A Gramscian Approach to Studying the Judicial Decision-Making Process

This paper applies a Gramscian analytical framework to scrutinise the judicial decision-making process. Based on two distinct research projects, the article explores how, on one hand judges in criminal courts can be identified as part of the bureaucratic machinery of the state, as ‘technicians of repression’; whereas, on the other hand, human rights judges can be distinguished as providing ‘moral and intellectual leadership’ in their production and reproduction of certain values. Some of the key questions this article seeks to answer are: What is the role of hegemony in the judicial decision-making process? To what extent are legal actors both ‘technicians of repression’ and ‘moral and intellectual leaders’? This paper uses examples from empirical research conducted at courts in Argentina and at the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights to identify and explore this dual role of judges as both repressive technicians and moral and intellectual leaders in neo-liberal capitalist societies.     

‘First Among Equals’: Breaking the Deadlock in Parental and Sibling Funeral Disputes

Family disputes over a loved one’s funeral arrangements are increasingly frequent, with courts intervening if consensus cannot be reached. In many common law jurisdictions, the law favours the executor where the deceased made a will and the highest ranking next-of-kin where the deceased died intestate. But what if two or more people fall within the same kinship tier and have equal rights to determine the deceased’s fate—who has the final say? Adopting a uniquely comparative approach which draws the authorities together for the first time, this article analyses the factors devised by judges in Australia and England, and contrasts them with the discrete statutory tests adopted in parts of Canada and the United States. Having evaluated the various approaches, the article proposes its own hybrid legal solution for breaking the deadlock in so-called ‘equal kinship disputes’.     

'Solange, chapter 3': Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union

Abstract: Soon after the accession of eight post‐communist states from Central and Eastern Europe to the EU, the constitutional courts of some of these countries questioned the principle of supremacy of EU law over national constitutional systems, on the basis of their being the guardians of national standards of protection of human rights and of democratic principles. In doing so, they entered into the well‐known pattern of behaviour favoured by a number of constitutional courts of the ‘older Europe’, which is called a ‘Solange story’ for the purposes of this article. But this resistance is ridden with paradoxes, the most important of which is a democracy paradox: while accession to the EU was supposed to be the most stable guarantee for human rights and democracy in post‐communist states, how can the supremacy of EU law be now resisted on these very grounds? It is argued that the sources of these constitutional courts’ adherence to the ‘Solange’ pattern are primarily domestic, and that it is a way of strengthening their position vis‐à‐vis other national political actors, especially at a time when the role and independence of those courts face serious domestic challenges.     

Exploring the Limits of the Judicialization of Urban Land Disputes in Vietnam

Economic and legal reforms have triggered waves of conflict over property rights and access to urban land in Vietnam. In this article I develop four epistemic case studies to explore the main precepts and practices that courts must negotiate to extend their authority over land disputes. Courts face a dilemma: Do they apply state laws that disregard community regulatory practices and risk losing social relevance, or apply community notions of situational justice that undermine rule formalism? I conclude that reforms designed to increase rule formalism in the courts may have the unintended consequence of reducing the capacity for judges to find lasting solutions to land disputes.     

Domestic judicial defiance and the authority of international legal regimes

Tensions and occasional overt defiance of international courts suggest that compliance with international regimes is not a self-evident choice for domestic judges. I develop a formal theory of domestic judicial defiance in which domestic and supranational judges vie for jurisprudential authority in a non-hierarchical setting. The model emphasises the role of domestic non-compliance costs and power asymmetries in determining the conduct of domestic and international judges. I argue that the EU represents a special case of a particularly effective international regime. Weak domestic courts have little to gain from an escalated conflict with the European court of Justice. But even domestic judicial superpowers like the German Federal Constitutional Court have strong incentives to seek mutual accommodation with European judges. The analysis also yields new insights into concepts, such as “judicial dialogue” and “constitutional pluralism” that have featured prominently in the legal literature, and suggests new hypotheses for empirical research.     

Translating Justice: The International Organization of Constitutional Courts

What is the international organization of national constitutional courts? This article develops a theoretical framework to analyze this question and tests it empirically with original data of translated opinions. Justices of different nations form an emerging epistemic community, which is congealed due to common practices as well as to competition and selectiveness throughout the judicial career. Opinions translated into English as the lingua franca are pivotal for communication within this epistemic community. Through engaging in a transnational judicial dialogue, and particularly as far as this dialogue concerns legal citations, this community uses international law as a key guide to finding equilibrium solutions at national and international levels. Five sources of international law overwhelmingly dominate. In addition, we find evidence in the collegial game within the different courts for the existence of a transnational epistemic community of Supreme Court justices.     

Constitutional Directives: Morally‐Committed Political Constitutionalism

About 37 state constitutions around the world feature non‐justiciable thick moral commitments (‘constitutional directives’). These directives typically oblige the state to redistribute income and wealth, guarantee social minimums, or forge a religious or secular identity for the state. They have largely been ignored in a constitutional scholarship defined by its obsession with the legitimacy of judicial review and hostility to constitutionalising thick moral commitments other than basic rights. This article presents constitutional directives as obligatory telic norms, addressed primarily to the political state, which constitutionalise thick moral objectives. Their full realisation—through increasingly sophisticated mechanisms designed to ensure their political enforcement—is deferred to a future date. They are weakly contrajudicative in that these duties are not directly enforced by courts. Functionally, they help shape the discourse over a state's constitutional identity, and regulate its political and judicial organs. Properly understood, they are a key tool to realise a morally‐committed conception of political constitutionalism.     

‘Playing the Judicial Card’: Litigation Strategies during the Process of Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

During the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a number of constitutional jurisdictions were activated by political actors. In playing ‘the judicial card’, opponents of ratification decided to seek political goals through judicial means, and thus they were obliged to develop litigation strategies. This article explores such strategies and the responses that courts gave them. It shows that constitutional proceedings with regards to the Lisbon Treaty became a political battleground governed by legal logics, in which the interpretation of European clauses, the democratic deficit of the Union and the tensions underlying the European judicial dialogue were privileged objects of discussion between claimants and courts in which law and politics intertwined.     

司法确定力的形成逻辑

司法确定力是与法院的宪法地位密切相关的,宪法对法院的独立地位以及解决纠纷、救济权利和发展法律的功能定位,是司法确定力的权威渊源;司法确定力来自于司法的管辖权威,法院在法律规定的范围内、在自己的能力范围内受理案件,运用法律知识、司法理性和司法经验,按照司法规律对案件事实和法律适用问题进行权威判断,为司法确定力提供了前提;司法确定力源于司法的整合权威,法院在审理案件过程中,通过对立法时的民意与法律适用时的民意、普遍正义与个别正义、法律正义与社会正义的有机结合建构了司法的整合权威,为司法确定力提供坚实的基础;司法确定力依赖于裁判的执行权威,当事人自觉履行生效判决的文化意识和国家强制执行生效判决的权威能量为司法确定力提供坚强的保障。     

Breaking the Principle of Secrecy: An Examination of Judicial Dissent in the European Constitutional Courts

As “oracles of the law,” judges are trained to provide certainty and guidance within an often‐uncertain legal landscape. Nowhere is this statement truer than in the civil law tradition, where the idea of legal certainty has been prized as a “supreme value.” Despite this tradition, dissenting opinions are now quite common within most European constitutional courts. Using new data from five countries and interviews with constitutional court judges and clerks, I investigate factors that contribute to dissent on constitutional courts. Results indicate that legal and policy characteristics matter, but so do judicial backgrounds and the issues reviewed.     

National Judges,Community Judges: Invitation to a Journey through the Looking‐glass—On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter‐systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical Principle

The historical conflict between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the national constitutional courts regarding primacy is a misunderstanding. In going through the looking‐glass, we can understand that, on the contrary, the ECJ and the national constitutional courts adopt comparable solutions in their treatment of legal pluralism, and that they see the negation of pluralism as essential for the survival of their own legal orders. Therefore, these judges must be offered a new theoretical context to help them reconcile their role as supreme guardian with the taking into account of the pluralist context. Finally, practical proposals must be made to give judges the instruments and techniques that are capable of reflecting this plural structure.     

Dialogue with Dictators: Judicial Resistance in Argentina and Brazil

Throughout the world, judges are often asked to implement the repressive measures of authoritarian rulers. Which conception of legal interpretation and judicial role, if any, make judges more likely to resist such pressures? That question, central to Anglo-American jurisprudence since the Hart-Fuller debate, is addressed by examining recent military rule in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina, judges were sympathetic to military rule and so criticized its “excesses” in the jurisprudential terms favored by the juntas: positivism and legal realism. Brazilian judges, by contrast, were largely unsympathetic to military rule, and so couched their criticism in terms of natural law, in order to raise larger questions and reach a broader public. Empirical study of the cases and conceptual analysis of existing theories both reveal that no view of legal interpretation inherently disposes its adherents to either accept or repudiate repressive law. Contingent political circtrmstances—the rulers’favored form of legal rhetoric, and the degree to which judges accept the need for a period of extra-constitutional rule—determine which legal theory fosters most resistance. But since most authoritarian rulers nominally affirm their constitutional predecessors’positive law and are often unwilling to codify publicly their most repressive policies, strict literalism usually offers the most congenial idiom for judicial resistance to such regimes.     

Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice

A cross-section analysis covering up to 42 countries and including the usual control variables shows that central government outlays as a share of general government outlays are significantly larger if the judges of the constitutional or supreme court are independent of the federal government and parliament and if the barriers to constitutional amendment are high. This evidence is consistent with the view that constitutional judges have a vested interest in centralization or that there is self-selection or both. These insights are used to draw lessons for the reform of the European Court of Justice. Self-selection should be reduced by requiring judicial experience—ideally with the highest national courts. The vested interest in centralization could be overcome by adding a subsidiarity court.     

"Constrained" Constitutional Courts as Conduits for Democratic Consolidation

Many constitutional courts, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, have more power than the "constrained court" model of judicial decisionmaking suggests because they operate in an increasingly international environment. By analyzing the Estonian Supreme Court's adjudication of minority linguistic rights, we show how even a new court can act as a "conduit" for democratic reform by identifying for legislators national constitutional paths along which domestically disliked but internationally defined democratic reforms can be pursued, preserving national integrity while acknowledging international reality. International pressures, while constraining courts, thus can free them from national constraints while allowing them to imprint their own vision.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

'An Unfortunate Coincidence': Jews and Jewishness in Twentieth-century English Judicial Discourse

This paper explores the neglected area of representations of Jews and Jewishness in English legal cases. In considering judicial knowledge of ‘the Jew’, I ask three primary questions. First, how do English judges understand and represent ‘the Jew’ and in relation to what material factors do these understandings and representations change? Second, how do English judges construct racial knowledge, what rhetorical technologies are fashioned and deployed? Third, are the effects of contemporary judicial racializations of Jewishness different in substance from earlier ones? The purpose of this paper is to study the encounter between English judges and ‘the Jew’ in the twentieth century, eschewing a reading that centres ‘antisemitism’ or ‘discrimination’ in favour of one that focuses on the complex and contradictory narratives in these judgments and the kinds of work these narratives do.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

司法鉴定行政与司法视角的边界——民诉证据司法解释鉴定内容的思考

2019年12月26日,最高人民法院发布了《关于修改〈关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定〉的决定》,备受司法界关注。其中,涉及司法鉴定的条款达24条之多,笔者结合《司法鉴定程序通则》,对相关内容予以了梳理与比较,揭示了民事证据规定给司法鉴定带来的变化与问题。民事证据规定重点规制了司法鉴定启动、受理、鉴定人出庭接受质询、鉴定人诚信承诺、鉴定人权利保障,鉴定人的出庭义务、遵守鉴定时限的义务,以及围绕鉴定资料的真实性、合法性方面的规定,以期保障鉴定质量。与此同时,民事证据规定也带来了管理上的边界之争的问题,包括司法鉴定行政管理部门与法院之间、法院与司法鉴定机构之间,以及法官与鉴定人之间权利义务的边界之争与之推,司法鉴定呈现多头管理已见端倪。本研究直面司法鉴定发展中的问题,建议尽早启动司法鉴定立法工作,强化鉴定意见的法庭质证,明确虚假鉴定的认定标准,梳理鉴定多头管理乱象等等,希望可以对司法鉴定制度的改革有所裨益。     

论法院处理环境纠纷案件中的司法能动

司法能动是法院在案件审理中,不因循先例和遵从成文法的字面含义进行司法解释的一种司法理念以及基于此理念的行动。我国法院在发挥司法能动性,处理环境纠纷案件方面作出了大量努力,为经济社会发展提供了司法保障。但法院在发挥司法能动性处理环境纠纷案件中仍然存在较大的问题。解决这些问题,必须把握法院在环境纠纷案件处理中司法能动的向度,落实司法独立,引导法官正确行使自由裁量权,努力培养环境司法专业人才,发挥法官适用法律的能动性。