Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence

In its first decade of post-communist independence, Poland achieved far more than most dared believe in 1989. Despite domestic political and economic turmoil, it has joined Europe as a new member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU. This article traces the evolution of Polish foreign policy since 1989 over four time periods: First, the early uncertainties from 1989 to 1992 when Warsaw — caught between a reunifying Germany and a collapsing USSR — was intent on solidifying its relations with Central European neighbors. Second, the watershed year of 1993, which witnessed changes in every aspect of Poland's external relations — the demise of Visegrad, first moves toward NATO and EU enlargement, the emergence of serious tensions in Warsaw's relations with the East, especially Russia. Third, the years in the anterooms of Europe from 1994 to 1996, when Poland and its central European neighbors lobbied for early accession to the EU and NATO, while relations with Russia remained in the deep freeze. And fourth, the period since 1997, in which Warsaw has been negotiating its “return to Europe”, joining NATO in 1999 and actively pursuing membership in the EU. These gains have not come quickly or easily; rather, they demonstrate a hard earned consistency in Poland's foreign policy agenda, despite numerous changes in domestic politics, as well as an increasingly realistic vision of the country's place in post-Cold War Europe.     

从美苏之间到美欧俄之间——1989年后中东欧国家的外交战略与大国关系的互动

在中东欧国家由苏联"卫星国"向北约和欧盟成员的转变中,苏联、美国、北约、欧盟及俄罗斯对中东欧国家的政策及它们之间的关系起到了至关重要、有时甚至是决定性的作用。正是在美苏对峙格局崩溃,美国成为世界唯一的超级大国,美、欧、俄的博弈渐次展开但远未构成三足鼎立的情况下,中东欧国家以加入北约与欧盟为主要内容的"回归欧洲"战略得以确立和实施。中东欧国家加入北约和欧盟对美、欧、俄关系产生了一定的影响,但不会从根本上改变与美、欧、俄之间现有的关系格局。     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

Prospects for Russia-NATO relations: The SWOT analysis

Despite recent changes in international relations and lapse of time since the fall of the USSR, the issue of Russian membership in NATO has been an ongoing fact. Hence, the principle scope of the paper is SWOT analysis of potential Russian membership in NATO from the perspective of the Russian Federation. Through the introduction and evaluation of advantages and disadvantages of such membership in the light of latest geopolitical events in Eurasia suggested by academic and professional circles in NATO countries and Russia, we proceed with identification of fundamental strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats that Russia might face. Taking into account such determining factors as the size of its territory, shifting geopolitical conditions in the world, modern understanding of security and a potentially frozen dispute in Ukraine, we come to the conclusion that benefits potentially brought by Russian membership in NATO could be sustained while drawbacks could be eliminated by incorporation of NATO to OSCE and a change in voting procedures of the Alliance.     

Introduction

Central Eastern Europe (further CEE) has been thoroughly reconstructed during nearly a quarter of century since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. The CEE countries turned to the West for economic and technological advancement, for political and administrative models as well as for protection. The authors coming from eight different countries look at the place and role of the former member states of the Warsaw Pact in the new European and international constellation. This concept of CEE includes most pro-western states of the former ‘Eastern block’: the four countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). There were many tumultuous political developments in and around the region within the last decade, and especially during the last five years when the financial crisis started to take its toll. While the Atlantic link of Central and Eastern Europe is still strong, many commentators have pointed out its wearing strategic meaning. The balance between the focus on the USA and the EU has shifted in favour of Europe. However, this shift has rather been an incomplete one due to the region's own political and economic problems. The aim of this special issue is to analyse the new constellation by looking at the CEE countries themselves, at their ability to react and adapt, produce sound political strategies and act on as national actors: through bilateral ties, regional co-operation, NATO and the EU. Also, the main external actors - the USA, Russia and Germany - are looked at as they directly influence the way how the CEE countries shape their policies.     

中东欧地区大国博弈新态势--兼论中国-中东欧国家合作面临的挑战与机遇

在地缘安全、能源、价值观等方面,美国、以德国为主要代表的欧盟国家以及俄罗斯在中东欧地区有着广泛而重要的利益。三者的互动关系呈现美俄博弈主导中东欧安全形势,美德(欧)联合制俄但共识有限,美德(欧)对中国在中东欧的经济介入保持警惕但难以形成合力三个特征。随着中美竞争的持续,美德(欧)与以波兰、匈牙利为代表的中东欧国家在价值观上的分歧扩大,美德(欧)对俄罗斯的地缘政治攻势升级,中东欧地区的大国力量格局发生了新的变化。美国对中国的战略围堵压力持续加大,以德国为代表的欧盟国家对中东欧国家的控制力不断降低,俄罗斯反“守”为“攻”回应西方威胁,而德国新政府和新一届欧盟委员会对华政策更加突出价值观因素,导致中国—中东欧国家合作面临的地缘政治压力总体上有增无减。但是,美欧内部也并非铁板一块,以德国为代表的欧盟国家在中东欧控制力的弱化以及美欧与波兰、匈牙利等国关系的恶化,也为持续推进中国—中东欧国家合作带来了潜在机遇。以上因素作为影响中东欧国家对华政策的重要变量,需要密切关注。     

Foreign policy, rhetorical action and the idea of otherness: The Czech Republic and Russia

This article employs the concept of rhetorical action in an analysis of the recent developments in Czech-Russian political relations. Through the discourse analysis of key Russian political speeches and official documents related to the Czech Republic, as well as Czech speeches tackling the same issues, we look at two different rhetorical actions employed by Russia to induce changes in Czech policy. The attempts to make Czech policy unacceptable in the wider community of European democracies were only partially successful. While the first rhetorical action aimed against Czech NATO membership failed, the new diplomatic strategy stressing the need for a “normalization” of relations was successful in transforming Czech policy towards Russia.     

The sources of Russia's fear of NATO

The paper analyzes Russia's perception of NATO since the beginning of its eastern enlargement. Russia's reaction to the enlargement evolved from attempts to diffuse its potential damage through a limited cooperation to passive and then active policies of containment. The latter have resulted in a risky behavior with respect to the alliance and a concentration of Russian military on the Western border. Two factors can assist us in explaining Russia's evolving perception of NATO from a potential partner to a renewed military threat – the historical experience of viewing the alliance, and the West in general, as potentially threatening and the post-Cold war interaction with NATO that served to strengthen the historically developed perception. As of today, Russia has learned from its interaction with the alliance that NATO remains a principle threat to Russia's national security and that through the alliance's expansion the West seeks to exercise its cultural, economic, and political domination in Eurasia.     

Ukraine between Russia and the European Union: Triangle Revisited

Ukraine has long been considered as a bone of contention between the EU and Russia which could eventually lead to a geographical split of the country. This interpretation, however, fails to explain the dynamic of the Ukrainian revolution and Russian–Ukrainian war. To address the deadlock in understanding the mixed dynamics of the situation in Ukraine, the article argues that the relations in the EU–Ukraine–Russia triangle are affected by the combination of choices that the Ukrainian political class, business elites and broader society make in four major dimensions: internal political practices; economic dimension; a dimension of international politics; and an ideological dimension.     

Democratization without enlargement? The European Neighbourhood Policy on post-communist transitions

This article explores the concept of normative power in Europe by assessing the democratic impact of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in Eastern Europe. By focusing on democratization as a normative objective of the ENP, the authors argued that the European Union (EU) should not be assumed to be a normative power in international politics. It is argued that the EU vision of creating a ring of friends through the ENP has failed. Although the number of EU member states has significantly increased, and the Western European norms and values have become consolidated in most of Europe, Europe remains divided between EU member states and the others. The democratic decline in Russia, the conflict in Georgia in 2008, and the growing authoritarianism in Belarus and Ukraine have had negative effects on the notion of a whole, free, and democratized Europe.     

The offensive posture of NATO's missile defence system

A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO's missile defence system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offence/defence posture of NATO's missile defence plans in terms of both capabilities and strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength and reach of its missile defence components, while rejecting any international treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and utilising NATO as an ‘insurance policy’ against Russia, to be activated when conflicts arise. We conclude that NATO has the capacity to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between potential targets, but it has displayed no intention to do so.     

Prince Adam Czartoryski as a liminal figure in the development of modern nationalism in Eastern Europe at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

In Polish history, Prince Adam Czartoryski is almost universally regarded as one of the most important Polish statesmen and patriots of the first half of the nineteenth century. In Russian history, on the other hand, he is remembered chiefly as the Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, and a close personal friend of Tsar Alexander I. How did Czartoryski reconcile his commitment to the Polish nation with his service to the Russian Empire (a state which occupied most of Poland)? This paper will attempt to place Prince Adam's friendship with Alexander, and his service to Imperial Russia, in the broader context of national identity formation in early nineteenth-century eastern Europe. It will be argued that the idea of finding a workable relationship between Poland and Russia, even within the framework of a single state for a “Slavic nation,” was an important and forgotten feature of Polish political thought at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By answering the question of precisely how Czartoryski was able to negotiate between the identities of a “Polish patriot” and “Russian statesman,” the paper will shed light on the broader development of national identity in early nineteenth-century Poland and Russia.     

An unlikely bulwark of Sovietness: cross-border travel and Soviet patriotism in Western Ukraine, 1956–1985

Focusing on the development of travel between the borderlands of Ukraine and Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe, this article explores what it meant to be Soviet outside the Russian core of the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s. The cautious opening of the Soviet border was part of a larger attempt to find fresh sources of popular support and enthusiasm for the regime's “communist” project. Before the Prague Spring of 1968 in particular, official policies and narratives of travel thus praised local inhabitants who crossed the Soviet border for supposedly overcoming age-old hatreds to build a brighter future in Eastern Europe. By the 1970s, however, smuggling and cultural consumption discredited the idea of “internationalist friendship.” This encouraged residents of Ukraine to speak and write about the continuing importance of the Soviet border. The very idea of Sovietness was defined in national terms, as narratives of travel emphasized that Soviet citizens were inherently different from ethno-national groups in the people's democracies. Eastern Europe thus emerged as an “other” that highlighted the Soviet character of territories incorporated into the USSR after 1939, helping to obscure western Ukraine's troubled past and leading to the emergence of new social hierarchies in the region.     

Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions

The deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations heightened in 2014 but did not begin then and has deeper roots. Both Russian presidents have had troubled relations with all five Ukrainian presidents irrespective if they were described as ‘nationalist’ or ‘pro-Russian.’ This article is the first to explain why the roots of the crisis go deeper and it does this by investigating three areas. The first is the different sources of elites in 1991 when independent Russia captured Soviet institutions and undertook top-down state building while Ukraine inherited far less and set course with bottom up state-building. The second is divergent Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The third is the resultant different transitions with Russia reverting to great power imperial nationalism and Ukraine quadruple and post-colonial transitions.     

Avoiding crisis contagion: Poland’s case

This paper examines the major reasons for limited crisis contagion to Poland in the period 2007–09. At this time Poland was the only European Union (EU) member that grew in the midst of the Great Recession and financial crisis. The following analysis focuses on domestic polices and economics structure which made this growth possible. Poland’s modest levels of private and public debt, low share of mortgages in bank assets, limited decline in real estate prices, and proactive policies by domestic and foreign banks substantially buffered Poland’s financial sector. At the same time, real economy was aided by a high share of domestic consumption as opposed to exports, a favorable labor market structure, and timely financial assistance from the EU, all that shielded it from major crisis contagion.     

Good Neighbours?: Dominant Narratives about the ‘Other’ in Contemporary Polish and Russian Newspapers

This article explores whether and how pre-communist images and stereotypes of Russia and Russians and Poland and Poles are being perpetuated in the framing of Russian–Polish relations by the contemporary Russian and Polish print media. It is hypothesised that the stable core of pre-communist Russian public discourse about Poland and Polish narratives of Russia survived the forced internationalism of the communist period and is present today, although it is also being reimagined at the margins. Using a sample of 1,208 articles from Russian and Polish daily newspapers, the article examines contemporary narratives and their relationship to the old discourses.     

Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians and why Novorossiya failed

This article discusses two inter-related issues. Firstly, the factors lying behind Russia's fervent belief that its Novorossiya (New Russia) project, aimed to bring back to Russia eight oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhhya, Odesa, Mykolayiv, and Kherson in eastern and southern Ukraine and launched during the 2014 “Russian Spring,” would be successful. Russian identity misunderstood, and continues to misunderstand, Ukraine and Ukrainians through stereotypes and myths of Ukraine as an “artificial state” and Ukraine's Russian speakers as “fraternal brothers” and Russians and Ukrainians as “one people” (odin narod). Secondly, why Ukrainian national identity was different than these Russian stereotypes and myths and how this led to the failure of the Novorossiya project. Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians came face to face with the reality of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism and their low support for the Russkij Mir (Russian World). The article compares Russian stereotypes and myths of Ukraine and Ukrainians with how Ukrainians see themselves to explain the roots of the 2014 crisis, “Russian Spring,” and failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin's Novorossiya project.     

European Reactions to the 2008 Georgian–Russian War: Assessing the Impact of Gas Dependence

Western observers and policymakers have voiced anxiety about Europe’s increasing dependence on Russian natural gas fueling Russian imperial ambitions. In 2008, speculation appeared to become reality, as war broke out between Russia and its post-Soviet, but Western-leaning neighbor, Georgia. But did a country’s dependence on Russian natural gas influence its politicians’ responses to the Georgian–Russian war? An analysis of the voting behavior in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe provides insight into conventional claims that a reliance on Russian energy dampens the willingness of European states to publicly criticize Russia.     

Rethinking the Economic Relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia

According to their governments, economic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia—the two largest post-Soviet countries—have been exceptionally solid and robust. However, statistical data demonstrate that Russian investments in Kazakhstan's economy have been weak, and that Kazakhstan has only recently increased investment in the Russian economy. This raises the question of whether relations between the two countries have been more uneven than has been claimed officially. The article also explores the influence of off-shore investments via third countries and other aspects of the bilateral relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and the involvement of each country in the other's economy.     

Putting Ukraine on the map: the contribution of Stepan Rudnyts'kyi to Ukrainian nation-building

This paper examines the contribution of the founder of modern Ukrainian geography, Stepan Rudnyts'kyi, to Ukrainian nation-building. It demonstrates how Rudnyts'kyi put Ukraine on the mental map of the Ukrainian public before the declaration of Ukraine's independence in 1918. This is done by analyzing his key publications and showing how he formed a vision of Ukraine and delineated its territory to influence the perceptions of the Ukrainian public on the eve of the struggle for Ukraine's independence. Rudnyts'kyi's contribution is also viewed within the context of competition from rival modern nation-building projects in Eastern Europe, most notably Polish and Russian. The developments are also examined within Miroslav Hroch's periodization of national movements. Rudnyts'kyi played an important role in stage B (patriotic agitation) in Ukrainian national revival.