If Not Soft Balancing,Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and U.S. Policy Toward China

Some scholars argue that soft balancing is a typical state behavior against the hegemon under unipolarity. Others contend that soft balancing against the hegemon is ineffective. We challenge both arguments and suggest that soft balancing is not only a product of specific configurations of the power distribution in the system, unipolarity, but also a rational behavior under another condition, economic dependence. We argue that the interplay between power disparity and economic dependence shapes a state's decision in choosing different balancing strategies. The higher the power disparity and economic dependence, the more likely a state chooses soft balancing to pursue its security. Using U.S. policy toward China after the Cold War as a crucial test, we suggest that the huge power gap and increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China shape U.S. soft balancing rather than hard balancing toward China. We conclude that future U.S.-China relations depend on whether the United States declines as a result of China's rise and on the degree of economic interdependence between the two countries.     

Why unipolarity doesn't matter (much)

This article first argues that states have not balanced against US unipolar power because the potential balancers do not view the United States as a major threat, because they believe it has benign security-seeking motives, at least with regard to other major powers. This explanation runs counter to the Brooks–Wohlforth argument, which holds that states are not balancing because the magnitude of the United States’ power advantage makes balancing essentially infeasible. The second part of the paper challenges the conventional wisdom on the benefits of unipolarity, arguing that the benefits the United States derives from unipolarity are generally overrated. More specifically, US security need not be significantly reduced by growth in China's economy that supports a return to bipolarity.     

System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu

This paper presents “strategic hedging” as a way to conceptualize much of the strategic behavior currently employed by second-tier states like China, Russia, Brazil, and France. Hedging is an alternative to strategies like balancing, bandwagoning, and buck-passing. Like those other strategies, hedging is driven by structural incentives associated with the current polarity of the international system and power concentration trends within it. Hedging will be most prevalent in international systems that are defined by a leading state that, while in a position of power preponderance, is also in the process of relative decline. Strategic hedging behavior is effective for second-tier states in such deconcentrating unipolar systems because it avoids outright confrontation with the system leader in the short term, while still increasing the hedging state's ability to survive such a direct military confrontation should it occur in the long run. Strategic hedging behavior can also be used to insure the hedging state against security threats that might result from the loss of public goods or subsidies that are currently being provided by the system leader. In this article, I define strategic hedging behavior, present a mechanism for identifying empirical evidence of strategic hedging, and apply that mechanism to three case studies: the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Brazil's approach to regional leadership, and French opposition to the 2003 us invasion of Iraq.     

Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity,Threat Perception,and Negative Balancing Strategies after the Cold War

This paper engages the ongoing soft balancing debate by suggesting a new analytical framework for states’ countervailing strategies—a negative balancing model—to explain why states do not form alliances and conduct arms races to balance against power or threats as they previously did. Negative balancing refers to a state's strategies or diplomatic efforts aiming to undermine a rival's power. By contrast, positive balancing means to strengthen a state's own power in world politics. I argue that a state's balancing strategies are shaped by the level of threat perception regarding its rival. The higher the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose positive balancing. The lower the threat perception, the more likely it is for a state to choose negative balancing. I suggest that the hegemon provides security as a public good to the international system in a unipolar world in which the relatively low-threat propensity of the system renders positive balancing strategies incompatible with state interests after the Cold War. Instead, states have employed various negative balancing strategies to undermine each other's power, especially when dealing with us primacy. China's negative balancing strategy against the United States and the us negative balancing strategy against Russia are two case studies that test the validity of the negative balancing model.     

安倍治下的日本对华政策:从战略制衡到战术避险

日本的对华外交深受国际体系和中美日三角关系的影响。由于中美两个大国在全球层面的战略竞争加剧,以2017年为分水岭,第二次安倍内阁领导下的日本的整体对华外交政策经历了从"战略制衡"向"战术避险"方向的转变。在2017年以前,日本为了联美对华实施"战略制衡",在外交方面,以"印太战略"孤立中国;在安全方面,加强岛屿防卫能力和强化日美同盟;在经济方面,大力支持"跨太平洋伙伴关系协定"和对"一带一路"倡议持冷淡态度。在2017年以后,在中美关系的不确定性增大的情况下,安倍领导下的日本对华实施"战术避险"。在外交方面,加强印太战略的开放性、领导人互访和对华自制;在安全方面,继续强化国防上的内部制衡;在经济方面,有条件地认同"一带一路"倡议并对华展开第三方市场合作。展望未来,令和时代的日本将是一个拥有部分战略自主的中等强国,在日美同盟框架下维持与中国有距离的交往,力图在瞬息万变的国际政治角力中实现日本国家利益的最大化。     

The future is uncertain and the end is always near

The standard view of contemporary unipolar politics is that systemic constraints impede the translation of American power capabilities into influence over security outcomes, rendering the United States (US) much less capable than its material capabilities imply. Challenging this logic, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks argue that systemic constraints under unipolarity are largely inoperative with respect to the security policies of the unipolar power. Indeed, the US is uniquely positioned in today's world to convert its enormous capability advantages into influence and usable power. While World out of balance is a masterwork of logical and rigorous argumentation, Brooks and Wohlforth, in their exclusive focus on the hegemon and its policies, do not attempt to offer a general theory of unipolarity. Thus, they do not consider the possibility that unipolarity does not constrain any actors or the issue of system change. This essay advances two routes out of unipolarity: (1) a ‘delegitimation’ phase followed by regular balancing behavior and (2) a sudden and dramatic shift from unipolarity to multipolarity brought on by an unforeseen US collapse.     

Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia

Realists agree that great powers balance the military power of rising powers, but there is little agreement regarding secondary-state responses to rising powers. First, there are differences regarding whether secondary states balance or accommodate rising powers. Second, there are differences among realists regarding the distinct roles of economic and military factors in secondary-state alignment policies. Third, some scholars argue that state alignments are not necessarily determined by realist variables, but can reflect preferences shaped by intentions, historical experiences, or cultural influences. This paper addresses these issues in balance-of-power theory. Its empirical focus is the impact of the rise of China on secondary-state alignments in East Asia. After examining the complex mix of China's military and economic reach in East Asia, it concludes that secondary-state behavior is sensitive to local variation in the great power capabilities and that secondary states tend to accommodate rather than balance rising powers. It further concludes that economic capabilities alone are insufficient to generate accommodation, so that the political-economy literature should reexamine cases of apparent secondary-state accommodation to economic dependency, sensitive to the presence of military vulnerability on the part these secondary states to proximate great powers. These conclusions suggest that there is nothing sui generis or culturally-determined in East Asian international politics and that realism can explain alignment behavior among East Asian states as well as it does among European states. Research on East Asia's response to China's rise that is sensitive to intra-regional variations in U.S. and Chinese military and economic capabilities also challenges assumptions of an emerging Chinese regional hegemony or of a costly region-wide U.S.-China competition.     

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea

Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.while China's behavior (as well as that of other interested states) has been more and less assertive at various times, China's three basic arguments claiming rights to the region have been comparatively stable. Both China's pattern of multiple legal arguments and fluctuating actions and rhetoric do little to resolve the debate over whether a rising China will be deeply disruptive of the regional and international order or whether it can—with sufficient skill and tolerable adjustments—be accommodated and integrated. Although China's stance on rights in the South China Sea may be partly the accidental product of conflicting agendas and shifting assessments, Beijing's embrace of three distinct lines of legal argument arguably constitutes a strategy that serves China's interests given the factual, legal and strategic environment that China faces.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back

The American Civil War is an important test case for offensive realism because it was the last occasion when offshore balancing by Britain could have prevented the United States from becoming a regional hegemon. Instead, Britain drew on the norm of nonintervention to justify a policy of neutrality. Offensive realists reject the idea that Britain was constrained by normative considerations but disagree about why Britain failed to operate as an offshore balancer. I acknowledge the importance of the offensive realists' regionalized approach to the international system, but use English School thinking to argue that the normative framework that Britain and the United States subscribed to must be taken into account to provide a coherent explanation of Britain's response to the Civil War. Detailed archival research demonstrates that despite concern about u.s. regional hegemony, Britain was unequivocally constrained by normative considerations. The case study suggests, therefore, that societal constraints were stronger than systemic ones.     

State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State

Neorealist theory holds that the international system compels states to adopt similar adaptive strategies—namely, balancing and emulation—or risk elimination as independent entities. Yet states do not always emulate the successful practices of the system's leading states in a timely and uniform fashion. Explaining this requires a theory that integrates systemic-level and unit-level variables: a “resource-extraction” model of the state in neoclassical realism. External vulnerability provides incentives for states to emulate the practices of the system's leading states or to counter such practices through innovation. Neoclassical realism, however, suggests that state power—the relative ability of the state to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society—shapes the types of internal balancing strategies that countries are likely to pursue. State power, in turn, is a function of the institutions of the state, as well as of nationalism and ideology. The experiences of six rising or declining great powers over the past three hundred years—China, France, Great Britain, Japan, Prussia (later Germany), and the United States—illustrate the plausibility of these hypotheses.     

Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset

Post-Cold War, balancing theory has fallen on “hard times.” A question of crucial importance for 21st-century peace and stability concerns how Asia–Pacific secondary states are responding militarily to China's rise. China's rapid growth, military modernization, and controversial policies vis-à-vis contested space and territories on its periphery make it a prime candidate for counterbalancing behavior. Yet several recent studies claim that secondary states are accommodating, even bandwagoning with, Beijing. This study challenges these claims, attributing them largely to problematic research designs not uncommon in the wider balancing literature. It proposes a methodological corrective, arguing for widespread employment of an alternative analytical framework relying on clearer definitions and explicitly delineated sets of 21st-century-relevant metrics reflecting the myriad ways contemporary militaries enhance their capabilities in response to perceived threats. Applied systematically to original analysis of the contemporary Asia–Pacific, this framework uncovers what existing studies miss—evidence of practically significant and accelerating balancing against China.     

Steadfast Yet Reluctant Allies: Japan and the United Kingdom in the Vietnam War

During the Vietnam War there were high expectations from the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for Japan and Britain to provide practical and political support for American military and strategic objectives in Indochina. The leader of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party, Sato Eisaku, and the British Labour Party's Harold Wilson, balanced political support for the United States with significant public pressure at home to eschew any entanglement in the highly unpopular conflict. As junior allies of the United States both Sato and Wilson did not want to see the United States fail in Vietnam or the communist sphere expand in Southeast Asia. Both leaders accrued significant foreign policy advantages as a result of politically and publicly supporting American actions in Vietnam. But to placate domestic electorates that clearly felt uncomfortable over their governments providing explicit, albeit non-military, support to the United States in Vietnam, Sato and Wilson expended substantial prime ministerial diplomacy in attempting to play a mediatory role in the conflict. Each was highly successful in balancing domestic and American demands, whilst maintaining their security partnerships with the United States.     

Israel's Deterrence Strategy Revisited

During the 2001–2009 period when American foreign policy was internationally unpopular and perceived as unilateral, many states strengthened their security cooperation with the United States and facilitated the reach of the us military. This behavior spans a range of actions along a spectrum from reaffirming traditional alliances to far more subtle forms of alignment. This pattern is in large part driven by the actions of regional powers such as Russia and China whose rising power pushes neighboring states to seek the assurance of the United States, and it has distinct implications for the endurance of American hegemony. As those regional powers seek to expand their influence, secondary states may increase their contributions to the maintenance of American hegemony, thus helping to extend it well into the future. They are less prone to do so, however, if the United States follows a strategy of restraint that calls into question its willingness to defend its hegemony. Therefore, a policy focused on maintaining American military preeminence and the demonstrated willingness to use it may be what sustains the cooperation from second-tier states that helps to maintain American hegemony.     

Taiwan's Quest for International Space: Ma's Legacy,Tsai's Options,China's Choices,and U.S. Policy

Taiwan's “international space” has been a vital concern for the nation's leaders, and increasingly so as China has grown in power, influence, and ability to “squeeze” Taiwan's international space and thereby undermine the international stature that matters for Taiwan's security. President Tsai Ing-wen inherits a legacy of multi-pronged efforts and some successes, and will seek to build on them as she pursues her own distinctive approach. But she must do so in the face of continuing, and possibly increasing, resistance from Beijing and amid uncertainty about the policies of key states, including China and the United States.     

Bringing the Leader Back In: Internal Threats and Alignment Theory in the Commonwealth of Independent States

Traditional alignment theories, such as balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories, suggest that states confronted by more powerful or threatening states are more likely to balance against those states than to bandwagon with them. Yet in the context of the newly independent states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis), this proposition has not held true. A refinement of Steven David's theory of omnibalancing sheds light on this empirical puzzle. Using in-depth case studies of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, the authors argue that the alignment calculations of cis leaders have been driven more by internal threats to those leaders' political survival than by external threats to the state. These internal threats include the more traditional variants, such as assassination attempts, coups, and civil war, but also include opposition leaders and parties that may be perceived as challenging a leader's political survival. The post–September 11 security environment and the u.s.-led war on terrorism has also fundamentally changed the strategic calculations of cis leaders, as the United States is now willing to assist leaders against Islamist extremism and terrorism, taking over a role formerly played by Russia. The theoretical nuances offered here provide a more robust and accurate understanding of alignment motivations in the cis, especially in light of recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.     

Global climate security governance: a case of institutional and ideational fragmentation

In recent years climate change has become integrated into pre-existing, but fragmented structures of global security governance. In this article I argue that while institutional fragmentation of global climate security governance is not automatically problematic, the phenomenon of ideational fragmentation that often goes with it is highly disadvantageous to achieving climate security for people. This is because the preferences of a diverse group of security organisations/actors (in this article the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union and the United States/Pentagon) are often vastly removed from the global agenda set by the United Nations and its expressed preference for understanding climate security in terms of human security. I suggest that the first step towards overcoming ideational fragmentation would have to be the advancement of a universal definition of climate security by an authoritative source, however, given that security is for many actors a matter of perception the chances of overcoming ideational fragmentation are slim.     

局部等级视角下的东亚安全秩序与中美战略竞争

东亚秩序转型是冷战后国际关系学界争论的重要问题。在回顾既有争论的基础上,本文尝试从局部等级视角切入,分析东亚安全秩序的性质及其转型动力。局部等级体系由体系唯一超级大国领导的地区安全等级与区域内自助国家共同构成。冷战结束以来,东亚地区呈现出典型的局部等级体系特征,并在中国持续崛起的过程中逐步形成了以战略对冲为主要行为模式的安全秩序。尽管当前美国对华政策的对抗性不断增强,但是在局部等级体系下中国坚持战略对冲不但可以有效缓解自身面临的崛起困境,而且有助于防止中美陷入美苏冷战式的集团对抗,以战略对冲为核心特征的东亚安全秩序也将因此得以延续。这些发现一定程度上深化了地区安全秩序和大国竞争的理论研究,同时也有助于中美两国更为有效地管控其在东亚地区的战略竞争。     

European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?

The European Union has, since 1999, moved deliberately, if slowly, to develop the capability to undertake autonomously a range of demanding political military operations beyond Europe's borders. This effort, the European Security and Defense Policy (esdp), is a puzzle insofar as post-Cold War Europe is very secure, and most European nations are members of an established alliance, the u.s.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization. esdp is best explained by the international relations theory known as structural realism, the modern guise of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory is contrasted with balance of threat theory. Though European states are not motivated by a perception of an imminent threat from the United States, they are balancing u.s. power. The concentration of global power in the United States, unipolarity, is uncomfortable even for its friends who fear the abandonment that u.s. freedom of action permits and who wish to influence the global political environment the United States could create.     

Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?

The increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world's population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters. But does Beijing also countervail democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States? After a summary of the party-state's response to democracy promotion at home, we test the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders. We do so by focusing on the most likely cases in China's near-abroad: Myanmar and Hong Kong. Our analysis of Myanmar suggests that Beijing remains focused on securing economic and security interests irrespective of regime type when regime survival at home is not at risk. The case of Hong Kong, on the other hand, allows us to identify the tactics used by Beijing when there is a significant risk of democratic spillover. This case also demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is able to stifle United States and European Union democracy support when it wishes to do so.