Following Legal Rules: Visibility and Feasibility

This paper reflects on the idea of ‘visualization’ of legal rules as part of an account of rule following in action. Presenting an alternative to Van Schooten’s (Jurisprudence and communication. Deborah Charles, Liverpool, 2012) account of interpretation, I first distinguish between two modes of interpretation: rehearsing and discursive. I argue that the former is the more basic one, relating to our respecting sources, rather than noticing signs, in action. In other (Wittgensteinian) words, we have to understand how we take guidance from rules. This account can profit from an analysis of what ‘seeing’ amounts to. Taking my cue from Merleau-Ponty, I point to the intertwinement between agent and world in seeing, in rule-following, and eventually in legal rule-following. The proof of the pudding is an alternative account of the time-honoured paradigm of legal interpretation: Hart’s ‘no vehicles in the park’. I show how this example is predicated on detecting ‘depth-clues’ in a rule, which allow an agent to correlate his vantage point to a vanishing point of a rule. The example illustrates a key-feature of rule following: reflexivity. I cannot follow a rule unless I project myself into its picture.     

Trial Argumentation: The Creation of Meaning

My purpose is to analyze lawyers creating meaning in three well-known cases in Anglo-American legal history: Commonwealth v. Woodward (1997) the famous Boston ‘nanny’ case, the O.J. Simpson Murder Trial (1995), and the John Peter Zenger Libel Case in Colonial New York (1734). In each case, creative lawyers were able to shift the question before the jury from the formal legal question—did Woodward and Simpson commit murder? Did Zenger publish libelous material?—to issues of vengeance and catharsis, and of the ability of the legal system to represent the community’s sense of justice.     

Law,culture and massively multiplayer online games

Massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs) are now a major international phenomena. Millions of people can play together online, readily navigating boundaries between nations, languages and legal jurisdictions. The communities around some of these games are huge, of a size equivalent to a large city or small nation. This article explores three themes, labelled for conceptual purposes ‘games as legal spaces’, ‘games need lawyers’, and ‘lawyers need games’. It argues that games are inherently legal spaces, infused with legal-ness in a variety of ways; that more direct engagement from the legal community would be of tremendous value in making these systems, and the entertainment spaces which they regulate, ‘better’; and that we have a great deal to learn about law and about the regulation of the online space from games. The article concludes with the proposition that there is an opportunity for impactful knowledge exchange between legal scholars, MMOG developers and publishers, and the gaming community.     

Cause Lawyers,Political Violence,and Professionalism in Conflict

This article examines how cause lawyers in conflicted and authoritarian societies balance their professional responsibilities as lawyers with their commitment to a political cause. It is drawn from extensive interviews with both lawyers and political activists in a range of societies. It focuses on the challenges for lawyers in managing relations with violent politically‐motivated clients and their movements. Using the notion of ‘legitimation work', it seeks to examine the complex, fluid, and contingent understandings of legal professionalism that is developed in such contexts, offering three overlapping ‘ideal types’ of cause lawyers in order to better understand the meaning of legal professionalism in such sites: (a) struggle lawyers (b) human rights activists and (c) a ‘pragmatic moral community'. The article concludes by re‐examining how law is imagined in the legitimation work of cause lawyers in such settings and how that work is remembered in the transition from violence.     

Gendering the Legal Complex: Women in Sri Lanka's Legal Profession

Drawing upon feminist standpoint theory and interviews with pioneering women lawyers in Sri Lanka, I argue for a focus on women as a distinct category in ‘legal complex theory’. I consider the following questions in making this claim. What were the internal structures of the legal profession that the older generations of women lawyers encountered as they entered the profession and as they took up positions of leadership? In what ways, if at all, was the ‘culture(s)’ within the profession patriarchal? In what ways, if any, did the entry and advancement of women impact these internal structures of the profession and its culture(s)? And what can we learn from these experiences in predicting the future trajectory of the legal profession? The analytical expansion that I propose reveals gender-based dynamics within the legal complex, such as gender-stereotyped perceptions about women lawyers within the profession, the ‘feminization’ of the profession, and ‘gender segmentation’ within its different spheres.     

论和谐社会建构中司法的克制主义立场

我国和谐社会的建构是以法治为基础的,而法治就是法律主治.当前我国法治社会建构初级阶段的特定时代背景要求倡导严格法治主义的法治理念,法律解释的权威根源于法律文本自身,严格法治主义的法治理念表现在司法领域中,就是强调司法对法律文本含义的严格贯彻,这需要我们重视文义解释的法律解释方法,遵循文义解释方法优先性的元规则.严格法治主义的这一法律解释立场需要捍卫司法克制主义,文义解释方法的优先性元规则是需要我们倡导司法的克制主义立场,这也是实现司法方法科学化和维护法律权威的要求.     

Avowal and Criminal Accusation

In his work on truth telling, avowal and juridical processes, Foucault alerts us to legal ‘apparatuses’ that demand certain ways of speaking the truth and the sorts of subjects these recursively produce. This paper explores the role of truth telling in a specific context; namely, ‘criminal’ accusation as instanced by the agora-like processes that enabled Socrates’ notorious accusation for impiety, his defence and the resultant death sentence. Through this analysis, I seek to highlight elements of truth telling required by accusatorial apparatuses that prefigured criminal justice. By examining selected texts detailing Socrates’ trial, I will indicate several aspects of accusation and an exclusionary political logic to which it has long been attached.     

What Did the Lawyers Do During the ‘War’? Neutrality,Conflict and the Culture of Quietism

Using Northern Ireland as a case study, this paper explores how lawyers responded to the challenges of entrenched discrimination, sustained political violence and an emerging peace process. Drawing upon the literature of the sociology of lawyering, it examines whether lawyers can or should be more than ‘paid technicians’ in such circumstances. It focuses in particular upon a number of ‘critical junctures’ in the legal history of the jurisdiction and uncouples key elements of the local legal culture which contributed to an ethos of quietism. The paper argues that the version of legal professionalism that emerged in Northern Ireland was contingent and socially constructed and, with notable exceptions, obfuscated a collective failure of moral courage. It concludes that facing the truth concerning past silence is fundamental to a properly embedded rule of law and a more grounded notion of what it means to be a lawyer in a conflict.     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

Reflections on the reconfiguration of access to justice

This paper draws on a series of research studies of the last two decades of legal aid reforms to consider their wider social and political meaning. They are evaluated against a ‘master ideal’ of access to justice rather than a fictive golden age. It will be argued that despite New Labour's rhetoric of social inclusion and the positive initiatives this sometimes produced, the neo-liberal character of the reforms has eroded both social rights and access to justice. Their internal logic requires the imposition of a market and the use of least cost labour, thereby reducing the guarantee of due process to the lowest common denominator: consumption of a legal service becomes a sufficient alternative to just outcomes.     

Interpreting the Political Theory in the Practice of Human Rights

In this discussion of The Heart of Human Rights, I support Allen Buchanan’s pursuit of a theory-in-practice methodology for interpreting the foundations and meaning of international legal human rights from within the practice. Following my use of that methodology, I recharacterize the theory of rights revealed by this methodology as political not moral. I clarify the import of this interpretation of international legal human rights for two problems that trouble Buchanan: (1) whether the scope of ‘basic equal status’ is a global or an ‘intrasocial’ standard and (2) whether there is a ‘proliferation’ of rights that risks undermining the legitimacy of international legal human rights. I argue that the scope of basic equal status is global and that the practice of making what he calls ‘new’ rights claims is part of the practice of human rights.     

论刑事律师的利益冲突规制

作为律师职业伦理中的重要规则,利益冲突及其规制在我国刑事领域受到了不应有的忽视。规制利益冲突体现了律师消极的忠诚义务,是司法程序理性运行的要求,也有助于维护律师的职业形象。根据利益冲突的严重程度,可将利益冲突划分为直接的利益冲突和间接的利益冲突。基于对利益冲突的严重性、实体真实的发现、当事人获得律师帮助的权利、律师自由执业的机会等因素的考虑,律师存在强制性规避和任意性规避两种方式。违反利益冲突规则既会使律师个人承担责任,也会带来程序性的法律后果。目前,律师利益冲突的规制在我国尚处于起步阶段,未来在利益冲突的类型划分、律师规避、法律后果以及司法审查等方面都有待进一步完善。     

Bentham on the Interpretation of Laws

A widely accepted view is that, for Bentham, legal interpretation was a mechanical or technical matter. This paper reconstructs Bentham’s complex theory of legal interpretation and challenges the above view. It demonstrates that Bentham’s theory of legal interpretation consists of three major theses. First, when there are different interpretations of a law, the authoritative interpreter ought to be the sovereign legislature. Second, strict interpretation attributes to the legislature the will it actually has when making the law. The strict interpretation of a law ought to take the text of the law itself as the standard, and then be guided by its purpose. Third, liberal interpretation attributes to the legislature a will that it would have had if it had been aware of the case before the court, but which it in fact failed to have through inadvertency. Liberal interpretation is a necessary evil, and must be checked: liberal interpretation ought to be made according to the pattern and materials of the old laws, and be subject to the authority of the sovereign legislature.     

The Way in Which Fee Reductions Influence Legal Aid Criminal Defence Lawyer Work: Insights from a Qualitative Study

This article examines how fee reductions influence criminal defence lawyers’ work. Data from 29 qualitative interviews with English defence solicitors and barristers are analysed in order to understand the way in which cuts to fees paid by government for criminal legal aid work can operate to influence criminal defence lawyers’ working practices. I use game theory and Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field to build a theoretical construct illustrating the invidious position current financial conditions place criminal legal aid lawyers in. I argue that these conditions reward and encourage perceived poor practices and values to thrive at the expense of other concerns – such as the conviction of the guilty, acquittal of the innocent, fair treatment of both victims and defendants, and value for the taxpayer. Ultimately, I argue that criminal legal aid lawyers are set up to fail by the current financial conditions within which they must work.     

In Dependence: The Paradox of Professional Independence and Taking Seriously the Vulnerabilities of Lawyers in Large Corporate Law Firms

In this article, and drawing on the work of Martha Fineman and others, we deploy a vulnerability lens as an heuristic device to push against the concept of professional lawyer independence as enshrined in statute and promoted by legal services regulators. Using interviews with 53 senior partners and others from 20 large corporate law firms, we show how the meaning and practice of independence are profoundly mediated by the contexts, relationships, and interactions of corporate lawyers’ everyday working lives. Vulnerable to competition from other firms, the demands of clients, the shift over time from ‘trusted advisor’ to ‘service provider', regulatory requirements, pressures to make profit, and so on, these corporate lawyers appeared prone to developing and normalizing potentially risky and irresponsible practices. We therefore argue that a debate about corporate legal regulation is better based upon a richly theorized concept of interdependence that takes seriously the causes and effects of practitioner vulnerabilities in particular circumstances.     

法律职业共同体引论

本文从解析法律职业共同体的概念入手 ,着重分析了法律职业共同体的构成、性质与特征 ,以期提供一个关于法律职业共同体的一般理论。本文认为 ,法律职业共同体是由法官、检察官、律师、法学学者所构成 ,是一个意义共同体、事业共同体、解释共同体、利益共同体 ,表现为独立与互涉的特征。     

Building sustainable free legal advisory systems: Experiences from the history of AI & law

The enthusiasm for artificial intelligence (AI) as a source of solutions to problems is not new. In law, from the early 1980s until at least the early 2000s, considerable work was done on developing ‘legal expert systems.’ As the DataLex project, we participated in those developments, through research and publications, commercial and non-commercial systems, and teaching students application development. This paper commences with a brief account of that work to situate our perspective.The main aim of this paper is an assessment of what might be of value from the experience of the DataLex Project to contemporary use of ‘AI and law’ by free legal advice services, who must necessarily work within funding and other constraints in developing and sustaining such systems. We draw fifteen conclusions from this experience, which we consider are relevant to development of systems for free legal advice services. The desired result, we argue, is the development of integrated legal decision-support systems, not ‘expert systems’ or ‘robot lawyers’. We compare our insights with the approach of the leading recent text in the field, and with a critical review of the field over twenty-five years. We conclude that the approach taken by the DataLex Project, and now applied to free legal advice services, remains consistent with leading work in field of AI and law.The paper concludes with brief suggestions of what are the most desirable improvements to tools and platforms to enable development of free legal advice systems. The objectives of free access to legal information services have much in common with those of free legal advice services. The information resources that free access to law providers (including LIIs) can provide will often be those that free legal advice services will need to use to develop and sustain free legal advisory systems. There is therefore strong potential for valuable collaborations between these two types of services providers.     

The “Paper Case”: Evidence and Narrative of a Terrorism Trial in Delhi

Through an ethnography of a terrorism trial that followed bomb‐blasts in Delhi in 2008, this article seeks to understand the centrality of files and documentary practices to the production of legal truth. By following key documents regarding the case against one man I call Fahad, I argue that the truth produced in a trial crucially depends a chain of seemingly insignificant certificatory practices‐the signatures, countersignatures, stamps, and seals that appear on documents. What emerges in the account I provide is that juridical truth is less a matter of finding ‘what really happened,’ and more about the competition between narratives that depend on the certificatory correctness of humble sheets of paper.     

In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid,Supply, Demand,and ‘Ethical Indeterminacy’ in Criminal Defence Work

As a professional, a lawyer's first duty is to serve the client's best interests, before simple monetary gain. In criminal defence work, this duty has been questioned in the debate about the causes of growth in legal aid spending: is it driven by lawyers (suppliers) inducing unnecessary demand for their services or are they merely responding to increased demand? Research reported here found clear evidence of a change in the handling of cases in response to new payment structures, though in ways unexpected by the policy's proponents. The paper develops the concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’ as a way of understanding how defence lawyers seek to reconcile the interests of commerce and clients. Ethical indeterminacy suggests that where different courses of action could each be said to benefit the client, the lawyer will tend to advise the client to decide in the lawyer's own interests. Ethical indeterminacy is mediated by a range of competing conceptions of ‘quality’ and ‘need’. The paper goes on to question the very distinction between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ in the provision of legal services.