Playing the race card: Making race salient in defence opening and closing statements

Purpose. Researchers have reported that making a Black defendant's race salient reduces White jurors' tendency to find Black defendants guilty ( Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000 ). We examined whether making race salient by including racially salient statements in the defence attorney's opening and closing statements (i.e., ‘playing the race card’) reduced White jurors' racial bias against a Black defendant. Method. We obtained scores on racial attitudes for 151 White college students who participated in an experiment where defendant race (Black, White) and race salience (not salient, salient) were manipulated in a between‐subjects design. Participants read one of four trial stimuli and completed dependent measures. Results. ‘Playing the race card’ reduced White juror racial bias as White jurors' ratings of guilt for Black defendants were significantly lower when the defence attorney's statements included racially salient statements. White juror ratings of guilt for White defendants and Black defendants were not significantly different when race was not made salient. This effect was separate from jurors' level of prejudice (as measured by racial attitudes) as high prejudice participants were more likely than low prejudice participants to find the Black defendant guilty, independent of the race salience manipulation. Conclusion. Our study indicated that an explicit attempt by a defence attorney to ‘play the race card’ was a beneficial trial strategy a defence attorney could use to reduce White jurors' bias towards Black defendants. However, the beneficial effect of such a strategy may not reduce White jurors' bias towards Black defendants for all White jurors.     

Hands‐Off or Hands‐On?: Deconstructing the ‘Test‐Case’ of Re G within a Culture of Children's Rights

This note challenges the so‐called ‘test‐case’ status of Re G in so far as it attempts to overturn the principle established in Re T that courts should adopt a neutral position when it comes to weighing the merits of different upbringings and the education provided by parents of minority religions. In determining the future upbringing and education of children who had been brought up in a minority religious community, Re G applies a principle of maximising educational opportunity in order to uphold the mother's proposed educational choice and way of life. This note argues that Re G was wrong to do so, should not be regarded as establishing any new principle and that the only relevant principle, both in determining this case and future cases, ought to rest on the psychological well‐being of the child.     

Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract

The Court of Appeal's decision in Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & Anor is both of interest and significance. By embracing the idea of the parties’ ability to ‘contract out’ of their statutory right to petition the court for relief under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (the so‐called ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy), their Lordships have not only contrived to stunt the future development of unfair prejudice as a minority shareholder remedy but, and more importantly for the purposes of this case note, their decision has reasserted and extended the contractual analogy in modern UK company law.     

Durie v Gardiner: Public Libel Law and Stare Non Decisis

This note examines the controversial case of Durie v Gardiner, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which radically altered the nation's public libel jurisprudence. It argues that Durie is incorrect as a matter of public libel law for three reasons. First, both Durie judgments failed to engage in freedom of expression theorising. Second, this undertheorising has caused significant confusion in Durie, including misinterpretation of material facts, breakdown of the ‘theory-doctrine’ interface, and a precipitous and unwarranted dismissal of the Court of Appeal's settled public libel principles. Third, owing to these difficulties, the Durie courts were in no position to import a new ‘public interest’ defence from foreign jurisdictions. Above all, by hastening towards wholesale law reform and ignoring its earlier comparative law deliberations, Durie arguably scuppers public libel law's best hope for advancement.     

On the Relations between Agent and Principal: Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey

In Angove's Pty Ltd v Bailey the Supreme Court faced ‘two important and controversial questions of commercial law’: whether an agent's authority could ever be ‘irrevocable’, and whether the receipt of money by an imminent insolvent could ever give rise to a constructive trust of that sum. It answered both in the affirmative, albeit subject to heavy qualifications. This note supports these conclusions in principle, however it will argue that the court's reasoning, especially in answering the second question, leaves much to be desired. In particular, it ignored the central role of fiduciary law in regulating the conduct of agents.     

The Digital Economy Act 2010: subscriber monitoring and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of s3 Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA) with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Ofcom’s Initial Obligations and two UK cases, namely: British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills,¹1 British Telecommunications Plc & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin).View all notes and R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others.²2 R (British Telecommunications plc and TalkTalk Telecom Group plc) v Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport and others [2012] EWCA Civ 232.View all notes It argues that the implementation of this obligation allows directed surveillance of subscribers’ activities without legal authorisation under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). It also analyses compliance with the Strasbourg Court’s three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether s3 of the DEA is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’; secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims contained within Article 8(2) of the Convention; and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that unless the implementation of s3 of the DEA required the involvement of State authorities and was specifically targeted at serious, commercial scale online copyright infringement cases it could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR’s test, thereby violating subscribers’ Article 8 ECHR rights.     

Desperately Seeking ‘Justice’ in Classical Chinese: On the Meanings of Yi

This essay sets out to search for an equivalent Chinese word to the English word ‘justice’ in classical Chinese language, through ancient Chinese philosophical texts, imperial codes and idioms. The study found that there does not seem to be a linguistic sign for ‘justice’ in classical Chinese, and further, yi resembles ‘justice’ in some ways and has been used sometimes to translate  ‘justice’, but yi is a complex concept in traditional Chinese philosophy with multiple meanings and it is dissimilar to ‘justice’ in their semantic and pragmatic meanings in Chinese and English legal culture. While ‘justice’ is a keyword and fundamental to Western law, yi is not a legal word or concept in classical Chinese in traditional China. Given its complexity, yi does not have a one-to-one equivalent in English. It sometimes carries a sense of ‘righteousness’ and occasionally ‘justice’, but yi and ‘justice’ are not equivalent. In view of these, it becomes understandable that the translations of yi in contemporary Chinese usage vary ranging from ‘friendship and justice’ to ‘greater good’, among others. The meaning of yi is still uncertain and context sensitive as it was two thousand years ago.

     

Anti‐suit Injunctions and the Doctrine of Comity

Hin‐Pro International Logistics Limited v CSAV is an important case in the areas of anti‐suit injunctions, contractual interpretation and private international law. Despite the ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction clause contained in the bills of lading, the Court of Appeal construed the jurisdiction clause as ‘exclusive’ in the context of a ‘contractual background’, and affirmed the continuation of the anti‐suit injunction granted by the Commercial Court. It is argued that the approach of applying the common law principles of contractual interpretation to a bill of lading is questionable. The approach used to apply English private international law is problematic in a number of ways. There are legitimate reasons for concern that the doctrine of comity in English private international law may become undermined as a result.     

Requirement‐Sensitive Legal Moralism: A Critical Assessment

Requirement‐sensitive legal moralism is a species of legal moralism in which the legitimacy of turning moral into legal demands depends on the existence of a legitimate moral requirement, producing a legitimate social requirement, which can then ground a legitimate legal requirement. Crucially, each step is defeasible by contingent or instrumental, but not intrinsic moral factors. There is no genuinely moral sphere (e.g., a private sphere) in which the law is not to interfere; only contingent, non‐moral factors can defeat this. Using William A. Edmundson's Three Anarchical Fallacies as a foil, this idea is spelled out; it is shown why considerations based on the harm principle, consent, and the fact of pluralism do not immediately defeat it, but several problems with Edmundson's account are examined to point out where the idea could be further developed.     

Re-Evaluating ‘Best Interests’ in the Wake of Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust & Anors

In Raqeeb v Barts NHS Foundation Trust, the latest of a number of cases concerning whether a child can travel abroad for treatment that doctors in the UK do not consider to be in their best interests, the High Court held that the hospital had acted unlawfully by failing to consider the child's rights under EU law when refusing to allow her to travel. Although this derogation could be justified on public policy grounds, as such treatment was, on the facts, in her best interests, no further interference with her rights was justified. In making this finding, the court recognised the ‘stress’ that such a case placed on the best interests test, lending weight to the argument for moving instead to a risk of significant harm threshold for judicial intervention in parental decisions, which better accounts for legitimate differences of value and strikes a better balance under Article 8 ECHR.     

Privacy and Search Engines: Forgetting or Contextualizing?

This article considers the much‐criticized ‘right to be forgotten’ in the context of the European Court of Justice's judgment in the Google Spain case. It defends the ‘right to be forgotten’ as a metaphor that can provide us with a better understanding of the particular privacy concerns of the search‐engine age and their interaction with the freedom to access information, and draws on Goffman's idea of ‘information games’ and Nissenbaum's theory of ‘contextual integrity’. While supporting the principles that underpin the judgment, the article rejects the Court's binary approach of ‘forgetting’ versus ‘remembering’ personal information. Instead, it argues that the EU legislator should introduce more nuanced means of addressing modern privacy concerns. By establishing two remedies – ‘delisting’ or ‘reordering’, depending on the nature of the information – online information flows can be adjusted to preserve both the right to privacy and the freedom to access information in more contextually appropriate ways.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.     

The world of committee reports: rapporteurship assignment in the European Parliament

The academic world has shown increasing interest in the European Parliament (EP), but still more has to be done to open the ‘black box’ of its micro-management. This study is an attempt to show that puzzles in the internal workings of the EP are far from being solved or understood. Its purpose is three-pronged: First, it illustrates that the world of committee reports is characterised by disproportionality which contradicts the overall principle laid down in the standing rules of the EP. Second, the study attempts to explain and understand rapporteurship allocation. Focusing on the consumer and environment committee in the fourth term of the EP, the results indicate that the group of rapporteurs consists of members with high demands for the policy in their jurisdiction. Its preferences systematically differ from those of the legislature as a whole. Third, this article discusses four aspects that deserve further elaboration in future studies on the EP's internal organisation.     

Rectification of the Register – Prospective or Retrospective?

In Gold Harp v MacLeod the Court of Appeal considered paragraph 8 of Schedule 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002 and interpreted this provision to mean that the priority between mistakenly de‐registered interests and registered interests can be altered following rectification. The court can give the de‐registered interest the priority which it ‘would have had’ but for the mistake. In other words, it allows for retrospective rectification. This case note concludes that this is the correct interpretation of paragraph 8 and of the words ‘for the future’. However, it argues that the current range of options available to the court in terms of rectification are producing uncertainty, and that a better approach may be to rely on the priority provisions in sections 28 and 29.     

Of ‘Landmark’ or ‘Leading’ Cases: Salomon's Challenge

This article seeks to question the two dominant conceptions of ‘landmark’ or ‘leading’ cases in English legal scholarship, using the House of Lords decision in Salomon v. Salomon Co Ltd. – the most famous case in corporate law – as a case study. It argues that neither the first dominant conception of ‘leading’ or ‘landmark’ cases, characterized by the analysis of the intrinsic merits of a case, nor the second, which looks at the historical contexts in which cases were decided, appears sufficient by itself to determine whether a case is landmark or canonical. Rather, we have to look at how the canonicity of a case is constructed by subsequent courts. The article seeks to advance the debate concerning the formation of landmark cases and aims to challenge certain prevailing views on the canonicity of corporate law's arguably most significant case.     

Privative clauses in special education legislative schemes: are they constitutional under the Canadian Charter?

This paper suggests that privative clauses in the enabling statutes (Education Acts) governing provincially appointed special education appeal tribunals (SET) are unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is suggested that ‘final and binding’ SET decisions about children's designation as special needs and their educational placement infringe upon the Charter rights of both parent and exceptional child. The standard for judicial review of SET decisions, given a privative clause, is whether the decision is ‘patently unreasonable’ while ‘correctness’, according to case law, is the appropriate standard when finally determining fundamental rights. Parents of exceptional children in practice have recourse to the courts regarding only procedural rather than substantive issues regarding SET decisions due to the high deference the courts afford any administrat ive tribunal protected by a privative clause. The very high judicial review standard of ‘patently unreasonable’ rather than ‘correctness’ is not consistent, furthermore, with the child's ‘best interests’ or in meeting international obligations to disabled children under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.     

Delfi AS v Estonia: The Liability of Secondary Internet Publishers for Violation of Reputational Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights

In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights in Delfi AS v Estonia upheld a decision of the Estonian Supreme Court to impose liability on the owners of an internet news portal for defamatory comments which had been posted on their website by anonymous third parties. This note suggests that the decision is important in the context of publications with a ‘public interest’ element to them, because it appears to afford more protection to the right to reputation (deriving from the Article 8 right to privacy) and less to freedom of expression than was formerly the case. It is further argued that the Court's emphasis on the positive obligation of states to protect this right to reputation may mean that the existing English law in this area, including, potentially section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, is inconsistent with the ECHR jurisprudence.     

Caution in the Classroom: K-12 Teacher In-Class Speech,The Federal Courts and Garcetti

The federal courts’ approach to regulating K-12 public school teacher speech in the classroom has been split during the past twenty years. Some circuit courts use Pickering v. Board of Education, in which speech is examined to see if it touches on a matter of public concern. Others prefer Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which focuses on whether speech is school-sponsored and whether the school had a legitimate reason for restricting it. In 2007, Garcetti v. Ceballos offered a new perspective on public employee speech. In that case, speech was examined to determine whether it was related to an employee's professional duties. An examination of federal court treatment of in-class teacher speech before and after Garcetti shows the case has further complicated the issue because it is being embraced by some federal courts as an appropriate precedent when dealing with classroom speech.