Deontic Logic as Logic of Legal Norms: Two Main Sources of Problems

Abstract .
The paper offers a critical survey of two main sorts of problems hindering the possibility of conceiving deontic logic as a suitable account of the logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "legal norm" is viewed as the main source of the first sort of problems: (a) the typological variety of legal norms requires an account both of the differing logical behaviour of (sentences expressing) differing legal norms, and of the relations which might hold amon them; (b) the ontologic, semantic, and epistemic features of legal norms shed doubt on the very attempt to figure out a logical analysis of (sentences expressing) legal norms. The notion of "systemic legal validity" is viewed as the main source of the second sort of problems: Deontic logic does not provide suitable logical tools to account for legal phenomena like enactment, derogation, and conflicts between legal norms which rely on systemic legal validity.     

Sources of Law Are not Legal Norms

Anglo‐American authors have paid little attention to a subtle distinction that has important jurisprudential implications. It is the distinction between sources of law (e.g., statutes, precedents, customs) and the legal norms which can be derived from sources by means of interpretation. The distinction might also be rendered as a threefold one, separating sources of law from legal norms and both of these from that which mediates their relation, namely, methods of legal interpretation. This paper intends to state the “source‐norm” distinction clearly and to give examples of jurisprudential insights that are missed, and mistakes that may be made if the distinction is not given its due.     

Legal Concepts in a Natural Language Based Expert System*

Abstract. A new approach to the formalization of concepts used in legal reasoning such as obligation and cause is presented. The formalization is based on the linguistic use of the concepts both in legal language and in ordinary language, and has been motivated by work on a legal expert system with a natural language interface. Particularly for the concept of obligation this yields quite different results from those obtained by the usual approach of deontic logic: So-called paradoxes are avoided, quantification over obligations becomes possible, no restriction to a “single-agent system” is required, and collisions of obligations can be formulated.     

不确定法律语言的救济

法律与语言的关系极其密切,法律离不开语言。有些语言天生存在着不确定性,导致法律的不确定性增强。法律语言的不确定主要是因为语言的模糊和歧义造成的。法律语言的抽象范式与具体案件发生的实然形态具有天然的距离,虽然一定程度上增加法律规则适用的弹性,但是也在消解着法律的确定含义。消除法律语言的不确定,维护法律的确定性,需要从多种途径入手。需要依靠语言探究法律的确定性,通过各种法律解释方法维护法律的确定性,规范使用法律语言保障法律的确定性。     

Modality of Obligation as a Legal Phenomenon (in the Context of Regional Legislation)

This article discusses deontic modality in the context of legal documents and its divergence from the natural, conventional, interpretation. This work demonstrates that the meaning of the performative verb is not purely linguistic. A number of non-linguistic factors cause the variation of meanings of performatives, in this case, when expressing prohibition, permission, recommendation, advice, proposal or request. These factors include: status of the addressee, type of the relationship between the author and the addressee, type of the document, possibility of control and subsequent punishment for the breach of a norm, methodology of legal drafting, traditions of the Russian document processes. There is no direct association between the type of the legal norm (permissive, obligatory, prohibitive) and the meaning of the performative. To express its will, a regional law-maker, to a varying degree, uses orders, prohibition and permissions. These are dictated by the type of the document.     

Facts, Fictions or Reasoning. Law as the Subject Matter of Jurisprudence

This paper deals with the problems involved in the concept of knowledge in the sphere of law. Traditionally, the idea of knowledge has dealt with the presumption of given objects of information. According to this approach, knowing means finding these objects. This is the natural and understandable foundation of metaphysical or philosophical realism. Cognition and cognitive interest are directed outside the sentences by which they are described. This is the point of departure of legal positivism as well. However, it is not possible to see valid law as totally independent of language and concepts. This makes the idea of legal facts as institutional facts vague. From a practical viewpoint, the sentences of judges and legal scholars, when they present valid law, justify rather than describe. Their crucial function is interpretation. Hence, the objectivity of these sentences cannot be based on the presumption of separate objects either. Instead, it has to be based on the principles of acceptable reasoning. Moreover, the author claims that this kind of approach, united with the utilization of human rights and substantial legal principles, leads one to acknowledge objective values.     

解释论、语用学和法律事实的合理性标准

法律事实是人们在诉讼过程中对客体事实的认识结果 ,这一认识开始于个别主体对客体事实的经验和感受。当经验者用言语方式表达其对客体事实的经验和感受时 ,客体事实便转换成语言流传物。诉讼过程就是各方主体以言语方式表达事实主张 ,以寻求主体间的共同理解和解释 ,从而建构法律事实的过程。在这一过程中 ,制度性语境和规则成为主体间对话和评价的依据 ,在此基础上形成的共识便成为法律事实合理性的来源。真实性是法律事实形成的条件 ,而共识性应是法律事实的合理性标准。这就要求诉讼制度能够体现交往合理性 ,并要求诉讼程序尽可能保障交往合理性的兑现 ,以期有效地达至共识性真理标准。     

The Dynamic Order of Norms,Empowerment and Related Concepts

`Authority', `competence' andother related concepts are determined on the basis ofthe concept of law as a dynamic order of norms. Thenorms which regulate the processes of norm creationestablish empowerments (Ermächtigungen). Thematerial domain of validity of the empowering norm iscalled `competence'. The concept of `person' inrelation to empowering norms yields the concepts of`organ' and `authority'. The spatial domain of thevalidity of these norms is the spatial or territorialjurisdiction. This paper analyses the basic norm andits legal functions; it considers the irregularity oflegal acts and norms, as well as the legalconsequences thereof, namely nullity and annulment.Additionally, the Kelsenian `Tacit AlternativeClause' is criticized and a possible solution to theproblem of irregular norms is offered through newdefinitions of the existence, validity and legitimacyof norms.     

试论法律领域内规范层面和事实层面的逻辑—句法对应性

从逻辑学和语言学角度分析 ,法律规范和法律事实、法律关系之间存在着某种对应关系。法律在规范层面呈现出“前件 /后件”结构 ,在事实层面上呈现出“法律事实 /法律关系”结构 ,在规范前件和法律事实之间 ,在规范后件和法律关系之间 ,分别存在着对应性关系 ;同时 ,在前件词项和法律事实构成要件之间 ,在后件词项和法律关系构成要素之间 ,都分别存在着对应关系 ;而且 ,就连前件、后件之间的和法律事实、法律关系之间的横向的逻辑必然联系之间 ,也存在着对应关系。这种对应关系 ,取决于规范本身的设定性或规定性特质 ,规范具有设定性或规定性 ,法律才能同其它异质因素区别开来 ,才能够把现实生活中极可能是毫不相关的两个事实强制性地扭结在一起。     

Are Legal Concepts Embedded in Legal Norms?

In this paper, we discuss the problem of the relationship between legal concepts and legal norms. We argue that one of the widespread theories of legal concepts, which we call ??the embedding theory??, is false. The theory is based on the assumption that legal norms are central for any legal system and that each legal norm establishes an inferential link between a certain class of facts and a certain class of legal consequences. Alf Ross??s embedding theory was presented in his famous paper ??Tu?CTu??. According to Ross, the sole function of legal concepts is to simplify normative information. Hence, the use of legal concepts may be a matter of convenience, rather than necessity. We criticize this approach mainly by pointing to the existence of so-called second order substantive concepts, which are not reducible to any determined set of conditional sentences (inferential links). In short, second order substantive concepts play the role of general standards, and general standards are used to provide flexibility for a particular legal system. In addition, general standards are ??value loaded??, since they serve as a frame of reference for judges applying law to particular cases. To understand such general standards as a predefined set of conditionals means to overlook their ??open?? content, and thus their function. In our opinion, the acceptance of the embedding theory means to misinterpret the function of general standards. We also argue that Giovani Sartor??s idea of defective legal concepts doesn??t help to clarify or defend the embedding theory.     

自然资源国家所有权双阶构造说

祛除国家所有权的法律神话,遵循解释论立场的研究范式,中国语境中的自然资源国家所有权是一个法规范系统。该系统包含基础性规范、确权性规范、授权性规范及管制性规范四个单元,分别由宪法文本、物权法文本和特别法文本予以载明。具备转介功能的引致条款把各单元串联成一个整体。在现代法秩序中,所有权绝不是由某一个部门法“独家经营”的法律概念。就所有权类型的理论反思而言,自然资源国家所有权蕴含着宪法所有权与民法所有权的双阶构造,纯粹私权说与纯粹公权说均难谓恰当。就自然资源使用的法律调整机制而言,应回归公物与私物二元区分的大陆法传统,并对“非对物采掘类”与“对物采掘类”自然资源作类型化处理,由此形成不同的规范配置。     

An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norms*

Abstract. Traditionally legal theorists, whenever engaged in controversy, have agreed on one point: legal norms are par excellence rules which impose obligations. The author examines this assumption, which from another perspective (that of constitutional law, for instance) appears less obvious. In fact, constitutional rules are commoniy empowering norms, norms which do not create duties but powers. To this objection many theorists would reply that empowering rules are incomplete and that they are to be understood as parts of duty-creating rules. A different position from this traditional stance is that defended in Kelsen's later writings, according to which the fundamental type of norm is the empowering norm. The author discusses Kelsen's three theories on the “ideal form” or structure of the legal norm, with special attention to the third of these, the empowerment theory.     

Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation

The fields of linguistic pragmatics and legal interpretation are deeply interrelated. The purpose of this paper is to show how pragmatics and the developments in argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on legal interpretation. The relation between the pragmatic maxims and the presumptions underlying the legal canons are brought to light, unveiling the principles that underlie the types of argument usually used to justify a construction. The Gricean maxims and the arguments of legal interpretation are regarded as presumptions subject to default used to justify an interpretation. This approach can allow one to trace the different legal interpretive arguments back to their basic underlying presumptions, so that they can be compared, ordered, and assessed according to their defeasibility conditions. This approach allows one to understand the difference between various types of interpretive canons, and their strength in justifying an interpretation.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

论其他形式的行政法规范解释

中国的行政法规范解释形式多样,有以抽象方式做出的,也有以具体方式做出的。前者主要在实定法层面体现为所谓的立法解释、司法解释与行政解释。后者则是在执法、司法过程中产生的个案式、具体解释。但除此之外,行政机关还以其他形式对行政法规范进行解释,如政策说明或法律询问答复,需要进行细致的分析与研究。     

Realism about the Nature of Law

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.     

Corpus Linguistics as a Method of Legal Interpretation: Some Progress,Some Questions

Corpus linguistics is becoming a respected method of statutory and constitutional interpretation in the United States over the past decade, yet it has also generated a backlash from a group of scholars that engage in empirical work. This essay attempts to demonstrate both the contributions and the risks of using linguistic corpora as a primary tool in legal interpretation. Its legitimacy stems from the fact that courts routinely state that statutory terms, when not defined as a matter of law, are to be given their ordinary meaning. Judges have responded to this challenge, with the assistance of the linguistics community, by using corpora to determine which meanings are ordinary. However, legal analysts have not determined exactly what makes one meaning ordinary and another not ordinary. This gap has led to a level of disagreement in the field. Moreover, while linguists who engage in corpus linguistic analysis typically emphasize the importance of context, the legal application is peculiarly context-free, in keeping with legal philosophies that eschew reliance on reference to a law’s purpose and the intent of the legislature that enacted it. This move adds a political dimension to corpus analysis as a means of legal interpretation. Yet, the article concludes that by relying on a blend of general and specialized corpora, the legal system can substantially reduce the problem of contextualization, as some linguists and practitioners have already recognized.

     

Linguistic Justice in International Law: An Evaluation of the Discursive Framework

Claims by minority groups to use their own languages in different social contexts are often presented as claims for “linguistic justice”, that is, justice as between speakers of different languages. This article considers how the language of international law can be used to advance such claims, by exploring how international law, as a discourse, approaches questions of language policy. This analysis reveals that international legal texts structure their engagement with “linguistic justice” around two key concepts: equality and culture. Through a close examination of the way in which these concepts function within international legal discourse, the article suggests that this conceptual framework may sometimes constrain, as well as enlarge, the possibilities for justice for minority language speakers. Thus while international law may provide a language for challenging injustices in the linguistic sphere, limitations inherent in this discourse may also restrict its emancipatory potential.     

A community in the Orange: the development of a multi-level water governance framework in the Orange-Senqu River basin in Southern Africa

An ensemble of normative codes of conduct in the form of global, regional and domestic norms, principles of best practice and laws have developed over time providing standards of appropriate behaviour in the governance of transboundary rivers in an attempt to eradicate or minimise real or perceived conflicts. Through a multi-levelled analysis of water governance in the Orange-Senqu River basin in Southern Africa, this paper investigates the relationships between co-operative management norms constructed at different levels of scale, and the ways in which both norm and context are transformed as a result of the other. At the basin level, legal and institutional processes symbolise a movement towards norm convergence in the basin. However, norm drivers (such as technical co-operation, personalised politics, trust and confidence building) and norm barriers (such as skills flight and the lack of trust) to the development of a ‘community of interest’ in the Orange-Senqu River basin have also been significant in shaping the legal and normative landscape. An analysis of global, regional, basin-wide and local norms is therefore useful because it illustrates the interconnectedness of their interactions as well as how their content is affected.