An obsessed task: Prospects, models, and impact of Korean reunification

Conclusion Korean reunification is unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future; any policy that rests on assumptions that North Korea will collapse easily or imminently is dangerous. Precedents found in the international experience of divided nations suggest that systems with conflicting ideologies cannot be merged peacefully into a lasting unitary governmental structure. In the case of Korea, unification by absorption on the basis of two ideological systems as part of a unitary governmental structure. The impact of Korean unification on the regional structure of international relations will be mixed and uncertain, but the achievement of Korean reunification need not affect the stability of the region in any significant way. When the time for unification is ripe, the four powers will have no choice but to accept such a process regardless of their own anxieties and adjust to the new situation pragmatically without regard to narrowly selfish interests.     

甲午启示录——朝鲜半岛篇

1894年甲午战争爆发后,朝鲜在摆脱与清王朝之间藩属关系的同时又陷入了日本侵略势力的魔掌。随着世界反法西斯战争的胜利,朝鲜终于挣脱了日本的殖民枷锁,获得了独立自主。然而,1954年日内瓦会议关于朝鲜问题的讨论无果而终,无情地宣告朝鲜半岛又进入了南北分治时代。当新的甲午年来临之际,回顾前两个甲午年朝鲜半岛的历史,总结其经验教训,将会为我们客观认识和妥善处理当前朝鲜半岛问题,避免历史悲剧的重演,提供一些有益的启示。     

The Cheonan Incident and East Asian Community Debate: North Korea’s Place in the Region

The East Asian community debates project the region as one integral unit. Rapidly shifting landscapes explain the tension between the old order and emerging hierarchy where North Korea plays a crucial role. This paper analyzes North Korea’s place in the East Asian community debates by examining the regional governments’ reactions to the Cheonan incident. The responses and circumstances of South Korea, Japan and North Korea to the sunken ship incident demonstrate three dynamics. First, domestic political needs of the regional government supersede normative Community rhetoric. Second, manageability of the North Korean regime will determine the next regional hegemon. And third, the community debates need to include North Korea for viability.     

Future dynamics in Sino-Korea relations

This article argues that the basic interests of the major actors involved in the Korean problem converge on the cross-recognition and “two Koreas” formula. Seoul’s diplomatic normalization with Moscow, and North Korea’s ongoing negotiations with Tokyo, testify to this trend. Because of its sensitivity to North Korea’s dilemma and carefully measured policy, China has succeeded in sustaining North Korea’s trust while improving its ties with South Korea. Shaken by the changes in the international system and threatened by the rapidly growing economic capability of the South, North Korea’s overall foreign policy objective is shifting from unifocation to accepting the existing status quo, a movement toward a direction that China has been advising. A mostly likely breakthrough to the stalemate in Korea will come from the Pyongyang-Tokyo bilateral relations. Ironically, when the South feels more confident than ever before about the possibility of unification under its terms, the rest of world is moving toward the cross recognition it has advocated. Whether the two Koreas with over-lapping diplomatic relations with all four major powers surrounding the peninsula will be able to achieve the unification that all Korean people desire will largely depend on how the regimes manage inter-Korean relations in coming years.     

Cultural Policy in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The purpose of this paper is to introduce North Korean culture as well as its foundation, North Korean cultural policy. The paper consists of three broad sections. First, I explore the unique qualities and changes of North Korean cultural policy. Next, I look into what North Korea considers to be culture and how it is portrayed. Finally, I will analyze the similarities and differences between North and South Korean cultural policy, and the possibility of their convergence.     

LIMITED WAR,UNLIMITED TARGETS

In the early days of the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had a policy of precision bombing military targets only. Policy-makers in Washington, D.C., formulated this policy to ensure the protection of Korean civilians and to increase the effectiveness of their air operations. Senior USAF officers in Korea, however, were unhappy about the limitations placed on them by Washington. In their strategic air operations against targets in North Korea USAF officers followed Washington's precision bombing policy, but they insisted that USAF bombers be permitted to use incendiary bombs against population centers in North Korea. China's entry into the war in November 1950 led to a drastic change in the precision bombing policy. On 5 November 1950, when the UN forces began suffering defeat after defeat in battles with the new enemy, General Douglas MacArthur designated cities and villages in North Korea as “main bombing targets” and permitted the use of incendiary bombs, which had been used in attacks against Japanese cities during World War II. From that point until the end of the war, the USAF regarded North Korean cities and villages as their crucial targets as political and military occasion demanded.     

Future of North Korea at Dead End

Since Chairman Kim Jong-il's reported stroke in August 2008, the stability or instability of the North Korean system has come under the spotlight. North Korea's one-man ruling communist and state-planned economic system will constantly come under pressure at home and abroad for change. For now, North Korea withstands the pressure for change with a strong state mechanism. If Pyongyang continues to allow its systemic rigidity to hinder opportunities for adjustment and change, then the deepening internal contradictions, the people's growing discontent, and increasing discord with the external environment may push the North Korean system to a critical breaking point. As the uncertainties shrouding the North Korean regime and system steadily increase, it has become urgent to accurately analyze and assess the present and the future of North Korea. While preparing for an uncertain future of North Korea, it is also necessary that the members of the Six-Party Talks exercise more efforts to generate genuine and positive changes in North Korea.     

金大中"阳光政策"的两难处境与当前的朝鲜半岛形势

由于"9.11"事件的发生,美国的军事外交战略发生了的重大变化,而布什在今年1月29日发表的"国情咨文"中又公开点名朝鲜,伊拉克,伊朗为"邪恶轴心",从此朝鲜半岛的形势开始震荡起来.韩国政府和美国布什政府在朝鲜半岛问题上产生了裂痕.本文分析了金大中"阳光政策"遇到的困难和朝鲜半岛形势的症结所在以及可预见的前景.     

The North Korea Problem: Perspectives on the Nuclear Debate,Economic Reforms and Beyond

ABSTRACT

Despite a plethora of research on North Korea, understanding and managing the challenges posed by the country have long been complicated with no simple solution to put an end to this decades-long security and economic predicament on the Korean Peninsula. With the potential for international conflict, attention must be given to the converging messages emerging from the scholarly works reviewed in this article: Glyn Ford, Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff, Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and the Threat of Nuclear War and William Overholt’s collection North Korea: Peace? Nuclear War? These works speak to the need to: take seriously the risk of nuclear war; consider the connectedness of the North’s decades-long security and economic reform dilemmas; and to acknowledge that the mistrust that is deeply rooted on all sides must be mitigated to bring peace. These books are published at a critical juncture of increased tensions following a highly publicised but remarkably short-lived effort at a breakthrough on the Korean nuclear issue, Pyongyang’s rapidly evolving security posture and its perennial domestic challenges. Each of these volumes provides valuable insights on these challenges for North Korea and internationally.     

Flawed Mediation and a Compelling Mission: Chinese Diplomacy in the Six-Party Talks to Denuclearise North Korea

This paper examines China’s role in the Six-Party Talks, a multilateral initiative with the aim of denuclearising North Korea. As North Korea’s behaviour has become increasingly provocative, evidenced by the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Incidents and the newly unveiled uranium enrichment plant at Yeonbyon, China’s indecision in dealing with the deteriorating situation has dramatically undermined Beijing’s ability to continue successfully to play the leading mediator role. Yet if China fails to take decisive action now, the consequences could be dire. Further deterioration in North Korea’s behaviour could trigger a nuclear arms race, severely hamper regional economic development and even create a geopolitical split in East Asia, leading to a confrontation between the US, South Korea and Japan acting together on one side, and China, Russia and North Korea aligned on the other. The factors that have prevented China from making further progress in the diplomatic process are many and various and this paper will reveal the complexity of the North Korean issue for China. Foreign academics and policy makers have tended to attribute China’s indecision over North Korea to China putting its own security interests first. But this is far too simplistic a picture of the complex relationship that China has with North Korea. There are a host of factors at work that need to be taken into account to understand the present impasse in the diplomatic process. These factors include China’s emotional ties to North Korea and empathy with its position as the weakest party in the Talks, the conflicting attitudes within the Chinese government itself towards the North, and the competing interests and lack of trust between the different stakeholders. It seems that for the foreseeable future, the North Korean issue will continue to plague Chinese foreign policy until all the parties involved act as a collaborative body to reach a consensus on how to resolve the situation.     

Be Careful What You Wish For: Security Challenges Facing the Korean Peninsula During a Potential Unification Process

There is a lacuna in the literature analyzing the mid-term (6-24 months) period after a DPRK contingency that results in the Pyongyang regime’s relatively sudden and unmanaged fall. This article helps fill that gap, particularly with respect to security issues that would challenge Korean unification efforts during such a period. Following an Introduction, Section I first makes the case for a DPRK contingency being the most plausible end to the Pyongyang regime. Assuming the scenarios from Section I, Section II addresses the question of what critical issues a unifying Korea will face over the mid-term, and how dealing with these challenges will condition the type of end-state that a unified Korea will embody. In particular we examine three challenges: (a) mid-term security provision related to potential weapons proliferation, cyber-security, organized criminality, and human security; (b) the foundations of institution-building through measures dealing with issues of transitional justice, disputed land title claims, and generating broad domestic stakeholder buy-in in a unifying Korea; (c) the disposition of Korea’s strategic alignment in a Northeast Asia that will have undergone a major alteration of the regional system. Section III concludes with policy recommendations concerning what efforts should be made now to prepare for the situations described in Sections I and II.     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

试论韩国朴槿惠政府的外交政策趋向与朝鲜半岛局势

韩国朴槿惠政府将在李明博政府实用主义外交的基础上,进一步调整韩国的外交政策,以韩关战略同盟关系为核心、进一步加强和充实中韩战略合作伙伴关系的内涵,并在推动朝鲜半岛和平进程方面,努力构建朝鲜半岛的南北信任程序,以改善朝鲜半岛南北关系。为解决朝鲜核问题等,朴槿惠政府还将强化韩美中三国在朝鲜半岛的战略合作,以进一步发挥韩国在中关两国和东北亚外交安保领域中的战略协调作用。朴槿惠政府时代,朝鲜半岛局势的发展,将取决于三大变量的博弈,即关朝关系、朝鲜半岛南北关系和中朝关系的变化。随着中关韩朝等半岛周边国家外交安保政策的调整,朝鲜半岛最终将走上和解与和平、合作的战略轨道。     

A sinologist’s observations on North Korea

This report provides reflections on a one-week visit to North Korea in April 1989 by a China scholar who lived in Maoist China. It draws on meetings with American and Chinese specialists on Korea, and with North Korea scholars and Party officials. It compares Kim’s North Korea with Mao’s China in terms of agriculture, policy towards education and intellectuals, and the Cult of Personality; it discusses apparent tentative stpes in the North towards openness and reform, but recognizes the dilemma of understanding complicated forces for the against reform in such a short visit. Finally, the report outlines discussions with North Korea international relations specialists and a member of the Secretariat of the Korean Worker’s Party which welcomed the end of the cold war and improved Sino-U.S., U.S.-Soviet, and Sino-Soviet relations as favorable for peace in the region and Korean reunification. He is author ofAgrarian Radicalism in China, 1968–1981 (Harvard University Press, 1989).     

The coming decade of change on the Korean peninsula: Implications for Northeast Asia and the United States

The next decade on the Korean peninsula will be one of dramatic change. With a nearly nonexistent economy and its people facing severe famine, the DPRK has no choice but to move away from its self-reliance policies towards another course of action—most likely leading to reunification of the peninsula. However it plays out, the changes in Korea will have important regional implications and impact U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia. Policy makers must formulate plans now for U.S. forces in the region during, and after, Korean reunification. Despite being in shambles internally, North Korea remains a hermit kingdom standing steadfastly against the tides of change and pressures from the outside world to become part of the international community. The Korean peninsula remains a potential, and very likely, international flashpoint as no formal peace treaty was signed after the Korean War—only an armistice agreement keeps the peninsula in a fragile military stalemate. With a badly broken economy, its people continuing to face famine, the threat to resume its nuclear program, and the recent missile firings over Japan, North Korea will likely be an international flashpoint sooner rather than later. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.     

Security,Nationalism and Popular Culture: Screening South Korea’s Uneasy Identity in the Early 2000s

By examining the cultural representations of the South Korean notion of the Self/Other in relation to its major traditional enemy — North Korea — this article aims to capture a picture of South Korea’s discursive economy of the North, and to problematise the South Korean identities implicated in that economy in the early 2000s. To achieve these aims, this article focuses on representations of a successful popular South Korean film which was released in 2000, just a few months after the first inter-Korean summit: Joint Security Area JSA. By analytically reading JSA, it is revealed that, in South Korea, the traditional discursive practices based on the Cold War thinking have been eroded. For the South, the North is part of the Self (Korean-ness; love for the North as the same nation) and, at the same time, is an Other (South Korean-ness; contempt for the North as an inferior state). Related to this, South Korea appears to be the uneasy Self without a firm Other in between Korean-ness and South Korean-ness.     

NORTH KOREA’S PERSPECTIVES IN ITS ARGUMENT FOR A PEACE TREATY

In recent years, North Korea’s military provocations have been making the headlines. Beyond its harsh actions and remarks, North Korea persistently mentions ‘peace’ through a demand for a ‘peace treaty’. This may sound paradoxical. However, the origin of the North Korean argument for a peace treaty dates back to the Korean War (1950–53). Since then, North Korea has continued to raise the issue of a peace treaty in a consistent manner and the arguments have displayed similar logic and terminology throughout. It is this consistency and similarity that this article examines: through reviewing North Korea’s original texts, this article attempts to undercover North Korea's perspectives reflected in its argument for a peace treaty.     

The Rescaling of the Chinese State and Sino-North Korean Relations: Beyond State-Centrism

While Beijing has repeatedly signed up to multilateral sanctions against North Korea, it is widely regarded as having failed to enforce them. Indeed, China’s deepening economic engagement with the country has led observers to debate the causes of this seemingly duplicitous approach. Constructivist and realist approaches have relied on state-centric frameworks that serve to reduce Sino-North Korean relations to the high politics of Beijing-Pyongyang diplomacy in the context of broader geopolitical dynamics. This article argues that such approaches pay insufficient attention to the profound rescaling of the Chinese state in recent years and the implications this process has for bilateral relations. This article sheds light on how Sino-North Korean relations are being driven by actors at multiple scales and by a multitude of objectives as a result of decentralisation and marketisation alongside increasing geographical unevenness within China and new challenges to continued capital accumulation. North Korea has come to play an increasingly important role in efforts to facilitate economic recovery in the northeastern border regions through serving as spatial fix for Chinese manufacturing capital. These new cross-border flows of capital and labour suggest an emerging pattern of Sino-North Korean relations that is by no means static but in considerable flux.     

The China model of Korean reunification

Like Germany's reunification, essentially the annexation of East Germany by West Germany, Korean reunification looms as most likely, ultimately and largely entailing South Korea's annexation of North Korea. The awesome cost borne by West Germany for reunification has been instructive to South Korea, particularly in recognition that the material and ideological gaps between North and South Korea are far greater than those which existed between East and West Germany. A possible solution to the negative implications of cataclysmic reunificationmay rest in gradual reunification of the Koreas, with an interim industrialization of North Korea by South Korea, based on the model of the economic development zones in southeastern China; hence, the “China Model”. In such a scenario the investors in North Korea's gradual industrialization would be (primarily) the huge conglomerate South Korean corporations chaebol which seek cheaper labor pools abroad. Investment by such corporations, in cooperation with the South Korean government, and possibly supplemented by western and Japanese capital investment, would presumably raise levels of productivity and the standard of living in the economically and agriculturally ravished North. The North-South gaps would thus be gradually reduced as would the financial and other burdens South Korea would otherwise have to bear for cataclysmic reunification.     

“Seoul will become a sea of fire…”

Abstract

Seoul, 19 March 1994: People watching the evening news are terrified. The network stations repeatedly show Park Yong Soo, the North Korean representative at the eighth working-level meeting between North and South Korea at Panmunjom, retorting angrily to Song Yong Dae, his South Korean counterpart. “Seoul is not far from here,” he declares, “If there is a war, it will become a sea of fire.” The next day disturbing headlines splash across the morning and evening newspapers: “Seoul will become a sea of fire.”