Rethinking the Chinese World Order: the imperial cycle and the rise of China

Looking to China's imperial history to understand how China as a great power will behave in the twenty-first century, some scholars have rediscovered the concept of the traditional Chinese world order coined by John K. Fairbank in the 1960s in the reconstruction of the benevolent governance and benign hierarchy of the Chinese Empire, and portrayed its collapse as a result of the clash of civilizations between the benevolent Chinese world order and the brutal European nation-state system. China was forced into the jungle of the social Darwinist world to struggle for its survival. As a result, China's search for power and wealth is to restore justice in an unjust world. China's rise would be peaceful. This article finds that while imperial China was not uniquely benevolent nor uniquely violent, the reconstruction of China's imperial past to advance the contemporary agenda of its peaceful rise has, ironically, set a nineteenth century agenda for China in the twenty-first century to restore the regional hierarchy and maximize China's security by expanding influence and control over its neighborhoods.     

The US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era and Its Implications for China‐United States Relations: A Chinese perspective

At the early stage of the post-Cold War era, Chinese scholars put more attention into the study of US international standing than to the study of US global strategy. Around the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious for Chinese scholars that the power structure in the post-Cold War era was 'yi-chao-duo-qiang' (one super-power and several big powers). People realized that the leading position of the US would be unshakable and its comprehensive national power would be unparalleled by any single country in the foreseeable future. Since then, Chinese scholars have paid more attention to the study of US global strategy. Chinese scholars tend to agree that the Bush Administration's strategy was a transitional one, and that the US global strategy in the post-Cold War era came into being in the middle of President Clinton's first term. It is symbolized by the appearance of so-called 'engagement and enlargement strategy'. At the very beginning of his Administration (January 1993), President Clinton set forth that 'economy, security and democracy' would be the three pillars of US foreign policy. This greatly changed the traditional 'security first' strategy. The new strategy reflects some new features in the international and domestic contexts of the post-Cold War era. It has very important influences on Sino‐US relations.     

Assessing China's Rise and US Leadership in Asia—growing maturity and balance

The common prediction in media and specialist commentary during much of the past decade was that Asia was adjusting to an emerging China-centered order and US influence was in decline. Over time, it became clearer that developments in the region showed a more complex reality. A growing contingent of scholars and specialists looked beyond accounts that inventoried China's strengths and US weaknesses and carefully considered other factors, including Chinese limitations and US strengths, before making their overall judgments. These more comprehensive and balanced assessments tempered sometimes alarming implications of earlier predictions of China's rise and decline in US leadership. This article reviews the evolution over the past decade of media and specialist assessments of China's rise and its implications for US leadership in Asia in order to draw lessons from this evolution in analysis and what the lessons might mean for future assessments of China's increasing role in Asian and world affairs.     

Discussion of 'US Global Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era'

This response to Jin Canrong's paper about US post-Cold War global strategy focuses on the concerns of both authors that the current 'three pillars strategy' is a source of growing tension in PRC‐US relations, leading to Chinese perceptions that ideological factors (US idealism) are playing a bigger role in US policymaking. Despite this, Jannuzi searches for common ground, focusing on issues areas, such as Cambodia, where China has found US idealism to be useful and helpful. He argues also that, as China joins more international treaties and regimes, Chinese and American interests will start to converge, although he concedes that the Kosovo intervention has caused ambivalence in China about unrestrained US 'idealism'.     

China Perceives America: Perspectives of international relations experts

This article seeks to examine Chinese analysts' perceptions of America, particularly their views on US China policy. It intends to explore how that issue has evolved over time, what progress has been made, what factors have shaped it, what principal impediments have existed, and what the prospects are for future management. Focusing on the period from the mid-1990s to the present, the study finds that there remains a perceptual gap in US-China relations today, though Chinese understanding of America continues to improve. Specifically, there seems to be a lessened diversity of opinions and an emerging consensus on the hegemonic nature of US foreign policy, particularly its intention of containing a rising China--though its dual strategy of containment and engagement continues to exist. More importantly, many Chinese analysts remain highly critical and negative. Thus, American external behavior worldwide would always be viewed with a great deal of suspicion.     

‘Peaceful Evolution’, ‘Regime Change’ and China's Political Security

This article explores the enduring impact of the Western strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ (heping yanbian) on China's political security. This non-military strategy is given an added significance in an era of the lone superpower, when American military might can provide the buttress. ‘Peaceful evolution’ can also overlap with the US notion of ‘regime change’, which often entails military intervention to bring about a desired political transformation in a particular state. Specifically, the strategy of ‘peaceful evolution’ still constitutes a serious threat to China because it needs to continue opening up to the West for the sake of economic modernisation.     

America in the Eyes of America Watchers: survey research in Beijing in 2012

Based on an original survey conducted in the summer of 2012 in Beijing, we examine how China's America watchers—IR scholars who work on US-China relations—have viewed China's power status in the international system, US-China relations and some specific US policies in Asia. Our survey shows that almost half of the survey participants thought that America would remain the global hegemon in the next ten years. Meanwhile, a large majority was also optimistic that China is a rising great power, especially in the economic sense, in the world. More than half of the respondents saw Asian military issues, such as the South China Sea issue, as the most difficult problem between China and the US.     

The Tenacious Tributary System

Recently, some writers on Chinese foreign relations have argued that the tributary system is a useful concept for describing imperial China's relations with its neighbors, and that it can even serve as a model for the future of international relations in East Asia. An examination of China's historical practice of foreign relations shows that there was no systematic tributary system, but instead multiple relationships of trade, military force, diplomacy and ritual. Furthermore, China's neighbors did not accept the imperial center's definition of hierarchy and subordination, but interpreted ritual relationships in their own way. Even in the 1930s, when scholars invoked Chinese history to advocate peaceful relations, they recognized the importance of military force, colonial settlement and domination in East Asian state relationships. The current myth of the tributary system ignores historical reality and misleads us about China's true position in East Asia and the world.     

The China challenge: Theoretical perspectives and policy implications

Over the past few years there has been a heated debate in the West over the potential challenge of an increasingly strong and assertive China to the Asia‐Pacific region and to the world in general. This article offers a systematic analysis of the debate on China's emerging role in the international system and its security implications from the theoretical perspectives of realism and liberalism. While both international relations theories have provided valuable insights, neither of them alone is able to unravel the puzzle of whether a prosperous and powerful China will be a major force of stability or a threat to international peace. Drawing on the theory of trade expectations, this article shows the conditions under which high interdependence between China and its trading partners will lead to pacific or belligerent Chinese behavior. If Chinese decision‐makers’ expectations for future trade are high, they will be less likely to use force to deal with unresolved disputes with neighboring countries. If, however, they have a negative view of their future trading environment, they will be likely to take measures, including military actions, to remove any obstacles that might forestall the pursuit of great‐power status. For the moment, China's expectations of future trade are by and large optimistic, but there is evidence of growing Chinese suspicion of a Western ‘conspiracy’ to contain China which may alter Beijing's future perceptions. To ensure that the rise of China will not cause regional and global instability, the outside world should seek to integrate China into the international community by pursuing policies that will have a positive influence on China's expected value of trade. In the meantime, some elements of the balance of power strategy need to be introduced in order to curtail China's expected value of war.     

Discussion of 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes'

In a response to Yan Xuetong's paper, 'The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes', Ted Osius (writing in August 1999) discusses Dr Yan's perspective on Chinese history and the question of whether China's rise will be peaceful. Mr Osius argues that, while we cannot know for certain what China's future holds, the Clinton‐Gore Administration has been clear in its goal of integrating China into the leadership ranks of the world community.     

Sino–Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in Central Asia and Beyond

Sino–Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China–Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long.     

China's Responses to External Pressures on its WMD-related Exports after 2004: reactive and proactive

China, although a member of most of the international non-proliferation and multilateral export control regimes and having a law-based comprehensive export control system, has not fully complied with its non-proliferation obligations, which is evidenced by not only the US's sanctions on some Chinese entities for their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related exports but also some external disclosures in this regard. Faced with these external pressures, China's responses have been both reactive and proactive. The rationale for China's mixed responses can be attributed to its security interest in preventing nuclear terrorism, geopolitical interests in South Asia, economic interests in procuring oil supplies, high-tech imports and missile export markets, in addition to its status interest in building a ‘responsible great power’ identity in the international community.     

Learning to Rise Peacefully? China and the security dilemma

The People's Republic of China's turbulent experience during the Cold War (1949–1991) has been followed by a remarkably tranquil period. Although conflict and crisis have certainly not been completely absent in the post-Cold War era, the PRC has managed to undertake three decades of ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peaceful development’. What explains this remarkably peaceful great power ascent? Prominent scholars, such as Thomas Christensen and Iain Johnston, stress the utility of the security dilemma in understanding the PRC's security behavior since the end of the Cold War. Can the PRC's peaceful rise in recent decades be attributed to a realization of the centrality of the security dilemma in great power politics acquired during the Cold War? This paper concludes that the security dilemma does not seem central to China's thinking about its relations with other powers, including the United States.     

A New Model of Big Power Relations? China–US strategic rivalry and balance of power in the Asia–Pacific

Exploring the causes of the China–US strategic rivalry and its possible mitigation, this article argues that President Xi's new model of big power relations represents a challenge to the US primacy in the Asia–Pacific based on China's rising power and deeply rooted suspicion of the US containment. But neither the US nor China can be the single dominant power in the region. The new model can be built only if China and the US demonstrate a strategic restraint and maintain a delicate balance of power to prevent their rivalry from boiling over into a new Cold War.     

China's Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in Asia–Pacific

China has adopted a state-centered approach towards energy security to deepen political and commercial relationships with all energy producing nations and to aggressively invest in oil fields and pipelines around the world. Applying this approach to its relations with its Asia–Pacific neighbors has produced mixed results. While China's energy diplomacy has brought about opportunities for cooperation with some of its neighbors, notably some countries in Central Asia and continental Southeast Asia, it has become a source of conflict with some other neighbors, especially those with border disputes over maritime territories which may have rich natural resources. This paper examines China's state-led search for energy security and its implications for China's relations with Asia–Pacific countries.     

Local Liberalism: China's provincial approaches to relations with Southeast Asia

One of the most interesting phenomena in contemporary international relations is the growing role of local government entities in forging and intensifying cross-border interactions in the social, economic and cultural arenas. Lamentably, this aspect of international relations, which I conceptualize as local liberalism, has not received sufficient scholarly attention. This paper attempts to fill in the gap by describing and analyzing how local liberalism has played a role in China's relations with Southeast Asia. The paper argues that local governments in Yunnan and Guangxi have played an important and positive role in cementing the relations between China and Southeast Asia. The paper suggests that debunking the China ‘black box’ to examine the different units in China, including the sub-national governments, may provide more useful insights for our understanding of China–Southeast Asian relations.     

Transnational Ties,HIV/AIDS Prevention and State–Minority Relations in Sipsongpanna,Southwest China

This paper depicts the transnational ethnic and religious ties between China and Southeast Asia and examines the cultural, political and economic implications for state–minority relations in Southwest China. It documents how transnational ethnic and religious ties facilitate cultural revival among the ethnic Dai people in Southwest China and examines the impact of Buddhist networks on local governance. In particular, it portrays the cooperative relationship between the Chinese state and the Buddhist Sangha on social issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention and care. The paper argues that the Chinese state is more willing to cooperate with transnational ethnic and religious groups when the latter can help improve local governance and generate economic development, under the condition that they do not challenge the state's ultimate legitimacy and authority.     

The dragon as demon: images of China on Capitol Hill

In congressional debate on China‐related issues, alliances of partisans of single issues of high symbolic significance to some Americans insist vocally on strongly negative views of China that often caricature a complex society and foster unconstructive moralizing rather than analysis of the problems that they address. By demonizing China they obstruct the formulation and maintenance of a coherent American policy toward China and weaken Congress' contribution to making US policy. Members of Congress who favor engagement and look to a future in which they hope economic and political reform will grow in a China benefited by trade, foreign investment, and a peaceful international environment cannot display the moral certainty affected in congressional debates by the most outspoken critics. A variety of reasons underlie the demonizing of China in Congress, including some ignorance (willful or not) and reliance on lobbyists and poorly informed staff. Distorted images deform the contribution that Congress makes to the formulation of US China policy and cloud the perceptions of China held by some members and, derivatively, by many of their constituents among the American people.     

China and Major Power Relations in East Asia

Tremendous changes have taken place in East Asia in the post-Cold War era, which have a great impact on Chinese foreign policy and its relations with major powers in East Asia. This new power configuration is related to as 'two ups' and 'two downs', which have become apparent since the early 1990s. The 'two ups' concern the rise of the United States and China. The United States' rise to sole superpower status has given Washington a dominant role in all four dimensions of world affairs: political, strategic, economic, and technological/cultural. Meanwhile, China has achieved a spectacular economic performance for the past two decades, sustaining high growth rates, and escaping, so far, the Asian economic crisis of 1997‐98. This expansion has greatly increased China's influence in regional and global affairs. The 'two downs' refer to the downturns of Russia and Japan. This article provides a detailed analysis of China's international environment in the context of the changing dynamics of major-power relations in East Asia. Special attention is paid to the crucial Beijing‐Tokyo‐Washington triangle. The examination focuses upon political, economic, and strategic dimensions.