拉美左翼和参与式民主:以拉美四国为例

拉美是参与式(制)民主实践的先锋。相较于世界其他地区,参与式民主在拉美的确有着更为广泛的存在。拉美第一代参与式民主实践是20世纪八九十年代左翼在地方政府执政的产物,其主要内容是各种管理拉美城市的参与机制。拉美第二代参与式民主实践始于20世纪末至21世纪初拉美"向左转"时期,是该地区参与式民主试验的高峰。在此期间,委内瑞拉、玻利维亚、厄瓜多尔和巴西的左翼政府建立了多种形式的参与式民主。比较而言,委内瑞拉创造了一个激进参与式民主模式,寻求以参与式民主取替代议制民主;巴西提供了一个务实参与式民主模式,主张通过扩大参与实现政府有效治理从而巩固代议制;厄瓜多尔和玻利维亚则是混合模式,兼具两者特征。本文从正式性、代表性、范围—规模三个维度,对上述四国的参与式民主实践进行梳理和比较。本文认为,拉美左翼的参与式民主实践在扩大政治参与、增强民主包容性和提高政府回应性方面取得了显著的成效,为拉美国家民主体制注入了新的活力,体现了拉美国家在独立探索民主体制发展方面的积极意愿,但参与式民主体制的内在复杂性和拉美国家的剧烈政治变动使相关实践的可持续性面临巨大的挑战。     

拉美不自由民主的陷阱？--评《论拉美的民主》CSSCI

彼得·H.史密斯在《论拉美的民主》一书中勾勒了一幅拉美政治变革的百年地图,并考察了第三个政治周期以来拉美各国的民主质量。在书中,史密斯以民主不等于自由为前提,以自由且公正的选举作为最低限度的民主标准,而将公民自由获得保障作为更高质量的民主。他发现,在20世纪的拉美地区,民主制度从无到有,历尽凶险波折,到世纪末终于战胜了所有其他的非民主体制,成为该地区最普遍的治理形式。然而,拉美地区当下的民主质量不高,仅仅停留在"选举民主"的层面,就权利保障而言乃是不自由的民主,与自由的民主还有相当大的距离。尽管如史密斯所言,新左翼的崛起体现了拉美地区民主的辩证法,但在一些国家,左翼意识形态被该地区根深蒂固的民粹主义所绑架,并对地区原本就不自由的民主造成了严重损害。本文认为,鉴于地区主要国家的经济陷入长期衰退,"钟摆效应"造成政治损耗,以及国际层面美国特朗普现象和英国脱欧公投背后的民粹主义崛起和全球化的可能逆转,拉美地区短期内很难跨越不自由民主的陷阱。     

拉美不自由民主的陷阱?——评《论拉美的民主》

彼得·H.史密斯在《论拉美的民主》一书中勾勒了一幅拉美政治变革的百年地图,并考察了第三个政治周期以来拉美各国的民主质量。在书中,史密斯以民主不等于自由为前提,以自由且公正的选举作为最低限度的民主标准,而将公民自由获得保障作为更高质量的民主。他发现,在20世纪的拉美地区,民主制度从无到有,历尽凶险波折,到世纪末终于战胜了所有其他的非民主体制,成为该地区最普遍的治理形式。然而,拉美地区当下的民主质量不高,仅仅停留在"选举民主"的层面,就权利保障而言乃是不自由的民主,与自由的民主还有相当大的距离。尽管如史密斯所言,新左翼的崛起体现了拉美地区民主的辩证法,但在一些国家,左翼意识形态被该地区根深蒂固的民粹主义所绑架,并对地区原本就不自由的民主造成了严重损害。本文认为,鉴于地区主要国家的经济陷入长期衰退,"钟摆效应"造成政治损耗,以及国际层面美国特朗普现象和英国脱欧公投背后的民粹主义崛起和全球化的可能逆转,拉美地区短期内很难跨越不自由民主的陷阱。     

特纳的“边疆假说”与拉丁美洲的边疆史研究

美国历史学家特纳认为,边疆向"自由土地"的推进为美国人提供了向上流动和重建社会的机会,成为塑造美国民主的重要因素。众多历史学家参照特纳的边疆学说研究拉丁美洲的边疆史,但多数学者发现,在多数情况下,特纳的边疆假说并不适用于拉美,拉美边疆并没有像北美边疆那样产生改造社会的作用,而是中心地区的文化和制度移植和嫁接的对象。由于缺乏有利的地理条件和文化传统,边疆开拓的经历并没有促进拉美民主制度,而是复制甚至强化了等级制度,制造了暴力和动乱。     

美国国家民主基金会及其对“疆独”组织的资助

美国国家民主基金会(National Endowment forDemocracy,NED)自称是一个私人非营利性组织,旨在通过非政府渠道在全球推广民主.它每年为亚洲、非洲、中东欧、拉美、中东和前苏联地区的"民主团体"提供大量资助,用于促进这些国家和地区的政治经济自由、催生强大的公民社会、建立独立的媒体以及推动人权与法治等.NED也是中国"民运"组织、"藏独"和"疆独"势力的重要资金来源,其近年对"疆独"势力的支持力度不断加大,值得关注.     

拉丁美洲"民主化"进程中的美国因素

1912年以后,美国开始逐渐改变对拉美赤裸裸的大棒政策,实行软硬兼施的政策,在保有军事优势和威慑的同时,加以"金元外交",从而开了以"促进民主"为名义和目标,维护本国根本利益的政策之先河。冷战期间,为了防止所谓"共产主义扩张",美国长期与拉美的独裁政权结盟,甚至颠覆拉美的民主政府。1974年以后,美国在世界范围内"促进民主"确实给拉美国家的"民主化"提供了良好的外部条件。然而,影响美国对外政策的主要因素一直是美国的战略安全和经济利益,而不是为了"促进民主"。拉美国家民主化的经验和教训表明,不能照搬美国等先进国家的经验和模式,而应该主要依靠自主创新,建立适合本国国情的民主制度。     

中国的国家形象构建：拉美的视角CSSCI

随着中国的崛起和"走出去"战略的推进,中国的国家形象意识日益增强。相对于其他地区,拉美距离中国更遥远,文化更复杂,受西方价值理念影响更深,从而给中国在该地区的形象构建带来了特别的挑战。本文通过对美国皮尤态度调查和"拉美晴雨表"公司有关拉美对华认知的连续调查进行比较性分析,发现中国在拉美的形象虽好于在西方世界的形象,但远逊于在非洲的形象。其背后的原因主要可归结于四点:中国对拉美的认知反过来影响了拉美对华认知;拉美的历史和文化形成过程导致拉美人对一切外来者采取怀疑和忧虑态度;在不同文化碰撞和融合中形成的拉美文化本质上是一种西方文化占主导的混合文化,与中国文化差异较大,由此成为中拉认知偏差的核心根源;西方媒体对拉美媒体的主导性影响和中国对外传播能力相对滞后,导致中国在拉美的形象构建尤其困难。作者认为,鉴于国家形象日益成为国家利益的构成要素,亟须采取综合措施提升中国在拉美地区的形象。     

美国在拉美软实力的构建及其对中国的启示

从历史的角度看,门罗主义和泛美主义为美国确立其在拉美的霸权和维护其利益提供了合理合法的依据.美国以其自身的民主政治制度、发展道路为模式,不断向拉美国家输出其民主政治和自由市场价值观,帮助拉美国家确立美国认同的民主制度,统一西半球经济思想意识.同时,美国在国际制度方面也不断创新,以集体约束的方式使拉美国家置于美国的领导之下,锁定对其有利的"软"资源.美国还通过各种公共外交手段使其价值观在拉美得到了更深入的传播.地理的邻近使美国的大众文化在拉美国家的传播和影响迅捷和普遍,产生了巨大的吸引力.伊拉克战争虽然削弱了美国在拉美的软实力,但毋庸置疑的是,目前仍然没有一个国家在这一地区的软实力可以与之匹敌.美国在拉美软实力的构建为中国在外交战略、价值观传播和文化交流等方面提供了借鉴.     

中国的国家形象构建:拉美的视角

随着中国的崛起和"走出去"战略的推进,中国的国家形象意识日益增强。相对于其他地区,拉美距离中国更遥远,文化更复杂,受西方价值理念影响更深,从而给中国在该地区的形象构建带来了特别的挑战。本文通过对美国皮尤态度调查和"拉美晴雨表"公司有关拉美对华认知的连续调查进行比较性分析,发现中国在拉美的形象虽好于在西方世界的形象,但远逊于在非洲的形象。其背后的原因主要可归结于四点:中国对拉美的认知反过来影响了拉美对华认知;拉美的历史和文化形成过程导致拉美人对一切外来者采取怀疑和忧虑态度;在不同文化碰撞和融合中形成的拉美文化本质上是一种西方文化占主导的混合文化,与中国文化差异较大,由此成为中拉认知偏差的核心根源;西方媒体对拉美媒体的主导性影响和中国对外传播能力相对滞后,导致中国在拉美的形象构建尤其困难。作者认为,鉴于国家形象日益成为国家利益的构成要素,亟须采取综合措施提升中国在拉美地区的形象。     

天主教伦理与拉丁美洲不发达的文化根源——兼与新教伦理对美国发展作用的比较

天主教伦理是拉丁美洲文化体系的主要基础,这是西班牙和葡萄牙在征服美洲和殖民化过程中所留下的遗产。天主教伦理观对拉美人的思想意识和行为方式产生了非常重要的影响,成为具有伊比利亚传统的拉丁美洲经济长期难以走出不发达的主要根源之一。天主教和新教都属于基督教的范畴,但却具有不同的伦理观,这一根本区别成为南北美洲以后的经济发展出现巨大差异的主要原因之一。新教伦理占主导地位的美国发展迅速,与天主教伦理占据优势的拉美的落后状况形成鲜明对比。本文分析了天主教伦理与资本主义精神之间的不合拍关系,通过与新教伦理对美国发展作用的比较,试图从文化的角度揭示拉丁美洲长期不发达的深层原因。作者的结论是,拉美地区走出不发达的状态首先在于走出文化精神上的“不发达”。     

Promotion of democracy as a foreign policy instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to international idealism

The promotion of democracy abroad was a much published issue in ‘European’ foreign policy during the 1990s. Based on five case studies, this article argues that the policy had very clear limitations to it. The limits were mainly imposed by the high priority given to security, and secondly they were the result of the institutional structure and the political‐bureaucratic culture of the European Community. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the policy declarations on democracy were not important to the European Community/European Union and to the member states. The issue was definitely important, but that was because it served other purposes. First, the promotion of democracy abroad was conceived as one among a number of instruments promoting European security in the post‐cold war era. Secondly, promotion of democracy internationally contributed to the higher profile in world affairs that Europe had sought since 1958. And thirdly, this international profile might have pushed the integration process forward within Europe.     

The Catholic contribution to democratization's ‘third wave’: altruism,hegemony or self-interest?

This article examines the contribution of the Roman Catholic Church to democratization's ‘third wave’. Whilst making no substantive claims about the centrality of religion to political transitions, it indicates several ways in which national Catholic hierarchies and the wider Catholic Church contributed to democratization. Of more interest, however, is the question of why the Catholic Church shifted from its traditional position of hostility to democracy. Three primary explanations are offered for the Catholic contribution: theological change, the pursuit of hegemony and the attempt to maintain market share. All three offer useful insights, though this article ultimately suggests that a combination of internal change and contingency is key to understanding this phenomenon.     

International,national or local? Explaining the substance of democracy promotion: the case of Eastern European democracy promotion

The EU is one of the most prominent democracy promoters in the world today. It has played an especially important role in the democratization of its Eastern European member states. Given the acknowledged success and legitimacy of EU democracy promotion in these countries, it could be expected that when they themselves began promoting democracy, they would borrow from the EU's democracy promotion model. Yet this paper finds that the EU's model has not played a defining role for the substantive priorities of the Eastern European democracy promoters. They have instead borrowed from their own democratization models practices that they understand to fit the needs of recipients. This article not only adds to the literature on the Europeanization of member state policies but also contributes both empirically and theoretically to the literature on the foreign policy of democracy promotion. The article theorizes the factors shaping the substance of democracy promotion—how important international ‘best practices’ are and how they interact and compete with donor-level domestic models and recipient democratization needs. Also, this study sheds light on the activities of little-studied regional democracy promoters—the Eastern European members of the EU.     

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

ABSTRACT

The European Union’s (EU) impact on the political governance of the European neighbourhood is varied and sometimes opposite to the declared objectives of its democracy support policies. The democracy promotion literature has to a large extent neglected the unintended consequences of EU democracy support in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. The EU has left multiple imprints on the political trajectories of the countries in the neighbourhood and yet the dominant explanation, highlighting the EU’s security and economic interests in the two regions,cannot fully account for the unintended consequences of its policies. The literature on the ‘pathologies’ of international organisations offers an explanation, emphasizing the failures of the EU bureaucracy to anticipate, prevent or reverse the undesired effects of its democracy support in the neighbourhood.     

Promoting democracy or the external context? Comparing the substance of EU and US democracy assistance in Ethiopia

This article analyses the substance of the European Union's and United States' democracy assistance in Ethiopia in 2005–2010. Does this case reveal a transatlantic split, whereby the EU focuses on the external context and the US on the partial regimes of embedded, liberal democracy? Emphasizing the importance of institutions in analysing how interests and ideas affect democracy assistance, the article investigates how the substance may differ between the European Development Fund (EDF), European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The analysis finds a transatlantic split whereby the EU focused more on the external context and the US more on the partial regimes. This transatlantic split can be explained by the combination of ideas and institutions. More specifically, it reflects a difference between the EDF and USAID in their focus on ownership, alignment and harmonization in democracy assistance. The combination of interests and institutions played a less significant role in explaining the substance of democracy assistance, as USAID emphasized the partial regimes, despite political control from the State Department.     

Democracy promotion between the “political” and the “developmental” approach: US and German policies towards Belarus

Following the end of the East–West conflict, the global spread of liberal democracy became an important strategic objective in world politics. Primarily, the foreign policy of the US and EU (states) demonstrated the relevance of democracy promotion abroad. While Western democracies' policy objectives regarding democracy promotion go well together, an obvious difference between their approaches in this area has often been shown: a largely “political” approach of the US vs a “developmental” one of European states. Accordingly, this article focuses on recent tendencies in democracy promotion by comparing US and German policies in the European post-Soviet space in order to investigate the expression of both approaches in a strategically important region. It thereby analyses the pivotal case of Belarus, which presents a great challenge to democracy promoters. The study concludes that external democracy promotion in that part of the world does not show a clear differentiation between the two approaches, and suggests a few potential explanations to be explored in future research.     

Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?

The increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world's population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters. But does Beijing also countervail democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States? After a summary of the party-state's response to democracy promotion at home, we test the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders. We do so by focusing on the most likely cases in China's near-abroad: Myanmar and Hong Kong. Our analysis of Myanmar suggests that Beijing remains focused on securing economic and security interests irrespective of regime type when regime survival at home is not at risk. The case of Hong Kong, on the other hand, allows us to identify the tactics used by Beijing when there is a significant risk of democratic spillover. This case also demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is able to stifle United States and European Union democracy support when it wishes to do so.     

The relation between cultural values and models of democracy: a cross-national study

The relation between democracy and culture is a long-lasting subject of interest in political science. In the contemporary approach to cultural analysis, value orientations are studied as fundamental manifestations of culture. The mainstream research has focused on finding a relation between the quality of a democratic system and the existence of essential values in a society. There is, however, an understudied question as to what the relation between cultural values and models of democracy in different countries exactly is. We know that there are different models or patterns of democracy (for example, majoritarian versus consensus and participatory versus spectator democracy) discernible in various countries. But what is the reason that a particular country, or set of countries, appreciates and accepts one type of democracy, while suspecting and discrediting other types? This article aims to find an answer to this question from the perspective of cultural differences. Using the empirical data derived from the operationalization of dimensions of democracy and dimensions of culture at the national level, we examine hypotheses regarding the relation between societal cultural values and the practice of different models of democracy in various countries.     

Regime change and the convergence of democratic value orientations through socialization. Evidence from reunited Germany

Theories of socialization and political culture claim that public ideas about how a democracy should be shaped will only change slowly after regime changes. Thus, citizens’ value orientations should converge after a replacement of generations and through institutional learning. Pertaining to the development and convergence of individual conceptions of democracy or democratic value orientations, these assumptions have not yet been tested empirically. This article therefore provides an empirical test, drawing on the case of German reunification as a natural experiment. I analyse the development of democratic value orientations based on data from the sixth wave of the European Social Survey using both factor and cohort analysis. The findings provide strong support for the assumptions of socialization theories: More than 20 years after reunification, people who grew up in East Germany still show a higher affiliation to a socialist model of democracy than people socialized in the West, who instead show higher support for a liberal model. However, differences in democratic value orientations are converging for citizens less than 30 years of age across Germany, the first generation socialized entirely in a democratic political system.     

Microstate Democracy: Majority or Consensus; Diffusion or Problem-Solving?

While several studies suggest that small country size is conducive to democracy, the understanding of this link between smallness and democracy is still less than complete. By examining the nature and profile of microstate democracy in the year 2005, this article aims at promoting a better understanding. Two research tasks are pursued. First, the article investigates if microstate democracy is predominantly about majority democracy, or alternatively consensus democracy, or a blend of majority and consensus. Second, while testing the validity of diffusion and rationality assumptions for explaining country choices of democratic form, the article aims at drawing forth a better appreciation of the foundations of microstate democracy. The findings indicate that smallness is particularly conducive to majority democracy, and that diffusion goes a long way to explain this small state preference for majority rule. However, the microstates within the majoritarian framework are often inclined to resort to non-majoritarian choices, and elements of rationality are therefore in the picture as well. Small size does not appear to associate systematically with culture to the exclusion of rationality or with rationality to the exclusion of culture.