从革命民族主义到超越民族主义——利比亚现代化的跃迁

利比亚革命民族主义是塑造利比亚民族国家最具影响力的一种政治力量,但利比亚现代化改造主要侧重于意识形态方面,且有明显的"乌托邦"和"理想化"色彩,无法实现既定的发展目标.作为革命民族主义的倡导者,卡扎菲在过去的30多年既没有促成阿拉伯民族的大一统,也未将利比亚改造成伊斯兰社会主义强国.伊拉克战争后,利比亚现代化开始从革命民族主义向超越民族主义转型.从历史发展的大方向来说,利比亚现代化转型是大势所趋,伊拉克战争只不过是一股强大的外动力.从现代化转型的客观后果来说,它使利比亚融入了久别的国际社会,顺应了历史潮流,维护了利比亚国家的根本利益.     

利比亚战争的相关影响及启示

持续6个多月的利比亚战争是冷战后西方干预非洲内部事务的最新案例,其产生的影响和相关启示至少有以下六个方面：1．利比亚战争反映出西方干预弱小主权国家内部事务的新模式,是当前全球力量由西向东转移过程中的必然产物;2．非洲国家担忧殖民主义和种族主义可能会借利比亚战争借尸还魂,对非洲的自主外交和一体化进程构成冲击;3．后卡扎菲时代的利比亚有可能出现“向北看”和“向东看”,而不再是卡扎菲时代的“向南看”;4．围绕利比亚战后重建的大国利益博弈,再次暴露出国际关系中“强者为王”的丛林法则迄今尚未退出历史舞台的严峻现实;5．利比亚战争造成的武器大量扩散还客观上使得恐怖主义在非洲趁势蔓延,这不仅使非洲的和平与安全成为利比亚战争负效应的牺牲品,而且还使美国借机进一步加强其在非洲的军事存在;6．对西方借利比亚战争挤压中国在非洲的生存空间和影响力的动机不可不察。中国作为国际社会中的一支重要力量,可以也应该在利比亚战后重建中发挥积极作用。     

利比亚新一波政治危机探析

2014年5月，利比亚政治和安全局势急剧恶化，一些国家甚至关闭了驻利使馆。这是2012年8月美国驻班加西领馆遭袭后，利比亚发生的又一次严峻危机，也是利比亚历史痼疾和2011年战争共同导致的后果，它再次说明，后卡扎菲时代利比亚的主要特征是乱，而由乱到治将可能是一个漫长的过程。     

美国宣战权的“府院之争”

利比亚战争已尘埃落定，然而由其引发的思考应该说刚刚开始。其中引人瞩目的一项就是美国白宫和国会围绕“宣战权”的“府院之争”。虽然被美国人捧为圣经的《美国宪法》明确规定国会拥有“宣战权”，然而在实际战争中，总统往往先斩后奏、先战后报甚至不报。此次奥巴马政府面对利比亚战争也没有例外，这再次引起了国会的极大不满。两党议员纷纷谴责奥巴马没有遵守宪法以及1973年的《战争权力法案》。而奥巴马则辩称，利比亚行动不算“战争行动”，因此无需得到国会的批准。其实，     

利比亚代理人战争的跨地区影响及走向

近年来,在域内外大国、强国陆续介入下,利比亚战争转化为代理人战争,动荡持续至今。利比亚交战双方欲解决"谁能统一全国"问题,域外力量则聚焦"统一后的利比亚受谁影响"问题。从形势发展脉络看,利比亚代理人战争已与西亚北非热点和域内外大国、强国地缘战略角逐深度交织,助推西亚北非格局加速演变。利比亚战争既给本国人民带来苦难,又使恐怖主义扩张蔓延,威胁地区和平、稳定和发展。     

利比亚战争以来法国对非干涉政策新趋势

法国在非洲事务上一直扮演十分活跃的角色，对非政策是其对外政策的主要支柱之一。利比亚战争以来，法国对非干涉政策开始呈现出新的特点。本文集中关注2011年利比亚战争以来法国对非干涉政策的特点变化，主要以法国在利比亚和马里的军事行动为个案，通过分析法国在两次军事干涉中的参与动机、干涉形式和战略考量，进一步明晰法国对非干预政策新趋势的认识。     

对利比亚战争的战略解读

2011年爆发的利比亚战争是当前国际政治经济秩序严重失衡的必然产物。目前，这场战争已经结束，但其影响和由之引发的问题逐步显现。其中最突出的是利比亚很可能成为西方体系中的附庸和跟班，阿拉伯民族复兴之梦日趋渺茫。战争的非正义性使西方赢得眼前，却可能失掉长远。     

对利比亚战争的战略解读北大核心CSSCISSCI

2011年爆发的利比亚战争是当前国际政治经济秩序严重失衡的必然产物。目前,这场战争已经结束,但其影响和由之引发的问题逐步显现。其中最突出的是利比亚很可能成为西方体系中的附庸和跟班,阿拉伯民族复兴之梦日趋渺茫。战争的非正义性使西方赢得眼前,却可能失掉长远。     

利比亚民兵武装组织

2011年利比亚战争爆发以来,利民兵武装组织日益滋生坐大,已逐渐成为左右利安全局势和政治过渡的关键势力。2014年5月以来,利政治危机加剧,民兵武装火并频仍。尤其是利比亚战争后,其国内长期掩盖的教俗矛盾、地区矛盾和族群矛盾迅速爆发,成为引发利民兵武装冲突的温床。同时,地区国家插手利比亚事务,进一步加剧了利冲突烈度并拖长了冲突周期。     

石油在中东战争中的作用：论争、演进逻辑与现实

近百年的中东战争史是用石油串联起来的历史，这是大部分主流国际关系理论的基本共识。这种把中东地区所有战争的驱动都指向石油的话语深受资源战争逻辑和能源现实主义基调的影响，导致石油因素对中东战争抑制作用的探究被忽视。实际上，石油因素既能催化战争，亦能抑制战争。获取石油资源、石油权力的诱惑以及石油收入的支撑，增加了国家通过武力解决利益争端的意愿，而对占领成本、报复风险、外力介入的担忧和对合作收益的期许则是冲突双方放弃对抗与停止战争的重要考量因素，战争的最终走向取决于国家对石油收益与战争成本的综合权衡。石油因素在中东战争中的两种作用，体现在利比亚与乍得战争、两伊战争等催化案例，以及巴林与卡塔尔的哈瓦群岛领土争端、埃及与以色列的“六日战争”、海湾战争的抑制案例之中。鉴此，在全球能源转型和军事技术变革的今天，围绕中东石油资源控制权爆发冲突的频率是不确定的，但国家为获取该地石油资源而发动大规模战争的概率不大。未来，发动石油战争成本的边际化、石油产业相互依赖的常态化和域外大国协调机制的制度化，将有效避免利益相关方因中东石油资源而陷入“石油战争神话”的话语窠臼。     

Libyan involvement in West Africa: Qadhaffi's “revolutionary” foreign policy

This article looks at a hitherto unexamined area of Libyan foreign policy. It looks at Libyan involvement in West African politics since 1980, and specifically at three states: Ghana, Burkina Faso and Liberia. It comes to the conclusion that Libyan foreign policy in these areas is oriented towards sustaining “progressive” regimes, perceived allies in the Libyan fight against US and Zionist imperialism.     

Libya's Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qadhafi on the International Stage

This article traces the development of Libya's African policy between 1996 and 2001, during which Qadhafi extricated his country from its pariah position to become a prominent player on the African stage. It analyzes the motives behind Libya's diplomatic encroachment into Africa, the tactics used by Qadhafi to crown this African policy with success, and the benefits garnered to Libyan interests far beyond the regional setting. The discussion is presented mostly from the Libyan point of view. Thus, particular emphasis is placed on the systematic and extensive coverage of Tripoli's African policy in the Libyan media. However, non-Libyan Arab and African sources are also thoroughly reviewed.     

Libya's Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qadhafi on the International Stage

This article traces the development of Libya's African policy between 1996 and 2001, during which Qadhafi extricated his country from its pariah position to become a prominent player on the African stage. It analyzes the motives behind Libya's diplomatic encroachment into Africa, the tactics used by Qadhafi to crown this African policy with success, and the benefits garnered to Libyan interests far beyond the regional setting. The discussion is presented mostly from the Libyan point of view. Thus, particular emphasis is placed on the systematic and extensive coverage of Tripoli's African policy in the Libyan media. However, non-Libyan Arab and African sources are also thoroughly reviewed.     

Between conflict management and role conflict: the EU in the Libyan crisis

This paper assesses the role of the European Union in the Libyan crisis (2011) and critically considers the implications for its evolution as an international security actor. Employing role theory, the paper reviews the historical development of the Union's security actorness and sheds specific light on the balance between self-conception and external expectations in the case of the Libyan crisis. Its central argument is that, despite external expectations and European narratives of a ‘comprehensive power role’, the Libyan crisis showed that the Union still acts in line with its traditional role as a civilian power. The inability to go beyond civilian power stemmed from internal dissonance on a potential hard power role and a corresponding lack of material capabilities. The growing gap between expectations about comprehensive actorness on the one hand and performance on the other is likely to damage the Union's future credibility as an international security actor.     

The Libyan Debate: Coercive Diplomacy Reconsidered

Muammar Qaddafi’s decision to dismantle his Weapons of Mass Destruction programmes in December 2003 elicited an extensive debate about the role of normal versus coercive diplomacy. The normal diplomacy perspective rests on factors that cannot solve the “why know” problem, and it relies on an unsupported assumption that Qaddafi’s identity had changed. The Libyan case, however, challenges the coercive diplomacy model. Libya confronted a demand and threat to disarm, but the George W. Bush Administration issued no explicit threats, placed no time deadlines on Libyan compliance, and attached only a moderate sense of urgency to Libya’s WMD program. This study argues that the coercive diplomacy perspective needs slight modification to account for the Libyan case. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provided implied threats to Qaddafi’s survival. The Bush Administration then used veiled threats to threaten Qaddafi simultaneously with unacceptable damage and enable diplomats to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.     

Egypt’s Foreign and Security Policy in Post-R2P Libya

Abstract

The post-intervention situation in Libya poses foreign and security policy challenges for Egypt. Egypt’s definition of the Libyan problem centres on two fundamental aspects: it is depicted as the consequence of an unfinished R2P military intervention, and perceived as part of a regional war against Islamist terrorism. All practical steps being taken by the authorities in Cairo are based on this dual framing. The implications of its positioning are, firstly, a securitised approach to foreign policy, including limited military interference and proxy support and, secondly, the emergence of a partisan position. To date, the impact of Egypt’s foreign policy line in the Libyan theatre has been limited and hence its viability risks being thrown into question.     

The Impact of Political Change on the State of Academia Including Academic Freedom in the Arab World: Libya as a Case Study

ABSTRACT

Furthering Western style academic freedom has been challenging, as Arab countries, especially Libya, have known only autocratic regimes throughout their modern existence. Amidst its current political and social upheaval, Libyan society is drifting towards the unknown. The problem addressed in this study is the impact of political change on the state of academia but, more specifically, academic freedom. Since the intervention in Libya by NATO states, many academics have lost their jobs. Some have become refugees outside of Libya as a direct result of the appropriation of most of the governmental posts in the country by religious and political radicals. The research questions reflect ways in which the new inserted de facto leaders of post-transitional Libya have impacted life on Libyan campuses and academic freedom.     

Re‐setting the Euro‐Mediterranean security agenda

The EU’s reaction is slow; the EU is divided; the EU is unable to deliver: time and time again, newspapers depict the image of an incoherent and uncoordinated EU foreign policy. This time, the topic under discussion was the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis. Many have compared the EU’s internal divisions over Libya with those over the Iraq war, an often used example to illustrate the limits of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article aims to assess the coherence of the EU’s short- to medium-term response to the Libyan crisis. It distinguishes between the horizontal, inter-institutional, vertical and multilateral dimensions of EU coherence. The analysis shows that unilateral actions or inactions of the member states mainly account for the EU's incoherent response. The post-Lisbon institutional structure has done little to compensate for these internal divisions. While the EU cannot change the course of national foreign policies, it should increase its ‘leadership for coherence’, Europeanise its crisis response in the medium term and aim at preventing incoherence in the longer term.     

France,Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis

This article seeks to explain the decisions by Nicolas Sarkozy's France and David Cameron's Britain to intervene in the 2011 Libyan crisis. None of the three major theories of international relations—constructivism, defensive realism and liberalism—can explain on its own such intervention decisions as the Libya case. The article's novel analytical model proposes that each theory emphasizes factors and mechanisms that explain part of the decision-making process and that these factors interact with state behaviour in complex ways. Britain and France initially began to consider intervention because they felt that the emergent norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’ applied to the Libyan case and because they believed the massive flows of refugees fleeing the violence were a threat to their border security. Both countries believed military intervention could be successful at relatively low cost and that if they did not intervene the problem would not be solved. At that point, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments engaged in initial action that made them more likely to intervene by jeopardizing their future economic relations with the Gaddafi regime and making him more likely to threaten them with future terrorist attacks. Taking initial action also meant that French and British prestige would ultimately have suffered had they not intervened to achieve a satisfactory solution to the crisis. Paris and London viewed international and regional support as a critical prerequisite for intervention and they sought and attained it. Finally, the Sarkozy and Cameron governments were able to minimize any domestic political risk of intervening because they had public and/or opposition party support.     

Explaining the United States' Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists

When an anti-US international terrorism incident occurs, the preferred US counter-terrorism response is law enforcement action. Sometimes, however, US decision-makers supplement or supplant this approach with a 'power' approach via overt military action. Among the more than 2,400 anti-US incidents over a 16-year period, the US has applied military force in response to only three: the 1986 Libyan bombing of a West German discotheque; the 1993 Iraqi attempt to assassinate former President Bush in Kuwait; and the 1998 bombing of two US embassies in East Africa by bin Laden operatives. What differentiates these incidents from other anti-US attacks? Although the presidents who ordered the strikes offered justifications common to each, this article uncovers five other factors that may have greater explanatory power.