Intergovernmental Organization Memberships: Examining Political Community and the Attributes of International Organizations

Why are states jointly members in certain intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) but not others? Despite the proliferation of IGOs and renewed interest in this topic, we lack systematic research to answer this question. Our theory of political community explains why dyads of states are likely to be common members in particular types of IGOs. We analyze and compare functionalist and Deutschian communitarian perspectives about IGO memberships. We test our theory using newly available data on IGO mandates and institutional structure, which allows us to make specific predictions about the types of IGO to which dyads become members. We show that dyads that are economically dependent, and/or democratic and enjoying enduring peace, are more likely to join those IGOs that possess high levels of institutional structure. Militarized interstate conflicts reduce the likelihood of states sharing membership in common IGO, but not substantially, whereas development and alliances also increase IGO memberships between states. Trade ties, however, are the most important determinant of joint membership between states in the most institutionalized IGOs, which is congruent with security communities.     

Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time-Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships

ABSTRACT

The literature on international organizations (IGOs) and interstate conflict in world politics produces a series of contradictory theoretical arguments and empirical findings about how IGOs help to prevent conflict and promote peace between member states. Empirical studies find a range of inconsistent results, ranging from pacifying effects of shared IGO memberships on dyadic militarized disputes to conflict-inducing effects of shared IGO memberships to null relationships. Theoretically, we consider how IGOs promote the rule of peace preservation through the mechanisms of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy, and we describe how these mechanisms help explain the time-varying relationships between shared IGOs memberships and militarized conflict since WWII. Analyses of time-varying parameter models of dyad-year data from 1948 to 2000 suggest that shared IGO memberships reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict in some historical periods (Cold War) but increase the chances for dyadic conflict in other periods (post-Cold War). The design of IGOs is relevant as well, with security-based, highly institutionalized IGOs best suited to prevent militarized conflict between member states. The results suggest that evolutionary dynamics in the Kantian peace vary across legs of the Kantian tripod and that we cannot understand the Kantian peace without considering dynamic relationships over time.     

Holy Trinities,Rivalry Termination,and Conflict

In this article we attempt to correct a number of gaps in the current literature on strategic rivalry. First, we argue that liberal and realist theories of conflict and cooperation have been generally ignored by scholars engaged in rivalry research. Secondly, we argue that current rivalry research fails to disentangle termination processes from conflict within rivalries, mainly due to problems with common operationalizations of rivalry. To bridge these gaps, we test the effects of liberal variables-manifested in the Kantian tripod (democracy, interdependence, and IGO membership)-and what we more loosely term the realist tripod (bipolarity, shared threat, and capability balance) on both rivalry termination and the probability that rivals will engage in a militarized conflict. We conduct this test utilizing a new data set of strategic rivalries compiled by Thompson (1999, 2001) which corrects the tautological operationalization of rivalry commonly used in rivalry research when conflict is the dependent variable. Overall, our results paint a variegated picture, underscoring the importance of rivalry as a special class of dyadic relationship. While realist variables better explain rivalry termination, the direction is opposite that predicted by some realist hypotheses; among liberal variables, only democracy is a robust predictor of both termination and conflict.     

The psychological effects of state socialization: IGO membership loss and respect for human rights

We present an interdisciplinary theory that considers how loss of membership in international organizations affects states’ human rights practices. Drawing mostly from social psychology and international relations research, we argue that states are socialized into the international community through a process of social influence, whereby they are incentivized to comply with group norms by the promise (threat) of social rewards (punishments). Social influence occurs when states form social bonds through interactions with other states. When social bonds are severed, fewer opportunities for social influence occur due to lower information to both the remaining states and the state that lost those social bonds. Thus, we hypothesize that the loss of membership from IGOs reduces incentives to comply with group norms and adversely affects human rights practices at home. A combination of propensity score matching/regression and autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models on a global cross-section across the years 1978–2012 supports the theory. Specifically, losing at least one IGO membership leads to a long-run drop in human rights respect of about one quarter to one half standard deviation.     

Intergovernmental Organizations,Interaction, and Member State Interest Convergence

This article presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between individuals from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they define their states’ interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization defined as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence and test them using an original IGO data set. The findings are supportive of my general theory but provide some interesting support for existing theory that runs counter to one of the hypotheses presented here.     

Neo-Kantianism and Coercive Diplomacy: The Complex Case of Economic Sanctions

Although voluminous research connects the neo-Kantian triad—democracy, economic interdependence, and intergovernmental organization membership—to amelioration of conflict processes, comparatively little is known about how these factors relate to economic coercion. We advance the relevant literature on neo-Kantianism and the determinants of sanction decisions by (1) analyzing the impact of all three neo-Kantian factors on economic coercion and (2) assessing the effects of these factors across both the onset of threat and imposition of sanctions. Results from the time-series, cross-national data analyses indicate a significant but complex connection between the neo-Kantian variables and sanctions. Specifically, we find that although democratic regimes are less likely to threaten each other with sanctions, once a threat is made, democracies are more likely to impose sanctions against each other. Economic interdependence and common IGO membership are likely to increase the probability of sanction threats. Yet, the results also suggest that common IGO membership decreases the probability of sanction imposition while economic interdependence has no statistically significant effect on the decision to impose sanctions. Overall, these results highlight the importance of a more nuanced study of sanction decisions for a better understanding of the factors that lead to sanction use.     

The Economic Leverage of International Organizations in Interstate Disputes

Addressing a long-standing debate in international relations scholarship, this study shows that international governmental organizations (IGOs) with high economic leverage over their member states, such as some development banks, substantially lower the risk that political disputes experience the use of military force. Empirical tests covering cases of disputatious claims and international crises since 1946 make use of a new classification of IGOs that have economic leverage and use it toward increasing states’ cost of using force in disputes. When pairs of states are subject to the economic leverage of IGOs, they are substantially less likely to use force. For the understanding and practice of interstate dispute resolution and international conflict more generally, the study suggests a specific linkage between institutionalized economic interdependence and conflict escalation.     

Global Energy Governance: Trade,Infrastructure, and the Diffusion of International Organizations

Why do states choose to join and form international governmental organizations (IGOs) that regulate energy policy? In this article we make three specific contributions to the literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse among countries that share oil and gas pipelines. Finally, we provide evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs impacts the development of their membership network. To test these hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970–2007). We employ both network analysis and spatial econometrics.     

The first image reversed: IGO signals and mass political attitudes

This paper considers the argument that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) send signals to the mass public, legitimizing certain policy options, and/or helping assure voters about the competence of the elected government. It discusses why the reception of IGO signals may be problematic within the mass public: many individuals lack the attention and knowledge to process them. And among those who are attentive and knowledgeable, pre-existing negative attitudes about IGOs may lead them to process the signal differently than intended. Using an experimental research design, it presents evidence consistent with an IGO signaling effect from two different scenarios. In an economic scenario, a negative signal from the World Trade Organization reduces support for the government’s economic policy. In a security scenario, a positive signal from the United Nations Security Council increases support for the government’s military policy. However, both IGO signals are conditional on certain individual-level attributes, and the IGO signal in the security scenario is generally stronger than in the economic scenario.     

Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict

Huntington's (1993a, 1993b, 1996) clash of civilizations thesis suggests that states belonging to different civilizations are more likely to become involved in conflict with one another. To evaluate the empirical accuracy of Huntington's claims, we examined the relationship between civilization membership and interstate war between 1816 and 1992. We find that civilization membership was not significantly associated with the onset of interstate war during the Cold War era (1946–1988), which is consistent with one aspect of Huntington's thesis; however, we also find that for the pre–Cold War period (1816–1945) states of similar civilizations were more likely to fight each other than were those of different civilizations, which contradicts Huntington's thesis. Most importantly, our analysis reveals that during the post–Cold War era (1989–1992), the period in which Huntington contends that the clash of civilizations should be most apparent, civilization membership was not significantly associated with the probability of interstate war. All told, our findings challenge Huntington's claims and seriously undermine the policy recommendations that devolve from his clash of civilizations thesis.     

The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms

Does membership in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) affect states' human rights behavior? One might expect IGOs with a specific human rights mandate, like the International Labour Organization or the Council of Europe, to have a positive effect on the human rights practices of their member states. But what about other sorts of IGOs, particularly those with no direct connection to human rights issues? This study employs cross-national data on abuses of "physical integrity rights" for 137 countries over the period 1982–2000 to test the hypothesis that IGOs can promote the diffusion of human rights norms by providing venues for interstate socialization. Recent empirical work on IGOs has suggested that this sort of socialization effect can play an important role in promoting democracy and can also lead to a more general convergence among states' interests. The results presented here suggest that IGOs can have a surprisingly powerful influence on states' human rights practices as a result of this process.     

Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Past studies regarding the success and/or failure of conflict management activities have brought about a wide range of results. In this paper we attempt to gain more definitive conclusions about effectiveness by accomplishing two tasks. First, using a basic theoretical framework we identify expectations of efficacy as they relate to differences between states, coalitions, and IGOs. Second, we also examine the utility of different conflict management techniques in an effort to place in greater perspective the effectiveness of mediation, the most utilized technique of third party intermediaries. Using a new dataset on third-party intermediary behavior in militarized disputes from 1946 to 2000, we find that while all conflict managers are useful in assisting belligerents in reaching a negotiated settlement, IGOs are the most effective. Additionally, while mediation is an effective technique to produce settlements, military intermediary actions, such as peacekeeping, are much more useful.     

The Nature of Borders and International Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory

This study examines the utility of moving beyond a simple "on–off" dichotomous view of contiguous land borders. For each of the 301 contiguous land borders between states in the international system, measures of ease of interaction, salience, and overall border "vitalness" have been developed using Geographical Information Systems technology. These variables are used to test two major extant lines of thought in international relations literature, as well as our proposed alternative, regarding the expected effect of the "nature" of borders on interstate behavior. We conclude not only that the "nature" of contiguous borders matters but also that the relationship between each of the three border measures and the likelihood of conflict is curvilinear concave—with both high ease of interaction and high salience related to lower levels of conflict, and the middle range of both variables related to higher levels of conflict.     

Guilt by association: The link between states�� influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations

Unfavorable views toward a particular state will result in skepticism about the legitimacy of IGOs in which that state possesses influence. The more extensive the avenues of influence, the stronger this “guilt by association.” The rationale is two-fold. First, a state that possesses institutionalized influence (e.g., a veto) within an intergovernmental organization faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities. Second, even if a state somehow could commit to abstention from overt interference, it may exert covert ideational influence if it already has embedded its values into an IGO. Elites and laypeople alike recognize the avenues of influence that fuel guilt-by-association. With statistical analyses of public opinion data from 35,397 people in 23 countries, I provide the first systematic evidence that guilt-by-association exists: for the United States, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan, vis-à-vis the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The evidence is robust to numerous alternative specifications. The findings contribute to international relations scholarship by enhancing our understanding of threats to IGO legitimacy and by providing concrete evidence for a mechanism by which antipathy toward powerful states matters in the international realm.     

External Intervention in Ethnic Conflict

Recently, ethnicity has received greater attention from international conflict scholars. This study explores a new aspect of how ethnic composition of states and the power of ethnic kin affect external state interventions in ethnic conflicts. Here it is hypothesized that states with dominant ethnic groups but still-significant ethnic minorities are expected to be more prone to intervention in ethnic conflict than states without one of these two characteristics. A new measure is proposed to capture such variation in ethnic composition more precisely. Looking at large-N panel data, it is found that ethnically fractionalized states with dominant ethnic groups are indeed the most likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts. Additionally, the power of the embattled ethnic kin minority, as determined by its settlement patterns in the host state, also increases the likelihood of intervention. Traditional variables like proximity and capability retain statistical significance. However, ethnic variables have the strongest effects on interventions in ethnic conflict.     

Organization without delegation: Informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) and the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements

The renaissance in the theoretical analysis of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has focused on formal IGOs (FIGOs), but many IGOs are subject to no formal treaty and/or have no permanent secretariat. Important examples of informal IGOs (IIGOs) include the G-groups that are the locus of much high-level interaction among states. We develop the spectrum of intergovernmental arrangements to show the wide variation in the formalization of international institutions and theorize when states will choose informal arrangements such as an IIGO over (or in combination with) a FIGO. A paired case comparison illustrates our claims that states use IIGOs when they need flexibility, to protect their sovereignty, to maintain close control of information, to lower short term transaction costs for speed, to minimize bureaucracy and to manage uncertainty during times of crisis. Finally, we examine how institutional choice is influenced by power.     

Procedural Justice and Conflict Management at School

In this research, we explored the contributions of perceived procedural justice (PPJ) to the conflict management behaviors of adolescents when they experience conflict with their teachers. We tested an extensive model to determine how PPJ contributes to conflict management. We also extended research on PPJ to examine its impact on adolescents. Our results, acquired from a large and diverse sample of 256 high school students, indicate that PPJ had an impact on adolescents' approach to managing conflicts with their teachers. Students who perceived that their teachers' decision processes were just were less dominating and more avoiding, obliging, and compromising. In addition, we found that students' perceptions about the legitimacy of their teachers' authority mediated the relationships between PPJ and conflict management style. This study contributes to the rather scarce research on PPJ's role in conflict management and should be useful for educators searching for constructive, relationship‐based tools for conflict management.     

Conflict in a changing world: Looking two decades forward

This article begins by outlining the likely changes in the strategic environment over the next 20 years, first globally than by regions. It goes on to offer some propositions on the nature of future conflict, given the perceived preference in the West for limited, low‐cost interventions. Most recent wars did not begin as inter‐state conflicts, and future ones will follow this trend. The characteristics of intra‐state conflicts are then examined in detail, particularly the effects of asymmetries on policies and perceptions: between states with widely differing capabilities, between states and non‐state actors, and in particular those involving guerrilla and terrorist movements.     

Democratization in Conflict Research: How Conceptualization Affects Operationalization and Testing Outcomes

Using the debate over democratization and conflict, we demonstrate how the connection between conceptualization and operationalization can play a decisive role in testing falsifiable hypotheses. We discuss seven different operationalizations of regime change based on three different conceptualizations of democracy. Although we find high correlations between different measures of democracy, when they are used to capture regime change, the correlations drop precipitously. In multivariate estimations of the effect of regime change on a range of conflict variables, we generate widely disparate results, providing no consistent support that democratization affects conflict. We thus demonstrate that decisions about conceptualization and subsequent operationalization have decisive impact on the inference we produce. In contrast, our controls for the effect of institutionalized democracy consistently show a negative relationship between joint democracy and conflict. Finally, autocratic regime change seems to be more robustly correlated with a range of conflict behaviors than heretofore recognized in this literature.     

International Integration and Democratization: An Event History Analysis

This article examines the relationships between transitions to and from democracy and membership in major intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), ratification of key human-rights treaties, and integration into the global economy while controlling for a variety of domestic factors. The findings show that for the most part, participation in the major IGOs and the United Nations' human-rights regime has made little difference to the chances that countries would attempt or sustain democracy. Participation in regional human-rights treaties in Africa and the Americas is linked to better prospects for democracy, but this association appears to stem from regional trends of which those pacts are emblematic, rather than mechanisms specific to the pacts themselves. Finally, entanglement in the global economy – as indicated by thicker trade flows and membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and then World Trade Organization (WTO) – seems to have had a stronger effect on the prospects for democracy than these other forms of international integration, but not always in the beneficent direction posited by liberal theorists. While participation in the GATT/WTO is associated with better prospects for the establishment and persistence of democracy, foreign trade itself is linked to the persistence of domestic political regimes of either stripe, democratic and non-democratic.