The world trading system: In the fog of uncertainty

The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was a transformative event in the world trading system in many ways. Most importantly among its unintended consequences were a North–South divide and a catalyst for new actors in the political economy of trade policy—the Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs. After considerable difficulty a new round was launched in Doha, Qatar in 2001. But the system has changed once again by the “new geography,” an emerging shift of power to the South. JEL codes F13 · F15 · F42 · L31     

The rise of “diminished multilateralism”: East Asian and European forum shopping in global governance

The article argues that the “principled multilateralism” of the immediate post-Cold War period is increasingly giving way to what may be called a “diminished multilateralism.” Newly emerging global and regional powers such as the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other rising powers in the Global South are increasingly questioning the legitimacy of the existing international architecture which they regard as a vehicle of the USA and Western countries to conserve their international influence in an era of rapid change. In the process, international institutions have increasingly become arenas of power rivalries which take the form of contests over access and membership, decision-making rules and normative order. The result is an increasing paralysis of these institutions and their inability to solve global problems. One aspect of these institutional power struggles is “forum shopping.” The article shows that East Asia and Europe have both become active players in forum shopping. Three conditions facilitated forum shopping: major crises and external shocks; sentiments of frustrated entitlement in connection with exclusive and discriminatory international institutions, and extra- and intra-regional power shifts.     

China as a ‘net donor’: tracking dollars and sense

The article examines China's emergence over the past decade as a net donor, and the implications of this status in global development. The analysis begins by outlining China's rise as a net donor, drawing comparisons in two-way aid flows with the other rising states, specifically Brazil, South Africa and India, and then turns to the implications of China's rise as an aid sender. The central argument is that conceptualizing China's rise as a ‘net donor’ is crucial for understanding the hybrid position that China has come to occupy in the global aid system, and the consequences of this positioning. Although China has achieved remarkable success with its own development, rather than join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) regime of traditional donors, the Chinese Communist Party and government leadership has chosen instead to continue to self-identify with the countries of the South, and to construct ties of South–South cooperation outside of DAC arrangements. The Chinese leadership is trying to stake out an unprecedented position in the global aid system, traversing the North–South divide, despite the fact that China has already joined the ranks of world economic powers.     

The Doha Round impasse: A graphical account

Several factors potentially responsible for the failure to conclude the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations are analyzed. A two-stage negotiation and ratification game between the “North” (industrialized countries) and the “South” (developing countries) is employed and collapses into a single diagram. The choice of negotiating agenda, principles, and currency of the Doha Round interact with domestic political factors in leading WTO members, the fast growth of exports prior to 2007, and pervasive unilateral trade reform to eliminate the “landing zone” for this particular multilateral negotiation. Recent emphasis on differences between developing countries and on Chinese WTO accession as independent causes of the impasse seems misplaced.     

The European Union, the Doha Round, and Asia

Agriculture has been the most contentious issue in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and the European Union (EU) intervenes substantially in agricultural markets. This paper reviews these interventions in light of the EU’s participation in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations with specific attention to Asia. It concludes that the offers made by the EU were designed precisely to avoid any real liberalization in its agricultural markets and have undermined the development aspirations of the round.

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An ocean for the Global South: Brazil and the zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic

In this article, we analyse an instance of revitalisation of a dormant interregional organisation dating back to the Cold War: the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS), initially launched by South American and African states in 1986 through the UN General Assembly. Drawing on the concepts of “consensual hegemony” we argue that the current phase of ZOPACAS’ existence is characterised by Brazil's efforts to rekindle it, thus reflecting its aspiration to create a new space of influence. Rather than pursuing more traditional forms of regional leadership, Brazil uses ZOPACAS as part of a persuasion-based strategy based on regional multilateralism that is designed in antagonism to other international organisations and Western powers. However, this strategy also faces important limitations resulting from resource constraints, lack of institutionalisation and an excessive exclusionary focus on minimising the role of global powers with interests in the region.     

The most-favored nation rule in principle and practice: Discrimination in the GATT

The conflicts of interest that prevailed between the great powers in the wake of the First World War eviscerated their ability to respond collectively to the advent of the Great Depression. Instead, each turned to discriminatory trade barriers and trade blocs to try to revive domestic output. Persuaded that trade discrimination exacerbated the political tensions that erupted in World War II, policy makers constructed a postwar economic order that institutionalized nondiscrimination. Thus, Article 1 of the charter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) mandates most-favored nation (MFN) treatment. We argue here that the MFN clause itself encouraged the adoption of practices and policies that actually recreated discrimination. In particular, we argue, developing countries, long regarded as victims of discrimination, institutionalized it in their negotiations with each other. We examine two developing country PTAs that included about 80 percent of all developing-country GATT members by output (the Global System of Trade Preferences and the Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations). We show that as in the GATT writ large, their patterns of tariff cuts and trade expansion were highly skewed toward a small number of their largest members. In trying to avoid discrimination, policy makers actually encouraged its de facto adoption.     

地区次大国缘何接受地区大国的领导

在地区权力结构不平衡的背景下,地区大国争取地区领导权的研究往往认为体系内的中小国家在功能上具有同质性,从而忽略了地区次大国的特殊性。事实上,地区次大国与地区小国的行为逻辑出发点不同,且对是否接受地区大国领导的态度表现存在差异。从地区等级的视角出发,可对全球各地区等级体系进行划分,并将主导地区等级体系变迁的内生动力归为地区权威的演化。基于此,本文依托地区权威二重性建立了以地区权威类型为核心解释变量的分析框架,呈现出地区次大国应对地区领导的因果机制。研究表明:地区次大国的态度取向与行为选择受到地区权威支配性(双边实力位差)与正当性(大国威胁程度、地区制度化水平和战略文化趋同性)的影响。在关系型权威下,地区次大国倾向于选择追随或承认战略;而在象征型权威下,地区次大国对地区大国易于表现为抵触或制衡行为。文章结合类型化与统计分析等方法对符合当今地区等级体系的总体经验事实进行跨地区全样本案例分析,结果验证了研究假设。充分把握地区等级体系中的次大国与大国互动规律对于地区大国领导力的平稳提升和地区战略稳定具有重要意义。     

Globalisation,Multipolarity and the L20 as an Alternative to the G8

The simultaneity of globalisation and the rise of powers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa are raising fundamental questions about the aptness of the contemporary global governance architecture. A few years ago, former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin proposed a “Leaders' 20” or “L20” as an apex body for global governance. After having put the L20 proposal in theoretical and historical perspective, the paper investigates structural trends in favour of the L20 proposal as well as obstacles to it. Taking into account the challenges the world's powerful states are facing, an enlargement of the G8 looks inevitable. But thus far the obstacles appear to be even stronger. The paper concludes by elaborating on the idea that neither conducing elements nor obstacles are deterministically given.     

Soft Power,Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The Lure of the Politics of Attraction

This article highlights and analyses a hitherto largely neglected dimension to the growing agency of large developing countries in global affairs: their hosting of international sports mega-events. Why are large developing countries hosting sports mega-events and what does this contemporary phenomenon tell us about the significance of, for example, the Olympics and the World Cup in global affairs? We explore these questions through brief examination of the cases of the three most active sports mega-event hosting states in recent times: Brazil, China and South Africa. The 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, and the upcoming 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games in Brazil provide interesting examples with which to explore developing country agency in the international system and in particular the discursive basis of that agency. We see the hosting of sports mega-events as the practice of public diplomacy by states to both demonstrate existing soft power capability as well as pursue its further enhancement.     

Investing in international security: rising powers and organizational choices

How do rising powers choose to allocate their finite resources among the multiple global and regional security organizations? Building on the literatures on forum shopping and rising powers, we argue that the different organizational investment choices of rising powers are explained by varying regional ideational affinities. Organizational settings have ideational foundations that can look very different from region to region. We argue that regional ideational affinity leads rising powers to invest in regional rather than global organizations. However, if the ideational composition of the region is highly diverse, global organizations are a better vehicle to accommodate rising powers’ emergent ambitions. To demonstrate our argument, we examine the choices of Brazil and South Africa in terms of their material and ideational investments in regional and global organizations.     

South Atlantic relations: from bilateral trade relations to multilateral coalition building

South Atlantic relations, under the leadership of Brazil and South Africa, have recently received a fresh breath of life. This article provides a general overview of developments and assesses aspects such as preferential trade agreements, multilateral coalition building and security cooperation in the context of South–South relations. The renewed impetus has resulted in improved influence and leverage from less developed Southern countries over the global political and economic agenda. New initiatives that have helped place the leaders of the South at the centre of the decision‐making process have emerged and are widely regarded as viable options for future progress in the developing world. These initiatives, which are driven by the growing strength of South Atlantic relations, are looked at in the broader context, from a practical perspective where tangible results are required over and above the ideals of solidarity to ensure sustainable socioeconomic development.     

The political economy of the Trans-Pacific Partnership: a US perspective

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), signed in February 2016, is the most ambitious free trade deal of the postwar era. The 12 TPP countries account for nearly 40 percent of the world's economy. Coupled with the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—which is still being negotiated between the United States and the European Union—the TPP represents an attempt by the Obama Administration to lead in promoting regional trade and investment arrangements despite the failure of the Doha Round to reach a comprehensive global trade deal under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. Although the agreement among the 12 TPP countries has been reached, ratification by their legislatures is pending. Ratification by the US Congress remains uncertain due to complex economic and political factors in the United States, including the presidential election of 2016.     

A. Johnstone,Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941–1948

Middle Powers are generally understood to perform diplomatic functions of constructive engagement and consensus-building to facilitate agreement in international negotiations. Middle Powers may, however, adopt more confrontational roles, especially when their accommodative functions become deficient. Whilst theoretical perspectives on Middle Powers account for such roles, limited empirical evidence has been provided to explore the conditions under which they revert to combative diplomacy. This article contributes to this area by examining the role of South Africa in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation. During this period, South Africa shifted to a more confrontational approach epitomised by the heightening of its public diplomacy against developed countries and its co-leadership of the G-20 coalition of developing countries. The Cancun Ministerial collapse reflected both the possibilities and limitations of combative diplomacy as South Africa enhanced its international prestige but failed to extract any meaningful concessions, whilst triggering the threat of diplomatic retaliation by the major trading powers.     

A New Politics of Confrontation? Brazil and India in Multilateral Trade Negotiations∗

Particularly in the North–South confrontation at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, developing countries seemed to be presenting a unified stance of resistance against the developed world. These developments were greeted with considerable surprise in the scholarly as well as policy communities, not least because many theorists of International Relations had predicted increasing homogenisation and policy convergence by developing countries around liberal solidarist norms. In this paper, we analyse the apparent revitalisation of the Third World, and evaluate the policies of developing countries at and around Cancun to assess the claims that this heralds a more activist and less accommodating period in North/South relations. We buttress this general analysis by probing further into the policies of two of the major players, namely Brazil and India. We argue that recent policy changes can be explained by learning and adaptation by developing countries within the specific institution of the World Trade Organisation. We examine this adaptation along four planes: coalitions, insider activism, negotiation strategies, and transnational coalitions. Domestic politics in both our country cases play, at best, a supportive role. We also investigate the extent to which these shifts in trade politics might be seen as broader shifts in foreign policy.     

日美贸易摩擦中三大谈判机制的对比研究

"市场导向的个别领域谈判"、"日美结构性障碍协议"、"日美经济框架对话"是战后日美双方缓解贸易摩擦的三大谈判机制。对三大谈判机制及其各自内部子议题的对比研究发现,贸易谈判中外压强度和谈判有效性之间并不存在对称关系。在这些谈判机制中,美国对日外压与日本国内的内压之间形成了动态的双层博弈。内压的结构与价值诉求、利益指向是分析贸易谈判的重要变量。     

冷战后印韩关系的迅速发展及其影响

与冷战时期的相互淡漠相比,冷战后印韩关系迅速发展,21世纪以来急剧升温。促成两国关系迅速发展的因素包括两国的相互认知、两国的亚洲战略、美国的亚太战略部署以及亚太局势的变化。印韩关系的迅速发展已经并将继续影响亚洲的政治安全局势和亚洲经济共同体的构建前景。有鉴于此,中国应该将全球战略的重点转向亚洲,重新思考亚洲国际秩序的建构。     

90年代印度实行经济外交的原因及主要措施

进入2 0世纪90年代,国际局势发生了巨大变化,而经济全球化的迅速发展使得经济实力在一国对外政策中的地位突显,因此,印度一直奉行的尼赫鲁外交思想已不适用,自1991年拉奥上台以后,印度对其外交政策进行了调整,推行经济外交,突出外交为经济发展服务,并通过经济手段发展与世界各国的关系,取得了显著效果。本文就印度实行经济外交的原因、主要措施与实践效果作一个简要分析。     

Agenda-setting from behind: India and the framework convention on climate change

ABSTRACT

India’s approach and policies at climate change negotiations have garnered considerable interest and attention. Over the last three decades, India’s positions have gained more importance as its carbon emissions rise. In this article, I explain India’s ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) using the New Interdependence approach, a framework that explains state behavior by analyzing how global rules affects the domestic politics and policymaking around a particular issue. Specifically, I map how the conflicts around which countries should address global warming influenced the domestic politics of climate change in India, particularly the rise of MEA in leading India’s policymaking on climate change, including FCCC negotiations. MEA’s political understanding of climate change, sharpened by two domestic environmental groups – TERI and CSE, decisively shaped India’s approach at FCCC negotiations. Indian negotiators focused on hammering the differences between developed and developing countries helping shape a Framework Convention that differentiated climate responsibilities based on development constraints.     

BRICSAM and the non–WTO

We highlight the seeming emergence globally of a non–WTO; a patchwork quilt of regional and bilateral trade management arrangements dealing with issues well beyond what the WTO covers and reflecting a wider and different set of concerns. In particular, we discuss recent regional trade and economic partnership agreements of a group of large population, developing economies (BRICSAM: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, ASEAN, and Mexico). Perhaps 50 out of 300 agreements that exist worldwide involve BRICSAM countries; most are recently concluded and will be implemented over the next few years. They exist along with extensive bilateral investment treaties, mutual recognition agreements, and other country to country (or region) arrangements. This paper aims to document and characterize the agreements and analyze their possible impacts. Agreements differ in specificity, coverage and content. In some treaties there are detailed and specific commitments, but these also co–exist with seemingly vague commitments and (at times) opaque dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. No overarching bloc–wide strategies seem to exist but whether these represent an emerging structure for newly negotiated reciprocity and trade management or instead largely limited content diplomatic initiatives which co–exist alongside significant WTO (World Trade Organisation) disciplines is the issue. This paper has been written as part of the BRICSAM project underway at The Centre for International Governance Innovation, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. We are grateful to Andrew Cooper, Sylvia Ostry, Daniel Schwanen, Terry Sicular, Gilbert Winham, Ron Wonnacott, and three anonymous reviewers for discussions and suggestions.