Keywords,case law and the Court of Justice: the need for legislative intervention in modernising European trade mark law

Recent preliminary references to the CJEU on online keyword advertising and registered trade mark infringement have exposed the challenges facing EU registered trade mark law in its response to new technologies. These cases and the challenges they pose provide a timely prism through which to examine the European trade mark law-making process and the role of the CJEU within that process. This article will employ an analysis of the way in which the CJEU has developed certain key new aspects of the law on ‘infringing use’ to explore concerns over the CJEU's role and approach. It will be argued that, driven by policy considerations, the CJEU has acted creatively to develop the law of infringement in ways that cannot be sustained by the TMD and CTMR and which are likely to cause increasing uncertainties going forward. With the European Commission currently considering reform of Trade Marks Directive 2008/95/EC and Community Trade Mark Regulation 207/2009/EC, this paper will argue that there is a need for more comprehensive and forward-looking legislative intervention than has yet been proposed and that such intervention will be essential to restoring balance in the European trade mark law-making process.     

The European Commission's Guidance on Article 102TFEU: From Inferno to Paradiso?

The European Commission has for the first time issued a document expressing its official position on the enforcement of Article 102TFEU which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position on the Common Market. The Commission Guidance on enforcement priorities in applying Article 102TFEU to exclusionary abuses (adopted in December 2008) has ended a review of about four years. Given the increased enforcement of Article 102TFEU at the European level and the fact that many national provisions in the EU on unilateral conduct are modelled after Article 102TFEU, how the Commission intends to enforce Article 102TFEU is crucial for the application of competition law and the undertakings subject to it under European and/or national laws. The review period was preceded by severe criticisms of the Commission's approach to Article 102TFEU for protecting competitors instead of competition and for being insufficiently grounded in modern economic thinking. At the heart of the review and the discussions surrounding it lay the question of the objective of Article 102TFEU. Some, including the Directorate General for Competition claimed the objective to be ‘consumer welfare’, whereas some argued that ‘consumer welfare’ cannot be adopted as the objective at the expense of the protection of the competitive process. This article critically reviews the Commission Guidance, with an eye to assessing the ultimate objective of and the test of harm under Article 102TFEU. After discussing whether the Guidance indeed sets priorities, it examines the general approach of the Guidance to exclusionary conduct. It points out that despite there being some welcome novelties in the Guidance, there are also suggestions therein whose legitimacy and legality are questionable. Reflecting on the Guidance as a soft‐law instrument, the article argues that although regarding the objective of Article 102TFEU, the Commission's apparent tendency towards ‘consumer welfare’ is not unlawful, the reform of Article 102TFEU to bring it more in line with modern economic and legal thinking seems to be far from complete.     

Social Insurance Monopolies in Community Competition Law and the Italian Constitution: 'Practical' Convergences and 'Theoretical' Conflicts

An Italian judge, following earlier suggestions of the national antitrust Authority, has referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC Treaty two questions on the interpretation of Articles 81 and 86 of the EC Treaty. With those questions, raised in an action brought by a self‐employee against the Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro (INAIL) concerning the actor's refusal to pay for social insurance contributions, the Tribunale di Vicenza has in summary asked the Court of Justice whether the public entity concerned, managing a general scheme for the social insurance of accidents at work and professional diseases, can be qualified as an enterprise under Article 81 EC Treaty and, if so, whether its dominant position can be considered in contrast with EC competition rules. This article takes this preliminary reference as a starting point to consider in more general terms the complex constitutional issues raised by what Ge´rard Lyon‐Caen has evocatively called the progressive ‘infiltration’ of EC competition rules into the national systems of labour and social security law. The analysis is particularly focused on the significant risks of ‘constitutional collision’, between the ‘solidaristic’ principles enshrined in the Italian constitution and the fundamental market freedoms protected by the EC competition rules, which are implied by the questions raised in the preliminary reference. It considers first the evolution of ECJ case law—from Poucet and Pistre to Albany International BV—about the limits Member States have in granting exclusive rights to social security institutions under EC competition rules. It then considers specularly, from the Italian constitutional law perspective, the most recent case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on the same issues. The ‘contextual’ reading of the ECJ's and the Italian Constitutional Court's case law with specific regard to the case referred to by the Tribunale di Vicenza leads to the conclusion that there will probably be a ‘practical convergence’in casu between the ‘European’ and the ‘national’ approach. Following the arguments put forward by the Court of Justice in Albany, the INAIL should not be considered as an enterprise, in line also with a recent decision of the Italian Constitutional Court. And even when it was to be qualified as an enterprise, the INAIL should in any case be able to escape the ‘accuse’ of abuse of dominant position and be allowed to retain its exclusive rights, pursuant to Article 86 of the EC Treaty. This ‘practical convergence’in casu does not, however, remove the latent ‘theoretical conflict’ between the two approaches and the risk of ‘constitutional collision’ that it implies. A risk of a ‘conflict’ of that kind could be obviously detrimental for the European integration process. The Italian Constitutional Court claims for herself the control over the fundamental principles of the national constitutional order, assigning them the role of ‘counter‐limits’ to the supremacy of European law and to European integration. At the same time, and more generally, the pervasive spill over of the EC market and competition law virtually into every area of national regulation runs the risk of undermining the social and democratic values enshrined in the national labour law traditions without compensating the potential de‐regulatory effects through measures of positive integration at the supranational level. This also may contribute to undermine and threaten, in the long run, the (already weak) democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. The search for a more suitable and less elusive and unilateral balance between social rights and economic freedoms at the supranational level should therefore become one of the most relevant tasks of what Joseph Weiler has called the ‘European neo‐constitutionalism’. In this perspective, the article, always looking at the specific questions referred to the Court of Justice by the Tribunale di Vicenza, deals with the issue of the ‘rebalance’ between social rights and economic and market freedoms along three distinct but connected lines of reasoning. The first has to do with the need of a more open and respectful dialogue between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. The second is linked to the ongoing discussion about the ‘constitutionalization’ of the fundamental social rights at the EC level. The third finally considers the same issues from the specific point of view of the division of competences between the European Community and the Member States in the area of social (protection) policies.     

The Consumer as the Empirical Measure of Trade Mark Law

Although consumer responses to signs and symbols lie at the heart of trade mark law, courts blow hot and cold on the relevance of empirical evidence – such as surveys and experiments – to establish how consumers respond to alleged infringing marks. This ambivalence is related to deeper rifts between trade mark doctrine and the science around consumer decision‐making. This article engages with an approach in ‘Law and Science’ literature: looking at how cognitive psychology and related disciplines conceptualise consumer decision‐making, and how counterintuitive lawyers’ approaches appear from this perspective. It demonstrates how, especially when proving confusion, decision‐makers in trade mark demand the impossible of empiricists and are simultaneously blind to the weaknesses of other sources of proof. A principled divergence, without seeking to collapse the gaps between legal and scientific approaches, but taking certain small steps, could reduce current problems of proof and contribute to better‐informed, more empirically grounded decisions.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

‘Consumer’ versus ‘Customer’: The Devil in the Detail

According to the European Commission, the objective of EU competition rules is enhancing ‘consumer welfare’. In EU competition law, however, ‘consumer’ means ‘customer’ and encompasses intermediate customers as well as final consumers. Under Article 102TFEU, harming intermediate ‘customers’ is generally presumed to harm ‘consumers’ and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. Using advances in economics of vertical restraints and, in particular, non‐linear pricing, this article shows that there are instances where the effect on ‘customer welfare’ does not coincide with the effect on ‘consumer welfare’ and the presumption can potentially lead to decisional errors. Thus, if the law is to serve the interests of ‘consumers’, the Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’; otherwise, it remains questionable whose interests EU competition law serves.     

Strong trade marks and the likelihood of confusion in European law

Legal context. One of the fundamental assumptions of trade marklaw is that provision should be made to prevent the registrationor commercial exploitation of trade marks that are likely tobe confused with earlier marks. The justification for this assumptionis however unclear. Is it to protect the expectation of itsowner that a trade mark will provide a comfort zone, an areawithin which other traders simply may not enter? Is it to encourageinvestment in the development of a relationship between thetrade mark owner and his prospective customers by offering interference-freemarketing opportunities? Is it to protect the efficiency ofthe market by facilitating the making of decisions by consumersas to which product or process they wish to purchase? Or isit to protect the vulnerable consumer against the personal consequencesof his inattention or inability to discern the differences betweenproducts or services? Key points. This article examines the development of Europeanlaw relating to the protection of strong trade marks, thosewhich are highly distinctive or well known, against similarmarks that may or may not be likely to cause consumer confusion.It demonstrates the manner in which the European Court of Justiceseeks to address the likelihood of confusion in terms whichappear to draw more from legal abstractions than from marketrealities. After giving a favourable review of the controversialdecision of that court in the PICARO/PICASSO case, the articlelists further issues which European trade mark litigation hasso far failed to address. Practical significance. Armed with an understanding of the principlesemployed by the European Court of Justice, trade mark proprietorsin Europe will obtain a better appreciation of the strategiesto be used in either challenging competitors' marks in courtor adopting commercial measures to combat them.     

The Paradox of American Critical Legalism

Duncan Kennedy's essay is a reprint from his recently published book. We hope to draw attention to Kennedy's work among students of European integration since we believe his analysis to be relevant both to the specific debate on the impact of European integration upon private law and to comparative legal study in general. European legal scholarship has only recently begun to examine the problems of private legal integration. The late appearance of private law in the integration arena is due to a primarily instrumental understanding and strategic use of law in the European market-building project: only once legal ‘barriers to trade’ were eliminated and national regulatory law replaced by Europeanised norms, did the degree to which the core institutions of ’private‘ law had been (indirectly) affected by the integrationist logic become apparent. Comparative legal research, however, has benefited from this awakening of interest. European Commission projects have widened the scope of and intensified comparative studies in Europe. Equally, experience gained from the ‘Integration Through (Public) Law’ project has led to a new private legal debate on the impact of national traditions, the concept of legal cultures and the social functions of private law. Accordingly, whilst Duncan Kennedy's deliberations on the history of American legal thought and the differences between American and European legal cultures are generally to be commended for their sensitive treatment of the specificities of the civil law system and the common law heritage, they are equally of particular topical concern since in addition to highlighting America's ‘utter faith and utter distrust in law,’ they also investigate the fundamentally different approaches adopted towards ‘the project law’ within each of the member states of the EU. If European private lawyers are to come to terms with the problems of integration and convergence, they must first tackle these deep-seated divergences between their own national legal cultures.     

The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’: Legal Framework and the Agreement of the Parties

The European Commission's Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (‘CESL’) seeks to create a European scheme of contract law available for parties to choose to govern cross‐border contracts for the sale of goods, supply of ‘digital content,’ and for the supply of related services. This article explains the background to the Proposal, sketches out the purposes and scope of the CESL, and considers and criticises its legal framework (and in particular its relationship with private international law) and the key requirement of the parties’ agreement. In the author's view, the CESL scheme remains an unconvincing basis for the achievement of its economic purposes and, as regards consumer contracts, puts too much reliance on the agreement of the consumer as a justification for the loss of their existing protection under EU private international law rules.     

The Origins of Trade Secrecy Law in England, 1600–1851

This paper examines the origins of trade secrecy law from the beginning of the seventeenth century until Morison v Moat (1851), described by the Oxford History of the Laws of England as ‘foundational’. The paper reveals something of a conundrum. The first part shows that although the prevalence of guild ordinances would have familiarized many with the concept of ‘lawful secrets’, these provisions could no longer be enforced in the guild courts by the late seventeenth century, or within the wider jurisdiction of the courts of the City of London. Instead, as the second half of the paper shows, it was the law courts proper that came to provide succour to those working trade secrets, allowing them to both restrain employees from using secrets for their own benefit and/or to sell secrets to other parties. This was a halting process, but one that had certainly begun prior to Morison.     

The Value of ‘Integration’ in European Law—The Implications of the Förster Case on Legal Assessment of Integration Conditions for Third‐Country Nationals

The European Court of Justice's Förster judgment can lead to a reduction of legal uncertainty caused by integration requirements for third‐country nationals. The judgment has created a strong ‘assumption of integration’ after five years of legal residence because it equalised integration requirements for European students to access the welfare system of host Member States with a requirement of five years legal residence. Almost all pieces of European legal migration law also contain five‐year residence requirements after which the status of third‐country nationals improves. However, these improvements are mostly subjected to the fulfilment of additional integration requirements. To keep coherence with European law, courts will not be able to disregard the Förster‘assumption of integration’ when assessing the legality of integration conditions for third‐country nationals put in place in addition to residence requirements.     

Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States,Civil Society and Union Citizens

Abstract: How does the quest for legitimacy of the European Union relate to the view the European Court of Justice(ECJ) accords to Union citizens, civil society and to private actors? It is submitted that the ECJ is currently developing a jurisprudence under which citizens, as well as their organisations and corporate private actors, are gradually, and in almost complete disregard of the public/private distinction, being included in the matrix of rights and—a crucial point—obligations of the treaties. The ECJ incorporates civil society actors and citizens, beyond notions of representative (citizenship) and participatory (civil society) democracy, into the body of law and thereby reworks its own and the Union's identity. Two core aspects are explored: the first is the reconfiguration of Union citizenship as a norm which triggers the application of the substantive norms of the EC Treaty. The second aspect of this evolution is the creation of ‘private governance’ schemes, i.e. processes in which, as a rule, private action is regarded as action that has to meet the standards of the Treaty. The analysis shows that the court is disentangling itself from the State‐oriented Treaty situation and drawing legitimacy directly from citizens themselves so that judgments should be pronounced ‘In the Name of the Citizens of the European Union’.

1 European Court of Justice 20 September 2001, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‐6193, para. 31.

     

Post-sale confusion

Legal context: Recent case law has established that post-sale confusion isrelevant to determining whether registered trade mark infringementhas occurred under UK law. This raises questions as to whatthat relevance is in practice and as to whether the common lawof passing off should develop accordingly so as to take post-saleconfusion into account. Key points: In this article, the authors review the case law on the relevanceof post-sale confusion to actions for trade mark infringementand passing off. They conclude that U K law does regard post-saleconfusion as relevant to trade mark infringement, provided thatthere is also sufficient similarity on a mark-for-sign basisat the point of sale. They argue that the tort of passing offshould develop in the same way. Practical significance: Brands can be harmed even where there is no confusion at thepoint of sale. The law's development to recognize this providesimportant weapons for brand owners, particularly in the contextof ‘look-alike’ products.     

Dr Bonham's Case and ‘void’ statutes

There are two opinions on Coke's remarks in Dr Bonham's Case concerning ‘void’ statutes. Firstly that Coke was assuming a power to declare statutes void as incompatible with some form of higher order law; secondly that Coke was merely asserting a power to interpret statutes. This article suggests that the range of meanings of the word ‘void’ in early-modern English law undermines the foundations of the first position, and that there is no good evidence suggesting a natural law position. Coke's method of statutory interpretation is then explored, showing that his report accords with contemporary jurisprudence on grants of judicial power and parliamentary affirmations of earlier acts, and that the word ‘void’, in this context, had a purely inter partes meaning.     

The Territorial Scope of Employment Legislation and Choice of Law

Traditionally, the determination of the territorial scope of the statutory rights conferred by employment legislation forming part of English law has been regarded as an issue entirely disconnected from the choice‐of‐law process. Indeed, this view formed the basis of the key decision addressing the problem of territoriality, Lawson v Serco, decided by the House of Lords in 2006. After presenting the current state of the law with regard to the territorial scope of employment legislation, this article takes a critical look at Lawson v Serco. It is argued that the ‘European’ choice‐of‐law rules must have a greater importance for determining the territorial scope of employment legislation and, consequently, that the approach pursued in Lawson v Serco is no longer correct, if it ever was, and should not be followed in the future.     

Law and the Financial Crisis: Searching for Europe's New Gold Standard

The role of law in the governance of the Eurozone confronts divergent economic and political perspectives which are reminiscent of the gold standard era. The Maastricht model sought to use to law to create a sound currency. In practice, fixed exchange rates caused large trade imbalances and risky cross‐border investments resulting in a Eurozone‐wide crisis of first private, and then later, public insolvency. In the face of continued political unwillingness to either pool fiscal resources or impose massive austerity and structural reform, the European Central Bank ECB has been forced to become lender of last resort to sovereigns to maintain the single currency. Ordo‐liberal critics argue that the ECB has created a transfer union in breach of the Maastricht agreement. Keynesians, by contrast, argue that, just as under the gold standard, using ‘constitutionalised’ austerity to rebalance trade is neither just nor credible. The Eurozone's reliance on law and markets above developed political institutions has failed, but no democratically legitimate process has replaced it.     

The new consumer and business protection regulations: another string to the brand owner's bow?

Legal context: This article assesses the impact of The Consumer Protectionfrom Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (CPRs) (implementing theUnfair Commercial Practices Directive) and The Business. Protectionfrom Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 (BPRs) (implementingthe consolidated and codified Misleading and Comparative AdvertisingDirective) on areas of marketing and advertising in which IPrights often become involved and the impact of the recent ECJdecisionon their application in the O2 v Hutchison 3G referencebythe Court of Appeal. Key points: The CPRs govern advertising and promotional activities aimedat consumers. Much of the consumer and business protection legislationpreviously scattered amongst various Acts has been repealedand replaced by elements of the BPRs or CPRs. In total, 36 Regulationsand Orders and 41 Acts are affected. The BPRs now govern misleadingmarketing and comparative advertising, previously dealt withunder the Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988.The article looks at how these Regulations may be applied insituations which interested parties currently attempt to resolveusing trade mark or passing off laws. Practical significance: The new Regulations are aimed at the protection of consumersand businesses from unscrupulous marketing and trade promotionpractices which affect their economic behaviour. Thirty-onepractices are specifically identified as automatically fallingfoul of the Regulations. Businesses will need to review theirpractices to avoid the possibility of criminal penalties includingfines and imprisonment for consenting, conniving, or recklessofficers of businesses involved in such practices. Until the ECJ decision in O2 v Hutchison 3G, it had been thought(from Jacob LJ's finding in his reference to the ECJ in thiscase) that trade mark law had no role to play in comparativeadvertising as it was specifically provided for under the ComparativeAdvertising Directive and hence under the BPRs. Since thesedid not provide an individual right of action (the OFT or TradingStandards alone may enforce), it left trade mark owners withlittle muscle in comparative advertising situations. However,the ECJ made clear that where practices fail to satisfy thecriteria set out in the Directive for legitimate comparativeadvertising, trade mark law may be invoked as a remedy. Thiswill be a relief to major brand owners for whom comparativeadvertising is commonly a concern.     

Durie v Gardiner: Public Libel Law and Stare Non Decisis

This note examines the controversial case of Durie v Gardiner, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which radically altered the nation's public libel jurisprudence. It argues that Durie is incorrect as a matter of public libel law for three reasons. First, both Durie judgments failed to engage in freedom of expression theorising. Second, this undertheorising has caused significant confusion in Durie, including misinterpretation of material facts, breakdown of the ‘theory-doctrine’ interface, and a precipitous and unwarranted dismissal of the Court of Appeal's settled public libel principles. Third, owing to these difficulties, the Durie courts were in no position to import a new ‘public interest’ defence from foreign jurisdictions. Above all, by hastening towards wholesale law reform and ignoring its earlier comparative law deliberations, Durie arguably scuppers public libel law's best hope for advancement.     

Eclipse of the Constitution {Europe Nouveau Siècle}

The Court of Justice of the European Union has come to adopt a peculiar mode of balancing, revolving around a set of ‘general principles of law’, which results in key social rights at the core of the postwar constitutional settlement no longer being sheltered from review by reference to supranational economic freedoms. It is submitted that this does not only imply a kind of ideological restyling of European law, as noted in the literature but, more fundamentally, the erosion of Europe's composite constitutional architecture (at once European and national) resulting from playing down social rights qua ‘constitutional essentials’. As the new jurisprudence ‘obscures’ Europe's constitutional constellation, it is submitted that the Court should rule under the constitution and not over it.