Rapprochement between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland: implications for American foreign policy

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US.     

Hong Kong's policy possibilities and directions toward the mainland‐Taiwan conflict

On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was returned from British colonial rule to Chinese rule under the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The change in political status of Hong Kong has great impacts on the triangular relationship between Hong Kong, the mainland and Taiwan, in which the mainland and Taiwan are still in a state of intense political conflict and competition. This paper examines the policy possibilities and directions for Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of the PRC in handling its relations with Taiwan. It argues that both Beijing and Taipei want to preserve the existing Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations for political and practical purposes but at the same time will try to avoid being forced into a suspected political trap—for Beijing the recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity and for Taipei the subordination of Taiwan to PRC sovereignty. Between these two baselines, the paper points out that Hong Kong should pursues its own Taiwan policy built upon the interests of Hong Kong and depoliticization of Hong Kong‐Taiwan relations.     

From functional integration to structural readjustment: Taipei–Beijing relations and the role of the United States

Regardless of the continued stalemate in the political arena, trade and economic interactions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have increased steadily. Both aggregate data and the results of survey research have testified to the existence of functional integration of the two societies across the Taiwan Strait. In addition to functional integration, structural readjustments have also been made by political authorities both in Taipei and Beijing so as to facilitate continuity of trade and economic relations. These types of mutual accommodations include: establishing proper ‘unofficial’ agencies on both sides to serve as instruments of practical contacts and negotiation; the more flexible definition of ‘One China’ by Beijing; and the opening of ‘small links’ between Quemoy and Amoy by Taipei. Beijing's refusal to grant Taipei any official diplomatic status and Taipei's reluctance to accept the ‘One China’ principle remain major obstacles to cross‐Taiwan Strait relations. The United States will continue playing a key role in future cross‐Strait relations. Beijing seems to be content, at least temporarily, to maintain cordial relations with the United States in exchange for the latter's adherence to the ‘One China’ principle and rejection of the option of Taiwan independence. Whether Taipei will use enhanced US commitment to Taiwan's security to strike a better deal with Beijing for gradual cross‐Strait integration or to utilize increased American protection to move onto the separatist road will be affected by domestic politics in Taiwan, future US policy toward to the island, and Beijing's response to Taipei's demand for security and international recognition.     

Continuity and change: the administration of George W. Bush and US policy toward Taiwan

This paper examines recent modifications in American policy toward the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan). It contends that, while the George W. Bush Administration may have carried out a significant readjustment of US policy, available evidence suggests that it will not endorse any major upgrades in ties with Taipei during the foreseeable future. Like previous administrations, the Bush Administration now recognizes the value of engaging the People's Republic of China (PRC). This development holds important implications for the future trajectory of America's relations with Taiwan and the PRC and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific.     

Taiwan's Expansion of International Space: opportunities and challenges

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate ‘international space’. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the ‘one China’ principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability.     

Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Africa: The limitations of dollar diplomacy

The search for status, or more correctly, the desire to maintain status, lies at the heart of the Republic of China on Taiwan's (ROC) foreign policy. This is particularly so vis-a ¤ -vis its official state-to-state relations. In this regard, the ROC has been constrained by a conscious policy by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to try and marginalize Taiwan on the international stage. Due to objective realities, Taiwan has had to become satisfied with maintaining official state relations with small states only. All, with the exception of the Vatican, are in the developing world, with a number in Africa. This paper examines Taiwanese foreign policy and its diplomatic initiatives, with particular reference to its use of 'dollar diplomacy' in its activities in Africa. The constraints and limitations of such policies are drawn out.     

Toward a republic of Taiwan or republic of China: a hypothetical analysis

Two Taiwanese republics have been mentioned in this paper, namely, the Republic of Taiwan (ROT) and the Republic of Taiwan (ROT). The ROT briefly existed in 1895, and the ROT is yet to be created. Two Chinese republics have also been discussed, the Republic of China (ROC), which was created by Dr. Sun Yat‐sen in 1912, and the Republic of China (ROC) or Zhonghuagongheguo, which may be created by the Chinese Communists with the blessings of Deng Xiaoping. If Beijing, indeed, changes its national title from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the ROC, Taipei's formal ties with other capitals may have to come to an abrupt end. Such a move will also shatter the hope of those Taiwan independists in creating a new country in Taiwan or frustrate those who are for the Taiwanization of the ROC. However, it will also mean the “end” of Communism in China, if one does not believe in Marxist Utopia.     

Economic Development and Corruption: Beijing beyond 'Beijing'

This study attempts to reveal the political dynamics of economic reforms in China through an analysis of the case of Beijing. As anywhere else in China, Beijing experienced rapid economic growth from 1978 through to 1994. During this period, Beijing's GDP increased four times; Beijing's foreign investment amounted to $26.1 billion and the number of foreign enterprises reached 10,196; and Beijing's people increased their income by a factor of 10. In the meantime, however, as in other places in China, Beijing witnessed more rampant corruption than ever in the history of the People's Republic. The world was shocked in 1995 by the news that a senior vice mayor of Beijing committed suicide and that the party secretary—a politburo member—was first placed under house arrest and then faced criminal charges because of corruption. The attack on Beijing by the center revealed another dynamic in the particular case of Beijing, that is, a strong capital can hardly coexist with the center. The strong capital may defy the power of the center, but the center has to control the capital to command the whole country. The struggle between the center and the capital resulted in the defeat of the capital, as was the case in the Cultural Revolution.     

Sino‐Japanese Relations

China's relations with Japan over the past several decades have been cyclical, with periods of relative cordiality interspersed with episodes of contention. Since 1995, however, the Beijing leadership has perceived a hardening of attitudes on the Japanese side in ways that are inimical to long-term amicable relations with the People's Republic of China. This has been mirrored in Tokyo, which sees Chinese behavior as increasingly provocative. The policy directions of the two states appear more divergent as well. Periodic slight thaws in relations and numerous joint projects notwithstanding, the problems between the two defy easy solution, and may be intractable. Weak leadership in both countries may encourage extremists in each to become more assertive.     

One Formula,Two Experiences: political divergence of Hong Kong and Macao since retrocession

Since the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to the People's Republic of China, the territory's political development has diverged from that of Macao. The poverty of leadership, state–society confrontations, deinstitutionalization and Beijing's explicit intervention have marked Hong Kong's political development from 1997 to 2004. Since April 2004, the Hong Kong governing style has converged with that of Macao in terms of its pragmatism. Although Macao's political development is characterized by leadership finesse, state–society partnership and institutionalization, its relatively weak civil society and lack of democratic reforms are by no means an attractive ‘one country, two systems’ model to Taiwan; nor does Hong Kong's ‘one country, two systems’ appeal to the Republic of China. Yet, the political corruption and chaos that punctuate Taiwan's democracy have failed to have any positive demonstration effect on Hong Kong and Macao. While the models of Hong Kong and Macao are bound to diverge from that of Taiwan, political development in the two Chinese Special Administrative Regions is gradually converging.     

US 'Dual Track' Policy: Arms sales and technology transfer to China mainland and Taiwan

This article analyzes the United States 'dual track' policy on arms sales and technology transfers to the China mainland and Taiwan. Despite its 'one China' policy, the US has continued to sell arms to Taiwan and provide Taiwan with military technology. At the same time, Washington is unwilling to transfer certain technology to the China mainland. The US 'dual track' policy of arms sales and technology transfer to both sides of the Taiwan Strait has maintained a strategic balance by developing closer relations with Beijing while maintaining the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Washington's objectives are to enhance Sino‐American relations and to maintain Taiwan's security while not unsettling the generally positive Sino‐American relationship. While this policy has caused tensions in US‐PRC relations, this 'unbalanced balance' has served US interests in maintaining Taiwan's security and has not strained Washington‐Beijing relations to the breaking point.     

美国因素在两岸关系和平发展进程中的影响

美国对两岸和谈的政策立场,是出于维系台海“不统、不独、不战”局面的战略考虑,以保证自己在台海地区的最大战略利益。美国既不希望两岸举行统一谈判又希望两岸达成和平协议的复杂心态,表现在一方面希望两岸进行谈判,降低敌对状态,另一方面又长期对台提供军售,使其增加与大陆相抗衡的资本。此一“双轨政策”对两岸和平关系的构建,有着不同方向的影响,往往起了互相抵消的作用。由于中国政府对台湾当局谋求“法理台独”的强烈反应以及台海紧张局势的升高,美国政府在20世纪90年代后期开始对两岸政治谈判采取较为积极的态度,反对台湾单方面改变现状。美国的上述战略考虑,在反对台湾“独立”、维系两岸和平这一点上,与中国政府的立场有相通之处,客观上为构建两岸关系和平发展框架提供了较好的外部条件。     

China's Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Question of Darfur

This article assesses China's response to the violence in Darfur. Whereas the People's Republic had already been taking a constructive stance towards international interventions in various intra-state conflicts, the mayhem in Darfur compelled China to take the lead in engaging Khartoum. Beijing's engagement evolved from a rather passive posture, to taking a clear position, and finally, to active persuasion and mediation. During these negotiations, Beijing departed from the interests of the local political elite and tried to meet its concerns, not by imposing measures, but by clarifying the different options and creating trust to find a feasible consensus. From the Chinese perspective this approach was highly successful as it increased its moral influence, reassured its partners in Africa and the West, safeguarded its oil empire in Sudan and upheld its prerequisite of sovereignty and state consent.     

‘The Chinese and the Thais are Brothers': the evolution of the Sino–Thai friendship

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese and Thais forged a close, friendly relationship based on their security cooperation in an informal alliance against Vietnamese regional hegemonism. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cambodian conflict and the Vietnamese threat, the Sino-Thai cooperative friendship became deeper and broader, rather than dissipating. How are we to explain the closeness of Sino-Thai relations today? While the dynamics of the international political structure in East Asia have played a critical role in shaping the relationship between these two countries since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the emerging regional international structure—particularly the rise of China—provides indeterminate incentives. Thailand could balance against or bandwagon with rising China, or try to hedge its bets; nor does the emerging structure direct how the Chinese will wield their growing influence and power over their neighbors. This article argues that the best explanation rests in a combination of the structural argument (the rise of China) with the desire of both countries to maintain the mutually beneficial partnership they constructed during the 1980s, in particular Thailand's role as a link or facilitator between the PRC and ASEAN.     

以“中国领土和主权完整”说辞替代“一中原则”可行性之探讨

大陆方面与台北当局固然在宪政与法理上均主张两岸之间只有一个国家的存在，但是台北在过去十多年始终对北京所提出的“一中原则”感到顾虑重重。未来双方展开政治接触之时，大陆可不可以避免使用台湾方面感到困扰的“一中原则”，与台北共同使用“中国领土主权完整”这一概念，以体现双方的有重叠与契合的精神与立场？从两岸双方发表过的重要文件与谈话，以及双方学界论辩的结果，证明用“中国领土和主权完整”的说辞作为双方都便于接受的“一中原则”表述的替代性方案，在理论上应是可以被接受的，而且双方更容易在政治上达成共识。     

The politics of greater China's integration into the global Info Tech (IT) supply chain

The most notable feature of the public ‘dialogue of the deaf’ taking place across the Strait separating Taiwan and China is its zero‐sum logic. This logic of one‐upmanship in political and security matters dictates that whatever benefits Taipei is detrimental to Beijing and vice versa. Commercial interaction between Taiwan and China, particularly in the broadly defined sector of information technology (IT), is arguably the more powerful driver of cross‐Strait interaction today. Two characteristics of this accelerating dynamic of commercial interaction across the Taiwan Strait are paramount: (1) its tight integration into a global IT supply chain; and (2) the extent of symbiosis by which all participants in this global supply chain depend on the worldwide vitality of this economic ecosystem. In interpreting what cross‐Strait economic integration in IT portends, political logic may be leading Taipei and Beijing along opposite paths to the same end‐point: the presumption that economic integration is undermining, and destabilizing, the cross‐Strait economic and political status quo. As a dominant player in global IT, the US has its own stake in a clear understanding of this globalization dynamic and in astutely maintaining its interests as the global IT supply chain continues to extend across the political fault‐line of the Taiwan Strait. Non‐partisan analysis of the logic of globalization suggests a different outcome for the cross‐Strait commercial dynamic than either Taipei or Beijing has publicly credited: its potential to mutually enhance economic prosperity and contribute long‐term to stabilizing cross‐Strait political interaction.     

两岸对“和平协议”的立场与前瞻

台海和平环境的建立，是两岸当局与人民自1949年内战之后一直的期待。两岸对和平远景的期待可以理解，但从理想走向实际却需要一段漫长而且曲折的过程。本文共分五个部分，包括前言、两岸创议“和平协议”的历史背景介绍、两岸终止敌对状态协议设计与推行、两岸对“和平协议”解读的相互冲突，以及两岸“和平协议”签署的展望，来解析两岸对此一问题的立场与要求，并整理出双方对此事件的不同解读，以及彼此尚无法“跨出门槛”的症结所在。     

Constructing Peace in the Taiwan Strait: a constructivist analysis of the changing dynamics of identities and nationalisms

Economic integration in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly stronger recently. Economic integration should have led to stronger political convergence. Why hasn't it occurred? I argue that democracy in Taiwan and the continuation of the single-party rule in China have created two very different social experiences. These different social experiences have formed two different identities. People in Taiwan are increasingly thinking of themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The growing level of popular nationalism in China has also altered the political identity of mainland Chinese. Such change could force Beijing to accommodate citizens' demand to act more toughly towards Taipei. Further political integration is still possible, but it would require another norm change, perhaps already in the making.     

From Zero-sum Game to Positive-sum Game: why Beijing tolerates Pacific Island states' recognition of Taipei

The Pacific Islands region might be regarded as one of the most remote and politically least significant areas in the geopolitical and economic considerations of world giants. However, as the regional order of the Asia–Pacific changes rapidly, China has shown more eagerness to engage the island states. Interestingly, Beijing's former arch-rival Taipei still maintains, arguably, considerable influence over the region. This raises a question that is thought-provoking: why is this status quo tolerated by Beijing? Drawing on empirical sources in relation to communication between Beijing, Taipei and these island states, by focusing on how Beijing handles the South Pacific region in general and the six non-recognizing states in particular, this article attempts to tackle the question by distinguishing the difference in Beijing's mentality today from that of 30 or 40 years ago. It argues that the zero-sum mentality of fighting against Taipei in the region has now been replaced by a positive-sum assumption to engage Taipei, as well as the pan-Chinese community in the world, via the PIS, regardless of whether they establish formal ties with Beijing or not.     

Four Contradictions Constraining China's Foreign Policy Behavior

Beijing's foreign policy behavior is constantly tested by a set of conflicting variables. China views itself as a major power and wants to play a role accordingly in the world arena, while it always lacks an adequate material basis to do so. The open-door policy requires China to be fully integrated into international society, while strong concern over sovereignty makes it difficult for Beijing to embrace some of the mainstream values. China believes in a set of principles in international affairs, while consideration of its national interests causes Beijing to make a pragmatic compromise from time to time. Beijing has long been accustomed to dealing with others in bilateral settings while the post-Cold War era is witnessing a rise of mulilateralism in international politics, which is bringing more and more pressure on China's traditional diplomacy. These variables will continue to constrain China's foreign policy behavior while their influence will decline as a result of rapid change with China both materially and conceptually.