Between Procedural Impermeability and Constitutional Openness: The Italian Constitutional Court and Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice

On 15 April 2008, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) raised for the first time a preliminary question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This decision (see judgment No 102/2008 and order No 103/2008) represented a turning point in the ICC's case‐law, and calls for a careful assessment of the motives backing such revirement as well as of the legal reasoning that the Italian judges used to wrap it up without repudiating their previous case‐law. In addition to this preliminary analysis, the aim of this essay is to explore two themes: i) the developments of the ICC's case‐law as regards the role of Community Law and the ECJ, and ii) the appraisal of the interplay between the ICC and the ECJ in the light of the notion of ‘interpretive competition’.     

Sincere Cooperation,Respect for Democracy and EU Citizenship: Sufficient to Guarantee Scotland's Future in the European Union?

The position of an independent Scotland within the European Union (EU) has recently been a subject of considerable debate. The European Commission has argued that any newly independent state formed from the territory of an existing Member State would require an Accession Treaty. This article critiques that official position and distinguishes between a set of claims that could be made on behalf of an independent Scottish state, and a set of claims that could be made on behalf of the citizens of an independent Scottish state vis‐à‐vis the EU. It argues that the general principles of the EU Treaties ought to govern how Scotland is treated, and that a new Accession Treaty is not necessary. Furthermore, notwithstanding the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of EU citizenship, we conclude that EU citizenship itself is not sufficient to guarantee or generate membership of the EU.     

Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency

The principle of proportionality is at the cornerstone of EU law, and precisely of the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the law and economics literature, the general principles of law are commonly opposed to legal rules in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the legal formalistic approach consists of apprehending the law as principled, whereby principles of law do not and should not encompass an efficiency rationale and should be self‐sufficient. On the other hand, the legal nihilism denying the existence or relevance of the general principles of law favours legal rules that are said to incorporate an efficiency rationale. I intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of probably the most important general principles of EU law—the proportionality principle. In this paper, I shall assert that not only does the EU proportionality principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such—hence, I propose the representation of the principle of proportionality as a principle of economic efficiency. After having introduced the principle of proportionality (1), I shall decipher the proportionality principle both from a law and economics perspective, and from a comparative perspective (2). Then, I shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (3). Finally, I conclude in light of the findings of this paper (4).     

The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited

This article analyzes how the judicial politics sparked by the European Union's (EU) legal development have evolved over time. Existing studies have traced how lower national courts began cooperating with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply EU law because this empowered them to challenge government policies and the decisions of their domestic judicial superiors. We argue that the institutional dynamics identified by this ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ proved self‐eroding over time, incentivizing domestic high courts to reassert control over national judicial hierarchies and to influence the development EU law in ways that were also encouraged by the ECJ. We support our argument by combining an analysis of a dataset of cases referred to the ECJ with comparative case study and interview evidence. We conclude that while these evolving judicial politics signal the institutional maturation of the EU legal order, they also risk weakening the decentralized enforcement of European law.     

Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus: The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order

The European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) jurisprudence of fundamental rights in cases such as Schmidberger and Omega extends the court's jurisdiction in ways that compete with that of Member States in matters of visceral concern. And just as the Member States require a guarantee that the ECJ respect fundamental rights rooted in national tradition, so the ECJ insists that international organisations respect rights constitutive of the EU. The demand of such guarantees reproduces between the ECJ and the international order the kinds of conflicting jurisdictional claims that have shadowed the relation between the ECJ and the courts of the Member States. This article argues that the clash of jurisdiction is being resolved by the formation of a novel order of coordinate constitutionalism in which Member States, the ECJ, the European Court of Human Rights and other international tribunals or organisations agree to defer to one another's decisions, provided those decisions respect mutually agreed essentials. This coordinate order extends constitutionalism beyond its home territory in the nation state through a jurisprudence of mutual monitoring and peer review that carefully builds on national constitutional traditions, but does not create a new, encompassing sovereign entity. The doctrinal instruments by which the plural constitutional orders are, in this way, profoundly linked without being integrated are variants of the familiar Solange principles of the German Constitutional Court, by which each legal order accepts the decisions of the others, even if another decision would have been more consistent with the national constitution tradition, ‘so long as’ those decisions do not systematically violate its own understanding of constitutional essentials. The article presents the coordinate constitutional order being created by this broad application of the Solange doctrine as an instance, and practical development, of what Rawls called an overlapping consensus: agreement on fundamental commitments of principle—those essentials which each order requires the others to respect—does not rest on mutual agreement on any single, comprehensive moral doctrine embracing ideas of human dignity, individuality or the like. It is precisely because the actors of each order acknowledge these persistent differences, and their continuing influence on the interpretation of shared commitments in particular conflicts, that they reserve the right to interpret essential principles, within broad and shared limits, and accord this right to others. The embrace of variants of the Solange principles by many coordinate courts, in obligating each to monitor the others' respect for essentials, creates an institutional mechanism for articulating and adjusting the practical meaning of the overlapping consensus.     

Italian Courts,the ECJ and Transfers of Undertakings: A Multi-Speed Dialogue?

The paper seeks to analyse certain paradigmatic cases of dialogue—or, indeed, non-dialogue—between national judges and the ECJ, though within the (still possibly emblematic) limits of a focus on the law on the transfer of undertakings. The analysis is less concerned with portraying the detailed impact of the ECJ's decisions on the domestic legal order, and is focused more upon the 'modality' of the dialogue to date carried out between Italian and European judges. The logic, which guides this dialogue (or, the lack of its evolution), furnishes us with a better understanding of the production, circulation and impact of ECJ jurisprudence. This dialogue seems to be characterised, by non-uniform, or multi-speed, developments. On the one hand, Article 177 references have been concentrated around the theme of undertakings in critical difficulties or subject to a creditors' arrangement procedure. In this area, the Italian courts have engaged in explicit dialogue with the ECJ and have made the greatest effort to read—not without some technical-juridical struggle—the national norm in the light of the provisions of the Acquired Rights Directive and its interpretation by the ECJ. By contrast, however, with regard to other specific issues (in particular, those concerning subcontracting) it is apparent that not only were the Italian courts (and the Corte di Cassazione in particular) loathe to enter into direct dialogue with the ECJ, but also that the ECJ's jurisprudence, built up through dialogue with other national courts, was not even consulted in an effort to guarantee an interpretation of national norms, in conformity with Community law.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

The National Judiciary—Sword of European Court of Justice Rulings: The Example of the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence

The role of the national judiciary in enforcing EC law, and particularly European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings, has been largely neglected by empirical legal and political science research. Existing research has categorised the role of the national judiciary as either shielding national legislation from the ECJ or as serving as a ‘sword’ to foster integration and to force change on reluctant governments. This article sides with the second assumption and attempts to empirically assess it using the example of the patient mobility jurisprudence by the ECJ, the so‐called Kohll/Decker jurisprudence. The three case studies on France, the UK and Germany show that national courts played an important role in overcoming the resistance against this jurisprudence: via a multiplication of national court cases that contradicted domestic legislation they forced the legislator to end judicial uncertainty.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Direct Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of Justice and the Southern Question

For a few years, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has declared inadmissible, for lack of direct concern, a number of annulment actions initiated by sub‐state actors in the context of regional policy. This article compares the ECJ's holdings with the General Court's more generous application of the ‘direct concern’ standard in some of the same disputes, and argues in favour of the General Court's approach. The cases hereby analysed pertain to the implementation of structural funds in Southern Italy. Relating regional policy to the historical unfolding of the ‘Southern Question’, this article examines the unexpected opportunity for civic and administrative renewal brought by regional policy to Italy's South in the late 1990s, and links standing for sub‐state actors to the long‐term realisation of that opportunity. It further argues that a more direct judicial involvement with territorial policies would prompt taxonomic renewal in EU law as a discipline.     

Why fairness cannot be automated: Bridging the gap between EU non-discrimination law and AI

In recent years a substantial literature has emerged concerning bias, discrimination, and fairness in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Connecting this work to existing legal non-discrimination frameworks is essential to create tools and methods that are practically useful across divergent legal regimes. While much work has been undertaken from an American legal perspective, comparatively little has mapped the effects and requirements of EU law. This Article addresses this critical gap between legal, technical, and organisational notions of algorithmic fairness. Through analysis of EU non-discrimination law and jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and national courts, we identify a critical incompatibility between European notions of discrimination and existing work on algorithmic and automated fairness. A clear gap exists between statistical measures of fairness as embedded in myriad fairness toolkits and governance mechanisms and the context-sensitive, often intuitive and ambiguous discrimination metrics and evidential requirements used by the ECJ; we refer to this approach as “contextual equality.”This Article makes three contributions. First, we review the evidential requirements to bring a claim under EU non-discrimination law. Due to the disparate nature of algorithmic and human discrimination, the EU's current requirements are too contextual, reliant on intuition, and open to judicial interpretation to be automated. Many of the concepts fundamental to bringing a claim, such as the composition of the disadvantaged and advantaged group, the severity and type of harm suffered, and requirements for the relevance and admissibility of evidence, require normative or political choices to be made by the judiciary on a case-by-case basis. We show that automating fairness or non-discrimination in Europe may be impossible because the law, by design, does not provide a static or homogenous framework suited to testing for discrimination in AI systems.Second, we show how the legal protection offered by non-discrimination law is challenged when AI, not humans, discriminate. Humans discriminate due to negative attitudes (e.g. stereotypes, prejudice) and unintentional biases (e.g. organisational practices or internalised stereotypes) which can act as a signal to victims that discrimination has occurred. Equivalent signalling mechanisms and agency do not exist in algorithmic systems. Compared to traditional forms of discrimination, automated discrimination is more abstract and unintuitive, subtle, intangible, and difficult to detect. The increasing use of algorithms disrupts traditional legal remedies and procedures for detection, investigation, prevention, and correction of discrimination which have predominantly relied upon intuition. Consistent assessment procedures that define a common standard for statistical evidence to detect and assess prima facie automated discrimination are urgently needed to support judges, regulators, system controllers and developers, and claimants.Finally, we examine how existing work on fairness in machine learning lines up with procedures for assessing cases under EU non-discrimination law. A ‘gold standard’ for assessment of prima facie discrimination has been advanced by the European Court of Justice but not yet translated into standard assessment procedures for automated discrimination. We propose ‘conditional demographic disparity’ (CDD) as a standard baseline statistical measurement that aligns with the Court's ‘gold standard’. Establishing a standard set of statistical evidence for automated discrimination cases can help ensure consistent procedures for assessment, but not judicial interpretation, of cases involving AI and automated systems. Through this proposal for procedural regularity in the identification and assessment of automated discrimination, we clarify how to build considerations of fairness into automated systems as far as possible while still respecting and enabling the contextual approach to judicial interpretation practiced under EU non-discrimination law.     

From Marx to Market: Lawyers,European Law,and the Contentious Transformation of the Port of Genoa

What happens when international courts are asked to tackle local political controversies and their judgments subsequently spark contentious resistance? In the European Union (EU), scholars have posited that the politicization of the often‐liberalizing rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) provokes Euroscepticism and noncompliance. In contrast, I argue that contentious politics may also produce permissive conditions for activist “Eurolawyers” to promote awareness of EU law and mobilize support for liberalization. To unpack this claim, I conduct an intensive case study of perhaps the most explosive controversy in Italy to generate litigation before the ECJ: The 1991 “Port of Genoa” case, where the public monopoly rights of a centuries‐old dockworkers' union were challenged. Leveraging interviews, court and newspaper records, public opinion data, and litigation statistics, I trace how—despite dockworkers' vigorous resistance—a pair of entrepreneurial lawyers liberalized Italy's largest port by combining strategic litigation with a public relations campaign to mobilize a compliance constituency. I conclude with insights the case study offers into the contemporary politics of transnational governance.     

The EU and Issues of Human Rights Protection: Same Solutions to More Acute Problems?

Academic literature repeatedly calls for the EU's accession to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (hereinafter Convention 1 ). Similarly, the Lisbon Treaty provides that the EU must accede to the Convention. [Correction made here after initial online publication.] This might seem odd as the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ 1 ) has over the years developed abundant case‐law on human rights protection in the EU, and the EU has not so long ago adopted a, albeit non‐binding, catalogue of human rights (the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereinafter Charter)). But after all these years, cases, and Treaty amendments, the EU is in fact going back to the ECJ's 1996 landmark opinion which recommended the EU's formal accession to the Convention, 1 already proposed in 1979 by the Commission. 1 One reason for this might be that, in the meantime, human rights issues have multiplied in the application of EU law, especially in areas such as the Second and Third Pillars where—at least initially—fewer human rights protection guarantees were foreseen.     

Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Rationalism in the Studies of the European Court of Justice

During the last two decades, law as a factor in European integration has attracted great scientific interest. Numerous studies and theoretical analyses have been published that have undertaken the task of examining and explaining the role of law in the progress of integration. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in particular, as Europe's judiciary body, draws much attention in this context. However, the inflexible, mechanistic and universalistic notion of rationality that these works employ leads to serious misinterpretations and unjustified criticism regarding the role the ECJ takes in the course of integration. Within the frameworks of contemporary approaches, the Court is perceived as just one more political player among other actors and institutions, able to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests. By outlining the theoretical concept of context rationality, this article shows that the logics of law and judicial lawmaking are based on a non‐trivial and non‐political rationality and cannot be understood appropriately without paying attention to the context of European law.     

Supranational Fundamental Rights or Primacy of Sovereignty?

This analysis explores in detail various aspects of the possible legal impact of ‘British’ Protocol No 30 (the so‐called opt‐out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). On the basis of a legal appraisal, it concludes that the Protocol is not in any way to be understood as a substantial derogation from the standard of protection of fundamental rights in the EU or as an ‘opt‐out’ from the Charter in a substantial sense. Nevertheless, its significance is definitely not to be underestimated. Its adoption as a source of primary law enshrines a legally binding interpretation of the Charter and, in particular, an interpretation of its horizontal provisions. In Article 1(2) and Article 2, the Protocol in fact confirms that the application of the Charter cannot lead to a change in the existing competencies framework. These provisions are of a declaratory nature and apply to all Member States. In Article 1(1), the Protocol is of a constitutive nature since it rules out an extensive interpretation of what can be considered national legal acts adopted in the implementation of EU law only for those States signed up to the Protocol. This specifically means that if, in the future, as part of the application of the Charter, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) has a tendency to subsume a certain area of national legislation under the ‘implementation of Union law’ outside the field of implementing standards, in the spirit of the Ellinki Radiophonia Tileorassi judgment (and subsequently allow their reviewability with respect to their conformity with the Charter), such action would be admissible only for those Member States that have not acceded to the Protocol. However, the Protocol cannot exclude the continued application of the general principles of law instead of the positively constituted fundamental rights in the Charter by the ECJ.     

Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal Approach

Over the years, in the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) determining the availability of family reunification rights for migrant Member State nationals, the pendulum has swung back and forth, from a ‘moderate approach’ in cases such as Morson and Jhanjan (1982) and Akrich (2003), towards a more ‘liberal approach’ in cases such as Carpenter (2002) and Jia (2007). Under the Court's ‘moderate approach’, family reunification rights in the context of the Community's internal market policy are only granted in situations where this is necessary for enabling a Member State national to move between Member States in the process of exercising one of the economic fundamental freedoms; in other words, where there is a sufficient link between the exercise of one of those freedoms and the need to grant family reunification rights under EC law. Conversely, under the Court's ‘liberal approach’, in order for family reunification rights to be bestowed by EC law, it suffices that the situation involves the exercise of one of the market freedoms and that the claimants have a familial link which is covered by Community law; in other words, there is no need to illustrate that there is a link between the grant of such rights and the furtherance of the Community's aim of establishing an internal market. The recent judgments of the ECJ in Eind and Metock (and its order in Sahin) appear to have decidedly moved the pendulum towards the ‘liberal approach’ side. In this article, it will be explained that the fact that the EU is aspiring to be not only a supranational organisation with a successful and smoothly functioning market but also a polity, the citizens of which enjoy a number of basic rights which form the core of a meaningful status of Union citizenship, is the major driving force behind this move. In particular, the move towards a wholehearted adoption of the ‘liberal approach’ seems to have been fuelled by a desire, on the part of the Court, to respond to a number of problems arising from its ‘moderate approach’ and which appear to be an anomaly in a citizens' Europe. These are: a) the incongruity caused between the (new) aim of the Community of creating a meaningful status of Union citizenship and the treatment of Union citizens (under the Court's ‘moderate approach’) as mere factors of production; and b) the emergence of reverse discrimination. The article will conclude with an explanation of why the adoption of the Court's liberal approach does not appear to be a proper solution to these problems.     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.