Financial industry groups' adaptation to the post‐crisis regulatory environment: Changing approaches to the policy cycle

This article explores the advocacy efforts of financial industry groups since the financial crisis. I describe key changes in the post‐crisis financial regulatory environment and argue that financial industry groups have adapted their advocacy strategies to these new conditions in innovative ways. Faced with a more challenging environment, financial industry groups have shifted their emphasis along the different stages of the policy cycle. Specifically, increased issue salience and a strained policy network have weakened financial industry groups' capacity to veto regulatory proposals at the stage of actual policy formulation. Focusing on the advocacy strategies of the global banking and derivatives industries, I show evidence that the response has been to invest in more subtle advocacy strategies which focus on other stages of the policymaking cycle. Self‐regulatory moves attempt to affect the agenda setting stage of policymaking, and a strong focus on the timing, rather than the content of new regulations, has attempted to affect the implementation stage. Such a transformation of advocacy strategies differs sharply from most depictions of financial industry groups simply “blocking” regulatory change since the global financial crisis.     

Crises and Paradigm Shift: A Response to Critics

International financial and regulatory reform continues in 2014, building upon the burst of crisis‐induced institutional and regulatory reforms begun in 2008. In particular, the Financial Stability Board is an element and an agent of reform and this paradigm shift. The leap taken was and remains a predominantly technocratic central banking macroprudential narrative and process, controlled by this elite epistemic community. As the new regulatory normal evolves in 2014, it now does so at a slower pace, as the crisis appears to abate. Today elements of paradigm defence, maintenance and resilience are seen.     

State of the Field

Although scholars of West European politics have long debated whether the region's highly institutionalised party systems were becoming de‐aligned and electorally unstable, the political fallout from the post‐2008 financial crisis has lent a new sense of urgency to the debate. The threats posed to party systems by economic crises are hardly unique to Europe, however. The Latin American experience with the debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s suggests that party system upheaval was not simply a function of retrospective economic voting during the period of crisis. It was also attributable to programmatically de‐aligning policy responses to crises – namely the ‘bait‐and‐switch’ imposition of austerity and adjustment measures by labour‐based, left‐leaning parties that were traditional champions of statist and redistributive policies. Such patterns of reform made it difficult for party systems to channel societal resistance to market orthodoxy in the post‐adjustment era, setting the stage for convulsive ‘reactive sequences’ when such resistance arose outside and against mainstream parties through varied forms of social and electoral protest, typically on the left flank. This article explores the political fallout from the European and Latin American economic crises from a comparative perspective, arguing that it is essential to think beyond the short‐term political dynamics of crisis management to consider the longer‐term institutional legacies and fragilities of the different political alignments forged around crisis‐induced policy reforms.     

Issue management as a post‐crisis discipline: identifying and responding to issue impacts beyond the crisis

• While there is a prolific literature on processes for organizational crisis management, and extensive scholarship on response methodologies such as apologia, image restoration and immediate post‐crisis discourse, little has been written about the longer term post‐crisis challenge beyond recovery, business resumption and organizational learning.
• Crises can lead to persistent and damaging issues, but there has been limited substantive research to illuminate the optimal processes to navigate the transition from crisis to issue. Moreover, if organizations remain in conventional post‐crisis mode there is a real risk of failure to put in place proper processes for longer term management of post‐crisis issues.
• After considering linear and non‐linear process models, and the development of a more holistic, integrated approach to issue and crisis management, this article proposes issue management as the most effective practical discipline to identify and respond to longer term post‐crisis impacts.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Measuring and explaining regulatory reform in the EU: A time‐series analysis of eight sectors, 1984–2012

Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) across eight different sectors is developed and the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU are analysed. Using time‐series analysis of count data, evidence is found that the number of winning coalitions in the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the EU. By contrast, the ideological composition of the EU's legislative bodies is not systematically related to regulatory reform.     

公立医疗机构民营化改革的模式及其比较

公立医疗机构民营化改革是新自由主义思潮波及并影响医疗卫生领域的重要表现，是当代全球公共部门治道变革的有机组成。尽管全球金融危机的爆发引起了人们对新自由主义思潮的全面反思，但是公共部门民营化改革的取向不会因此发生重大的转变。从国内公立医疗机构民营化改革的实践来看，托管经营模式、股份合作制模式和产权整体转让模式是较为典型的三种模式，这三种模式不论是在改革的进路、力度、目标，还是在绩效、阻力与风险等方面均存在着较为显著的差异。文章借助于浙江公立医疗机构民营化改革的实证材料，对上述三种模式进行了多维度的比较分析，以期更好地解读公立医疗机构民营化改革的不同模式及其适用性。     

The Club Rules in Global Financial Governance

Though the list of reforms following the onset of the financial crisis is long, we should resist the temptation to view the emerging regulatory framework in terms of a paradigm shift. Many key features of the system, including the privileged position of financial institutions, remain unchanged. This is not merely due to obstruction or capacity shortcomings but can be explained by considering the sources of ideas and the governance setting. Ideas and policy programmes for reform were generated by a policy community also responsible for shaping the pre‐crisis governance framework. Moreover, the ideas and preferences of these players are moulded by their transnational interactions and the club‐like mechanisms in place for determining what (and who) is to be included in discussions. These settings have produced policy programmes that helped address the immediate, ‘fast‐burning’ elements of the crisis, but have so far failed to put together a comprehensive reform programme.     

Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland After the Crisis

Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top‐down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post–New Public Management emphasis on recentralizing administrative capacity. This article, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command‐and‐control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European‐type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.     

Why reregulation after the crisis is feeble: Shadow banking,offshore financial centers,and jurisdictional competition

A crucial element in the complex chain of factors that caused the recent financial crisis was the lack of regulation and oversight in the shadow banking sector, which is largely incorporated in offshore financial centers (OFCs), but instead of swift and radical regulatory reform in that sector after the crisis, we observe only incremental and ineffective measures. Why? This paper develops an explanation based on a two‐level game. On the international level, governments are engaged in competition for financial activity. On the domestic level, governments are prone to capture by financial interest groups, but also susceptible to demands for stricter regulation by the electorate. Governments try to square the circle between the conflicting demands by adopting incremental and symbolic, but largely ineffective, reforms. The explanation is put to empirical scrutiny by tracing the regulatory initiatives on shadow banks and OFCs at the international level and within the United States and the European Union, where I focus on France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.     

Time for a New Paradigm? Past and Present Transitions in Economic Policy

This article seeks to place the UK's present economic ‘moment’ in historical context. Over the course of the decade since the 2007 financial crisis, it has increasingly been acknowledged that a cyclical crisis has become a structural crisis. The failure of most economists to predict the financial crash in the first place, and the inadequacy of economic policy in responding to its lasting effects, has led many to conclude that economics itself is in crisis. This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the present period of disjuncture. Drawing on theories of paradigm shift from both the physical and social sciences, we argue that the speed of change in UK economic policy is comparable to the two major historical transitions that ended with the post‐war consensus and neoliberalism. We conclude by offering some remarks on how and where the present change might take us.     

Timing as a source of regulatory influence: A technical elite network analysis of global finance

Rules governing the international financial system are the subject of some of the most intense distributional battles waged in any area of global governance. Who wins and who loses such battles – and why? I develop a novel analytical framework – technical elite network (TEN) theory – which explains the widely varying levels of influence that stakeholders enjoy over global financial standards. TEN theory draws attention to how issue‐specific characteristics of international finance – in particular, its highly technical and complex nature – shape the distributional consequences of global regulatory processes. It posits that such characteristics influence distributional outcomes by (i) affecting who claims first‐mover position and, thus, sets the agenda in global financial rulemaking, and (ii) ensuring that proposals made by first movers are increasingly difficult to alter at later stages of rulemaking. I provide empirical evidence for the theory by examining two regulatory regimes that are central to the efficiency and stability of the global financial system: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Accounting Standards Board.     

Crises and Paradigm Shift

Crises can force leaders and technocrats together, highlight failures and, more rarely, precipitate changes in ideological worldview and the prevailing consensus. In 2007–8, the worst financial and economic crises since the Great Depression of 1929 caused a paradigm shift in financial and regulatory ideology. G20 leaders and central bankers reasserted collective power and authority over financial markets and global banks to an extent and in a manner not seen since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. The retreat of state authority reversed direction. The spell of the ‘mystical Anglo‐Saxon model of liberalisation and deregulation’ was broken. In 2014 the paradigm shift is still underway and still under attack by recalcitrant bank CEOs and their lobbyists, but the shift may be durable—signalling a major change in international regulation of the world's largest financial markets and firms.     

The IMF's Rethink of Global Banks: Critical in Theory,Orthodox in Practice

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new financial interconnectedness agenda, developed in response to postcrisis calls from G20 to better understand systemic financial institutions, deploys a critical approach that stresses the spatial, political, and institutional dimensions of cross‐border financial networks. It portrays global banks as key nodes in those networks, “super‐spreaders” of systemic risk through complex business models that involve yield search, regulatory and tax arbitrage. Yet this critical view does not translate into its policy advice at country level. In regular surveillance of developing countries, the IMF remains committed to a benign view of transnational banking, even when confronted with growing cross‐border fragilities. During crises of cross‐border banking, the IMF tailors its conditionality to minimize domestic regulatory challenges to cross‐border banking models and to propose crisis measures that create new profit opportunities for transnational banks.     

Risk and Financial Armageddon in Ireland: The Politics of the Galway Tent

This article examines Ireland's financial crisis. Thus far explanation has focused on individual or collective administrative failure: the office(r) of financial regulation singularly failed to scrutinise the banks sufficiently: it was a matter of poor risk management. While this article would agree that the (mis)management of risk was important to how the crisis unfolded, I argue that an explanation of why the crisis emerged demands an altogether different focus. Put simply, after financial regulatory reform, a reconfiguration of risk in politics took place as the locus of decision‐making about financial risk shifted from the realm of the political/legal (Cabinet/Central Bank/Department of Finance) to the economic/legal (retail banks, shareholders/consumers). It was a critical development, one that mirrored events taking place in the UK, upon which Ireland drew experience, for now assessments about risk undertaken by the banks demanded that intervention could be justified only on an ascertainable risk, not a theoretical uncertainty (or spurious fear). The evidentiary bar for intervention was therefore raised, removing the precautionary instinct implicit in the prudential governance of Central Banks.     

The approach of senior public officials to information technology‐related reform: lessons from India

A review of global experience suggests that information technology (IT) has great potential to contribute to public sector reform. However, the Indian reality — like that for many countries — has been more problematic, with many failures of IT‐related reform; failures that can be described as total, partial or failures of sustainability and replication. Many factors help explain such failure, but a key component is the approach to IT and reform adopted by senior public officials. A ‘four Is’ model of approaches is described: the non‐IT approach of ‘ignore’ and the IT‐related approaches of ‘isolate’, ‘idolize’ and ‘integrate’. Analysis of Indian cases suggests that it is the last approach that is most likely to deliver reform objectives; yet it remains the least commonly adopted. Changes are therefore required in current strategies for public administration training and in the planning and management of change. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No Guaranties: The Decline of Municipal Bond Insurance

The credit crisis that roiled the financial and housing markets in late 2007 and early 2008 resulted in well‐publicized budget challenges for state and local governments. Less visible has been a dramatic change in the bond insurance market, which alters how governments issue long‐term debt. Debt issuance data from Texas are used to model bond insurance premiums and examine utilization following the crisis. The results provide evidence that insurance premiums rose dramatically following the fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the underlying credit quality of issuers.     

Capturing the Moment? Crisis,Market Accountability,and the Limits of Legitimation

This article extends the concept of regulatory capture to a prominent element of responses to the 2007–2008 global financial crisis overlooked in political science: the out-of-court settlements undertaken between regulators and financial firms. In outsourcing accountability to markets and diverging from previous crisis responses, these billion dollar agreements have remained highly controversial. How have financial regulators sought to legitimate this novel approach to post-crisis accountability? Contrasting material and cognitive conceptions of regulatory capture, I illustrate how American financial regulators have persistently prioritized market values in self-legitimating post-crisis financial accountability. Inconsistencies in the stress on transparency and growth, however, are shown to undermine the wider legitimation of this market-based approach. These limits underpin the scepticism with which post-crisis settlements have been received, as well as to the broader sense that accountability for the most severe period of volatility since the Great Depression has remained lacking.     

Flatliners: Ideology and rational learning in the adoption of the flat tax

What factors explain the wave of adoption of the flat tax in Eastern Europe? It is argued in this article that, once the first few successes were underway, governments with liberal outlooks toward taxation adopted the reform through a process of rational learning: an often radically new government will tend to adopt the policy based on successful implementation of its neighbours. The issue of policy diffusion is approached by explicitly modeling the different mechanisms that might underlie the process. Little evidence is found for pure ‘bandwagoning’ in the adoption of the flat tax – the presence of other market‐minded reforms do not predict adoption of the flat tax, and contagion measures do not capture the dynamics of the adoption of the reform. Instead, rational learning, where economically right‐wing governments evaluated the success of the reform (as measured by their ability to attract foreign investment) in the medium term, plays the largest role. Rational emulation in a shorter time period contributes to the probability of adoption as well, as does a change to an economically liberal ideology.     

Financial industry mobilisation and securities markets regulation in Europe

The 2007–2009 financial crisis has led to considerable debate about the role of financial industry actors in global regulatory processes. This article seeks to contribute to this debate by assessing when and why financial industry actors mobilise in order to influence securities markets regulations. Do these mobilisation patterns suggest undue influence by a small set of powerful industry actors, or do they reflect the engagement of a more diverse set of actors representing broader public interests? It is argued that variation in mobilisation patterns is a function of: (1) institutional opportunity (the openness and accessibility of regulatory politics); and (2) demonstration effects (how crises increase the salience of regulatory issues). Empirical analyses suggest that the financial crisis diminished the diversity of mobilising actors. This trend, however, is reversed when the news media disseminate information about the costs of weak financial regulation and thereby increase the salience of regulatory issues.     

Introduction to Neumann: law and socialist political theory

Abstract

Regulators attempt to understand financial markets and their risks in terms of categories of knowledge and datasets that are defined and produced by the markets. However, regulators cannot adequately interpret or utilize such knowledge, for reasons including their social distance from the sites of knowledge production, the diversity of financial firms’ proprietary risk models, firms’ abilities to game the rules thus rendering the ‘metrics’ meaningless and several backfiring aspects of global regulatory networking and reform. Calls for yet more information about trading, posed in terms of the merits of transparency, result in information swamping of regulators. Meanwhile, while policy-makers tinker with regulatory structures (‘architecture’), political reaction to the crisis de-legitimizes public regulation as a project. Yet there is one positive aspect of the reforms – enhancing powers for ‘resolution’ of financial firms in ways that impact upon investors while minimizing wider destabilization – upon which the regulatory information requirement can and should be refocused. To protect the public interest, legal transparency is required, trading transparency is not. This paper introduces these issues by drawing on critical work on transparency and markets.