Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.     

The Transformation of Higher Education in Israel since the 1990s: The Role of Ideas and Policy Paradigms

This article examines the transformation of Israel's higher education system since the 1990s. During that period, the system underwent expansion, diversification, privatization, and internationalization in a series of pathbreaking reforms. The main argument is that while external factors—such as demographic trends—exerted pressure for change, the trajectory and policy options preferred were shaped by ideational factors. Policy entrepreneurs played a crucial role in advancing pathbreaking institutional change when they reframed policies through linking cognitive ideas of “what has to be done” with the normative ideas that granted legitimacy to the proposals for reform.     

The Scandinavian Welfare State: The Institutions of Growth, Governance, and Reform. Review Article

In a review of five recent works on Scandinavian politics and public policy, it is shown that the basis for talking about a Scandinavian model is unfounded. Politics and policies diverge from country to country and within each country from sector to sector as a result of institutional variation. This variation is embedded in institutional history which accounts for strong national path dependency in public policies. However, the institutional set-up at a given point in time also provides political actors with incentives for change. Two of the works reviewed take up this lead as they argue for institutional reform, in one case to protect the welfare state against political erosion, in the other case to facilitate renewed economic growth and improved living standards. The review concludes by arguing for the positive prospects for systematic comparative analysis of Scandinavian politics, providing a mixture of institutional and political similarities combined with theoretically relevant variation.     

Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.     

Contested governance: The new repertoire of the Eurozone crisis

The austerity policies that EU policymakers adopted in response to the Eurozone crisis are often criticized as the product of institutionalized neoliberal ideas. This critique has merits, but tends to overlook institutional changes that do not neatly conform to well demarcated neoliberal ideas considered as “switchmen,” “paradigms,” or “blueprints.” This article offers an alternative reading of the Eurozone's institutional evolution that bridges pragmatist scholarship with cognitive and social psychology. The Eurozone crisis saw the emergence of a new and contested repertoire of governance. Policymakers agreed that “stronger governance” was necessary, but they struggled over how to perform that repertoire. This contest ultimately produced institutional changes that typically mixed austerity and unconventional policies. The advantage of thinking about ideas in terms of repertoires that actors perform is to afford a more granular view of institutions as sites of individual cognition, collective innovation, and political contestation.     

State‐Building and the European Union's Fight against Corruption in the Southern Caucasus: Why Legitimacy Matters

This article asks under which conditions the state‐building efforts of external actors in areas of limited statehood are likely to be effective. We argue that the legitimacy of the specific norms promoted by external actors among local actors is crucial for their success in strengthening state capacities. International efforts need to resonate with prevalent social norms. To substantiate this argument, we focus on the European Union's (EU) anticorruption programs and their implementation in one of the most corrupt regions in the world, the Southern Caucasus. We show that legitimacy can explain why the EU's fight against corruption helped reduce corruption in Georgia but not in Armenia. In both countries, political elites could selectively use anticorruption programs as an instrument against political opponents, using enhanced state capacities to stabilize the incumbent regime. Only in Georgia, however, was the fight against corruption facilitated by sustained domestic mobilization for anticorruption policies that added pressure on political elites “from below.”     

How Policy Entrepreneurs Reduce Corruption in Israel

This article suggests a new perspective for analyzing anticorruption policies by emphasizing the important role of policy entrepreneurs. We maintain that these entrepreneurs combat corruption in three ways: (1) by initiating attempts to reduce corrupt practices, whether through legislation or judicial decisions; (2) by being recognized as honest brokers for informants and insiders; and (3) by providing reliable information from these sources to promote scandals. Even when they are unsuccessful in getting legislation passed, anticorruption entrepreneurs reduce corruption because they raise the level of scrutiny into corrupt practices. In addition, they foment uncertainty, deterring those considering abusing their power. We test our theoretical framework on several anticorruption entrepreneurs in Israel, demonstrating that their existence increases the potential cost of corruption. By creating networks, sharing information with others, and building reputations of honesty and courage, they encourage those involved in or considering illegal activities to refrain from such actions.     

Who Will Be the “Principled‐Principals”? Perceptions of Corruption and Willingness to Engage in Anticorruption Activism

Many anticorruption campaigns aim to encourage citizens to demand better control over corruption. Recent literature suggests that perceived high levels of corruption and government effectiveness in controlling corruption will limit citizens' willingness to actively oppose corruption. Using Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, we test these ideas across a 71‐country sample. We find that perceived government effectiveness tends to encourage anticorruption civic action, while perceptions of corruption being widespread tend to have the opposite impact in non‐OECD countries. Our analyses also suggest that the interaction between these perceptions is important; we find that, especially among those who perceive that the level of corruption is high, when confidence in the government's efforts grows, so does their willingness fight corruption.     

Legitimation as justification: Foregrounding public philosophies in explanations of gradual ideational change

In accounts of institutional change, discursive institutionalists point to the role of economic and political ideas in upending institutional stability and providing the raw material for the establishment of a new institutional setup. This approach has typically entailed a conceptualisation of ideas as coherent and monolithic and actors as almost automatically following the precepts of the ideas they hold and support. Recent theorising stresses how ideas are in fact composite and heterogeneous, and actors pragmatic and strategic in how they employ ideas in political struggles. However, this change of focus has, until recently, not included how foundational ideas of a polity, often referred to as ‘public philosophies’, are theorised to impact on institution-building. Drawing on French Pragmatic Sociology, and taking as a starting point recent efforts within discursive institutionalism to conceptualise the dynamic nature of public philosophies, this article seeks to foreground moral justification in accounts of ideational and institutional change. It suggests that public philosophies are reflexively used by actors in continual processes of normative justification that may produce significant policy shifts over time. The empirical relevance of the argument is demonstrated through an analysis of gradual ideational and institutional change in French labour market policy, specifically the development from the state-guaranteed minimum income scheme of 1988 to the neoliberal make-work-pay logic of the 2009 scheme, Revenu de solidarité active. The analysis shows that public and moral justifications have underpinned and gradually shaped these radical changes.     

Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of Central Banking Reform

Recent studies on institutional theory and the public policy field called for efforts to pry open the black box of institutional and policy change. This article offers a response to this call. It demonstrates that historical and discursive institutionalist approaches are complementary to explain how and why institutional change occurs. In addition, it shows how these approaches can add value to and benefit from the public policy and administration fields that seek to explain policy change and success. In particular, it emphasizes the interactions between structure and agency that contribute to the change. The empirical finding is based on qualitative analysis of central banking reform in Turkey. It suggests that institutional and policy change is more likely to occur when policy entrepreneurs, with joint membership in domestic and transnational policy communities, mediate various ideas and discourse within and among these communities in a punctuated institutional equilibrium.     

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

Despite strong whistleblowing intention, very few truly act to blow the whistle. Building on a random sample of local citizens with citywide anticorruption performance indicators, this study investigated the linkages between institutional anticorruption and citizens' whistleblowing acts, both directly and indirectly via situational settings (i.e., corruption incidence and corruptive climate). The findings confirmed the impacts of varying anticorruption practices and detected both direct and indirect trajectories. More judicial convictions against senior officials directly reduced citizens' subsequent whistleblowing acts, but also indirectly invited more as they signaled more ensuing corruption incidence, with overall effects toward reduced whistleblowing. More citywide public whistleblowing incentivized more individual whistleblowing subsequently; yet, such effects were canceled out as such practices also deterred ensuing corruption incidence and indirectly reduced citizens' acts. The total effects explained why there were so few acting whistleblowers. The study concludes with discussion of research findings and potential policy implications.     

反思与进展:新制度主义政治学的制度变迁理论

新制度主义政治理论被认为更有助于解释制度稳定与维持,而对制度变迁解释乏力,因为它仅把制度变迁看作是由外生因素引起的。面对这种批评,近年来,新制度主义者提出制度变迁的内生理论,并试图与外生理论结合起来,把制度的起源、稳定维持和急剧变动看成是一个统一的演化过程,更加注重制度变迁的历时与空间维度,对制度变迁中观念与制度的相互作用给予了更多的关注,洞悉路径依赖的多样性及其解释制度变迁的可能性。另外,制度变迁的动力与具体方式,制度的分层等问题也成为研究制度变迁的议题。新制度主义者的这些努力大大丰富了新制度主义对制度变迁的解释,增强了其理论说服力,但并没有解决批评者提出的所有问题,同时还带来了不少新问题。     

Europeanization and Institutional Change in Vocational Education and Training in Austria and Germany

This article analyzes how the EU's vocational education and training (VET) policy is reflected in domestic reforms in Germany and Austria. It perceives Europeanization as a heuristic concept to disentangle a twofold process of institutional change: The first process, the "Europeanized" arena of change, concerns change initiated by the reactions of domestic actors to EU initiatives; the second process of change—the "domestic" arena of change—concerns the ongoing incremental endogenous change in domestic institutions beneath and independent from the Europeanized arena of institutional change. This procedure allows us to differentiate between two modes of Europeanization: In Germany, Europeanization occurs as reform policies and politics; in Austria, Europeanization occurs more as institutional change by default, hence without strategically enacted reform initiatives shaped by the EU and as domestic institutional change that occurs anyway. The article combines the case-oriented method of difference with process tracing.     

Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF

Financial crises can trigger different actors to reassess their ideas, interests, and policies, and sometimes change them. The Global Financial Crisis triggered a reassessment at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the utility of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. In 2010, the IMF embarked upon an official reassessment of these issues and in 2012 published an official “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and managing capital flows that gives more caution toward capital account liberalization and endorses the use of capital controls in certain circumstances. This article traces the political process that yielded the IMF's new view and draws out lessons for thinking about policy change in global economic governance institutions.     

Policy makers,policy choices,and policy outcomes: The political economy of reform in developing countries

This article presents an analytic model for understanding the role of decision makers in bringing about significant policy and institutional changes and in understanding how processes of agenda setting, decision making, and implementation shape the content, timing, and sustainability of reform initiatives. Central to the model is the assertion that policy elites and the policy making process are important determinants of reform. The framework indicates that circumstances surrounding issue formation, the criteria that decision makers use to select among options, and the characteristics of specific policies are analytic categories that explain a considerable amount about reform outcomes. The model is based on cases developed by participants in twelve initiatives to bring about policy and institutional change in a variety of developing countries.     

Public sector innovation,e-government,and anticorruption in China and India: Insights from civil servants

Both China and India are adopting information and communication technologies to facilitate openness and transparency in their governments, and hence reduce corruption. Distinctive from their traditional anticorruption approaches, is the innovative e-government approach an effective solution to corruption in these two large developing countries? This paper addresses the question through comparative in-depth interviews with 44 mid- or senior-level officials in the public sector in these two countries. The first study of its kind, our research shows that civil servants in both countries overall think positively about transparency and technology in reducing corruption. However, to what extent these innovative measures will be effective is conditional on various factors, such as political willingness, income inequality, and infrastructure readiness. What is worth noting is that the Chinese respondents were more positive regarding the role of transparency, whereas the Indian respondents were more positive about the role of technology, which may reflect the different facilitators of corruption and the constraints of anticorruption in China and India.     

CAPITAL MOBILITY, DOMESTIC POLITICS, and FRENCH MONETARY DIPLOMACY

This article evaluates the role of increased capital mobility, sectoral interests, and domestic institutions in bringing about policy change in French capital markets. Capital mobility played an indirect role by making it more costly for French governments to pursue inflationary economic policies. But it was domestic politics, not capital mobility, that led governments to achieve lower inflation by stabilizing the exchange rate. The key domestic political factor was institutional change to regulatory practices, while financial markets reduced bank lending to industry and internationalized French finance, breaking the strong ties and comon monetary diplomacy interests of bankers, industralists, and policymakers, and thereby weaken the political priority of promoting domestic growth and industrial competitiveness.     

The new institutionalism and the study of the European union: The case of the social dialogue

This article applies new institutionalist perspectives on institutional change to the inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty of social dialogue provisions giving the social partners the right to participate in social policy‐making. It concludes that the new institutionalism cannot explain institutional change. By relying on exogenous variables such as ‘critical junctures’, ‘leadership’ or ‘ideas’, new institutionalist analyses resort to a collection of explanations that proponents of almost any theoretical perspective could use. The new institutionalisin's failure to develop an institutionalist account of change is a serious weakness that brings into question its use as an analytical tool in EU studies.     

“Big Tigers,Big Data”: Learning Social Reactions to China's Anticorruption Campaign through Online Feedback

This article examines the effect of campaign‐style anticorruption efforts on political support using the case of China's most recent anticorruption drive, which stands out for its harsh crackdown on high‐ranking officials, known as “big tigers.” An exploratory text analysis of more than 370,000 online comments on the downfall of the first 100 big tigers, from 2012 to 2015, reveals that public support for the top national leader who initiated the anticorruption campaign significantly exceeded that afforded to anticorruption agencies and institutions. Further regression analyses show that support for the leaders with respect to intuitions increased with the tigers' party ranking. Findings suggest that while campaign‐style enforcement can reinforce the central authority and magnify support for individual leaders, it may also marginalize the role of legal institutions crucial to long‐term corruption control.     

New Institutionalist Explanations for Institutional Change: A Note of Caution

This article demonstrates the explanatory poverty of new institutionalist hypotheses on institutional change. The new institutionalism fails to provide an adequate explanation of institutional change because, by relying on variables such as critical junctures, path dependency, leadership or the role of ideas, it leaves institutions behind and employs a grab-bag of explanations that proponents of almost any theoretical perspective could use. The conditions under which these variables matter are unspecified and the causal relevance of institutions themselves is unclear. New institutionalists should specify more rigorously the factors that change institutions and explicate the links between these factors and institutional change. Doing so, however, could mean abandoning their emphasis on the primacy of institutions in developing explanations for political phenomena.