The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century

The neat dividing lines between hard and soft, civil and military security are rapidly dissolving, requiring far more flexibility and causing much confusion as allies and partners have disagreed significantly about how to manage such complexity. Many Europeans continue to recognize only as much threat as they can afford. For them “soft” security often means no security commitment at all. Whilst America needs the European allies for its excessively “hard” security policy to work effectively, it refuses to recognize the extent of that need because of the implications such a recognition would have for control over security outcomes. Therein lies a dilemma, brought to public attention in the fight against catastrophic terror and the war in Iraq. This article explores how both sides of the transatlantic divide might begin to cope with this new set of problems, with a new set of relationships in a new set of ways.     

Anglo–American Relations 1950–51: Three Strikes for British Prestige

In 1949–1950, Britain rejected ideas of being a third force between the post-war Superpowers and adopted instead an approach that has been the keystone of British foreign policy from that point onwards: “hugging America close.” The aspiration was to establish a position closely related to the United States yet sufficiently independent, effectively to harness American power to British ends. This now familiar position has been much-debated recently in the context of post-9/11 military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan especially. However, this analysis examines three crises immediately following the British decision in 1949–1950 to give priority to the Anglo–American “special relationship” to demonstrate that, for Britain, this policy from the onset was both advantageous and potentially difficult. The outcomes of crises over NATO's Atlantic Command, Iranian oil, and ANZUS demonstrate how expansion of United States influence benefitted Britain but sometimes also required painful British adjustment and loss of prestige.     

Liberal intervention in the foreign policy thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron

David Cameron was a critic of Tony Blair's doctrine of the ‘international community’, which was used to justify war in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq, suggesting caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. However, and in spite of making severe cuts to the defence budget, the Cameron-led Coalition government signed Britain up to a military intervention in Libya within a year of coming into office. What does this say about the place liberal interventionism occupies in contemporary British foreign policy? To answer this question, this article studies the nature of what we describe as the ‘bounded liberal’ tradition that has informed British foreign policy thinking since 1945, suggesting that it puts a distinctly UK national twist on conventional conservative thought about international affairs. Its components are: scepticism of grand schemes to remake the world; instinctive Atlanticism; security through collective endeavour; and anti-appeasement. We then compare and contrast the conditions for intervention set out by Tony Blair and David Cameron. We explain the similarities but crucially the vital differences between the two leaders' thinking on intervention, with particular reference to Cameron's perception that Downing Street needed to loosen its control over foreign policymaking after Iraq. Our argument is that policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas prompted the two leaders to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years. This return to a pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that military operations in Kosovo and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, yet came to be justified by similar arguments from the two leaders.     

Continuity in the Face of Upheaval—British Strategic Culture and the Impact of the Blair Government

This chapter will consider how the elements of continuity and change in British foreign policy that emerged under the current Labor government will be managed in the short to medium term and ask what their fuller implications for the UK and European security may be in the longer run. The article will examine how the change that transpired after 1997 which saw a new pro-European stance on security can be reconciled with the prevailing continuities in British strategic culture, namely Britain’s special relationship with the US, its global role, and, as demonstrated in the case of Iraq, the UK’s negation of Franco-German security initiatives. The article will also emphasise the central importance of the UK’s commitment to the EU’s security policy ambitions, given that the UK armed forces are the most capable in Europe and as confirmed in Iraq, an ESDP without a UK contribution would have no credibility. Despite Blair’s policy overtures towards developing greater European military capabilities, the continued reliance on the US has meant that British strategic culture has displayed remarkable continuity rather than fundamental transformation.     

Governing migration from a distance: interactions between climate,migration, and security in the South Mediterranean

Links between security and migration are well established and are associated with the meaning, status, and practice of borders in the international political system. This article assesses how and with what effects the effects of environmental and climate change have entered this relationship between migration and security. It does so by assessing the EU’s external governance of migration in “South Mediterranean Partner Countries” (SMPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia. It is argued that a focus on promoting “adaptation” and building “resilience” has developed that is consistent with the logic of governing migration from a distance. However, the article challenges ideas that environmental/climate change act as simple migration “triggers” and instead explores implications of movement towards and not away from risk, as well as the potential for populations to be trapped in areas that expose them to risk. It is shown that both have important implications for the relationship between migration, environmental/climate change, and security in SMPCs.     

American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda

This article explores US perspectives on the new transatlantic security agenda in the context of the evolution of strategic culture. The war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003 serve as focal points to examine sources of divergence and convergence between US and European security policies. The article explores key questions including: Have we seen the collapse of a shared, transatlantic security culture since September 11? How have US leaders manipulated strategic cultures to achieve security objectives in the new era? Why has the Bush administration willingly engaged (and even encouraged) the intra-European divide? How significant to the United States is the shift in “old” and “new” European perspectives on the war on terrorism? The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of recent events for the future of transatlantic security ties.     

Living Up to a New Role in the World: The Challenges of “Global Britain”

Theresa May promised a new role for the United Kingdom in the world, dubbed “Global Britain.” But what challenges arise from supposedly being more open to the world while decoupling from the European Union? This article explores how much the UK can meet the expectations stemming from a new, unabashedly global posture. Examining the rhetoric of British foreign policy since 1945 is juxtaposed against the emerging language of global openness after Brexit to illustrate what the UK's partners might expect for trade, security, and global governance. In evaluating the strategic benefits of using the rhetoric of globalism after EU withdrawal, this article examines the British state's capacity to find the administrative resources, public expenditure, and elite consensus necessary to redefine the country's position in world affairs. While the political expediency of devising a new role cannot be faulted, the strategic value of “Global Britain” appears limited in light of this analysis.     

The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

Scholars have variously queried the existence of the Anglo-American “special relationship,” consigned it to history as “special no more,” or demanded that Britain choose between its European and American relationships. These critiques have become increasingly prevalent since the Cold War. Yet the current British government, like many before it, continues to portray a choice between America and Europe as a “false choice,” and the “special relationship” has arguably deepened in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This article contends that international diplomatic history can contribute much to understanding the “Lazarus-like” quality of the “special relationship.” Specifically it argues that a number of critical continuities in post–World War II British foreign policy survived the end of the Cold War and have since contributed heavily to the determination of the British foreign policymaking elite to maintain the “special relationship” at the same time that Britain pursues a leadership role within Europe.     

Shaping the European External Action Service and its post-Lisbon crisis management structures: an assessment of the EU High Representatives’ political leadership

ABSTRACT

This article assesses the role, influence and core aspects of the EU High Representatives’ (HR/VPs) “political leadership” in the context of their efforts to advance the institutionalisation of the EEAS and its crisis management structures in the post-Lisbon era. By combining analytical lenses from the literature on “European political leadership”, foreign policy analysis (FPA) and political psychology with insights from a wide range of semi-structured interviews and primary sources, the article analyses how the leadership approaches of Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini were influenced by core aspects, such as institutional setting, situational factors and “personal qualities”. By examining how both HR/VPs and their chosen advisors sought to shape the EU’s EEAS and crisis management institutions, scholars can gain important insights about how “personal qualities” and prior foreign policy experience can influence the HR/VPs strategic choices and their impact within and across the EEAS. Finally, the article considers the differing effects between “maverick” and “orthodox” leadership and approaches and concludes that whilst outside perspectives can bring fresh ideas and institutional innovations, they will fail to be of lasting significance and permanence if not accompanied by sufficient support from the dominant foreign and security policy conventions.     

Human Rights and Foreign Policy: Wilson and the Greek Dictators, 1967–1970

The military coup of 21 April 1967 brought to power a repressive dictatorship in Greece. It proceeded to deprive Greeks of their human rights and civil liberties, outraged international public opinion and strained transatlantic relations during the Cold War. The “Greek case” culminated in the withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe and calls for its expulsion from NATO. This article will analyse the foreign policy considerations that determined British policy towards the Greek junta during 1967—such as Cold War realities, alliance dynamics, economic and commercial imperatives, regional instability in the Mediterranean and domestic pressures. It will look at how these factors coalesced into shaping British policy towards the Greek junta into one in which human rights had little bearing. The article will also consider the impact of the “Greek case” on the image and credibility of the Labour government of 1966–1970 and explain why vociferous anti-junta activities in London were to create such policy difficulties for the British government.     

Origins of Regime Change: “Ideapolitik” on the Long Road to Baghdad, 1993–2000

How was the ouster of Saddam Hussein defined as the solution to America's Iraq problem? Current scholarship on the U.S. invasion of Iraq tends to focus on the post-9/11 road to war, promoting models of policy capture, intelligence manipulation, threat-inflation, or rhetorical coercion of Bush administration opponents. In this essay, I trace the “Ideapolitik” of regime change in the 1990s and show that Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric was firmly embedded in a preexisting foreign policy consensus defining Saddam Hussein as the “problem” and his overthrow as its “solution.” Drawing upon recent research in international relations and public policy, I show how the idea of regime change prevailed in redefining American strategy for Iraq. While the September 11, 2001 attacks had important effects on the Bush administration's willingness to use force, the basic idea that ousting Saddam Hussein would solve the Iraq problem was already embedded in elite discourse. Saddam Hussein's ouster was not simply the result of idiosyncratic or nefarious decision-making processes within the Bush administration, but was instead the realization of a social choice made by U.S. foreign policy elites well before George W. Bush came to power.     

De-radicalisation interventions as technologies of the self: a Foucauldian analysis

De-radicalisation has become increasingly prevalent in the UK as a strategy for tackling the threat of religiously inspired violence/extremism. Recent events, such as the tragic murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013, British citizens fighting in Middle Eastern conflicts, and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, have rekindled the preoccupation of policymakers with the radicalisation of British Muslims. Indeed, the work of the Prevent strategy in UK counterterrorism post-2011 has primarily been recalibrated towards a greater focus on de-radicalisation interventions, which is perceived by policy-makers to be a more streamlined and effective way of dealing with radicalised/extremist individuals. And, yet, despite the greater attention paid to de-radicalisation, the discourse on de-radicalisation is characterised by the absence of detailed research, little or no empirical evidence for policy development, and confusion surrounding its conceptual framework. This article therefore offers an alternative conceptualisation of de-radicalisation to the one found in the Prevent strategy. Drawing on the works of Foucault, I argue that de-radicalisation is best understood as a “technology of the self”. This article will enumerate the interplay between the three major types of technologies that constitute the technologies of the self: discursive, disciplinary, and confessional technology. It is argued that conceptualising de-radicalisation as a technology of the self allows us to reframe it beyond the narrow confines of counterterrorism policy and places it within wider governmental relations.     

Peace and quiet in the British House of Commons, 1990–2010

This article is concerned with disruption by Members of Parliament in the British House of Commons between 1990 and 2010. Disorder in the “Thatcherite” parliaments of the 1980s has been the subject of parliamentary and academic investigation, but the phenomenon since then has gone unexamined. This article introduces a distinction between non-tolerated and tolerated disorder. Non-tolerated disorder has been relatively rare in the House of Commons between 1990 and 2010, and can mainly be attributed to a handful of parliamentary “mavericks”. Tolerated disorder, which forms an accepted part of the Commons' culture, is also explored, and recent changes to the House are examined for their potential effects on the phenomenon. While opinions vary about the desirability of tolerated disorder, this article accepts the argument that it is a symptom of serious problems with the British governing tradition and will persist unless and until those problems are addressed.     

Against Food Security: On Forms of Care and Fields of Violence

This article addresses recent changes to the policy landscape on global food security. It argues that a new consensus is emerging on how to tackle (or more hubristically “end”) global hunger and spur agricultural development. The consensus I speak of is evident in recent briefings by the World Economic Forum (especially its “New Vision for Agriculture”), the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition”, initiated by the G-8 (now G-7), the Grow Africa network, the US government's “Feed the Future” programme, the philanthropy-led Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, not to mention the many flagship reports emanating from the international financial institutions as well as key statements from global food retailers and leading agribusinesses. The article argues that this “new vision” for global agriculture is deeply problematic. Indeed, the projected “solutions”—in so far as they aim to radically transform agricultural life, especially in Africa—may well cause more harm than good. To put this argument more forcefully: what today is commonly called “food security” is perhaps better seen as a way of subjugating the poor under the pretence of doing them good.     

The Cold War and Counter-Insurgency

Due to the American-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, theories surrounding counter-insurgency, or COIN, have aroused intense debate in political, military, and academic circles in the United States, Britain, and other Western countries. This article shows that current thinking about how to fight and defeat insurgent movements is based primarily on Cold War-era theories and conflicts. It traces the evolution in COIN thinking both before and during the Cold War—incorporating Western and Eastern bloc experiences of war against insurgents from Malaya to Afghanistan—but also illustrates the conceptual difficulties of applying doctrines based on the historical record of this era. The article concludes by arguing that theories derived from the experiences of states involved in COIN campaigns from 1945 to 1991 still retain utility, but that there are significant differences between Cold War insurgencies and current conflicts associated with the “war on terror”/“long war” which affect the applicability of doctrines based on historical analysis and the works of Thompson, Kitson, Galula, and other “classic” theorists.     

“Only the USSR Has … Clean Hands”: The Soviet Perspective on the Failure of Collective Security and the Collapse of Czechoslovakia, 1934–1938 (Part 1)

The first part of this two part essay is a re-examination of the Czechoslovak crisis (1934–1938) based on papers from the Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii in Moscow. The essay is also grounded in British, French, and Romanian archives and the standard published collections, including the American and German series. It is about the development and conduct of Soviet collective security policy in the key years leading to the “Munich crisis” in September 1938. Evidence from the Moscow archives demonstrates that the Soviet government was serious about collective security and that it was ready to participate in an anti-Nazi alliance. Its initiatives were repeatedly rebuffed in Europe, notably in Paris and London. Even in Prague, the Czechoslovak president, Eduard Bene?, was an undependable ally. These rebuffs led the Soviet government to be cautious during the Munich crisis. The Soviet Union would not act unilaterally, but what it actually did do was intended to defend Czechoslovak security within the constraints of Anglo–French abandonment in which Bene?? himself was complicit.     

The Heroes of COIN

The conventional wisdom holds that security in Iraq only improved after Gen. David Petraeus implemented a new counterinsurgency doctrine that stressed population security instead of aggressive operations against insurgent forces. This interpretation is strikingly similar to the historiography of the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. In each case observers criticized initial efforts as brutal and counterproductive, only to be rescued when enlightened new leaders arrived on the scene. This article challenges the familiar hero narrative, arguing that critics routinely exaggerate the importance of leadership changes because they view conflicts as experiments in counterinsurgency rather than exercises in state-building. Whereas counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes issues like public security and government legitimacy, theorists of state-building describe a bloody and protracted competition for power under conditions approaching anarchy. The upshot is that the “heroes” of late-stage COIN might actually depend on the earlier “villains” who did the dirty work of establishing political order and coercing the population into obedience.     

The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

This article analyses the US–EU transatlantic dialogue on the Iranian nuclear dossier with a particular view to the implications for EU foreign policy on Iran. Doing so, it uses neo-Gramscian scholarship to put the EU’s “over-compliance” with Iran sanctions into perspective. Constrained by the imperatives of hegemonic coercion in the form of US financial Iran sanctions against third country entities and with the hegemonic consent of a Western US-led “historic bloc”, Europe was relegated to a subaltern below its mediatory potential. It will be shown how this finding complicates the EU’s ambition to renew relations with Iran. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with experts and delegation members from the P5+1, this article thus analyses “the normative element” in the transatlantic security dialogue on Iran at a time where the latter is undergoing a sea change in the wake of the implementation of the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” of July 2015.     

Great Britain and Kashmir, 1947–49

In 1953, a book on Jammu and Kashmir titled The Grim Saga (Dasgupta & Co. Ltd.) came out in Calcutta, India. Its author, S. N. Shivpuri, lamented “the triple tragedy of Kashmir–local, subcontinental and international.” Almost five decades since then, a great deal has been written about the local and subcontinental tragedy(s) in Kashmir. This article instead turns its gaze towards the international aspects that accompanied the evolution of the first India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir from 1947–49, which sowed the seeds of the enduring dispute between the two countries. Focusing on the British policy towards Kashmir during this period, it contends that the impact of three wider, over-lapping contexts of international geopolitics, namely, British fears about unrest in the north-west of Indian subcontinent along the border with Afghanistan, British involvement in the Middle East, and British plans against the former Soviet Union, affected the official interpretation of British interest in Kashmir. These contexts, in turn, were created by the two themes of decolonization in South Asia and the Cold War in that pivotal year of 1947.     

“Possession is Nine Tenths of the Law”: Britain and the Boundaries of Eastern Europe since 1945

This article argues that British policy on boundaries in Eastern Europe after 1945 was based on hardheaded Realpolitik whereby the justice of any given border was of entirely secondary importance to wider policy imperatives. British disregard for the legal and moral merits (or demerits) of respective cases was justified by British policy makers on two counts: firstly, international relations could not assess boundary disputes on a case-by-case basis as such thinking had undermined international stability to the point of global conflagration after 1918; secondly, British policy makers declared that it was their aim to stabilize the international system by means of détente. In reality, the proclaimed goal of universally beneficial goals by means of a “pragmatic” consolidation of the status quo hid a real desire to institutionalise a system that was seen as the best possible option for Britain given the harsh reality of its relative decline after 1945.

“There is no government on earth which divulges its affairs less than England, or is more punctually informed of those of others.”

—Sagredo, Venetian Ambassador to London in the Sixteenth Century.