China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands

Abstract

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China–Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce.     

The ethos of sovereignty: A critical appraisal

Taking as its starting point the commonly held claim about the obscurity of the concept of sovereignty, the article first identifies a fundamental paradox between the classical Westphalian notion of state sovereignty and human rights. In the rhetoric of international politics, attempts to establish the responsibility of states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms within their jurisdictions are often countered with claims referring to the “sovereign equality” of all states and the subsequent principle of non-intervention. The article suggests that in a more contemporary understanding of sovereignty the responsibility of a state to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen as a constituent ingredient of the state itself. The chapter continues to elaborate how this change has come about. The classical notion of sovereignty is illustrated through a reading of Bodin’s Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576). In Bodin’s world, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the state, and the possibility of a multitude of sovereign entities in a global world logically denying the possibility of any “supra-national” normative framework is still a minor consideration. This possibility is only worked out with the emergence of international law. In both classics such as Emmerich de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (1758) and more contemporary treatises such as Lassa Oppenheim’s International Law (1905), state sovereignty has become conditional to recognition by other sovereign states and a subsequent membership in the “family of nations.” The conditional membership in the “family of nations” involves a contradiction: a sovereign state must act in a “dignified” manner, it must use its sovereignty with “restraint” by respecting the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its citizens, i.e., it must employ its sovereignty in a non-sovereign way. This restriction of sovereignty, addressed as “ethical sovereignty,” becomes a constitutive element in a post-Westphalian state and a central ingredient in the contemporary doctrine of humanitarian intervention. The article further criticizes the various uses (and abuses) of “ethical sovereignty” in the regulation of “failing” and “rogue” states and concludes by identifying its general political dangers. Finally, with reference to Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2003), the article suggests a more radical reappraisal of the concept of sovereignty. It is a fact that sovereignty is a term used without any well-recognised meaning except that of supreme authority. Under these circumstances those who do not want to interfere in a mere scholastic controversy must cling to the facts of life and the practical, though abnormal and illogical, condition of affairs.¹ —Lassa Oppenheim But to invoke the concept of national sovereignty as in itself a decisional factor is to fall back on a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content. It is to substitute pride for reason.² —Eli Lauterpacht     

State versus market: Taiwan’s trade, investment and aid policies in mainland China and southeast Asia in the post-Deng period

For many years Beijing has sought to isolate Taiwan from the world community, threatening to sever relations with any country that tries to establish or strengthen relations with Taiwan. As a result, economic diplomacy has become a tool in conducting Taiwan’s international affairs. Political and economic considerations are thus intermingled in Taiwan’s pursuit of its foreign economic policy. This paper does not intend to go into a traditional debate on the conflict between the state (politics) and the market (economics) in conducting a country’s foreign economic relations. Rather, it attempts to coordinate the merits of both state and market and assumes that an understanding of their interaction is useful in examining Taiwan’s foreign economic relations in the post-Deng period. The empirical study of this paper will focus on mainland China and the Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asia is a region where no country maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It is difficult indeed for Taiwan to develop official political ties with Southeast Asian countries because of their geographical proximity to mainland China, which tends to make them subject to pressure from Beijing. Thus, whenever Taipei conducts its economic communications (such as in foreign trade, foreign direct investment and foreign economic assistance) with mainland China and those Southeast Asian countries, political and economic factors are always taken into account by decision-makers.     

Bridging the human rights—Sovereignty divide: Theoretical foundations of a democratic sovereignty

Human rights and sovereignty are generally construed as disputatious, if not entirely incompatible; the liability of the former constrains the license of the latter. This article challenges the certitude of that notion and argues that democratic, isocratic, and humanistic elements, or what may be thought of as precursors of human rights, are actually embedded in early theories of sovereignty, including what I call Bodin’s hierarchical, Althusius’ confederative, Hobbes’ singular, and Hegel’s progressive/constitutional sovereignty. Despite the differences in governmental structure to which each attaches sovereignty, each disassociates sovereignty from its agents (who does the work of supreme authority) and aligns it to its end (the good of citizens). From them I derive eight theses to ground a democratic, human rights friendly conception of sovereignty, which aids in bridging the divide between human rights advocacy and sovereign defenders.     

Rivalry between Taiwan and the PRC in Latin America

Latin America and the Caribbean have been a major battleground of the “foreign policy war” between Taiwan and the PRC over international legitimacy, and recognition. This paper analyzes the growing rivalry between China and Taiwan and its implications. The first part of the paper examines the importance of Latin America and the Caribbean for both Beijing and Taipei. The second section explores political aspects of their involvement in the region. The third part assesses how Beijing and Taipei use economic diplomacy to meet their diplomatic objectives in Latin America. The fourth section examines the implications of the increasing rivalry between Taipei and Beijing in the region. This study is supported by a Fulbright scholarship and a faculty development grant from Merrimack College. The views in the paper are entirely mine and should not be ascribed to the institutions acknowledged above. I would like to express my appreciation to Wang Hsiu-chi at Tamkang University in Taiwan who provided me with excellent facilities during my field trip to Taiwan. Author would like to thank Curtis Martin, Lowell Dittmer, Xiaogang Deng, Antonio Hsiang, Tchen Tchiang, Baohui Zhang, Baogang Guo, Guoli Liu, Ping Li, and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the International Symposium on National Identity and the Future Cross-Strait Relations, University of Macau, in December, 2004.     

The Final Frontier: China,Taiwan, and the United States in Strategic Competition for Central America

China’s rise as a global power corresponded with a diminution of Taiwanese diplomacy, which has left Central America as the last region to host a continuous bloc of countries that recognize the ROC. In this article, we argue that China’s success in gaining diplomatic recognition from Taiwan’s former allies has largely resulted from China's economic policy, specifically its promises of large-scale infrastructure projects and the integration of Central American economies with Chinese markets. However, there are limits to how far China has advanced in gaining full recognition from the region. The competing political and economic interests of China, Taiwan, the United States, and the Central American countries themselves, continue to influence patterns of diplomatic switching. More specifically, we argue that the threat of punitive measures from the United States combined with a turn in Taiwanese diplomacy toward assistance efforts to combat Covid-19 may deter future switching in the short to medium-term. Our analysis offers case studies of four Central American countries (Costa Rica, Panama, El Salvador and Nicaragua) to illustrate the multi-year processes by which China’s economic strategy leads to diplomatic switching and examine the paths ahead for the remaining holdouts facing the prospect of economic and political penalties by the United States.

     

Attenuated Sovereignty: An Immodest Proposal for Addressing Ethnic Diversity

The conventional sovereignty that has prevailed for the past several centuries restricts the options open to ethnic minorities in multiethnic populations that are subject to a single sovereign authority. Minorities will either trend toward integration with majority populations or else the direction of change will be toward separation and the establishment of new, smaller sovereign states. There are serious problems with both options. The present proposal is for a form of diluted or “attenuated” sovereignty whereby, in its most basic form, a particular ethnic minority would be afforded limited sovereignty in a specified area within an existing sovereign state’s overall territory. An attenuated-sovereignty government established in the specified area would be answerable to—and have authority over—only those persons of the designated ethnic minority who have opted to affiliate themselves with it. Distinctive to this proposal, all other persons, irrespective of their ethnicity, could remain in the delimited area and remain subject to the pre-existing, conventionally sovereign authority. This proposal includes various strategies to make attenuated sovereignty a practical, workable option. The notion of attenuated sovereignty is not as fantastical as it may seem at first glance. Re this assertion, the conventionally sovereign state is everywhere at bay. Its best days are behind it. Under the circumstances, in some situations, attenuated sovereignty could prove advantageous to both ethnic minorities and majority populations willing to accommodate them in the creative manner here proposed.     

Sovereignty,Human Rights,and Responsibility: Changes in China’s Response to International Humanitarian Crises

The question of whether human rights are above sovereignty has dominated China’s human rights discourse. Relying on a sovereignty-human rights spectrum, this article reviews China’s behaviors, particularly its participation in the UN Security Council, in managing the three major international humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War era—Rwanda, Kosovo, and Darfur, and finds that there have been impressive changes in China’s response to the crises. Yet, a content analysis of China’s official discourse on human rights finds that China’s attitudes towards sovereignty and human rights have not changed much. Drawing on constructivist international relations theory, this article attempts to explain the paradox. It is argued that the international discourse on the “responsibility to protect” has brought about changes in international norms regarding violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and that, having undergone in recent years an identity change from a defensive power of bitterness and insecurity to a rising power aspiring to take more responsibility, China is more concerned about its national image and more receptive to international norms, which has led to the changes in its response to international humanitarian crises.     

China's passport move stokes South China Sea dispute

A new row over the South China Sea has erupted following Beijing's issue of biometric passports containing a map showing the so-called ‘nine-dashed line’ that China has used to assert its sovereignty over disputed islands. By printing the passports, and inviting other states to stamp their visas in them, Beijing is attempting to gain recognition for its claims to sovereignty.     

Japan and the cross-Taiwan Strait conflict

An armed conflict between Taiwan and China is not unthinkable in the future. For historical, geographical, economic, and diplomatic reasons, Japan would not be able to stand on the sidelines. Relying on three major concepts—national interests, path dependence and balance of power, this paper explores Japan’s three possible roles in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. First, Japan could pass the buck, staying out of the conflict as much as possible and providing at most logistical and intelligence support for an American military operation. Second, it could balance power, throwing its weight behind Washington against Beijing. Finally, it could play peacemaker. At the end of the article, the author discusses several key factors that would shape Tokyo’s decision-making in the event of a cross-Strait conflict and assesses the relative probability of each option. He is the author ofExplaining Chinese Democratization (Praeger, 2000). His recent research interests include Chinese pacifism and China’s historical place in the world. For their comments, the author would like to thank anonymous reviewers, Natalie Edwards, Mei Guan, Sujian Guo, James Hsiung, Wade Hudson, Erica Johnson, Chien Liu, Andrew Needle, Anne Schotter, Steve Snow, Liang Tang, Wallace Thies, Yong Wang, and Kim Worthy.     

The Political Economy of the Sino-Middle Eastern Relations

This paper attempts to understand the Sino-Mideast relations in terms of energy cooperation and the subsequent cooperation in the areas of trade and arms sales. It also examines the political economy of China’s energy policy toward the Middle East. The paper argues that the objective of China’s engagement in the Middle East is energy security rather than undermining the United States’ interests in the region. Contrary to realist assumptions, China is utilizing the existing Western institutions to achieve its goals in the region, a step highly welcomed and encouraged by Middle Eastern states. The paper attempts to develop a tridimensional and triangular approach to the political economy of the region in relation to the rapid pace of China’s involvement in the Middle East. Such involvement is generating substantial intellectual interests and anxiety among major players in the region in terms of its nature, goals and mechanisms. In so doing, China maintains a balance in its relations with protagonists in the region and skillfully navigates its national interest in the region.     

Chinese capital flows and offshore financial centers

Abstract

Why is the British Virgin Islands a bigger source of foreign direct investment into China than the USA, the European Union and Japan combined? Why is there 10 times more investment from China in the Caymans Islands than there is in the USA? This paper argues that these flows represent the efforts of Chinese and foreign investors to reduce governance and measurement transaction costs. Investors avail themselves of efficient institutions in offshore centers that are absent locally. These institutional attractions include the ease of raising capital on foreign stock markets, access to reliable courts, and more flexible and sophisticated financial products. Existing explanations of these capital movements, characterizing them as criminal money or tax arbitrage, are insufficient. Evidence is drawn from government statistics, private legal advice and interviews in offshore financial centers.     

How Plausible is Chinese Annexation of Territory on the Moon?

This article argues that a hypothetical decision by the People's Republic of China to assert territorial sovereignty over the area surrounding its planned manned Moon base is plausible. Enhanced international prestige in the near term and access to natural resources and strategic military positions in the long term may be sufficient temptations for China's leaders to challenge the United States to a twenty-first century space race. Strategic surprise could be successfully employed, given the opacity of Chinese decision-making; the conceptual blindness of external observers, including decision-makers, analysts, and academics; and China's repeatedly demonstrated capacity for executing military or diplomatic surprises of comparable magnitude. The ability of signatory states to withdraw from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty with one-year's notice means that international law only poses a temporary obstacle to such a decision. A manned Moon base would fulfill the condition of effective occupation necessary for territorial sovereignty under international law. An international relations constructivist approach discourages consideration of the advantages to states of territorial aggrandizement or the weakness of international law in restraining the behavior of states.     

Regional differences and sustainable development in China

Sustainable development has become a significant consideration in economic development and environment policy in China. Because of its size, China’s sustainable development has global implications. The issue is further complicated by China’s growing regional differences. Excessive regional disparties are obviously harmful to the interests of the less developed regions. They are even more unpalatable in this socialist country which takes pride in reducing inequalities. Serious regional disparities will bring along social and political instability, and may even generate demands for regional autonomy. This article first attempts to analyze regional development in China in the context of sustainable development; and to examine the inter-relationships among poverty relief, population growth, environment protection, natural endowment and regional differences in China. The Chinese leadership in recent years has shown considerable commitment to accelerate the development of the central and western regions to reduce regional disparities. Before 2010, however, the Chinese leadership can only aim to slow down the expansion of regional disparities. The authors would like to express their gratitude for a generous grant from the Pacific Cultural Foundation in Taiwan in support of this research project. He is also a vice-president of the Senior Professors’ Association of China.     

Recognizing regions: ASEAN's struggle for recognition

Abstract

Does recognition matter for a region as much as it does for a state and a person? This article examines the power of recognition in shaping regional cooperation. Rather than focusing on the behaviours and interactions between member states, which most studies have done, this article introduces a recognition model to investigate how the social practices of a region with non-member entities promote regional cooperation. By viewing recognition as a tradable commodity and an independent variable, the framework illustrates how the contest for recognition permeates beyond interpersonal and interstate interactions to include the struggle for recognition by regions. The model hypothesizes that the extent of recognition accorded to a region has an influence on its development. Drawing on newly released US declassified diplomatic records, this article tests the soundness of the proposed recognition model for regions by analysing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) struggle for recognition in the 1970s. It discusses how recognition was traded between ASEAN and three foreign powers, namely the USA, Japan and the European Economic Community, during the grouping's formative years. The findings suggest that the strengthening of a regional concept is influenced by the willingness of, and the extent to which, foreign powers recognize the entity. The central theme of this article is that recognition plays an important function in the development of a regional concept.     

To Build A “Harmonious World”: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South

This study attempts to answer a new but important question in China’s foreign policy— how Beijing has wielded its soft power to construct its ideal of international order in the age of China’s rise. Before empirical analyses, this study tries to set up a conceptual framework on the relations between the idea of “harmonious world” and China’s soft power wielding in its rising process. Within this framework, this study examines a rising China’s foreign policies towards three targeted regions in the global south—Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. On the one hand, due to Beijing’s carefully-designed and soft power-based foreign policies, the global south has become an increasingly harmonious environment for Beijing to cultivate a favorable national image, exert its political influence on regional affairs, benefit its own domestic economic developments, etc. On the other hand, some problems such as the so-called “China’s New Colonialism” and the increased vigilance from the other powers have already began to challenge Beijing’s harmony in those regions. Sheng Ding is assistant professor of political science at Bloomsburg University. He received both his masters and doctoral degrees from Rutgers. His research interests include soft power in international relations; transnational identity in globalization; information technology and world politics; politics in Pacific Asia; Chinese politics and foreign policy; U.S.-China relations, etc. His research articles have been published by Pacific Affairs, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and East Asia: An International Quarterly. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on the draft of the paper.     

East asia and cross-Taiwan strait relations

The evolution of the Taiwan issue has been closely linked to the interaction of China and other countries including Japan, Russia, and especially the United States. It is important to examine the great power interaction in East Asia and its effect on the cross-strait relations. Japanese policy toward the Taiwan issue will be a critical indicator of the nature of Sino-Japanese relations. One issue is Japan’s expanding role in the U.S.-Japanese security relations and the implication of such relations for East Asian security. Russia has consistently supported Beijing’s policy on Taiwan. Since the return of Hong Kong to China on July 1, 1997, the policy of “one country, two systems” has been put into practice. If Hong Kong can continue to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and prosperity, valuable lessons might be gained for resolving issues in cross-Taiwan Strait relations.     

Affordable Ally: Taiwan's Diplomatic Venture in Macedonia

This article examines foreign policy of the Republic of China (ROC) towards East Central Europe (ECE) through the prism of Taipei's diplomatic strategies vis-à-vis Macedonia. Specifically, it identifies and explains the broad goals and rationale behind Taipei's increased interest in ECE after the Cold War. The study concludes that the Taiwanese interest in East Central Europe was motivated by its wish to capitalise on ECE's anti-communist euphoria and need for foreign capital, hoping that promises of generous economic assistance would convince some ECE states to extend diplomatic recognition to the ROC.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

Stretching a third of the way around the globe, the Asia Pacific is the world's most populous region. Yet, it remains the sole region without a human rights court or commission, and without a human rights treaty. The notable absence there of a human rights mechanism based on such institutions is often explained away by reference to the region's size and heterogeneity, the constituent states’ reluctance to interfere in the affairs of others, and the existence of rivalries. Whilst agreeing that there is no inter-governmental initiative that looks set to change the present state of affairs in the Asia Pacific, this article places the spotlight on another model of creating a regional human rights mechanism, that is, the unique and burgeoning Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. Specifically, it assesses the prospects for Japan, Taiwan and China – three key regional players whose membership of the Forum is still outstanding – to create domestic human rights bodies that eventually join.     

China's ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific and Australia's regional order

Abstract

In recent years, a perception has emerged among many policymakers and commentators that the deepening of the People's Republic of China engagement in the Pacific Islands Region, predominantly through its expanding foreign aid programme, threatens to undermine the existing regional order, in which Australia is dominant. In this article, it is argued that China's apparent ‘charm offensive’ in the Pacific is mainly driven by commercial, not political, imperatives and is far more fragmented and incoherent than is often assumed. Hence, its (real) political effects hinge, not on any Chinese strategic designs for regional domination, or even a more limited resource security agenda, but on the intent and capacity of Pacific governments to harness deepening aid, investment and trade relations with China towards their own foreign and domestic policy objectives, which include limiting Australian interference in the internal governance processes of Pacific states. This argument is demonstrated by the case of Fiji after the December 2006 military coup.