论推定规则的适用

推定是以推理为桥梁的由事实 A 到事实 B 的认识活动。在法律领域内所说的推定,一般都是以法律规定为依据的,因此在司法活动中运用推定方法认定案件事实或争议事实就表现为对推定规则的适用。这种规则的形式可以是立法机关制定并颁布的法律,也可以是司法机关依法制定的证据规则或者作出的司法解释和具有     

论推定对刑事诉讼证明责任分配的影响

推定功能的发挥依赖于其对刑事诉讼证明责任分配产生的影响。法律推定与事实推定对证明责任分配的影响不同。法律推定是证明责任倒置的实现方式,其对证明责任的倒置配置具有确定性,不随具体诉讼的进行情况发生变动;事实推定是引起证明责任转移的原因。推定与无罪推定原则不相矛盾。     

过错及因果关系推定与证明责任倒置——从事实到价值的思考

过错及因果关系推定是法律在前提事实(某种情境下的损害)获得证明的条件下,绕过了法官对基础事实问题的认定,而对法律事实中的法律问题(过错及因果关系有无)给出的暂时性结论。证明责任本质上是要件事实真伪不明时当事人承担的败诉风险,是对法律事实中事实问题的解决。因此在大陆法系,法定推定必然导致证明责任倒置。英美法系情形不同。过错及因果关系推定具有相同的正当性基础,它们在现行法中的体现尚未得到全面认识。     

民事诉讼中的事实推定探析

事实推定是一种特殊的司法证明方式,作为证据证明的辅助手段,有其特定的理论基础。事实推定的适用,不仅要遵循一般逻辑规则,而且要受特定的法律规则的约束,必须在穷尽了其他证明方法的情况下,事实推定才有适用的必要性,法官运用事实推定认定案件事实,必须心证公开,并且应当赋予当事人反驳的权利。事实推定能够产生转移提供证据责任的效果。     

论刑事诉讼中推定对证明责任分配的影响

刑事司法领域所涉及的利益较为重大,但推定仍然有适用的空间。证明责任的分配并非全部是由推定引起,但是推定在诉讼中通常会对证明责任的分配产生影响。不可反驳的推定将产生证明责任的免除效果;可反驳的推定中法律推定将引起举证责任倒置;事实推定则引起举证责任的转移。     

试论刑事诉讼中被告人的证明责任

在刑事诉讼中，根据证明责任的分配原理，被告人应对其积极主张的某些程序法事实和只有他自己知道的实体法事实承担主观证明责任；基于罪错推定与举证责任倒置，被告承 担特定的客观证明责任，即对法律规定的某些特殊犯罪，由被告人负责证明自己行为的合法 正当性，否则，将被推定有罪。考虑到被告人的证明能力，被告人对案件事实的证明标准， 只需达到合理程度即可。     

从逻辑到法律:推定改变了什么

推定是根据法律规定,在基础事实被确定为真(或不需要基础事实)的条件下,确定推定事实为真的法律规则。推定基于经验法则或社会政策对证明强度作了人工强化。区分推理、推论和推定有重要意义,推理只关注形式的有效性,推论同时关注内容真实性和形式有效性,所谓事实推定本质上属于推论。推定对裁判者的自由心证构成了局部侵蚀,同时推定具有转移或倒置证明责任的重要功能。推定的强度可以从其相反推论所需强度来解释。在关注推定的积极功能时还应关注推定的消极功能,在推定设定和适用中实现权利(权力)、价值的综合平衡。     

民事推定新探

推定包括法律推定和“事实推定”。“事实推定”不是真正的推定。“事实推定”是审判人员在具体案件中由基础事实推导出推定事实的活动。审判人员的“事实推定”,根据的是经验、逻辑法则、情理,盖然性等,不是法律的明文规定。法律推定分为：法律上的权利推定和法律上的事实推定。法律推定与法律拟制完全不同。法律推定具有多方面的诉讼价值。法律推定与证明责任关系密切。采用法律推定这样的立法技术的本质原因是客观证明责任的存在;法律推定导致主观证明责任的转移;法律推定不能转移客观证明责任;侵权法中的过错推定归责原则中,过错推定导致了“举证责任倒置”。     

论法律推定与事实推定

随着民事诉讼理论的改革和证明责任理论的引入,推定制度也被引进我国的民事诉讼,并且目前在司法实践中,法官也越来越多的用到推定来解决一些案件。但关于推定的界定还存在混乱的问题。世界各国主要都从广义上来理解和解释推定,这样在"推定"一词下就存在各种法律的规定。推定又因性质的不同而对证明责任的影响有所不同,需要辨证分析。法律推定实质上是证明责任规则,它通过改变证明的主题,直接将证明推定事实不存在的责任分配给受推定不利的一方当事人,具有转移证明责任的作用。而事实推定属于证明方法范畴,影响法官自由心证,仅转移提供证据的责任而不会改变证明责任的分配。     

也论推定规则适用中的证明责任和证明标准——兼与何家弘教授商榷

中国现行法不仅存在转移完整证明责任的推定规则,也存在类似于美国法上仅转移举证责任的推定规则。在中国,对推定事实进行有效反驳的证明标准不应该是统一的优势证据标准,而应该根据诉讼类型、推定类型不同而有所区分。     

BURDEN OF PROOF BEGONE

This article examines the tendency of emergency child removal decisions—by social workers, police officers, and judges—to become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating in subsequent child protective proceedings. This "snow-ball effect," as one court has referred to it, is widely acknowledged by lawyers who practice in juvenile court yet is largely unknown beyond those circles. The article explores the causes and consequences of this phenomenon in the age of ASFA (the 1997 federal Adoption and Safe Families Act), which converts every day that a child spends in foster care into one more tick of the clock in a countdown toward termination of parental rights. This article provides some background on the law and practice of emergency child removal in the United States today, analyzes the factors that make initial removals outcome determinative in many child protection cases, considers the implications of this phenomenon in light of ASFA, and identifies possible solutions.     

BURDEN OF PROOF BEGONE

This article examines the tendency of emergency child removal decisions—by social workers, police officers, and judges—to become self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating in subsequent child protective proceedings. This snowball effect, as one court has referred to it, is widely acknowledged by lawyers who practice in juvenile court, yet is largely unknown beyond those circles. The article explores the causes and consequnces of this phenomenon in the age of the 1997 federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), which converts every day that a child spends in foster care into one more tick of the clock in a countdown toward termination of parental rights. The article provides some background on the law and practice of emergency child removal in the United States today, analyzes the factors that make initial removals outcome determinative in many child protection cases, considers the implications of this phenomenon in light of ASFA, and identifies possible solutions.     

MERGERS, STANDARD OF PROOF AND EXPERT ECONOMIC EVIDENCE

There is an increasing use of complex econometric modellingin EC merger control proceedings. The question is whether econometricsare subject to a standard of evidence similar to that applicableto facts and theories that the Commission traditionally usesand articulates in its merger decisions or whether there shouldbe some margin of discretion left to the Commission in the treatmentand handling of econometric evidence. In the former case, ECcourts would exert an intensive review of the Commission's useand articulation of econometric evidence. In the latter case,EC courts would adopt a rather deferential approach. While theissue has not yet been dealt with before EC courts, this articlesubmits that the Commission should use econometrics with cautionand, hence, should meet a relatively high evidentiary thresholdbefore admitting the results of econometric models into evidence.Several guiding principles of evidence are suggested, whichare not intended to negate the Commission's margin of discretion,but would, nevertheless, ensure that econometrics be subjectto a fairly high standard of proof.     

民事行为能力的证明责任 对一个法律漏洞的分析

<正>一、问题的提出法律要件分类说是关于民事证明责任分配原则的一种有力学说。德国、日本及我国台湾地区的法院在审判实务中主要依据该学说分配证明责任。我国澳门地区的民法典中对证据的实体部分作了规定,其中第35条关于证明责任的规定就是按照法律要件分     

THE CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC PROOF IN A DECENTRALIZED AND PRIVATIZED EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Since the announcement in late 2002 of the Modernization Plan,and continuing in 2005 with the release of the Green Paper ondamages actions, the European Commission has been committedto a significant restructuring of the EU's approach to enforcingcompetition laws. Under the revised system as envisioned bythe Commission, national competition authorities and privateparties will assume a far greater role in supplementing thework of the Commission, which for 50 years has been the predominantcompetition policy enforcer in Europe. The goal is not onlyto produce a system of shared enforcement authority, but topromote the continued evolution in Europe of a "culture of competition,"while avoiding the creation of a "culture of litigation." Ifnational competition authorities and private parties acceptthis invitation, however, they are likely to face the same kindsof demands for substantial economic evidence from their nationalcourts that the EC has faced from the Court of First Instanceand the European Court of Justice in some of its most complexand challenging recent cases. This paper asks whether nationallevel enforcers, public and private, will have the proceduraland evidentiary tools necessary to respond to demands for sucheconomic proof. Drawing on the Commission's recent experiences,as well as lessons from the U.S. experience, it asks whetherthe Green Paper's treatment of economic evidence is adequategiven the importance that economic proof plays today in competitionlaw cases. It then urges the Commission to devote additionalattention to identifying and advocating reforms that will moreactively facilitate the disclosure, development, and presentationof economic evidence. This paper particularly questions theGreen Paper's preference for the use of court-appointed expertsin lieu of party-secured expert witnesses. It argues that partyand court-appointed experts can perform very different functionsin competition law cases and should not be viewed as substitutes.Moreover, it suggests that the Green Paper may significantlyunderestimate the degree to which party-secured expert economicwitnesses will be necessary if national level enforcers—publicand private—are to be adequately equipped to meet theburdens of proof they will face. If national enforcers systematicallyfind that they lack the procedural tools necessary to developthe economic evidence they need to meet those burdens, theywill reduce or abandon their efforts to initiate competitionlaw actions and it will be less likely that the promise of decentralizationand privatization can be realized.