Personality under EU Law: A Conceptual Answer towards the Pluralisation of the EU

Although the trend towards pluralisation within the institutional framework of the EU is somewhat reflected in theoretical efforts, legal scholarship's answer remains incomplete. Acknowledging that legal personality is always relative—ie related to a particular legal system—personality under EU Law should be recognised and developed as a distinct category. This allows for reconsideration and rearrangement of inter‐ and intrapersonal relations in EU Law: inter‐institutional agreements can gain firmer legal ground, the recognition of hierarchical structures within the EU executive branch can advance the maintenance of the rule of law, legal protection of the Union's citizens shall be advanced, and options as well as limits to privatising organisation at the EU level shall be formulated. On the whole, methodological self‐reflection along these lines is bound to lead to a valuable contribution of legal research in times of EU crisis.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Law and the Periphery

The Euro crisis brought to the fore a larger and hitherto invisible structural problem as to the relationship between the European Union's centre and its periphery. I am arguing that the concerns of the peripheral EU countries, of their workers and companies are difficult to argue in the existing ideology and that this contributes to the reproduction of the existing hierarchies in the EU. The ideology of the EU legal profession is one of the centre of the EU, and this importantly determines how harm is understood in EU law and which doctrines are present in legal thinking. For example, there is a presence of social dumping, but an absence of goods dumping in the EU legal vernacular. I argue that the centre‐periphery relationship is structured by legal entitlements, that the overtly political discourse of left and right is analytically insufficient and explain the phenomenon of conceptualism of contemporary legal thought.     

Rediscovering the public/private divide in EU private law

This article explores the role of the public/private divide within EU private law. It shows that although EU private law cuts across the boundaries of public and private law, the conceptual distinction between these well‐established categories does matter within it and may lead to better law‐making in the EU more generally. The legal grammar of a particular EU harmonisation measure—which can be more “public” or “private”—may have important implications for the position of private parties at national level, for the CJEU's likely activism in this context, and ultimately for the measure's ability to realise its policy goals. Therefore, instead of ignoring the existing differences between public and private law, EU law should explicitly adopt the public/private law language in its discourse, without, however, introducing any sharp divide between these two areas.     

Granting the Right to Vote for the European Parliament to Resident Third‐Country Nationals: Civic Citizenship Revisited

The EU grants rights to third‐country nationals (TCNs) and strives to approximate their rights to those of Union citizens. Up to now, the approximation has extended to social and economic matters. This article investigates whether political rights, notably voting rights for the European Parliament (EP), should also be approximated. To this end, the analysis applies Dahl's democratic principles of ‘coercion’ and ‘all affected interests’ as well as Bauböck's principle of ‘stakeholding’ to the position of TCNs in the EU. Against that background, it explores the relevance of arguments for and against granting TCNs the right to vote in European elections and submits that voting rights should be granted to long‐term resident TCNs. The author then proposes including TCN voting rights in the legal framework for EP elections and concludes by suggesting the use of the concept of civic citizenship to express political approximation of TCNs to EU citizens.     

European Law Beyond ‘Ever Closer Union’ Repositioning the Concept,its Thrust and the ECJ's Comparative Methodology

The article investigates competing understandings of European law. It supports, against the prevailing EU‐centred understanding, an ecumenical concept that embraces EU law, supplementing international instruments, the European Convention on Human Rights and, importantly, various domestic laws enacting or responding to such transnational law, as well as European comparative law. To keep the concept in sync with European politics, it posits a new idea that binds the parts together: to provide for a European legal space rather than further European integration (the ever closer union). This idea can also serve as European law's functional equivalent to forming one legal order. European law thus conceived grasps the puzzling complex of interdependent legal orders, sets a common frame for corresponding reconstructions (European composite constructions, legal pluralism, network theories, federalism or intergovernmentalism) and allows forces with diverging outlooks to meet in one legal field, on one more neutral disciplinary platform. Within this framework, European comparative law finds a new mission as well as a sound legal basis.     

Soft Post‐Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control

The Commission's soft post‐legislative rulemaking by way of communications, notices, codes and similar instruments has become an increasingly important tool for the adequate functioning of the system of shared administration in the EU. However, the development of its legal framework has not kept pace with this, as the Treaty on the EU nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) recognise this regulatory phenomenon. As a result, its current procedural control is of a very ad hoc nature. Given the risks this rulemaking involves for the legitimacy of the EU, its practical and legal importance for legal practice and the way in which the Treaty of Lisbon has sought to condition and control the behaviour of the Union institutions, it is argued that the time is ripe for a more stringent and consistent procedural control of soft post‐legislative rulemaking. Some options to realise this are presented for further research.     

Does the Centrality of Values in the Lisbon Treaty Promise More Than It Can Actually Offer? EU Biometrics Policy as a Case Study

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced the term ‘values’ in EU primary law. This development coincided with the granting to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the same legal force as the Treaties. The question remains, though, how the prominence of values is actually shaping EU law and policy. This paper critically appraises the ways that certain values translated into the Charter's principles and rights are being construed under the EU policy for biometrics, a security technology whose use is being actively promoted by the EU. We conclude that the balancing of pertinent values, namely security and liberty, owe to a great deal to political and economic considerations that shape EU politics. Research priorities, combined with those of EU security policy, in particular, the fight against terrorism, then tend to prevail over ethically or morally based legal claims in respect of biometrics.     

Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member States

Abstract: Securing energy supply for Europe has been for decades at the forefront of the energy policies of individual European Community member countries. However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders.     

Resistance to European Law and Constitutional Identity in Germany: Herbert Kraus and Solange in its Intellectual Context

This article recasts our understanding of the Federal Constitutional Court's Solange decision by tracing its lineage within the domestic context and as part of a new history of EU law. The external dynamic of the decision, a moment of judicial discourse between two of Europe's highest panels, has been the focus of many studies. Much rarer are attempts to embed the decision within its internal context: the struggle within the German legal academy to accept the primacy of EU law. Central to this contextualisation is the reinvigoration of the ‘structural congruence’ theory of Herbert Kraus, which long shaped the German reception of EU law. This article recounts Kraus' theory, tracing the struggle for the German legal consciousness between three positions: constitutionalists, traditionalists, and the congruence advocates. While Hallstein's constitutionalism is most closely associated with Germany's early Europhilia, even he admitted by 1975 that Kraus had won the day.     

The Troika: The Interlocking Roles of Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium,Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL in the Creation of the European Legal Order

Through comparisons with dispute resolution procedures in the North American Free Trade Area's Side Agreements, and with the debate over the direct effect of World Trade Organization obligations in the European legal order, this paper demonstrates that three of the European Court of Justice's most important decisions—Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL—should be understood as combining to reorganise general international law's relationship between the EU Member States by substituting national court application of European obligations for the use of interstate retaliation as an enforcement mechanism, and thus providing the foundations for the EU's distinctive legal order.     

Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case

This note examines the UK Supreme Court's judgment in the Brexit case, Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union. The case upheld the decision of the High Court, which rejected the claim that the foreign affairs prerogative provided a legal basis for giving notice to EU institutions of the UK's intention to withdraw from the EU. But the Supreme Court's preferred basis for dismissing that claim rested on the more general proposition that significant constitutional change can only be effected by statute. This position offers the germs of a jurisprudence of constitutional change and was substantiated by means of an analysis of Parliament's dual capacity as legislator and constituent agent. Miller also includes important and potentially innovative dicta on the relationship between international and domestic sources of law.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.     

The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification

This paper provides a brief critical overview of the recent EU citizenship case‐law of the Court of Justice including Rottmann, Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and Dereci. While these cases open a number of new avenues of fundamental importance for the development of EU law, they also undermine legal certainty and send contradictory signals as to the essence of the EU citizenship status and the role it ought to play in the system of EU law. Most importantly, the Court's reluctance to specify what is meant by the ‘essence of rights’ of EU citizenship potentially has disastrous consequences following its own determination that such rights play a crucial role in moving particular factual constellations within the material scope of EU law. The substance and meaning of such rights is however left in suspense to harmful effects. An urgent clarification is needed.     

Human Dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Interpretation Before the European Court of Justice

This article argues that the EU Charter’s dignity provisions must be given a specific, expansive European meaning that underpins the importance the EU places on fundamental rights protection as a principle EU value. To this end, the article examines the EU Charter provisions on dignity and critically analyses the case law before the EU Charter had full legal effect and after it did. It finishes with looking at three areas in which the potential for an expansive interpretation of dignity could help bring the EU closer to its people and fully respect and protect dignity: asylum, criminal justice and sexual orientation.     

Gender Equality on the Boards of EU Companies: Between Economic Efficiency,Fundamental Rights and Democratic Legitimisation of Economic Governance

Currently, there is a large gap between the proportion of employed and well‐educated women and those sitting on the boards of EU companies. This gap should be significantly diminished because it is mandated by the EU fundamental right of equality between women and men (Article 23 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights), and by the need for democratic legitimisation of the EU and of its economic governance (Articles 2 and 3(3) TEU). However, the Commission's proposal for a directive on improving the gender balance among non‐executive directors of companies listed on stock exchanges does not constitute an appropriate legal solution for this problem because it infringes the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. There are many other instruments than compulsory gender quotas that can be used by EU institutions to promote more gender‐balanced boards of EU companies. The potential of such measures has not been utilised yet in full.     

The Temporal Paradox of Regions in the EU Seeking Independence: Contraction and Fragmentation versus Widening and Deepening?

This article investigates the possibility of regional entities within EU Member States to become EU Member States in their own right following their secession from their mother state. International law does not automatically allow such regions to remain EU Member States since it refers this issue back to the constituent instruments of international organisations and a reading of both the EU Treaties and the ECJ's jurisprudence seems to preclude such a ‘continued membership’. The article then further explores the legal issues which could arise during the accession process of the newly independent state. After suggesting solutions to bridge the gap between its secession and its own EU membership, it is argued that the key challenge for such a region would be to ensure a smooth transition, without the loss of prerogatives under EU law, from being an EU region to an EU Member State proper.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.