贿赂犯罪的经济分析与法律对策

<正> 一、经济分析在现代经济学说中有一种“寻租理论”,它的基本观点是:一切利用行政权力攫取租金,从而大发横财的非法行为(包括贿赂行为),都被称为寻租活动。这里的所谓“租金”,是泛指政府干预或行政管制市场竞争而形成的级差收入,即超过机会成本的差价。在它看来,一切商品经济中的行政管制,都会创造出这种差价收入,即寻租者竞相争夺的租金,因此寻租理论具有广泛的适用性和实证性。在我国传统经济模式中,由于实行     

市场改革中的寻租行为与经济治理

论文旨在说明寻租行为与经济治理的关系。寻租行为在中国之所以普遍存在,并非仅仅因为市场活动不规范或者监管不足,而是因为经济租金的创造和分配就是国家经济管理体系的一个构成部分。基于对各类经济租金的分析,论文提出租金的创造、分配和追逐,是与市场准入制、选择性政策以及地方保护主义等制度连在一起的。它们在各个租金的生产的环节中发生作用,使得租金的创造和追逐成为继行政分配和市场交易以外最重要的资源分配机制。     

以制度创新抑制寻租性腐败

所谓寻租性腐败,即以权谋租的腐败,它是改革开放以来我国腐败现象中的一种泛滥最广、危害最大的新现象。寻租性腐败的原因从根本上说,是因为有大量制度租金存在。以制度创新抑制寻租,就是要建立这样一种制度,它加大寻租的成本,减小寻租的收益,使寻租的净收益小于寻利的净收益,从而把经济人的寻租行为引导和转变为寻利行为,这是治本之术。具体地说,要从制度上全面、有效地抑制寻租,就必须做到“四不”,即使经济人不能为、不敢为、不必为和不愿为。一、使经济人“不能为”的制度创新所谓“不能为”,是指通过制度创新消除租金存在的基础,使经济…     

治理腐败的可行性报告

“腐败不除,国无宁日”,这句话振聋发聩,一语道破了各国发展道路上这只拦路虎的危害,也表达了各国人民治理腐败的决心和强烈愿望。本文试图以经济学的分析方法,对腐败问题进行较深层次的认识,并对其解决方案予以探讨。一、腐败从何而来七八十年代,在国外由于对直接非生产性寻利活动(DUP)的研究,最早由克鲁格提出,后经布坎南发展并建立起了寻租理论。称之为寻租,是因为这些活动寻求的都是凭借人为垄断获取的超额收入,也就是经济学上的“租金”概念。对于这里的垄断,应该作这样的理解:经济市场上的寻利活动,包括某些垄断,大都是生产性的努力…     

寻租行为与权力监督

我国现阶段经济领域中出现的权钱交易等腐败现象,其主要根源是制度和政策在运行过程中的扭曲使经济活动出现寻租行为。因此,我们必须认真研究寻租行为与权力监督之间的关系。制度缺陷与经济转轨过程中的寻租行为经济领域腐败现象的根源是利用制度缺陷进行寻租。从经济学的角度看,腐败的性质是以寻租手段谋取经济租金的经济活动和政治活动,即利用较低的贿赂成本获取较高的利益或超额利润。我国现阶段的制度缺陷主要是:1.政府行政制度的缺陷。我国现行的行政体制是在计划经济体制下形成的,存在诸如政企不分,机构重叠,用人制度不健全,行政权力…     

寻租、腐败及其法律控制

“寻租”,是本世纪70年代以后西方经济学界公共选择学派创立的理论.在寻租理论里,“租”泛指政府干预和管制,抑制市场的平等竞争,人为地扩大供求差额而形成的差价收入.寻求这种差价收入(租)的活动就称为“寻租活动”,其特点是利用合法或非法的手段(如游说、行贿、拉关系、走后门)来得到占有租金的特权,从而产生权钱交易的腐败.寻租理论已在我国经济学界受到关注,但法学界却尚未予以足够重视.本文认为,借鉴寻租理论的基本原理,分析我国权钱交易腐败的根源及对策,为法学界探讨如何防治腐败打开了一个新的思路和视角.     

“寻租理论”的价值探讨──与杜晓智同志商榷

1995年第10期《中国监察》发表了杜晓智同志题为《“租金”是腐败产生的根源吗？──与寻租理论者商榷》的文章。文中，作者认为寻租理论有两个“明显的缺陷”：其一，“把‘租金’看作腐败产生的根本原因”，“混淆了原因和条件的关系”，有“政治虚无主义倾向”；其二，主张“消除和抑制腐败的根本途径”是“大力培植和发育市场经济”。笔者认为，上述看法有失偏颇。首先，“租金”在经济学中被称为“租”或“经济租”，其原意是指一种生活要素的所有者获得的收入超过这种要素机会成本的剩余。在早期的经济学中，它多指由于某些资源供给弹…     

寻租理论与我国的律师收费制度改革

寻租理论对于律师收费改革中的某些消极现象有着较强的解释能力。律师服务收费办法的制定与政府指导价标准的设立是政府对市场调节的一种行政干预,不可避免地导致寻租机会和寻租活动。正确界定政府在法律服务市场中的角色和作用,使其在充分发挥积极作用的同时有效地避免寻租现象的产生,已成为律师收费制度改革的当务之急。     

从寻租理论窥探腐败现象

自上世纪70年代寻租理论兴起以后,该理论的影响就越来越广泛,寻租理论成为少有的几个主要研究课题之一。围绕寻租和腐败的理论研究,为解释发展中国家的腐败现象及其与经济发展之间的关系提供了一个新的维度。本文试图从寻租理论的本身的发展,对寻租、寻租活动和腐败作出相应界定。对寻租和腐败之间的关系进行了详细的阐述,并据此提出了相应的防范对策。     

从寻租理论窥探腐败现象

自上世纪70年代寻租理论兴起以后,该理论的影响就越来越广泛,寻租理论成为少有的几个主要研究课题之一。围绕寻租和腐败的理论研究,为解释发展中国家的腐败现象及其与经济发展之间的关系提供了一个新的维度。本文试图从寻租理论的本身的发展,对寻租、寻租活动和腐败作出相应界定。对寻租和腐败之间的关系进行了详细的阐述,并据此提出了相应的防范对策。     

Rent-Seeking in Research Markets

Using a standard model of uncertain innovation, this paper examines research rivalry and rent-seeking rivalry in innovation markets. Previous literature has not considered the implications of rent-seeking in research markets. We find that greater rent-seeking by the rival unambiguously lowers own profit-maximizing research and rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, greater research spending by the rival also lowers own research and rent-seeking, especially when the probability of own innovation is low. Policy implications are discussed.     

Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison

This article analyzes class actions as a technology that groups may use in their rent-seeking activity, in addition to other rent-seeking methods such as legislative investment within the political market, when they seek to achieve favorable decisions from decision-makers—courts and legislators. It claims that groups may make their choice between various rent-seeking technologies according to their sensitivity to the problem of free riding. Therefore, it analyzes the effect of the legal instruments that facilitate class action lawsuits and collective litigation in most countries upon the rent-seeking strategies of groups, as compared to rent-seeking through legislation.     

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.     

Negotiating Effective International Environmental Agreements: Is an Objective Approach to Differential Treatment Possible?

The negotiation of international environmental agreements is rendered less effective and more costly than necessary on account of the incentives for rent seeking. This article argues that the problem of rent seeking in this context is complicated by the legitimate demand for the differential treatment of relevant heterogeneity, when insufficient information is available to distinguish between demands based on legitimate differences and rent-seeking. In order to reduce the overall costliness of the totality of international resource agreements, the general rule should be that differential treatment should be provided only in exceptional circumstances. A corollary to this rule is that differences that do not affect future negotiating costs may be considered in current negotiations. This points to differences that are exogenous to the bargaining process, such as a country's physical location. It is argued that development status of a country is another such factor, since the incentives to pursue development are unlikely to be affected by its recognition in current negotiations. Furthermore, the failure to recognise development status as a legitimate basis for differentiated treatment implicitly rewards the early identification and exploitation of unmanaged resources. Restriction of differential treatment to a small number of such differences enables the focusing of negotiations, and the structuring of discussions. A case study of the Montreal Protocol illustrates how the differential impacts of a uniform standard may be estimated, once the range of impacts is delimited.     

The Liberalization of the Telecommunications Sector: A Rent-Seeking Perspective

This paper assesses market liberalization in the telecommunications industry from a rent-seeking perspective. Our focus is on United States regulation, with corollary international developments that are spurring competition. The analysis which is general in approach, assesses pervasive government controls which have long shaped the nature of competition in the telecommunication sectors. We find that government has been a means for retarding competition and innovation in the telecommunications sector through the actions of rent-seeking agents. Rapid technological change, however, increasingly is rendering traditional government regulation obsolete. This change is spurring welfare-enhancing competition, regulatory reform, and privatization in the telecommunications sector.     

权力寻租的生态学分析

透过生态学视角,任何权力寻租现象都可以视为与现代法治理念相背离的退化权力生态系统。缺乏有效控制的权力寻租常常激化社会矛盾,引发社会动荡。权力寻租既是一个不稳定的生态系统,也是一个不可持续发展的生态系统。运用生态学的基础理论,分析权力寻租生态系统的基本结构与功能表现,解读权力寻租生态系统组分要素与系统环境之间的生态作用关系,梳理权力寻租生态系统演化的主要影响因素、发展阶段和时空特征。通过探讨权力寻租的生态运行机理,提出权力寻租的生态修复、控制路径,驯化权力运行尽早转向法治稳态,实现权力生态系统的可持续、法治化的常态演替。     

Industry-specificities and size of corporations: determinants of ownership structures

This paper analyses ownership concentration in six European countries and empirically studies the rent-seeking theory. This theory states that ownership concentration not only depends on the level of investor protection but also on company-specific and industry-specific parameters. This study analyses the sector-specific ownership patterns of listed corporations. The results only partially confirm the influence of industry-specific characteristics. Different industries are characterized by different shareholder concentration patterns. Hence, and in light of the rent-seeking theory, it is plausible that company's specific characteristics, like the identity of the largest shareholder, the risk of the firm, etc. influence rent-seeking behavior.     

“以人为本”：素质教育的价值实质

有中国特色的人的全面发展理论把"努力促进人的全面发展"确立为建设有中国特色社会主义的根本价值目标,也就确立了素质教育"以人为本"的基本价值定位,以人为本"是一个全新的教育理念,对于深化我国教育改革,全面推进素质教育,构建一介充满生机的有中国特色社会主义的教育体系,具有重要意义.但当囿于社会历史条件的限制,人的全面发展不可能是全体的或全方位的进步时,素质教育必须基于社会历史的现实,以终极价值为基本导向,合理地安排人所追求目标的先后秩序.只有这样才能彻底坚特"以人为本"的价值立场,才能保证素质教育价值定位的历史合理性.     

人工智能时代的算法规制:责任分层与义务合规

通过云端搜集、校勘、分析海量大数据,独立法律人格待定的智能机器人,透过算法活动,在多个行业替代自然人从事高精尖业务并重塑人们的社会评价、权利义务及法律责任。算法活动以“信义义务”为核心调整传统受托人关系以及基于合同相对性进行损害赔偿,传统制度已不能完全囊括智能主体理应承担的所有义务,导致算法操纵、信息寻租和监管套利的三重失控,凸显人工智能产业布局中的法律规范缺位;算法妨害具有公共属性,穿透技术黑箱对合同之外的普罗大众造成“公共滋扰”,法律应当为不同潜在责任主体创设不同缺省合规义务,引导算法运营商、技术开发方内部化不合理社会成本,以构建人工智能责任体系的中国标准。