Flipping the Switch: Combat,State Building,and Junior Officers in Iraq and Afghanistan

Contemporary us counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan requires junior leaders to engage in both combat and state-building activities. This study aims to explain the fundamental challenge in merging these. I argue that difficulty lies in separating insurgents from civilians, and translating doctrine from senior to junior officers. Junior officers consistently develop a similar ad hoc decision-making tool— role-switching—to simplify complex situations to a binary of “hostile or not.” They understand themselves to fill only two roles, the violent “on” role and the non-violent “off” role and develop several tools to minimize the difficulty of role-switching, help their subordinates switch, and signal switching to local populations. Ultimately, however, problems with role-switching—role stickiness, inappropriate switching, and role bias—can in some cases encourage indiscriminate and excessive violence, pointing to the fundamental failures of using military forces as a one-size-fits-all solution to state-building projects abroad.     

Neither episodic,nor destined to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 2010

The Palestinian Authority's (PA) claim to embody the spirit of the “Arab Spring”, through its recent “state-building” agenda – including its elevation to “non-member observer status” at the United Nations – is disingenuous. This conclusion rests on three key arguments outlined in this article. First, this article identifies a continuation of broader patterns of authoritarianism represented by the PA's lack of adherence to democratic practices, the deprivation of access for the Palestinian population to basic resources and the wider issue of the continued absence of Palestinian sovereignty. Second, it identifies the intensification of some authoritarian practices within Palestine, particularly in the areas of security and policing, for example by the use of force against protestors. Finally, this article identifies that civil-society groups and opposition supporters throughout 2011–2012 have more genuinely embodied evidence of resistance to authoritarianism in popular demonstrations against the PA.     

Campaign Analysis: The “Surge” in Iraq, 2007-2008

In analyzing the “Surge” in Iraq during 2007 and 2008, the article contends that the campaign contributed greatly to Iraq's stabilizing, and did so because the “surge of ideas” facilitated crucial variables: population separation, both by U.S. forces and from ethnic cleansing; local Sunni insurgents’ reconciliation; a new, “networked” Special Operations Forces campaign, and a politically self-reinforcing impression that the United States had recommitted to Iraq. Ultimately, however, the essay concludes, the Surge needed to be more ambitious to be endurable.In January 2007 President George W. Bush announced the “new way forward in Iraq.”¹ He deployed 30,000 additional troops, replaced the commander, and endorsed a new counterinsurgency strategy. The campaign that followed became known as the Surge: these five additional brigades fanned out to Baghdad and neighboring provinces; and a “surge of ideas” shifted the goal to protecting the Iraqi population, instead of transitioning responsibility for security to Iraqi forces. The strategy, President Bush announced, was to reduce the violence enough so that “daily life will improve, Iraqis will gain confidence in their leaders, and the government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas.”²

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Useful Knowledge: Snouck Hurgronje and Islamic Insurgency in Aceh

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1858-1936), a Dutch scholar of Islam, served as a “military anthropologist” during the Aceh war in the Dutch East Indies. The Acehnese fighters viewed their anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch as a jihad, construing themselves religious martyrs fighting “infidel invaders,” and carrying out suicide attacks with a machete or dagger. To combat this insurgency Snouck Hurgronje, one of the first Westerners to visit Mecca and author of many books on Islam, developed the so-called “Aceh method,” which became the basis of modern Dutch counterinsurgency strategy. This article addresses the question: what can we learn from the life and times of Snouck Hurgronje?     

The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in the 21st Century

The neat dividing lines between hard and soft, civil and military security are rapidly dissolving, requiring far more flexibility and causing much confusion as allies and partners have disagreed significantly about how to manage such complexity. Many Europeans continue to recognize only as much threat as they can afford. For them “soft” security often means no security commitment at all. Whilst America needs the European allies for its excessively “hard” security policy to work effectively, it refuses to recognize the extent of that need because of the implications such a recognition would have for control over security outcomes. Therein lies a dilemma, brought to public attention in the fight against catastrophic terror and the war in Iraq. This article explores how both sides of the transatlantic divide might begin to cope with this new set of problems, with a new set of relationships in a new set of ways.     

A Military Anthropologist Looks at Islamic Insurgency in Aceh

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1858-1936), a Dutch scholar of Islam, served as a “military anthropologist” in during the Aceh war in the Dutch East Indies. The Acehnese fighters viewed their anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch as a jihad, construing themselves religious martyrs fighting “infidel invaders,” and carrying out suicide attacks with a machete or dagger. To combat this insurgency Snouck Hurgronje, one of the first Westerners to visit Mecca and author of many books on Islam, developed the so-called “Aceh method,” which became the basis of modern Dutch counterinsurgency strategy. This article addresses the question: what can we learn from the life and times of Snouck Hurgronje?     

Against Food Security: On Forms of Care and Fields of Violence

This article addresses recent changes to the policy landscape on global food security. It argues that a new consensus is emerging on how to tackle (or more hubristically “end”) global hunger and spur agricultural development. The consensus I speak of is evident in recent briefings by the World Economic Forum (especially its “New Vision for Agriculture”), the “New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition”, initiated by the G-8 (now G-7), the Grow Africa network, the US government's “Feed the Future” programme, the philanthropy-led Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, not to mention the many flagship reports emanating from the international financial institutions as well as key statements from global food retailers and leading agribusinesses. The article argues that this “new vision” for global agriculture is deeply problematic. Indeed, the projected “solutions”—in so far as they aim to radically transform agricultural life, especially in Africa—may well cause more harm than good. To put this argument more forcefully: what today is commonly called “food security” is perhaps better seen as a way of subjugating the poor under the pretence of doing them good.     

We Always Fight the Last War? Prior Experiences in Counterinsurgency and Conventional Warfare and War Outcomes

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military’s likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to “win hearts and minds.” These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state’s readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not.     

Informers,agents and the liberal ideology of collusion in Northern Ireland

There is now considerable evidence of systemic and institutionalised collusion between state forces and loyalists paramilitary groups during the Northern Ireland conflict, not least in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Focusing on a critical reading of the 2012 de Silva report into the killing of human rights lawyer, Pat Finucane, this article examines state collusive practices surrounding the handling of agents and informers as evidence of a culture of collusion extending into the highest echelons of state institutions. The article will argue that such practices evidence an approach to state counterinsurgency predicated on a “doctrine of necessity” and what can be understood as a “liberal ideology of collusion”.     

Back to the future: the Arab uprisings and state (re)formation in the Arab world

This article contributes to debates that aim to go beyond the “democratization” and “post-democratization” paradigms to understand change and continuity in Arab politics. In tune with calls to focus on the actualities of political dynamics, the article shows that the literatures on State Formation and Contentious Politics provide useful theoretical tools to understand change/continuity in Arab politics. It does so by examining the impact of the latest Arab uprisings on state formation trajectories in Iraq and Syria. The uprisings have aggravated a process of regime erosion – which originated in post-colonial state-building attempts – by mobilizing sectarian and ethnic identities and exposing the counties to geo-political rivalries and intervention, giving rise to trans-border movements, such as ISIS. The resulting state fragmentation has obstructed democratic transition in Syria and constrained its consolidation in Iraq.     

人工智能时代背景下的国家安全治理：应用范式、风险识别与路径选择

作为新一轮科技革命和产业变革的核心驱动力量,人工智能技术的发展与应用在为社会提供强大发展动力的同时,也对国家安全治理造成了一系列影响。实际上,人工智能技术与国家安全之间存在一种结构性互动的关系。一方面,人工智能技术能够基于进化赋能的实践应用,从传统安全、非传统安全以及两者间的重叠领域,为国家安全提供更为有效的维护和保障机制;另一方面,人工智能技术的应用也存在着超出预期设想的可能性。因此,人工智能在国家安全治理中的应用就极易在"界域与有效性""效能与可靠性"以及"竞争与稳定性"之间出现矛盾。尤其是在因人工智能技术嵌入所导致的力量失衡以及安全格局的转变下,国家安全就极有可能在国家竞争的稳定性、社会治理的有序性与技术应用的稳定性三方面遭受巨大的冲击。需要指出的是,目前人工智能技术所导致的国家安全风险已经逐步显现,而全面评估人工智能技术对国家安全治理带来的机遇与挑战将是解决这一技术安全悖论的关键所在。为此,中国应在紧抓人工智能技术发展契机的同时,更要加强对这一技术发展潜在风险的研判和预防,从而维护好中国的国家安全与人民利益。     

American Perspectives on the Transatlantic Security Agenda

This article explores US perspectives on the new transatlantic security agenda in the context of the evolution of strategic culture. The war on terrorism and the Iraq War of 2003 serve as focal points to examine sources of divergence and convergence between US and European security policies. The article explores key questions including: Have we seen the collapse of a shared, transatlantic security culture since September 11? How have US leaders manipulated strategic cultures to achieve security objectives in the new era? Why has the Bush administration willingly engaged (and even encouraged) the intra-European divide? How significant to the United States is the shift in “old” and “new” European perspectives on the war on terrorism? The article concludes with an assessment of the implications of recent events for the future of transatlantic security ties.     

探索中美关系新范式及全球安全治理

特朗普执政以来,美国对华战略定位出现全方位负面趋向,由“接触”向“规锁”的转型不断加深。作为当今国际体系中的新兴大国与霸权国家,两国关系正在形成战略竞争日益突出的新态势。中美经贸摩擦的出现和深化表明,经贸合作作为两国关系的传统“压舱石”,在单独应对战略竞争“新态势”方面所能发挥的作用有限。为有效阻止“新态势”向全面对抗与冲突方向演变,中美亟须重新定位、处理和管控彼此关系的“新范式”。包括全球安全治理在内的全球治理架构为中美战略博弈与权势平衡提供了相对稳定的制度体系。通过明确战略竞争边界、构建对话协调平台,有效借助第三方力量等,中美的理性博弈、积极合作能够得到有效推动,并直接带来全球安全治理在观念、制度、模式等方面的变革。这不仅符合两国根本利益和国际社会的普遍愿望,也是全球治理健全发展的需要。但确立“新范式”有待解决的一大问题是,经贸合作作为两国关系“压舱石”的作用已经不稳,需要探索新的“压舱石”,全球安全治理合作在此方面的作用是不够的。未来中美关系的首要特点是战略竞争,新的“压舱石”可以通过权力博弈建立某种相对稳定的机制架构,最终以大国权势平衡的方式来打造。     

暴力方式与民心向背：寻找治理族群叛乱的条件组合

治理族群叛乱的目标既包括土地的控制，也包括人的控制，这是治理族群叛乱区别于其他形式叛乱的特点之一。人的控制实际包含两个内容，既包括人心向背，也包括人员数量的控制。人心向背关乎民众支持，而争取民众支持的必要性在于，虽然拥有民众支持并不必然导致叛乱的平息，但是没有民众支持是不能平息叛乱的。在族群叛乱已经发生的情况下，国家政府只有赢得更多当地民众的支持，才能成功治理叛乱。根据冲突各方的暴力行为方式及其对当地民众支持的影响，成功平息叛乱应具备国家政府有区别使用暴力、叛乱组织无区别使用暴力、当地温和派主导平叛行动等三个必要条件，以争取更多民众支持。这三个条件构成的条件组合，可以有效控制和减少叛乱组织能够招募到的人员数量，只要国家政府的平叛战略能够有效控制叛乱组织所招募的叛乱人员数量，叛乱组织就将走向衰败并最终消亡，也就是说这一条件组合能够成为国家政府成功平叛的一个充分条件。通过对结合俄罗斯、印度和西班牙等国家治理族群叛乱的经验和教训的分析，进一步证实了以上观点。     

Theorising the “suspect community”: counterterrorism,security practices and the public imagination

This article considers Hillyard’s first application of the term “suspect community” to the Irish in Britain in the era of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and its more recent application to Muslims in the global war on terror. A review of the application of the term “suspect community” and research in the field points to the problems associated with constructing an entire population and to problems of misidentification. Ethnographic and other evidence illustrate the stigmatisation, alienation and violence that results from its deployment. Given these difficulties and Greer’s objections to the use of the term “suspect community”, a redefinition of the concept of “suspect community” is proposed, borrowing from Anderson’s concept of the imagined community. The “suspect community” is not merely the product of legal and security apparatuses, but the product of a larger cultural apparatus or “imaginary”. It is redefined as “a community created in and by the securitised imagination and enacted in a processes of ‘othering’ through a range of security practices of counter-terrorism”. The “suspect community” is not an embodied community, but an imagined one, whose boundaries are permeable and shifting and in the eye of the beholder. Its operations are distinct from Islamophobia or anti-Irish racism, yet racism, Islamophobia and other forms of subordination may well be implicated in the process of “othering” the suspect. The effect of being “suspect” on the performance of identity and citizenship is indicated in the conclusion.     

The Malaysian “Islamic” State versus the Islamic State (IS): evolving definitions of “terror” in an “Islamising” nation-state

ABSTRACT

This article provides a study of how the Malaysian state defines and redefines “terror” as the nature of militancy changes from the Communist insurgency to present day’s Islamist jihadism. Tracing such definitional changes, the article demonstrates how the portrait of a terrorist not only is inherently political (and at certain junctures, politicised), but also reflects the changing nature of the state. While able to ethnicise and externalise the Communist Terrorists (CTs), the rise of Islamist militancy forced the Malaysian state to shelve the term “terrorist” in favour of religious “deviancy” until the advent of the “war on terror”. Advancing along a state-driven Islamisation project, the discursive ideal that is the “Islamic state”, was securitised (1980–2001), normalised (2001–2013), and resecuritised (2014–2016) as a balancing act not only to neutralise the security threat but also to augment the state’s “Islamic” credentials for domestic political gains. Following the emergence of the Islamic State (IS), I argue that the Malaysian state is now embroiled in an “Islamic state versus Islamic State” dilemma, where in the face of a far enemy it cannot decisively eliminate, the state has no choice but to defend itself as a sovereign nation-state as well as an “Islamic” one, further problematising Islam in discourses of security and violence.     

Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22?years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian “regime breakdown” and “regime maintenance”. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalize once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism”, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total “victory” for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.     

The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview

By suggesting predictable and controllable patterns of development, the literature on global governance seems to simplify the world for decision-making tractability. In this respect, security narratives often remain analytically frozen, while the dynamics of global life are not. Relying on complexity thinking, this article both comments on the construction and potential reconstruction of the concept of security as it relates to the question of global governance and engages with the cognitive multiplicity of the notion of global security governance. Such an exploration suggests the need for the complexification of the discourses and practices of security governance through the adaptive contingency of “security as resilience”, which rejects the detachment between human and natural systems and the ability of the former to control the latter. The argument is that the logic of “security as resilience” is more appropriate than the conventional logic of “security as control”. In policy terms, therefore, the complexity of global security governance intimates an ability to cope with vulnerabilities, defy adversity and construct a new proficiency in response to the uncertainty, cognitive challenges, complex unbounded risks and the need for continuing adaptation prompted by the alterations in global life.     

The EU,Russia and the Manichean Trap

Conceptualizing the EU as a postmodern cooperative power that “transcends realism” provides ideological scaffolding for an exclusive conception of “Europe” and veils a zero-sum geopolitical project as “European integration”. Neoclassical realism considers assigning morally opposite political identities to the EU and Russia to be “rational” to the extent it strengthens internal cohesion and mobilizes resources to enhance security in accordance with the balance of power logic. Yet, the artificial binary construction can also produce a Manichean Trap when compromises required to enhance security are depicted as a betrayal of indispensable virtues and “Europe”. The ability to harmonize competing security interests diminishes as the conceptual space for comparing the EU and Russia is de-constructed. Competition is framed in uncompromising terms as “European integration” versus Russian “spheres of influence” and democracy versus authoritarianism.     

“New Terrorism” = Higher Brutality? An Empirical Test of the “Brutalization Thesis”

This article focuses on the so-called “brutalization” of terrorism. The brutalization thesis as part of the larger theoretical concept of “new terrorism” argues that “new terrorism” is more brutal than “old terrorism.” Many scholars claim that the 9/11 attacks mark the beginning of a new era of terrorism that has lifted international as well as domestic terrorism to a new level of violent brutality. Others argue that this process had already started in the early 1990s. After discussing possible ways to operationalize a brutalization of terrorism, for example focusing on suicide bombings or terrorist attacks against soft targets, this article tests the empirical credibility of the brutalization thesis regarding both potential starting points. Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that only three out of nine indicators increased significantly during the 1990s, partially backing the idea of a general brutalization, whereas increasing numbers of suicide attacks and beheadings after 9/11 support the notion of a qualitative change in terrorism and its brutality connected with the idea of maximizing media and public attention. Yet, these developments are regionally limited and the brutality of this “new terrorism” exceeds the levels known from the zenith of “old terrorism” in the 1970s and 1980s in only a few cases.