Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract: One of the main factors in ensuring the widespread support for accession to the European Union amongst the various populations of Central and Eastern Europe is the perception that it will serve to entrench and strengthen the process of democratisation after the fall of Communism. The purpose of this article is to examine this claim, that accession will provide a ‘democracy dividend’ in this fashion. To this end, the article begins by examining the political conditionality of the accession process, and the extent to which the process of democratisation can be understood as a result of ‘external’ pressures. It also discusses the extent to which the effectiveness of political conditionality is likely to survive after the accession takes place. The article then moves on to consider the effects of accession upon democracy in the states of the region by looking in detail at three areas that have been particularly important: the role of national parliaments, the new constitutional courts, and the tendency towards decentralisation and regionalism. The article concludes by noting that, although not all of the developments discussed are necessarily good for democracy in the region, the real dividend coming from the accession process lies in the fact that, on a macro‐level, membership in the EU will make the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe practically irreversible.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

Abstract:  One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Juctise respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.     

‘Citizens’ and ‘Foreigners’ in EU Law. Migration Law and its Cosmopolitan Outlook

Migration has become a controversial subject across Europe and beyond. At the same time, the EU has built up an impressive set of rules for third‐country nationals over the past two decades, which—unlike the mobility of EU citizens—received comparatively little attention apart from immigration and asylum specialists. This contribution presents the constitutional framework for ‘migration law’ towards third‐country nationals and shows in how far they depart from the paradigm of intra‐European mobility. It will be argued that differences can be rationalised by divergent objectives and do, nonetheless, not present a move towards ‘fortress Europe’. EU migration law maintains the distinction between citizens and foreigners at the same time as it protects migrants, including refugees. By accommodating migrants' rights and self‐government, EU migration law can be construed as an endeavour to replace traditional notions of alienage with constitutional rules with a cosmopolitan outlook.     

EU Enlargement and the Emboldening of Institutional Integrity in Central and Eastern Europe: The ‘Tough Test’ of Public Procurement

EU enlargement and the incorporation of the acquis communautaire are widely seen as successful and emboldening the integrity of political, administrative and legal institutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The analysis reported here describes the specific problems associated with affirming institutional integrity in the field of public procurement, which constitutes a ‘tough test’. Public procurement is namely an area where the acquis swiftly gained pre‐eminence in accession states, but whose complex regulations depend on a well‐functioning judiciary, effective administrative supervision and limited corruption. The experience in Poland and Bulgaria, countries that represent different stages of institution building in this area, is compared. The results suggest that an EU‐compatible public procurement regime is being consolidated throughout the CEE region. At the same time, that regime may only work well when boundaries between institutional subjects, as well as between the spheres of law, politics and economics, are upheld in post‐communist countries.     

Sameness and selfhood: The efficiency of constitutional identities in EU law

This article enquires into the formal dimension of constitutional identity by focusing not on what it consists of but on how it is expressed in the different discursive practices developed by constitutional courts. Contrasting constitutional identity as sameness and constitutional identity as selfhood shows that domestic courts can favour either a substantive determination of core constitutional features or a performative approach where the reflexive ability to define oneself prevails. Such a choice conditions the judicial strategies developed in the interactions with the Court of Justice, and their effectiveness. From this perspective, the accommodation in EU law, in light of the respect for Member States' national identity affirmed in Article 4(2) TEU, of these domestic identity claims rooted in the supremacy of the Constitution, depends less on what is asked for than on how it is asked for.     

Ironies in Human Rights Protection in the EU: Pre-Accession Conditionality and Post-Accession Conundrums

In the wake of the extensive scrutiny of the human rights credentials of the new Member States under the EU pre-accession conditionality, which itself was riddled with paradoxes, this article considers a rather unexpected irony thrown up by the accession of these countries. It is that the post-communist constitutional courts, which have been applauded for vigorous protection of fundamental rights after the fall of the Communist regime that was marked by nihilism to rights, have come rather close to having to downgrade the protection standards after accession, due to the new constraints of supremacy of EC law. The article will consider the sugar market cases of the Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts and of the Estonian Supreme Court, which appear to add weight to the concerns that have been voiced in some older Member States about the fundamental rights protection in the EU. Indeed such concerns were recently also addressed in the concurring opinions to the Bosphorus judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.     

Pluralism,Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine

In this article it will be argued that good use of the instrument of deference might help the EU courts to deal with the situation of pluralism that is currently visible in the European legal order. By means of deferential judicial review, the EU courts can pay due respect to national constitutional traditions and to national legislative and policy choices, thus preventing situations of real conflict. In addition, deference enables the EU courts to take into account the intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co‐equal institutions or by national elected bodies. Although the EU courts already make use of some form of deferential review, they may use the instrument in a clearer and more structured manner. As a basis for the development of a European ‘doctrine of deference’, a comparison will be made with the margin of appreciation doctrine devised by the European Court of Human Rights. Although this doctrine is certainly not fault‐free, it offers a number of advantages in terms of clarity and controllability. If improved and adapted on the basis of theoretical notions of procedural democracy, the doctrine might be put to good use by the EU courts.     

The Evolving Judicial Politics of European Integration: The European Court of Justice and national courts revisited

This article analyzes how the judicial politics sparked by the European Union's (EU) legal development have evolved over time. Existing studies have traced how lower national courts began cooperating with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply EU law because this empowered them to challenge government policies and the decisions of their domestic judicial superiors. We argue that the institutional dynamics identified by this ‘judicial empowerment thesis’ proved self‐eroding over time, incentivizing domestic high courts to reassert control over national judicial hierarchies and to influence the development EU law in ways that were also encouraged by the ECJ. We support our argument by combining an analysis of a dataset of cases referred to the ECJ with comparative case study and interview evidence. We conclude that while these evolving judicial politics signal the institutional maturation of the EU legal order, they also risk weakening the decentralized enforcement of European law.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing Syllogisms

The Miller case concerned the constitutional requirements for the UK to give notice of its intention to withdraw from the EU pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The parties made submissions in terms of two competing syllogisms. The Government argued that ministers, exercising Crown prerogative, had the power to give notice without statutory authorisation. The Applicants argued that the process required authorisation by Act of Parliament because the UK's withdrawal would deprive people of rights arising under EU law. However, a majority of the Supreme Court decided in favour of the Applicants based on a third and significantly different syllogism, based on the proposition that the European Communities Act had established EU law‐making and law‐interpreting institutions as new ‘sources of law’. This note assesses the three competing syllogisms and examines the constitutional significance of the majority's proposition that these new EU sources of law were integrated into UK domestic law without disrupting the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.     

Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative,Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum

This article confronts the controversies surrounding Article 50 by analysing the relationship between statute and prerogative in the UK. The piece focuses on domestic constitutional issues and suggests a new way of classifying the relationship between statute and prerogative into two types falling under ‘the abeyance principle’ or ‘the frustration principle’. The abeyance principle means that where statute and prerogative overlap, the prerogative goes into abeyance. The frustration principle means that where statute and prerogative give rise to potential inconsistencies, but do not overlap, the prerogative cannot be used inconsistently with the intention of parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. It then argues that Article 50 has the status of primary or ‘primary‐equivalent’ legislation which could justify applying the abeyance principle. This would mean that the trigger power would be exercised on statutory authority rather than through prerogative powers. If the courts are unable thus to construe the relevant legislation it argues EU law requires the courts to bridge the gap. Alternatively, if the abeyance principle is not applicable, it argues the frustration principle could apply but the circumstances in this litigation fall outside it. In the further alternative, EU law could require the frustration principle itself to be set aside in this case.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Constitutionalising EU Executive Rule‐Making Procedures: A Research Agenda

The existence or non‐existence of procedural rules for executive rule‐making in the EU is not merely a ‘technical’ question free of constitutional value choices. This article argues that constitutional principles, such as transparency, openness and participatory democracy, highlighted by the Treaty of Lisbon constitute decisive normative standards for the design of administrative procedures in the EU, with a considerable impact on substantive outcomes. We apply such principles to executive rule‐making procedures in the EU, highlight the salience of this discussion and argue that systematisation of executive rule‐making procedures is needed in order to implement constitutional principles in a complex and plural environment.     

Horizontal Effect and the Constitutional Constraint

This article offers a new interpretation – the ‘constitutional constraint’ model – of the duty the Human Rights Act imposes on the courts to give horizontal effect to European Convention rights through the common law. The model requires courts to develop the common law compatibly with the Convention, but only where compatibility can be achieved by incremental development. We argue that models requiring more than incremental development are unsustainable; that deep constitutional norms compel the constraint of incrementalism, which is preserved under the HRA; and that by virtue of section 2 of the HRA, Convention rights function as principles rather than hard‐edged rights in this context. This further undermines the idea that the courts must strictly apply Convention rights and cannot allow them to be overridden by non‐Convention factors. The final section explores the nature of incrementalism in this context and the impact of the model on the doctrine of judicial precedent.     

Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro‐Crisis

This article analyses how the European Union's response to the euro‐crisis has altered the constitutional balance upon which its stability is based. It argues that the stability and legitimacy of any political system requires the structural incorporation of individual and political self‐determination. In the context of the EU, this requirement is met through the idea of constitutional balance, with ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’ and ‘spatial’ dimensions. Analysing reforms to EU law and institutional structure in the wake of the crisis – such as the establishment of the ESM, the growing influence of the European Council and the creation of a stand‐alone Fiscal Compact – it is argued that recent reforms are likely to have a lasting impact on the ability of the EU to mediate conflicting interests in all three areas. By undermining its constitutional balance, the response to the crisis is likely to dampen the long‐term stability and legitimacy of the EU project.