The Evolution and Continuing Challenges of E‐Governance

E‐governance comprises the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to support public services, government administration, democratic processes, and relationships among citizens, civil society, the private sector, and the state. Developed over more than two decades of technology innovation and policy response, the evolution of e‐governance is examined in terms of five interrelated objectives: a policy framework, enhanced public services, high‐quality and cost‐effective government operations, citizen engagement in democratic processes, and administrative and institutional reform. This summary assessment of e‐governance in U.S. states and local governments shows that the greatest investment and progress have been made in enhanced public services and improved government operations. Policy development has moved forward on several fronts, but new policy issues continually add to an increasingly complex set of concerns. The least progress appears to have occurred in enhancing democracy and exploring the implications of e‐governance for administrative and institutional reform. ICT‐enabled governance will continue to evolve for the foreseeable future providing a dynamic environment for ongoing learning and action.     

Regulating finance after the crisis: Unveiling the different dynamics of the regulatory process

It is now widely recognized that regulatory failures contributed to the onset of the global financial crisis. Redressing such failures has, thus, been a key policy priority in the post‐crisis reform agenda at both the domestic and international levels. This special issue investigates the process of post‐crisis financial regulatory reform in a number of crucial issue areas, including the rules and arrangements that govern financial supervision, offshore financial centers and shadow banking, the financial industry's involvement in global regulatory processes, and macroeconomic modeling. In so doing, the main purpose of this special issue is to shed light on an often understudied aspect in regulation literature: the variation in the dynamics of regulatory change. Contributors examine the different dynamics of regulatory change observed post‐crisis and explain variations by accounting for the interaction between institutional factors, on the one hand, and the activity of change agents and veto players involved in the regulatory reform process, on the other.     

Taming the real estate boom in the EU: Pathways to macroprudential (in)action

In the fallout of the 2008 crisis, macroprudential policy has been installed as the policy remedy against future financial instability, a primary focus being developments in the real estate sector. With house prices consistently rising in the EU since 2014, causing alarm among macroprudential supervisory bodies, a core question of EU regulatory governance is how far macroprudential bodies have been capable of bringing about countercyclical actions against the build-up of such vulnerabilities. This paper investigates this question using a novel dataset of macroprudential intensity coded for the 17 EU countries that experienced real estate vulnerabilities post-euro crisis. Specifically, it asks which configuration of conditions account for the (in)capacity of countries to impose stringent countercyclical regulations against housing booms? Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis technics coupled with qualitative analysis of country cases using expert interviews, we find that the absence of political salience of homeownership and the political independence of macroprudential authorities to be crucial conditions that jointly explain countercyclical macroprudential activity. These findings, which show two pathways to action have implications for the capacity of the EU to prevent future crises and future reform of the EU prudential framework.     

Collaborative Governance in the Reform of Western Australia's Alcohol and Other Drug Sector

Collaborative governance involves processes and structures for policy development and decision making with particular relevance for health and social services. We examined collaborative governance in the reform of Western Australia's alcohol and other drug sector, applying Emerson et al.'s (2012) integrative framework. A documentary review and group interviews with government, sector, and consumer representatives were involved. Contextual factors included increased service funding, and the development of a partnership approach. Drivers for collaboration involved leadership and financial incentives for policy implementation. Key stakeholders across government and the sector reported a mutually supportive and constructive relationship and increased capacity, and they shared an agenda for change. The integrative framework was a useful structure for the explication of collaborative governance, although financial arrangements were not addressed.     

From asset to patrimony: the re-emergence of the housing question

Abstract

The global financial crisis has ushered in a major housing crisis in many European countries. The paper seeks to shed light on why, despite massive housing crises, there are few policy efforts at tackling it. Probing into the policy paradigms that have informed housing policies, the paper demonstrates a shift towards housing as an asset before the crisis. Increasingly, housing policies have become interwoven with financial markets. This has led to a major policy mismatch after the crisis: while the return of the ‘housing question’ would have required renewed efforts at establishing housing as a social right, de facto policy makers sought to stabilise financial markets. The result is a paradoxical outcome, where neoliberal market-driven programmes are embedded in increased dependence on family wealth. The article demonstrates the shift from housing as asset to housing as patrimony in three different varieties of residential regimes, represented by Ireland, Denmark and Hungary.     

Ripples Not Waves: A Policy Configuration Approach to Reform in the Wake of the 1998 Sydney Water Crisis

The aim of this article is to understand why, in the aftermath of the 1998 Sydney water contamination crisis, policy and institutional reform was comparatively minor—despite intense scrutiny and criticism of the framework of water policy in New South Wales (NSW). The article should be of serious interest to scholars interested in crisis and policy change, rather than simply those with a particular interest in water policy in Australia. It frames the Sydney case as a disconfirming one but finds that an understanding of the stability/change relationship in NSW water policy can only partially be understood through applying key contemporary institutional, actor, and interest‐centered explanations. Therefore, it probes the plausibility of an additional explanation and develops the rudiments of a new “policy configuration” approach to help explain policy stability and change. It concludes by suggesting that there is potential for a policy configuration perspective to be tested against other cases.     

Explanations of the Financial Meltdown and the Present Recession

The concern of this article is to locate the unfolding literature that seeks to explain the present financial crisis into three dimensions of contestability. The major areas of disagreements between various authors include: the role of government; the issues of whether the recession was unavoidable or whether it was inevitable; and the area of ideas and ideals and how economic ideas shaped and influenced the policy process. These explanations include the pragmatists and all that literature that had a time dimension of major actors trying to produce policies that aimed to stabilise the financial markets. These policy makers did not have the benefit of hindsight but were concerned that the financial markets were so fragile that there was no other choice but for governments to intervene. By contrast, there were the market fundamentalists who argued that the pragmatists had got it wrong and were therefore highly critical of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury and tended to blame the recession on government housing policy. Institutionalists have argued that the regulatory system is broken, while structuralists tend to focus on growing income inequalities, the concentration of wealth and how the changing structure explains the recession in the sense that households took the avenue of higher debt on their homes to sustain higher levels of consumption. Finally, there is the Keynesian Collectivist argument that points to the limits of Rational Expectations and Efficient markets. No one really know who is right, but the fierce debate that is emerging is highly important in that each explanation seeks to provide a framework for policy making     

The unstable core of global finance: Contingent valuation and governance of international accounting standards

Accounting standards are the foundations of the financial regulatory edifice, and global financial governance is no more stable than the asset valuations that feed it. Yet for two decades and up to this day, no international accounting rule for financial instruments – the bulk of banks' balance sheets – has emerged that was more than a temporary fix, to be succeeded by further reforms. We show how banking regulators have been central to this dynamic and how their support for applying fair value accounting to financial instruments, the cornerstone of regulatory debate, has oscillated throughout the whole period. The two common international political economy approaches to global financial governance, which analyze it either as interest‐based bargaining or as ideas‐driven expert governance, fail to account for this pattern. In contrast, we show how the contingency of financial valuations itself has made it impossible for regulators to embrace or reject a stable set of accounting rules.     

Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance

Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.     

Track 1/Track 2 symbiosis in Asia-Pacific regionalism

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of how Track 2 international policy networks contribute to economic security. If we accept a neoclassical economic interpretation that economic security is best achieved by trade and capital liberalization, then Track 2, or non-formal research and policy networks, are able to help enhance economic security by providing Track 1 or the formal, inter-governmental organizations with novel ideas and approaches on how best to advance regional economic liberalization. As well as providing institutional memories for regional cooperation, Track 2 networks also serve as test-beds for new ideas in emerging issue areas. This was clear in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis when a number of Track 2 networks grappled with the inter-linkages between economics and security as well as provided expertise on how states can best cope with globalised financial markets and the free flow of capital. By discussing each of the Track 2 networks and how they respectively interact with Track 1 processes, the paper provides a detailed account of the regional governance architecture in the Asia-Pacific region more broadly, and its contribution to economic security.     

State of the Field

Although scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.     

Regulatory reform and governance: A survey of selected developing and transition economies

Regulation is now considered an integral instrument in developing policy toolkit to support market‐led, pro‐poor growth in developing and transition economies. Institutional environment in general and regulatory governance in particular have increasingly been viewed as a factor of competitiveness. In search for better governance, regulatory reform is critical. This article assesses regulatory reform in selected developing and transition economies by reporting the results of a survey on the application of regulatory governance policies, tools and institutions. It is found that in these countries regulatory reform has not shifted in approaches and objectives to taking a systematic view of regulatory governance and the means of promoting and enhancing it. It is suggested that, in order to improve regulatory governance, focus should be put on each of the three elements: regulatory policies, tools and institutions, and that centralised and concerted efforts are needed to integrate the elements. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk and Financial Armageddon in Ireland: The Politics of the Galway Tent

This article examines Ireland's financial crisis. Thus far explanation has focused on individual or collective administrative failure: the office(r) of financial regulation singularly failed to scrutinise the banks sufficiently: it was a matter of poor risk management. While this article would agree that the (mis)management of risk was important to how the crisis unfolded, I argue that an explanation of why the crisis emerged demands an altogether different focus. Put simply, after financial regulatory reform, a reconfiguration of risk in politics took place as the locus of decision‐making about financial risk shifted from the realm of the political/legal (Cabinet/Central Bank/Department of Finance) to the economic/legal (retail banks, shareholders/consumers). It was a critical development, one that mirrored events taking place in the UK, upon which Ireland drew experience, for now assessments about risk undertaken by the banks demanded that intervention could be justified only on an ascertainable risk, not a theoretical uncertainty (or spurious fear). The evidentiary bar for intervention was therefore raised, removing the precautionary instinct implicit in the prudential governance of Central Banks.     

Means,Motive, and Opportunity – Local Government Data Distortion in a High‐Stakes Environment

Regulatory authorities are increasingly relying upon performance data for developing public policy. However, this reliance necessarily assumes that the data are free from material distortion. This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding the ‘means’, ‘motive’, and ‘opportunity’ for distorting data employed in high‐stakes performance‐management programmes. We present empirical evidence which suggests that the use of data drawn entirely from financial statements by no means guarantees a distortion‐free depiction of performance. In addition, we provide econometric evidence of some important determinants of performance data distortion. Taken as a whole, the following analysis provides a comprehensive picture of the salient matters which must be addressed to ensure accurate data for public policy‐making purposes.     

Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland After the Crisis

Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top‐down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post–New Public Management emphasis on recentralizing administrative capacity. This article, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command‐and‐control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European‐type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.     

Tracing policy influence of diffuse interests: the post-crisis consumer finance protection politics in the US

Dodd–Frank, the financial reform law passed in the United States in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decision-makers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalition building among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.     

How do interests,ideas, and institutions affect multisectoral governance? The case of tobacco governance in two Pacific small island developing states

Multisectoral governance has been recognized to be vital to regulate harmful commodity industries, yet countries struggle with reaching policy coherence due to government agencies' conflicting mandates and industry interference. Limited empirical evidence is available on how interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and influence multisectoral governance in low- and middle-income countries, particularly in Pacific small island developing states (PSIDS), often exploited by vested industry interests and whose non-communicable disease crisis commands urgent action to regulate harmful commodities. This study assessed the ways interests, ideas, and institutions intersect and shape multisectoral tobacco governance in PSIDS. Interviewee data collected in Fiji and Vanuatu show that the idea of individual responsibility, the limited recognition of commercial determinants of health, the centralization of authority, and the vulnerabilities of small island developing states, (including small population, land, economy, geographic isolation, and status as a developing economy), prevent these states from achieving policy coherence in multisectoral tobacco governance.     

Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle

This article explores the advocacy efforts of financial industry groups since the financial crisis. I describe key changes in the post‐crisis financial regulatory environment and argue that financial industry groups have adapted their advocacy strategies to these new conditions in innovative ways. Faced with a more challenging environment, financial industry groups have shifted their emphasis along the different stages of the policy cycle. Specifically, increased issue salience and a strained policy network have weakened financial industry groups' capacity to veto regulatory proposals at the stage of actual policy formulation. Focusing on the advocacy strategies of the global banking and derivatives industries, I show evidence that the response has been to invest in more subtle advocacy strategies which focus on other stages of the policymaking cycle. Self‐regulatory moves attempt to affect the agenda setting stage of policymaking, and a strong focus on the timing, rather than the content of new regulations, has attempted to affect the implementation stage. Such a transformation of advocacy strategies differs sharply from most depictions of financial industry groups simply “blocking” regulatory change since the global financial crisis.     

Civil Service Reforms: learning from Commonwealth experiences

This article illustrates the degree to which new areas of consensus are emerging in the implementation of civil service reforms. A crucial development in Commonwealth countries has been the change in the strategies being pursued by most governments in achieving economic growth and developmental objectives. The need to change the role of the State for improved economic efficiency is finding greater acceptance in most countries. The article highlights several common themes emerging in the introduction of civil service reform programmes with remarkable similarity about the concerns and changes taking place in very different settings. The article also identifies a set of key strategies that have emerged as major instruments for the implementation of the reform process, such as securing leadership for change, enhancing policy development capacity, improved human resource and financial management systems, establishing efficiency and quality management programmes, harnessing information technology and mobilizing external and internal advice. The article concludes that there is no unique solution and each country would need to identify key strategies drawing on experiences of other countries and keeping in view national priorities. The article hence provides a useful framework for sharing of experiences and cooperation among Commonwealth countries.     

Ideas and Coordination in Policymaking: The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

Policy change occurs because coalitions of actors are able to take advantage of political conditions to translate their strong beliefs about policy into ideas, which are turned into policy. A coalition's ability to define a problem helps to keep policies in place, but it can also cause coalitions to develop blind spots. For example, policy subsystem actors will often neglect the need for coordination between governmental actors. We examine the financial crisis of 2007–2009 to show how entrenched policy ideas can cause subsystem actors to overlook the need for policy coordination. We first analyze the prevalent idea that policymakers should aim to keep inflation low and stable while employing light touch regulation to financial markets. We then demonstrate how this philosophy led to a lack of coordination between monetary and regulatory policy in the subprime mortgage market. We conclude with thoughts about the need for coordination in future economic policy.