A candidate for relegation? Corruption,governance approaches and the (re)construction of post‐war states

The article discusses the place of anti‐corruption in the post‐war donor agendas. It uses examples from a set of country reports to demonstrate the divergence between the rhetoric and reality of donor‐led initiatives, and the delivery of reform through the governance approach of which addressing corruption has been a part. It suggests that dealing with corruption has often been diluted or downplayed within the wider approach. Within the debate to revise that approach, corruption may be relegated further down the agenda. While recognising the complexity of the post‐war reform process, and the demands from the multiple tasks and volume of funding being addressed by a range of domestic and external actors, the article suggests that failure to address corruption within any new approach in favour of what are considered more pressing reform issues may well cause problems for the future. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conditions for effective large‐scale anticorruption efforts and the role of external actors: What does the Slovak experience tell us?

The article looks at what policy‐makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, based on an in‐depth examination of effectiveness of actual anticorruption measures in Slovakia. The research presents a synthesis of 12 case studies where measures in the sectors most associated with corruption as well as horizontal measures were analysed. The research shows that corruption can be decreased significantly within several years and external actors can play a substantial role in the process. An overall decrease in corruption can be based on aggregation of individual sectoral changes in areas most suffering from graft. In particular, the Slovak strategy was based on a sector‐by‐sector economic approach to resolve supply–demand imbalances based on either liberalisation/privatisation, limitations on discretion or managing supply and/or demand. Horizontal reforms complemented by sectoral reforms with their strong focus on increasing transparency. Concerning the role of external actors, we conclude that even when there is a domestically driven anticorruption effort, the external actors can still help significantly by serving as sources of inspiration, legitimacy, know‐how and funding for reform design and implementation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Regulatory Gift: Politics,regulation and governance

This article introduces the “regulatory gift” as a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of government‐led deregulation that is presented as central to the public interest. Contra to theories of regulatory capture, government corruption, “insider” personal interest, or profit‐seeking theories of regulation, the regulatory gift describes reform that is overtly designed by government to reduce or reorient regulators’ functions to the advantage of the regulated and in line with market objectives on a potentially macro (rather than industry‐specific) scale. As a conceptual framework, the regulatory gift is intended to be applicable across regulated sectors of democratic states and in this article the empirical sections evidence the practice of regulatory gifting in contemporary United Kingdom (UK) politics. Specifically, this article analyses the 2011 UK Public Bodies Act, affecting some 900 regulatory public bodies and its correlative legislation, the 2014 Regulator's Code, the 2015 Deregulation Act, and the 2016 Enterprise Bill. The article concludes that while in some cases the regulatory gift may be aligned with the public interest – delivering on cost reduction, enhancing efficiency, and stimulating innovation – this will not always be the case. As the case study of the regulatory body, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, demonstrates, despite the explicit claims made by legislators, the regulatory gift has the potential to significantly undermine the public interest.     

IS ALL CORRUPTION DYSFUNCTIONAL? PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Many anti‐corruption organisations work from the notion that both petty and grand corruption axiomatically results in negative consequences. However, few studies have asked citizens to evaluate the effects of different scales and types of corruption. This article investigates how rural people in Papua New Guinea associate dysfunctional or functional consequences to different types and scales of corruption. It draws on findings from focus groups conducted in four provinces of the country. The article finds that most examples of corruption considered by respondents were perceived as dysfunctional; however, marginalised respondents considered small‐scale corruption as functional—if the acts described benefitted marginalised people. These findings suggest that it is critical that anti‐corruption organisations understand and respond to the constraints faced by poor and marginalised people when operating in weak states. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Politics of Civil Service and Administrative Reforms in Development—Explaining Within‐Country Variation of Reform Outcomes in Georgia after the Rose Revolution

This article examines the role of politics as a determinant of civil service and administrative (CSA) reform outcomes in Georgia. The majority of existing studies on CSA reforms face several methodological challenges, which make it difficult to understand the influence of politics in more detail. Based on literature review findings, the article proposes a model for within‐country comparisons that allows one to control for a number of variables such as context and policy design. Comparing CSA reform outcomes in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs in Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution through a matched case study, the article shows that certain countrywide legal adjustments, anti‐corruption measures and context variables are necessary but insufficient conditions for successful reform. While in general Georgia has achieved considerable success in its CSA reform efforts, the President's leverage over reform implementation, leadership at the ministry level and the politics of foreign aid have led to significant variation in reform outcomes across the analysed institutions. In addition to this, institutional constraints reflecting inherent differences between policy sectors explain another part of the variation in outcomes in Georgia. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dealing with sectoral corruption in Bangladesh: Developing citizen involvement

Bangladesh has had a troubled political history since gaining independence in 1971 and is also beleaguered by poverty and natural environmental disasters. In particular however, corruption is blighting its prospects for economic growth, undermining the rule of law and damaging the legitimacy of the political process. This article adopts a sectoral approach to the study of corruption by examining people's experiences of using health and education services in Bangladesh through a large scale quantitative survey. It also presents case study research which assesses the impact of anti‐corruption work by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) in the areas of health and education. The article concludes that: the poorest in Bangladesh are most penalised by corruption; there are significant benefits for health and education service users resulting from TIB's interventions and there is a need for committed political leadership if ongoing efforts to tackle corruption are to be effective and sustainable. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

Regulatory Agencies—The Challenges of Balancing Agency Autonomy and Political Control

In this article we focus on the dynamic interplay between increase in autonomy of regulatory agencies and political control of those agencies. The general research issues are the weak empirical foundations of regulatory reforms, the complex trade‐off between political control and agency autonomy, the dual process of deregulation and reregulation, the problems of role‐specialization and coordination, and the questions of “smart practice” in regulatory policy and practice. The theoretical basis is agency theories and a broad institutional approach that blend national political strategies, historical‐cultural context, and external pressures to understand regulatory agencies and regulatory reform. This approach is contrasted with a practitioner model of agencies. Empirically the article is based on regulatory reform in Norway, giving a brief introduction to the reform and agency context followed by an analysis of the radical regulatory reform policy introduced recently by the current Norwegian government. We illustrate how regulatory reforms and agencies work in practice by focusing on two specific cases on homeland security and telecommunications.     

Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability

International organizations, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations promote greater governmental transparency as a crucial reform to enhance accountability and curb corruption. Transparency is predicted to deter corruption in part by expanding the possibilities for public or societal accountability, that is, for citizens and citizens associations to monitor, scrutinize, and act to hold public office holders to account. Although the societal accountability mechanism linking transparency and good government is often implied, it builds on a number of assumptions seldom examined empirically. This article unpacks the assumptions of principal‐agent theories of accountability and suggests that the logic of collective action can be used to understand why exposure of egregious and endemic corruption may instead demobilize the demos (i.e., resignation) rather than enhance accountability (i.e., indignation). We explore these theoretical contentions and examine how transparency affects three indicators of indignations versus resignation—institutional trust, political involvement, and political interest—given different levels of corruption. The empirical analyses confirm that an increase in transparency in highly corrupt countries tends to breed resignation rather than indignation.     

Legitimacy and context: implications for public sector reform in developing countries

This article examines the interplay between legitimacy and context as key determinants of public sector reform outcomes. Despite the importance of variables such as legitimacy of public institutions, levels of civic morality and socio‐economic realities, reform strategies often fail to take such contextual factors into account. The article examines, first, relevant literature – both conceptual and empirical, including data from the World Values Survey project. It is argued that developing countries have distinctive characteristics which require particular reform strategies. The data analysed shows that in Latin American countries, there is no clear correlation between confidence in public institutions and civic morality. Other empirical studies show that unemployment has a negative impact on the level of civic morality, while inequality engenders corruption. This suggests that poorer and socio‐economically stratified countries face greater reform challenges owing to the lack of legitimacy of public institutions. The article concludes that reforms should focus on areas of governance that impact on poverty. This will in turn help produce more stable outcomes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

State reform and the ‘privatized state’ in Paraguay

This article uses Paraguay, in Latin America, as a case study in order to examine the difficulties of introducing state reform where the state itself has a long history of control by private interests. It shows how the ‘privatized’ nature of the Paraguayan state is central to an understanding of how it has functioned and responded to recent reform efforts. The article provides an overview of the Paraguayan public sector and identifies several of its peculiar features that are relevant to understanding the state reform process: its small size, high levels of inefficiency and ineffectiveness, rampant politicization and endemic corruption. The article examines the three major components of an externally driven state reform process that began with democratization in 1989: privatization of loss‐making state corporations, civil service reform and decentralization. It shows how the ‘privatized’ nature of the state has proved a major obstacle to these efforts and is a major factor in explaining their limited success. The article concludes by offering a pessimistic assessment of the likely prospects for state reform and highlights the danger that Paraguay could descend into a ‘failed state’. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement

The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market‐oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co‐development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulation. Extending the conceptual framework of institutional theory about formal and informal rules, and using public procurement in China as an example, this article shows that formal tendering rules and regulations may be modified, circumvented, or replaced by informal ones which facilitate corruption. The article identifies four corruption schemes through which procurement actors may distort competition processes and mechanisms under the guise of formal rules. Consequently, public procurement in China displays the structural outlook of market competition, but not its essential substance.     

The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption

The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (TI), has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption. Despite recent critiques of the CPI, it remains highly influential on research into the causes of corruption and is also extensively used to galvanise support for measures to fight corruption. In this article we explore the CPI in more depth in order to highlight how the index has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. The argument is developed in four sections: in the first, we focus on Transparency International's definition of corruption, highlighting some conceptual difficulties with the approach adopted and its relationship to the promotion of 'good governance' as the principal means of combating corruption. In the second section, we outline some methodological difficulties in the design of the Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the CPI has been much criticised, we demonstrate in the third section that the index continues to exercise great influence both in academic research and in the politics of anti-corruption efforts, particularly as exercised by Transparency International itself. In the final section we argue that the CPI contributes to the risk of creating a 'corruption trap' in countries where corruption is deeply embedded, as development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid.     

Eyes wide shut? Reforming and defusing checks and balances in Argentina

How effective are autonomous audit agencies (AAAs) in curbing corruption and improving fiscal governance in emerging economies? AAAs are autonomous oversight agencies tasked with scrutinising government finances. However, they are not as effective as they could or should be, partly because of the political constraints they face and the political economy context in which they are embedded. This article assesses the performance and trajectory of the Argentine AAA. It suggests that AAAs can have only a limited impact when formal fiscal institutions are undermined by informal practices and undercut by adverse political incentives. It further highlights the limits of radical reform strategies based on the import of exogenous institutional models. This research has important research and policy implications for the reform and strengthening of AAAs in developing countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

E‐participation Opportunities and the Ambiguous Role of Corruption: A Model of Municipal Responsiveness to Sociopolitical Factors

Municipalities ostensibly scale the ladder of e‐participation improvement to gain legitimacy. However, research has not yet addressed how e‐participation initiatives are affected by serious legitimacy concerns such as corruption. One municipal response to corruption is to use e‐participation offerings as a remedial effort to gain citizen trust, but window‐dressing strategies might also be used. In this article, the authors attempt to make sense of this ambiguity by hypothesizing that the effects of perceived corruption on e‐participation offerings depend on the type of e‐participation as well as the level of local social capital and local public accountability demand. Analysis of data from 104 municipal websites in South Africa between 2013 and 2017 reveals support for two moderation mechanisms: (1) a positive remedial response to corruption in the presence of strong social capital and (2) a negative avoidance response to corruption in the presence of high demand for accountability.     

Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.     

Public administration reform in Vietnam: problems and prospects

Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Vietnam is an ambitious programme that seeks to implement ‘rule by law’ within a centralized, state management framework. It is a political strategy by the key party and state officials with the aim of institutionalizing and legitimizing the transition to the ‘socialist market economy’ through creating a dependable system of rule‐bound public administration. This programme has received extensive donor support. In the content and trajectory of PAR, external models and technical assistance are influential but the political struggle over control of state resources shapes the process. This is seen in the attempts to constitutionalize the powers of state organs and to distinguish them from the party; to separate owner and manager roles and to replace political with economic criteria in the operation of state owned enterprises; to combat corruption in ‘street level’ decision making; to rationalize the machinery of government; to create a centrally managed, professional civil service; and to reform the system of public finances. In each of these areas, there is resistance to reform proposals and evidence of implementation gaps. In these circumstances, concentration of donor support on the centrally managed PAR programme is a high risk strategy. Continued support for local, ‘bottom‐up’ reform initiatives could help sustain the demand for reform. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Applying rapid results approach to local service delivery: issues,lessons and challenges from Nairobi City Council

Over the years, the Kenyan Government has pursued wide‐ranging public sector reforms to improve local service delivery, but little has been achieved due to lack of a wide‐ranging decentralisation policy and institutional framework. To precipitate the reform process, the rapid results approach (RRA), commonly applied in private sector organisations, was recently introduced thorough out the public sector, including local authorities (LAs). This article assesses the efficacy of the rapid results approach (RRA) methodology in local service delivery using Nairobi City Council as a prototype; highlighting the success stories, pitfalls and challenges. The analyses are based on the findings obtained using current literature on the subject matter and the author's interactions with the council staff, councillors and other stakeholders. On the basis of the analysis, the article draws the main conclusions and policy advice on what could be considered critical for further debate, highlighting issues, lessons and challenges that could be raised to improve the practice of RRI. The key messages presented here will help policy makers, scholars and practitioners of reform to re‐think the envisaged countrywide replication of RRI to the rest of LAs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corruption and Anti-Money-Laundering Systems: Putting a Luxury Good to Work

Systems of laws, regulations, and institutions developed to counter money laundering provide powerful tools for fighting corruption. Currently, however, the potential benefits anti‐money‐laundering (AML) systems can provide in fighting corruption go largely unrealized, especially in developing countries. This mismatch poses a puzzle: Why are developing countries failing to best capitalize on their expensive AML systems by using them to fight corruption? The article is built on three core claims. The first claim is that it is logical to use AML systems for anti‐corruption purposes because of a pronounced overlap in the standards required for each and the rising costs of the former. The second section demonstrates specifically how AML systems could significantly augment anti‐corruption efforts, focusing on the importance of financial intelligence, asset confiscation, and international cooperation. Finally, although powerful outsiders have successfully diffused AML systems among developing countries, a lack of “ownership” in the latter explains why these systems are often established only as tokens to enhance international legitimacy and reputations.     

Understanding the changing role of public sector performance measurement in less developed countries

This article develops a framework for understanding changes in the demand for and supply of performance information in public sector organizations in less developed countries (LDCs). New Institutional Sociology (NIS) is used to argue that pressures from specific stakeholders stimulate organizations to produce particular performance information. The article distinguishes three groups of stakeholders (i.e. funding bodies, statutory boards and purchasers), and elaborates on the performance dimensions these stakeholders are interested in. The group of funding bodies, with their interest in financial performance information, used to be the most important group of stakeholders. However, statutory boards and purchasers are gaining importance as a result of recent public sector reforms, which include decentralization, marketization and the implementation of anti‐corruption programs. As a consequence of pressures coming from these stakeholders, new performance dimensions, such as the quality and quantity of services and the political governance structure, will be added to organizations' performance measurement (PM) systems. Whether these and other—often more traditional financial—performance dimensions will be balanced and integrated throughout organizations depends on the power positions of the various stakeholders. The arguments presented in this article intend to stimulate public sector organizations in LDCs to design and redesign PM systems as a response to changing stakeholder interests. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.