Why Germany Wanted EMU: The Role of Helmut Kohl's Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

In light of the current Euro-crisis and seemingly erratic German response to it, the question of why Germany wanted EMU has gained new relevance. While EMU entailed economic and political benefits for Germany, this article indicates that taking into account the German shared historical consciousness, and the combined effect of Chancellor Kohl's beliefs and 1989 Eastern European revolution provides a more adequate answer to this question. More specifically, such an explanation provides an answer to remaining questions concerning the timing of the German acquiescence, and the ambiguous and inconsistent behaviour of the Kohl government on the road to Maastricht.     

Ökonomisches Kapital der Eltern und Medizinstudium im Ausland. Wie Europäisierungs- und Globalisierungsprozesse die Reproduktion sozialer Ungleichheiten verändern

The fact that university degrees are accepted throughout Europe has led to the founding of medical faculties, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, that offer medical studies in German or English and thus attracting students from richer Western European countries like Germany. Unlike medical studies in Germany, access to these foreign universities is not dependent on the final school exam grade, but on the ability to pay high tuition fees. The article compares the social class background of medicine students in Germany with German medicine students in Hungary. The analysis shows that the percentage of medicine students who come from higher social classes is even higher in Hungary than it already is in Germany. Studying medicine in Hungary primarily serves as an immediate reproduction of the parents’ profession as many of German medicine students in Hungary have a parent who belongs to the medical profession. The case of German students studying medicine abroad illustrates how Europeanization and Globalization have changed the reproduction of social inequalities; upper classes profit most from the new opportunities.     

Notes on contributors

The pre-unification European and foreign policy of the ‘old’ Federal Republic was marked by four principal traits: an emphatically Western orientation, a strong commitment to multilateralism underpinned by close bilateral relations with France and the US, its civilian character, and Euro-centrism. Although it took place in radically different circumstances and under radically different conditions to the first, the second German unification nonetheless gave rise to fears among the political leaders of many other states in Western, Central and Eastern Europe – and among the proponents of some international relations theories – that it would herald sweeping changes in Germany's foreign policy orientation and profoundly destabilise inter-state relations in Europe. The contributions to this volume show that, in the decade following the second unification, there has been more continuity than change in German European and foreign policy. The most important change concerns attitudes and behaviour in respect of the use of military force. Under the pressure of its Western allies and events in the Balkans which have forced it to choose between opposition to war and opposition to genocide, Germany has shed much of its earlier inhibitions concerning the use of military force and become much more like a ‘normal’ big power in Europe. However, because this trend has been explicitly encouraged and welcomed by Germany's allies and partners and because it has taken place exclusively within the multilateral frameworks of NATO and the EU, it does not presage the return of a political ‘Frankenstein monster’ or the revival of the pre-Second World War patterns of European inter-state rivalry. The second German unification will assuredly not turn out to be a re-run of the first.     

The end of the affair? Germany's relationship with France

French–German resistance to the US war against Iraq marked a high point in the two countries' political alignment. It was followed by French proposals for even closer integration. Yet French and German policies and priorities differ in a number of fields. Prominent among these is the EU, where Germany has long worked for a reduction in EU spending and a redistribution of votes among the member countries. After reaching a compromise on these issues, co-operation with France on foreign and security policy has grown particularly close. This has affected Germany's relations with Central and Eastern Europe and with the US, areas where Germany traditionally pursued policies different from France. At the end of the second period of the Red–Green government, Germany's national interests have been redefined as a result of the relationship with France.     

从“北溪-2”项目看德俄关系及俄美欧三方博弈

作为两个重要的地区大国,德国与俄罗斯的关系对彼此和欧洲都有着重要影响。在双边关系中,能源因素因其对国民经济生产的决定性意义长期发挥着“稳定器”的作用。2018年9月,由德俄牵头,法国、奥地利与荷兰合资建造的“北溪-2”天然气管道项目正式动工铺设。该项目将使输往欧洲的俄罗斯天然气绕开乌克兰,经过波罗的海海底直接连通德俄两国,德国由此成为俄罗斯天然气最重要的转运国。此举虽然在双边层面上保证了德俄的能源经济安全,但在多边层面却招致欧盟、美国等多方反对。因担心会进一步加深对俄罗斯能源的依赖,欧盟委员会及中东欧国家欲诉诸法律对该项目施以约束;美国在制裁项目企业的同时转而向波兰、乌克兰等国出口液化天然气,在利用政治机遇抢占欧洲市场的同时试图制衡俄罗斯的影响力。在多方力量博弈中,德国需要在平衡俄美欧关系中付出更多努力。     

Energy Security and Germany's Response to Russian Revisionism: The Dangers of Civilian Power

This article examines the impact of German dependence on Russian gas supplies for Europe's ability to apply effective sanctions against Russia. It demonstrates that by focusing on the environmental dimensions of energy policy and a policy of rapprochement with Russia, Germany has neglected the security of supply implications of its dependence on Russian gas. The article argues that Germany's excessive energy dependence on Russia has limited the ability of the EU to challenge Russian revisionism by targeting its energy sector through sanctions. The article makes a number of energy policy recommendations which will be essential for Germany to avoid undue Russian influence on its foreign and security policies. The article concludes by exploring the utility of Neoclassical Realism in understanding Germany's approach to energy security. In doing so it highlights the dangers of allowing ideology to cloud a sober assessment of the imperatives of the balance of theat.     

Beyond Semi‐sovereignty: The new Germany in the new Europe

Semi‐sovereignty was identified by Peter Katzenstein as an external condition of West German Politics. Semi‐sovereignty persists as an internal condition of the new German state, but externally Germany is less semi‐sovereign as a result of the disappearance of external restrictions and its increasing economic and political power which is now allied to its greater freedom of manoeuvre in the security area. While less semi‐sovereign in objective terms than before unity, it is argued that the political elite in Germany will continue to be multilateralists and to eschew the adoption of a national interest discourse.     

Forgetting the Führer: the Recent History of the Holocaust Denial Movement in Germany

The crimes committed by National Socialist Germany during the Second World War place Germany in a unique position for the Holocaust denial movement, and combine its so-called "academic" aspect with its political core. In no other country has the movement attracted so much publicity for its pernicious mixture of lies, distortions and half-truths as it has in Germany since the late 1980s. The introduction of laws in 1985 and 1994 that target " die Auschwitzlüge " (Auschwitz-Lie) changed the frequency of Holocaust denial in German public life, if not its nature. This article is an analysis of the German Holocaust denial movement since 1988, with an emphasis on the most important individuals and events that have influenced the movement's direction in this period. It also includes an examination of the laws that seek to stop its spread.     

Are We Doing Enough? Change and Continuity in the German Approach to Crisis Management

In the two-and-a-half decades since unification Germany has developed a distinctive approach towards international crisis management. This approach accepts the need to engage in the full spectrum of military and civilian operations but maintains a clear preference for the latter. Consequently, the European Union with its profile as a civil–military actor in international security is the preferred framework for German contributions. The article analyses the development of the German approach during the governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel in the light of three interlinked debates on German foreign policy: continuity and change; multilateralism; and leadership. The announcement of a more active German foreign policy in 2014 has reanimated these debates. Concentrating its efforts on networked security and capacity building Germany has become an indispensable player in international crisis management. At the same time Germany's deeply rooted attachment to a culture of military restraint and continued reluctance to lead, limit its ability to work for necessary reforms at the European level.     

Lifestyle groups,social milieus and party preference in Eastern and Western Germany: Theoretical considerations and empirical results

The aim of this paper is to analyse the existence of political milieus in the eastern and western German electorate by using the concepts of lifestyle and social milieu. After introducing these ideas a theoretical approach will be taken which integrates them by pointing out their similarities and differences. Finally, empirical analyses of lifestyle groups and social milieus in the eastern and western German population will be carried out with the aim of ascertaining the existence of political social milieus in reunified Germany. The results indicate that the German electorate to some extent is still characterised by political milieus.     

从文化共同体到后古典民族国家:德国民族国家演进浅析

长期封建割据造成德国民族国家的形成晚于英、法等传统西方国家。其建立民族国家的路径是先有民族,后有国家。德国民族国家是建立在由血缘、历史、语言、文化等要素构成的"文化共同体"的基础上,这一文化共同体同时也构成了德国民族认同的核心要素。受到历史和地缘政治因素的影响,德国民族国家的发展道路较为特殊,这也决定了其融入西方过程的曲折与漫长。20世纪90年代,两德重新统一后,德国与其他欧盟成员国一样进入后古典民族国家形态,将主权部分地让渡给超国家共同体。德国民族国家目前需要解决的是欧盟治理结构中的"新德国问题"。     

Locating Kaliningrad And KÖNigsberg In Russian And German Collective Identity Discourses And Political Symbolism In The 750Th Anniversary Celebrations Of 2005

This article begins by briefly exploring issues of conflict and control in relation to the 750th anniversary of the city of Kaliningrad/Königsberg. An analysis of the tensions between Russian regional (Kaliningrad) and national (federal) identity discourses on the political symbolism of the 750th anniversary commemoration is offered, using Russian media reports and interviews conducted in Kaliningrad. German narratives on the political symbolism of the anniversary events and their implications for German national identity discourses are investigated via interviews conducted in Kaliningrad and Germany, German media reports, books, films and a theater production about Königsberg. Particular attention is given to the impact of the German expellee organizations on framing the discourse about Königsberg in contemporary Germany. The article will conclude by comparing and contrasting the various discourses and interpretations of the anniversary in the Kaliningrad region, Russia and Germany.     

Europe and the German Model: Growing Tension or Symbiosis?

Recent conflicts between the Commission of the European Communities and the German government suggest a growing tension between structures of the German political economy and the agenda of economic liberalisation fostered by European integration. Will mounting conflict ultimately force Germany to choose between its commitment to the integrity of the social market economy and support for European economic integration? This article considers the cases of Germany's public sector banks and the German postal service. Both entail potential conflict between the public service functions integral to the social market economy and the competition central to Europe's single market. Examination of these cases suggests that, rather than forcing change on a reluctant Germany and jeopardising the core of the social market economy (SME), enforcement of European competition policy from Brussels has taken place in fundamental symbiosis with the SME. Nonetheless, tensions between federal government and Länder indicate that a positive-sum relationship between Europe's single market and Germany's social market economy may be constrained by German federalism.     

Democracy Promotion and Civilian Power: The Example of Germany's ‘Value-Oriented’ Foreign Policy

While Germany is generally considered one of the most important democracy promoters, there is still limited work on the German approach to promoting democracy. There is a general understanding that Germany – as a civilian power – should be guided by democratic values in its external affairs, but it is neither theoretically nor empirically very clear what this means for the actual practice of democracy promotion. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by (1) locating democracy promotion as a foreign policy aim and instrument in the role conception of civilian power, (2) summarising the fragmented state of the art on German democracy promotion, (3) presenting results of a qualitative content analysis in order to reconstruct the main features of the official outline of German democracy promotion, and (4) confronting these programmatic findings with a brief comparative view on the practice of German democracy promotion towards Bolivia, Turkey and Russia.     

Germany's power and the weakening of states in a globalised world: deconstructing a paradox

It is somewhat ironical to ponder Germany's power at a time when radical changes due to globalisation vastly limit the efficiency of state actions worldwide. Certainly, Germany's resources increased with reunification – though the country also has to bear its costs. An enumeration of the – possible – resources of German power provides us, however, with little understanding of the nature of German power, embedded as the country is in a European system from which it derives its strength. Hence, only an analysis of this system fully renders the picture, contrary to what neo-realists and liberals might assume. While Germany did exercise a semi-hegemony over Western Europe in the monetary area up to EMU, the further integration of the EU has altered the European structure and diffused Germany's power. A particular configuration allowed Germany to devise one-sidedly the rules of EMU. This configuration does not exist in other issue-areas, such as, for example, defence and enlargement. This does not mean that power is absent from Germany's tool-box: political credit in particular is abundant. Yet in a larger Europe, where coalitions are more issue-oriented and hence more volatile than formerly, Germany's power will turn out to be more limited than its demands for recognition may lead us to believe.     

The federal republic and the future of Europe: A reassessment

Speculation concerning a dominant or hegemonic role to be played by a unified Germany in a post‐cold war Europe is misplaced. The extent to which the Federal Republic of 1949–89 has been caricatured as an economic giant but a political dwarf has undermined an appreciation of the manner in which successive Bonn governments have used multilateralism in foreign policy to further Germany's political influence in Europe long before national reunification. At the same time, it is unlikely that reunification will bring a dramatic change in German foreign policy. The nature of the Federal Republic's domestic politics, as well as the relationship with the European Community, apply substantial constraints on the ability, or the desire, to bring about a radical reorientation. The principal architect of change in Germany's relationship with its neighbours will be the country's expansive corporate sector. The gap between the restrained nature of Germany's diplomacy and the extrovert dynamism of its industry, furthermore, promises to make the Federal Republic's adjustment to a new international role awkward.     

The Partnership between the Czech and German Greens

The paper (1) reviews the value differences between west and east Germany after unification and their development to date, and (2) explains the fact that between 1990 and 1995 east and west Germany do not approach each other in terms of values. (1) Of the four values considered, equality is more strongly endorsed in west Germany, whilst achievement is more strongly endorsed in the east. Co‐determination finds more support in west Germany. Acceptancy of institutions differs in its two domains in opposite directions: Religiosity is more strongly supported in west Germany, morality in east Germany. Across all four values, differences between both parts of the country mostly remain constant or even grow between 1990 and 1995. (2) As the former German Democratic Republic relied heavily on ‘work’ as an integrative ideology, east Germans should still be able to create a feeling of togetherness today based on the work product they established under the GDR. On the other hand, as this work is no longer linked to an unjust and ineffective political and economic system, it retrospectively gains in value on the one hand. Yet, as it is inevitably poorly assessed in the economic reconstruction of east Germany, it continually loses its value on the other hand. As unification has set off these contradicting developments, east Germans attribute them to west Germany; hence their growing distance from west German values.     

East Germany in 1956: Walter Ulbricht's Tenacity in the Face of Opposition

Why did East German leader Walter Ulbricht outlast other Stalin‐era Soviet allies in Central and Eastern Europe? This article considers this question, comparing Ulbricht's situation with that of the Hungarian communist leadership in 1956. The article examines different aspects of the question, from relations with the Soviet Union to the archival evidence for popular opinion in East Germany in the crisis year of 1956. It concludes that Ulbricht's relative longevity in power was due to a combination of factors, from the exposed position of the German Democratic Republic in the Cold War, and the support this elicited from the Soviet Union, to the legacy of the unsuccessful workers' uprising of 1956 and the weakness of Ulbricht's internal opposition.     

Germany in Europe: return of the nightmare or towards an engaged Germany in a new Europe?

Especially since (re-)unification, perceptions of Germany alternate between the fear of the return of the German hegemon and – at the same time – the diametrically opposed call for more German leadership based on Germany's outstanding pro-European engagement. Nonetheless, Germany's foreign policy has changed little since 1989: it is still cautious rather than assertive. Due to Germany's experience with the two world wars, German foreign policy places great value on the enlargement as well as the deepening of the EU. In sum, Germany can best be characterised as a normal and engaged European state.     

Welfare State and Political Culture in Unified Germany

This paper addresses the assertion that preferences for a comprehensive welfare state hamper and delay the emergence of a liberal-democratic culture in East Germany. Two questions are explored: first, has the impact of welfare-state values on support of the German democratic regime declined in East Germany since re-unification and adapted to the lower levels observed in West Germany? Second, are attitudes towards different welfare-state programmes equally important for citizens’ approval of the German democratic regime? Empirical analyses on the basis of representative public opinion surveys conducted between 1991 and 2012 confirm that the effect of welfare-state values in East Germany has converged to the smaller effect size observed in West Germany. Furthermore, attitudes to welfare-state programmes aimed at reducing income inequalities turn out to be a significant determinant of regime support in both parts of Germany. It is the higher demand for inequality-reducing governmental activities which still restrains the approval of the liberal-democratic regime among citizens in East Germany.