论法官之裁判解释

近年来,在司法领域特别是刑事司法领域,出现了许多新型、疑难案件,在学界与司法机关、学者与法官之间引发了很多争论。对于法官来说,面对有争议的案件,不论是等待司法解释的出台,还是依靠上级法院的答复,或是依据法官的自由裁量权作出裁决,都可归结为是法官对法律的解释问题。因此,转变传统观念,正确界定裁判解释,确立正确的法律解释观,突破束缚法官进行法律适用的瓶颈,对于司法实践具有重要意义。一、对我国法律解释概念的考察近年来,我国法学理论界关于法律解释的研究十分活跃,但就法律解释的概念似乎尚未形成通说。按照张志铭教授在其《…     

刑事诉讼概念十辨——以《中国的司法改革》白皮书为视角

近年来中外法律交流日益频繁,中国积极向世界宣传司法改革的成果和了解世界法制状况.法律概念的翻译是交流的必要条件.笔者发现英文中有不少常用的法律概念在中国存在误解或误译,中国的法律文件中出现翻译或理解错误,反映了不少人对一些中外司法概念的异同理解不准,这个问题使外国人不能正确理解中国法制情况,也影响中国人对西方法制概念的认识,甚至影响到中国的司法改革.本文以中国政府2012年10月中英文发表的《中国的司法改革》白皮书中提及的刑事司法十个常用概念为例,辨析了刑事司法一些最基本概念中英文的异同,提出一些问题.这些问题看似很浅显,但特别重要,并不是翻译精确与否的简单问题,而是重要的法律研究课题.准确理解和翻译刑事诉讼中的概念,有利于向国际社会正确介绍我国司法改革的成果,了解国外刑事诉讼中有关概念的真实意义,有利于中外司法交流和借鉴,有利于我国司法与国际公约和国外司法制度的比较研究,有利于中国人对国外法律制度的正确认识,促进中国的司法改革.     

中国船舶碰撞之法律概念研究

《中华人民共和国海商法》明确规定了船舶碰撞的法律概念。然而,在司法实践和理论研究中,却存在着船舶"直接碰撞"和"间接碰撞"的争论,并由此导致了对同种事故的不同裁决。从文义解释、法律概念的生成及特征、立法技术等角度,运用比较、分析的方法对船舶碰撞的法律概念进行比较全面和深入的研究,以期能够明确船舶碰撞的法律概念,对统一船舶碰撞法律适用、维护司法法律权威有所裨益。     

谢觉哉同志在司法训练班的讲话(摘要)

我的讲话,如要有个题目,就是《在司法训练班的讲话》,我不想用课程表上的《马列主义的法律观》,我对马列主义的研究有限,说不上来,且我讲的内容,只是对解放区施行的司法工作的实际,加以一般地阐述。我们知道,要正确了解国家的概念,才能正确了解法律的概念。国家是     

论法律形式与法律渊源的界分

法律形式与法律渊源的关系比较复杂,但是我国学者一般将之作为等同的概念使用。这种观点导致了某些学术上的混乱,也导致法律形式和法律渊源各自的作用没能够充分发挥。正确界定法律渊源和法律形式,是实现二者区分的逻辑起点。法律形式是法律文本的表现方式;法律渊源是裁判规范的集合体,法官从中发现裁决案件所需要的裁判依据和裁判理由。由此可以得出二者之区分:从实践来看,法律渊源之法是指司法之法,法律形式之法是指立法之法;从内容来看,法律渊源之法是具有一定开放性的规则体系,而法律形式则是具有一定封闭性的规则体系;从路径来看,法律渊源之法是在司法适用过程发现和寻找的,法律形式之法是立法中形成的。司法适用之法完全局限于制定法之时,二者会出现种属统一,但是其概念内涵依然有着重大区别。     

论破产

破产是人们日常生活中经常使用的一个概念,也是一个重要的法律概念。作为一个法律概念,破产具有特定的含义。准确把握其含义,弄清其与法律领城之外的破产概念的区别,是正确研究、讨论破产法律制度的前提。破产(作为一个法律概念,下同)是债务人经济状况恶化,不能偿还其金钱债务时,为了满足多数债权人正当的清偿要求,而就债务人的总财产实行一般强制执行的裁判(司法)程     

论法国公共秩序理论的新发展——兼论我国民事立法与司法的启示

公共秩序从传统的政治、社会以及道德领域走向经济领域,于此,公共秩序具有保护性公共秩序与指导性公共秩序的区分。公共秩序在法律调整以及法律体系的构建与协调方面都具有重要的作用。法国司法实践已经改变了违反公共秩序概念的法律行为绝对无效的做法。我国民事立法需要以公序良俗的概念来取代传统的公共利益概念。在民事司法中,尽量避免适用公共利益对私人的法律行为进行判断,更不能一概地以此来判断法律行为为绝对无效。     

法律解释及其在法律适用中的作用

法律适用和法律解释的概念有广义与狭义之分。国外法理学者对法律适用过程的分析有助于对法律适用和法律解释二者关系的理解。探讨法律适用与法律解释的关系、明确法律解释的价值对有效弥合共性法律与个性案件之间的罅隙、保证法官正确适用法律、实现司法裁判法律效果与社会效果的双赢具有重要意义。     

论法律拟制、法律虚拟与制度修辞

法律拟制和法律虚拟是两个不同的法学概念,作为立法和法律运用的重要方式,两者本身预示着法律的修辞属性。法律拟制和法律虚拟分别勾连着立法和司法,从而可以在概念体系中进一步划分为立法拟制和司法拟制,立法虚拟和司法虚拟。这些概念都表明法律不仅是科学的、理性的、逻辑的规则体系,而且同时也是诠释的、诗性的、修辞的预设体系。因此,对法律不仅需要从科学、理性、逻辑的观点看,而且也要从诠释、诗性和修辞的观点看。只有把法律作为制度修辞,法律的逻辑推论才有展开的前提条件。     

中国司法概念史研究

司法这一概念的发展在中国历史上经历了三个阶段:古代的司法、新法律传统中的司法和现制中的司法。在正史中,司法作为学理用语最早出现在《汉书》中,作为政府职务,它最早出现在隋代,历唐、宋而亡。古代司法的核心意义是"司刑",与税收、户籍管理一样,是地方政府的一项行政职能。新法律传统中的司法出现于清末变法后,它的核心含义是与立法、行政相对立的审判,是宪政概念下的法概念。同时,司法也保留了行政意义,是指称行政机关中与审判相关的事务。现制下,司法一度被负面化并从政治法律语言中消失了20多年,改革开放以后,司法得以复活,这是改革开放的产物。但是,司法与宪政的意义关联被忽略,这需要学界作进一步的努力。     

两大法系形成理念之差异——以两大法系的民法存在形式为视角

本文试图以两大法系的民法存在形式为视角,探讨隐藏在法律制度背后,对两大法系的法律制度形成、发展起着指引作用的形成理念上的差异,并以此为基础探讨我国民事法律建构理念之取向。     

法律推理的客观性及其实现条件

20世纪西方法理学经历了从法律确定性向法律不确定性的转向，以“唯一正确答案”为核心的法律确定性难以成立。然而，这并不会影响法律确定性所追求的限制权力这一政治目标的实现，恰当阐释的法律客观性观念可以作为法治的基石。共同的社会文化背景、适当的法律推理思维方法、成熟的法律职业共同体三者的共同作用将为法律推理的客观性的实现提供保障。     

法律全球化：争论与出路

围绕着法律全球化问题,我国学者产生了有没有、要不要和如何进行的三重争议,由于这些争议是在没有对全球化做出前提性界定的基础上进行的,所以总是陷入事实与价值两极之争的困境之中。我们引入“过程”论来理解全球化的思想,意在指出从发展路向上看全球化有不同的阶段且每个阶段都有它的内在规定性。从当下的阶段来看,全球化已经把世界联结为一个异质的整体,从性质上说这个整体是事实和价值的统一体。它们一起对法律全球化的过程、制度和理念起着规制作用。理解这种“过程”论要求我们从根本上转换现代法的精神,即促进权利范式的发展、培育新的自由理念和参与全球法律制度竞争与全球治理。     

法律全球化新论——从辩证与历史唯物主义的视觉

在经济全球化成为时代主旋律的背景下,西方学者形形色色的法律全球化理论纷涌而上,并引发包括中国在内的广大发展中国家的学者广泛思考。事实上,无论是在东西方,法律全球化皆是一个全新课题,它的内涵是否具备科学性;它是否是已存在事实或客观发展趋势;它是否是经济全球化的必然要求或反映以及其与国家主权之间是此消彼长还是辩证统一关系等等,都是很值得研究的问题。本文正立足于此,拟从马克思主义唯物辩证法与唯物史观的角度,对这些问题作出探讨,以求得抛砖引玉之效。     

Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ??intention?? into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ??ought??. The methodological strategy is the ??inversion thesis?? which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ??will?? or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ??objectifies?? the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ??will??, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ??ought?? and therefore the ??will??. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen??s own notions, I will show that Kelsen??s ??inversion thesis?? is parasitic on Aristotle?CAnscombe??s ??ought??.     

权利冲突论——一个法律实证主义的分析

权利冲突普遍存在于我们的法律生活、司法实践之中 ,而权利冲突本身却是一个尚未被我们深入研究的问题 ,目前国内法学界仅有几篇文章对此问题进行了探讨。有鉴于此 ,本文试图通过初步地讨论权利冲突的概念、原因及解决等几个相关问题来澄清人们对权利冲突的认识。     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

Retributivism and Legal Moralism

This article examines whether a retributivist conception of punishment implies legal moralism and asks what liberalism implies about retributivism and moralism. It makes a case for accepting the weak retributivist thesis that culpable wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for blame and punishment and the weak moralist claim that moral wrongdoing creates a pro tanto case for legal regulation. This weak moralist claim is compatible with the liberal claim that the legal enforcement of morality is rarely all‐thing‐considered desirable. Though weak moralism has some plausibility, it does not follow from weak retributivism if legitimate state functions are limited in certain ways.     

Conceptions Of Liberty Deprivation

This article adopts a theoretical and comparative perspective on the prisoner's legal status in England and Wales. Applying the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality, it argues that the prisoner's legal status must rest on a divisible conception of liberty. Such a conception must distinguish clearly between the liberty lost, and the rights restricted, by the imposition of the custodial sentence as opposed to the administration of prisons (the key distinction). In order for this to be achieved, the conception of the prisoner's legal status must also establish the purpose or purposes of the custodial sanction as distinct from the purpose of prison administration. Through comparison with Germany, the article demonstrates that the common law concept of the prisoner's legal status is unstable. Vacillating between a divisible and indivisible conception of the prisoner's liberty, the English conception of the prisoner's legal status lacks a foundation firm enough to satisfy the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality.