-time low for the SPÖ achieving only 21.2 per cent. The article presents the background, the election campaign and the results of the 2019 Austrian election, discussing the wide range of ‘firsts’ that characterized them, including the formation of the first ÖVP-Green coalition government in Austria.