民主行政视野下服务型政府的构建

新公共管理运动推动了政府再造的进程,各国政府也为了更好地履行其职能,从不同方面对本国政府进行了改造。民主行政理念作为一种政府运行方式也再次得到人们的关注;同时,民主行政也为官僚制行政日益突出的僵化、死板、腐败等问题的解决提供了思路。有鉴于此,我国以民主行政为理论依据,提出建立服务型政府。同时,以建立服务型政府实践,更好地去丰富、实现民主行政理论。     

不同视阈下的官僚制改革：中西方行政体制改革比较

官僚制是适应工业社会的行政模式,然而,随着官僚制在全世界的发展和运用,其形式合理性和工具理性的弊端也日益暴露出来,中西方政府行政面临着官僚制危机的共同命运。于是,中西方国家都展开了官僚体制的改革尝试。由于处于不同的行政发展阶段和制度完善程度,中西方的官僚制改革又有不同的目标任务和路径选择:西方国家展开了“摒弃官僚制”的政府再造运动,而中国则开始了一场以“职能转变”为切入点和着力点的行政改革,以期实现完善政府官僚体制和转变行政典范这一双重的共时性行政发展目标。面临“全球行政改革时代,”西方政府再造对中国行政改革有借鉴意义,但也有不适用于中国的理念、方式和方法,所以,我们应该学会对西方政府的再造进行取舍考量。     

我国政府模式的发展历程及趋势的行政生态学分析——从传统型政府走向多元化政府模式

我国政府模式的发展经历了:纯农业社会——神秘型/传统型政府行政模式;过渡型社会——逐渐过渡、确立的官僚制政府行政模式。在现阶段,关于中国政府行政模式改革主要有三种观点:第一种观点认为理性官僚制仍是最佳选择;第二种观点认为我国应跨越官僚制阶段,直接进入后官僚制时代;第三种观点提出以建立完善官僚制为主,同时汲取“新公共管理运动”的精髓。我国现阶段政府行政模式的理性选择应是以官僚制为主的多元化模式并存。     

善治语境下中国政府再造的路径选择

20世纪90年代,治理和善治理论在西方国家兴起,根据中国的行政现状和善治条件以及全球行政改革的时代背景,新时期中国的政府再造要努力解决行政官僚制的构建和行政治理方式创新这一共时性的行政发展压力,将治理和善治理论及其理念融入到官僚体制的构建中去,建立一种善治官僚制的行政体制和范式。这不失为新时期中国政府再造的路径选择。     

善治语境下中国政府再造的路径选择

20世纪90年代,治理和善治理论在西方国家兴起,成为中国行政改革的全球语境和有效的分析范式。中国社会的转型变迁与治理结构的深刻变革,特别是社会转型期中国公共行政的官僚制范式面临着两难的困境,为治理和善治理论提供了生长土壤,为行政改革的善治取向提供了基础和条件。根据中国的行政现状和善治条件以及全球行政改革的时代背景,新时期中国的政府再造要努力解决行政官僚制的构建和行政治理方式创新这一共时性的行政发展压力,将治理和善治理论及其理念融入到官僚体制的构建中去,建立一种善治官僚制的行政体制和范式。这不失为新时期中国政府再造的路径选择。     

官僚制理论与中国的行政改革

中国政府进行改革的目标与官僚制理论的实质不谋而合 ,官僚制理论的优点对于我们的行政改革有着指导意义 ,但其又具有一些消极方面。我们应该对官僚制理论进行扬弃 ,对其合理的内容 ,应该正确的借鉴、学习 ;而对官僚制理论自身无法克服的缺陷 ,要进行改革 ,从而推动中国的行政改革     

从"官僚制"的思考框架看公共行政的精神演变

从传统官僚制到现代官僚制,再到后官僚制,体现了公共行政的精神转变.权力分布从官僚主导到势力均衡再到社会主导,体现了行政体系公共性的增强;从倚重权术到尊重规则再到多种治理方式的并重,体现了政府乃至整个社会管理效率和治理能力的提高.从官僚制的思考框架引申出,我国的行政管理体制改革应当是加强民主化与理性化并重;既要重视政府自身的改革,也要改善政府与社会的互动,提高公民社会的自我管理能力.     

民主行政：概念、流派及理论构建

在 2 0世纪 6 0年代之后 ,民主行政再度引起西方学术界的重视 ,官僚制与民主精神之间的紧张关系促进了民主与行政的融合。西方学界对民主行政的研究经历了三个历史发展阶段 ,形成了不同的研究流派 ,各个流派在价值、制度、技术三个层面上都存在着一定的分歧。相对于西方的研究范围和深度而言 ,我国学界的研究相对比较薄弱。     

民主行政——一个兴起的研究题域

在20世纪60年代之后,民主行政再度引起西方学术界的重视,官僚制与民主精神之间的紧张关系促进了民主与行政的融合。西方学界对民主行政的研究经历了三个历史发展阶段,形成了不同的研究流派,各个流派在价值、制度、技术三个层面上都存在着一定的分歧。相对于西方的研究范围和深度而言,我国学界的研究相对比较薄弱。     

从官僚制行政到民主治理:公共管理范式转换的再思考

范式理论自引入社会科学领域被广泛应用,公共管理领域尤其如此。官僚制行政范式始于理性官僚制和政治行政二分理论,随着古典行政原则的确立达到顶峰。新公共管理是该范式的突破和分化,而民主治理则是公共管理范式的转换和革命。民主治理兴起的直接动力是源于改革和救助官僚制这朵"恶之花"的需要。但在更深层次上,民主治理是议会制民主的超越和代议制民主的补充,涉及民主政治和公共行政的调适和相容性问题。     

The Bureaucracy and Its Masters: The New Madisonian System in the US

The bureaucracy's masters have redesigned the American political system over the past 20 years. As before, checks and balances play a critical role. This time, however, relations between one branch of government (the bureaucracy) and the rest are decidedly and deliberately asymmetrical. While acknowledging the need for bureaucratic accountability, the author raises questions about a growing emphasis on highly coercive controls from above. Instead he recommends greater reliance on catalytic controls from below, which energize the bureaucracy without stifling bureaucratic creativity and eroding bureaucratic integrity.     

Missing pieces in each other's puzzles: Integrating the new public management and the new political economy

Although New Political Economy ideas have sometimes accompanied New Public Management ideas in programs of bureaucratic reform (especially outside the United States), the two schools of thought have remained separate. I argue that the problems of bureaucracy are largely political problems. Therefore, bureaucratic reform must be viewed in tandem with political reform. New Public Management can learn from New Political Economy's emphasis on the incentives of self-interested politicians, and New Political Economy can learn from New Public Management's normative approach and focus on citizens. I use an “exit and voice” framework to discuss and evaluate alternative approaches to reform.     

Bureaucratic Neutrality among Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia

This article uses Kaufman's theory of competing bureaucratic values as a foundation for studying bureaucratic values in a developing society. It discusses civil service reform within a socio-bureaucratic-political exchange, as well as characteristics associated with bureaucratic values and ethnic federalism. The inherent conflicts between a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or executive leadership and practices within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity are explored. Factors related to Ethiopia's postconflict status, which further complicate the governance environment, are identified, and building blocks for postconflict governance are suggested.     

Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate

The literature on political control of bureaucracy reveals that bureaucracies are highly responsive to political forces. This paper argues that the political control literature misses evidence from other academic literature that bears directly on this phenomenon. Specifically, researchers need to consider the values of the bureaucracy in any effort to assess the degree of political control. An empirical test is presented using a data set from public education. Results show bureaucratic values to be far more influential in explaining bureaucratic outputs and outcomes than political factors. These findings suggest that a reinterpretation of previous empirical research is urgently in order.     

Low‐trust bureaucracy: Understanding the Mexican bureaucratic experience

Latin American bureaucracies are notorious for their inefficiency and opacity, yet there is very little empirical research done on what exactly constitutes the “bureaucratic experience” for citizens and what the costs of bureaucratic dysfunction are. To improve our understanding of this topic, 5 cases of Mexican citizens' encounters with public bureaucracies are used to develop the notion of “low‐trust bureaucracy”: public organisations in which access to services is unreliable and the levels of control towards both citizens and bureaucrats are excessive. This bottom‐up analysis of administrative practices contributes to our understanding of the ineffectiveness of government programmes and services, but also of how bureaucracies in developing countries amplify social inequality rather than function as a social equaliser. Furthermore, this article adds new insights to the existing understanding of administrative burdens as a result of either political tactics or mere benign neglect. The data presented here suggest that structural and intractable characteristics of the broader administrative context, such as authoritarian legacies, can produce behavioural patterns that shift bureaucratic attention away from a fair and efficient service provision.     

When Missions Matter: Professional Priorities and the “Stepchild” of Supervisory Programs

If there is a clear bottom line to the literature on political control of the bureaucracy, it is that control is never complete. Principals can be multiple, priorities diverse, preferences for policy incomplete and not articulated, and intentional choice lost in the muddle. Yet as long as bureaucratic studies remain focused upon outside political actors, or at best, the political appointee at the helm of an agency, we will not make many advances in our understanding of important organizational dynamics that act as an independent force upon the phenomenon of bureaucratic behavior. This article suggests a politically cognizant return to the bureaucracy by examining the distinct management efforts of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the FDIC to supervise the consumer and civil rights obligations of banks, known collectively as “compliance” obligations. The same mandates, issued and overseen by the same political principals, and implemented within common professional cultures, have been managed in ways that vary in the context of each agency's organizational mission. It is argued that organizational mission provides an empirical link between the priorities and mandates imposed from a system of “overhead democracy,” and the influential priorities of a common professional group (bank examiners) in each of the agencies.     

Prospects for future Australian‐United States defence cooperation

Singapore’s governing elite is less bureaucratic and less separated from private interests than commonly thought. The bureaucracy has little independent strength and the political leadership is entwined with leading members of the business community, particularly the financial sector, to the point that the line between public and private is frequently indistinct. Given that democratic or interest-group constraints are minimal, transparency low and the rule of law in doubt, why Singapore’s activist economic policies have not decayed into a search for private rewards is rather puzzling. This article argues that Singapore’s record of sound government rests on informal governing institutions as well as attributes of the formal government sector. The informal institutions encompass nominally public and private actors in a systematized way, structuring the incorporation of private actors to embed the values of performance-based merit and working with, not against, government. The system of government is, however, fragile and may be showing signs of decay.     

The Importance of Trust in Government for Public Administration: The Case of Zoning

Many scholars argue that citizens with higher levels of political trust are more likely to grant bureaucratic discretion to public administrators than citizens with lower levels of trust. Trust, therefore, can relieve the tension between managerial flexibility and political accountability in the modern administrative state. Unfortunately, there is little empirical evidence showing that trust is actually associated with citizens' willingness to cede policy-making power to government. This article tests theories about political trust and citizen competence using the case of zoning. Trust in local government is found to be an important predictor of support for zoning, but trust in state government and trust in national government have no effect. These findings suggest that trust affects policy choice and helps determine how much power citizens grant to local administrators.     

When Politics Matters: The Impact of Politicians' and Bureaucrats' Preferences on Salient and Nonsalient Policy Areas

For three decades, the “politics matters” literature has found that political ideology is an important explanation of public policy. However, this literature systematically fails to include the influence of the bureaucracy. In fact, it is almost impossible to identify a single study in this literature that controls for the influence of the permanent bureaucracy. In this article, we investigate whether politics still matters when bureaucratic preferences are taken into account. We do this in a simultaneous test of political and bureaucratic influences on public budgets, a policy measure often studied in the “politics matters” literature. We find that political preferences trump bureaucratic ones in policy areas salient to the public but not in less salient areas. This might be comforting news from a democratic perspective. However, as public budgets represent an easy case for political influence, it is food for thought that political preferences do not always prevail.     

State Building and Capitalism: The Rise of the Swedish Bureaucracy

The purpose of this article is to answer the following question: When did Swedish bureaucracy arise? That is, to determine a point in time when the organizational technology that Weber called bureaucracy became dominant in the process of Swedish state formation, as well as when bureaucracy finally replaced the feudal form of government based on the authority of nobility and the hierarchical ties of individual loyalties. The importance of this question relates to the debate on the sequential logic of economic and political development. The change from an aristocratic/particularistic to a bureaucratic/universal state apparatus can be understood as a change from despotic to infrastructural state power. Most empirical material indicates that, in terms of institutional structure, the transition to a bureaucratic administration started in the 1850s. Contrary to what most Swedish historians have argued, the Swedish state remained feudal and particularistic all they way up to the mid-19th century. If any particular decade is key to this transformation, it would be the 1870s. By then the last of the noble privileges had disappeared, a uniform salary system had been introduced, and the various state apparatuses had begun reorganizing toward a higher level of efficiency and rationality.