State Capacity in Contemporary China: ‘closing the pits and reducing coal production’

This paper analyses the capacity of China's central state to control society and implement its policies at the local level, using as a case study the implementation from 1998 of a major policy initiative—‘closing the pits and reducing coal production’. The aims of this policy were to close down many of the TVE (township and village enterprise) mines, thereby ameliorating China's coal safety record, and to reduce output in order to balance supply and demand, thereby improving the situation of the SOE (state-owned enterprise) coal mines. The paper concludes that, despite some success, the state found it difficult to overcome resistance from a powerful coalition of local cadres, mine bosses, workers and farmers who depended directly or indirectly on the mines for their living. It therefore highlights continuing shortfalls in China's state capacity, particularly in situations where the state is trying to control or influence the distribution of economic rents as between different groups in society.     

Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Foreign Tax Policies in China

This paper employs province-level data between 1992 and 2000 to assess the impact of fiscal federalism and pro-internationalization industrial groups on provincial foreign tax efforts in China. It argues that part of the provincial variation in tax efforts on foreign investors is related to the level of fiscal autonomy, the strength of pro-internationalization industrial groups, and provincial economic conditions. The level of fiscal autonomy is found to be positively associated with provincial governments' tax efforts on foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Transfer-dependent provinces tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs than transfer-contributing provinces. The transfer systems designed to combat regional inequality and absorb regional shocks may undermine incentives for local governments to be fiscally responsible, potentially resulting in over-consumption. In addition, provinces that have strong pro-internationalization industrial groups or disadvantaged economic conditions tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs.     

Domestic Institutional Constraints on China's Leadership in East Asian Economic Cooperation Mechanisms

The study of Chinese foreign policy has long shown that domestic politics and domestic constraints are sources of foreign policy, albeit generally considered less potent than ideology and interests. Domestic political constraints should also be explored as factors in Chinese regional policies toward East Asia, including regional economic institutions. This paper examines three domestic institutional constraints on regional foreign policy in the area of trade and economics: a fragmented decision-making structure that has difficulty with coordination, a relatively heavy reliance on top level decision-makers at a time when issues of Asian economic policy have relatively low priority for these same decision-makers, and the relatively extreme lack of autonomy for negotiators vis-á-vis top decision-makers in Beijing. These constraints are by any means unique to China. However, at a time when many observers and participants are expecting—indeed, often hoping for—Chinese leadership in the region, the paper posits that these constraints hinder the PRC's ability to fill this role. The key empirical focus is regional trade agreements and regional economic organizations.     

Deconstructing decentralization in China: fiscal incentive versus local autonomy in policy implementation

This article examines the congruent and conflicting effects of fiscal decentralization and power devolution—two main types of decentralization in post‐reform China—in order to tackle the insufficient distinction between them in current academic analyses. Derived from the two types of decentralization respectively are fiscal incentive and local autonomy, which influence local states' policy implementation in turnover taxation. By uncovering the unique logic of either factor, this article argues that contrary to what is widely presupposed, local autonomy is not necessarily congruent with fiscal incentive in affecting local compliance with centrally imposed policy rules during policy implementation. When power devolution and fiscal decentralization follow an internally consistent logic of decentralization as a whole by proceeding at the same pace and favoring the same specific locality, they inevitably generate conflicting effects on local states' implementation strategies. Congruent effects arise only if incoherent evolution occurs between the two types of decentralization. This paradox highlights the contradiction inveterate in the dynamics of decentralization. This argument is first developed through theoretical reasoning, and then substantiated by an empirical comparison between Guangzhou and Shanghai during 1984–1988 and 1992–1995.     

Fiscal Federalism: a refined theory and its application in the Chinese context

China's central–local relations have been marked by perpetual changes amidst economic restructuring. Fiscal decentralization on the expenditure side has been paralleled by centralization on the revenue side, accompanied by political centralization. Hence, our understanding of China's fiscal relations is not without controversy. This paper aims to make a theoretical contribution to the ongoing debate on ‘fiscal federalism’ by addressing crucial questions regarding China's central–local fiscal relations: first, to what extent do Chinese central–local fiscal relations conform to fiscal federalism in the Western literature? Second, are there any problems with existing principles of fiscal federalism and, if so, how to refine them? Third, how are refined principles relevant to the Chinese case and what policies should the Chinese government pursue in the future? Based on an in-depth and critical review of the theories on fiscal federalism, we develop a refined prototype of fiscal federalism. The model shows that quasi-traditional fiscal federalism is a much closer reality in China, while we argue that the refined fiscal federalism should be the direction of future reform in China.     

Municipal leadership and interest‐oriented mass participation: The process of housing reform plan in Shanghai 2

In the light of China's leadership transformation—from revolutionary to technocratic—in the reform era, this paper attempts to explore the new leadership through a case study of making of the Shanghai housing reform plan in 1991. After delineating housing problems and previous reforms in the mega‐city, this paper examines the process of the making of China's most comprehensive housing reform hereto, which inevitably invited conflicts of interests among social groups, especially between the ordinary urban residents who were in disadvantageous positions and the cadres who by and large benefited from old housing policies under China's planning system. The principal conclusion of the paper is that the ways of making the housing reform plan indicate that the current leadership is more responsive to ordinary people's interests and opinions than the Maoist leadership, even though both have much in common as the former inherites the latter.     

我国经济增长效率的空间特征分析:2000-2010

本文从空间分布规律视角分析我国经济增长的效率结构。对我国内地31个省份2000-2010年经济增长的效率进行Malmquisit指数分解,结果表明我国经济存在效率对增长贡献份额低、技术利用效率几乎无改善、技术进步主宰效率变化的总体特征。同时,各区域之间经济效率差距巨大,东部、东北地区优于中、西部地区,而西部又好于中部地区。依据Moran-I指数分析发现,各省份之间的技术进步和整体经济效率呈现出集聚状态,而技术利用效率未表现出空间相关性。空间分析结果意味着要获得持续稳定均衡增长,必需加快市场制度建设,改变当前依赖行政推进的区域经济发展模式。     

Local States,Institutional Changes and Innovation Systems: Beijing and Shanghai compared

The purpose of this paper is to look into the transformation of local innovation systems in the high-tech parks of Shanghai and Beijing and their technological learning and upgrading. The areas that we have chosen to investigate are Beijing's Zhongguancun and Shanghai's Yangpu District. The main reason that we selected these two areas for study is because they are home to most of the top universities and R&D institutes in these two cities. Our main focus will be on how institutions—the local state, inter-firm relations and the relationship between R&D institutions and firms—are co-evolving to shape and constrain a local system of innovation. Our research finds that the capacities and autonomy of the Zhongguancun of Beijing's Haidian District and Yangpu District of Shanghai differ in various aspects, but both regions are struggling to upgrade innovation and enhance economic development. The ‘high-tech cluster’ provides a useful instrument or label to achieve goals other than innovation and R&D. Elite universities are regarded as engines for network formation, but visible and invisible walls of Chinese universities discount efforts to foster a university-centered innovation hub which especially shows in the Yangpu case.     

空间效应视角下中国省域碳排放总量的驱动因素分析

运用空间计量经济学模型实证分析中国省域碳排放的空间效应及驱动因素的结果显示,中国省域碳排放存在显著的空间自相关性和集群趋势,并主要集中在经济发达、人口密集和能源消费强度大的地区;能源消费强度、人口规模和人均GDP对碳排放总量影响显著,其中能源消费的影响最大;城市化、产业结构和技术创新对碳排放的影响不显著。该研究结论为我国城市化和产业结构升级进程中控制碳排放增量、国家和地方政府建立相应的碳减排鼓励政策和技术研发支持机制,以及各省域构建各具区域特色的低碳经济发展模式具有决策参考意义。     

China's Unbalanced Economic Growth

This paper summarizes empirical findings and results from the author's most recent research publication in Chinese: China's Unbalanced Economic Growth. It studies China's economic growth with a special emphasis on its regional disparities. It provides an analysis of China's overall economic landscape as well as an empirical study of China's unbalanced regional development. Based on its quantitative findings and results, the author predicts the emergence of ten Chinese metropolitan economies in the early twenty-first century and recommends a regional development strategy as well as implementation policies for China's future development. The major empirical findings, results and conclusions of this research are outlined in three sections: the first describes China's economic future—the emergence of ten regional metropolitan economies, the second reports the empirical findings of China's national and regional economic disparities and discusses policy implications, and the third investigates China's future economic growth and discusses its growth limitations.     

Economic Development and the Implementation of Village Elections in Rural China

Based on survey data from rural Fujian Province of China, this paper shows that economic development, especially village collective revenue, plays an important role in village elections. With economic development and industrialization, collective revenues will increase and differentiated interests will develop among villagers. Village elections are institutional channels for villagers to articulate their interests. The research findings show that it is the collective revenue and the relative living standard of the village compared with other townships within the same county or district that arouse villagers' interests for participation and candidates' motives for campaigning, and thus enhance the implementation of elections. The paper concludes that village-level economic development is crucial for the implementation of competitive elections. With economic development, village committees will control more collective revenues, thus increasing the stakes villagers have in elections. This will result in greater participation by villagers in elections, and in more competitive elections. Increased competitiveness of elections will facilitate changes in the institutions regarding village committee elections.     

Performance Legitimacy,State Autonomy and China's Economic Miracle

Theories that explain post-Mao China's economic success tend to attribute it to one or several ‘successful’ policies or institutions of the Chinese government, or to account for the success from economic perspectives. This article argues that the success of the Chinese economy relies not just on the Chinese state's economic policy but also on its social policies. Moreover, China's economic success does not merely lie in the effectiveness of any single economic or social policy or institution, but also in the state's capacity to make a policy shift when it faces the negative unintended consequences of its earlier policies. The Chinese state is compelled to make policy shifts quickly because performance constitutes the primary base of its legitimacy, and the Chinese state is able to make policy shifts because it enjoys a high level of autonomy inherited from China's past. China's economic development follows no fixed policies and relies on no stable institutions, and there is no ‘China model’ or ‘Beijing consensus’ that can be constructed to explain its success.     

建立市场导向的就业机制研究

我国的就业压力在增大 ,创造就业机会的难度在不断增加。为此 ,必须认真分析造成失业问题及就业压力的各种因素 ,建立市场导向的就业机制的模式 ,即以中央和各级地方政府经济政策为指导 ,以调控劳动力供求为基本点 ,以市场调节为基础 ,以经济发展为目标 ,以创业为方向 ,形成劳动者自主择业 ,企业自主用人的就业机制     

China's Economic Diplomacy towards the Arab Countries: challenges ahead?

Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in late 2010, China has adhered to its ‘business-first’ economic diplomacy towards the Arab countries, a policy driven by China's ongoing geoeconomic interests. The ten-year-old China–Arab States Cooperation Forum serves as the nucleus for China's economic diplomacy in the region. The Chinese authorities have also initiated interagency coordination and central–local governments' power sharing in order to pursue this diplomacy successfully. However, while its economic diplomacy may be evolving, China, unlike what it has achieved in Black Africa, seems to have failed to develop strategic, political and cultural exchanges with its Arab counterparts. The intertwined geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that have emerged since the Arab revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the longer run.     

Did Policy Experimentation in China Always Seek Efficiency? A case study of Wenzhou financial reform in 2012

Policy experimentation has been widely considered a ‘magic bullet’ of policy improvement and key to economic prosperity in China. This article, however, argues that policy experimentation in China does not always seek policy efficiency. Rather, it can be manipulated as a political symbol without actually affecting practices. By taking a case study on Wenzhou's financial reform, this article illustrates that local policy experimentation can serve as a mechanism for the central government to legitimately delay reform practices—in the case of Wenzhou's financial reform in 2012, out of a desire to maintain socio-economic stability during the power succession at the 18th Party Congress. In this reform, socio-economic stability was deemed more important than developing a sustainable and effective long-term policy. This article provides a new perspective on understanding policy experimentation in China by proposing the idea of ‘symbolic reforms’.     

我国公共政策执行的示范方式失效分析——基于示范村建设个案的研究

示范作为政府执行公共政策的一种工作方式,在我国被普遍使用,示范村则是新农村建设中地方政府公共政策执行的重要方式。本文基于西北地区某县示范村建设实际情况的个案调研,从政府利益内在性的角度,比较分析了中西方公共政策执行与公共资源分配的方式。本文认为,公众对行政官员没有形成有效的制约,部分地方官员为了产生有显示度的政绩成果,将各种政府项目相对集中地投入到少数示范村,是导致公共政策执行的示范方式失效的主要原因,并针对我国的实际情况提出了相应的对策建议。     

Bureaucrats–Enterprise Negotiation in China's Enterprise Reform at the Local Level: case studies in Guangzhou

This article explores the implementation of SOE reform in China at the local level, using case studies in Guangzhou as illustration. It is argued that local government spearheads a reform agenda that puts locally-defined state objectives first, not necessarily favouring enterprise restructuring. A full-fledged negotiation model does not exist in SOE reforms because all enterprises are controlled by the state and have to comply with top-down policies and orders. Government-enterprise relations and the degree of entrepreneurial power depend largely on the economic strength of the enterprise, with the boomers getting a good economic bargain while the laggards fail to gain sympathy from government. Enterprise workers are largely at the mercy of restructuring decisions that come from bargaining and at times collusion between managers and local bureaucrats.     

Business‐Government Relations in Industrializing Rural China: A principal‐agent perspective

This paper explains why rural enterprises prosper in the post-Mao reform era. Based on a case study of Shaanxi province, the paper argues that the institutional arrangements in rural China under economic reforms are conducive to sustained economic growth because the principal‐agent problem is alleviated in two dimensions. First, the interests of local government officials and enterprises overlap. Prompted by the fiscal pressures on local governments as a result of the fiscal reforms, particularly the 1994 tax-assignment reform, local governments are eager to promote local industrial growth. Apart from absorbing rural surplus labour and contributing to the provision of communal welfare to local residents, rural enterprises provide local governments with tax and non-tax revenues to finance their expenditure obligations. In return, local governments provide preferential aid to their enterprises in the form of tax and credit privileges. Second, the principal‐agent problem is abated by a closer effort-and-reward link for the various parties involved in the operation of rural enterprises.     

“高位推动”模式下区域协同治理政策的时空演进——以2014-2019年京津冀协同发展的政策文本分析为例

京津冀协同发展已进入政策转变阶段的关键时期。国家和地方的相关政策需要从"谋思路、打基础"的顶层设计阶段,演变到"攻坚克难"的政策执行阶段。复杂的地缘政治因素使得京津冀协同治理的方式显著区别于"珠三角"等地的准市场机制。基于"三地四方"京津冀协同发展政策文本数据,研究发现京津冀协同发展是具有显著"高位推动"特征的区域协同治理模式,即高位推动为协同治理的核心驱动力赋能、长期引导治理主体开展政策协同、重塑协同治理主体的角色定位。基于此,未来京津冀协同发展应注意高位推动作用审慎让渡市场机制,建立社会组织参与的多元主体协同机制,尝试共建共管产业园区。