Ukraine,Russia and the strategic partnership dynamics in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: recalibrating the EU’s ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’

The present contribution explores the changing relationship between the European Union (EU) and the two largest countries in its eastern neighbourhood, namely Ukraine and Russia, between 1991 and 2014. Taking the differential between the existence of the EU Strategic Partnership (SP) with Russia and the absence of such an arrangement in the relationship with Ukraine as a point of departure, it investigates how the EU has dealt with different aspirations and challenges stemming from its two largest eastern neighbours. Adopting the Social Identity Theory perspective, the contribution analyses the interrelationship between the evolution of the EU’s SP approach towards the eastern neighbours and the development of (particular dimensions of) the EU’s identity. It demonstrates how the process of categorization relating to the ideational ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’ took place; and how only the EU’s relationship with Russia and not that with Ukraine has accumulated the discursive markers of a strategic partnership. The contribution, furthermore, analyses the challenges to the EU changing approach stemming from the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis.     

Political factors affecting cooperation between Italy,Greece and Turkey

The rise of political Islam in the EU's southern neighbourhood represents a political as well as conceptual challenge to the EU as a foreign policy actor. In the past, the EU reacted to this challenge based on its essentialist perception of political Islam and its overarching interest in regional stability and security. However, the growing salience of ‘contingencist’ interpretations of political Islam and the resolution of the EU's democratisation-stabilisation dilemma in the wake of the Arab Spring have recently provided an opportunity for greater engagement and cooperation. This has enabled a switch in EU policies from a strategy of containment to a strategy of engagement. Despite this, problems remain as the EU continues to expect Islamist actors to adjust to its own discursive framework and as intra-European divisions revive as a result of the renewal of secular-religious divisions in the neighbourhood. This will complicate EU attempts to build a new partnership with Islamist democracies and will fuel old stereotypes and animosities.     

Unintended Consequences of EU Democracy Support in the European Neighbourhood

ABSTRACT

The European Union’s (EU) impact on the political governance of the European neighbourhood is varied and sometimes opposite to the declared objectives of its democracy support policies. The democracy promotion literature has to a large extent neglected the unintended consequences of EU democracy support in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. The EU has left multiple imprints on the political trajectories of the countries in the neighbourhood and yet the dominant explanation, highlighting the EU’s security and economic interests in the two regions,cannot fully account for the unintended consequences of its policies. The literature on the ‘pathologies’ of international organisations offers an explanation, emphasizing the failures of the EU bureaucracy to anticipate, prevent or reverse the undesired effects of its democracy support in the neighbourhood.     

Regional institutions: State withering or consolidation. the case of the Arab summits

The European Commission has spelled out its policy ambition for EU energy cooperation with the southern neighbourhood with plans for the establishment of an ‘Energy Community’. Its communications make clear that an Energy Community should be based on regulatory convergence with the EU acquis communautaire, much in the same vein as the existing institution carrying the same name; the Energy Community with Southeast Europe. It is puzzling that the Commission insists on repackaging this enlargement concept in a region with very different types of relationships vis-à-vis the EU, especially when considering the lukewarm position of key stakeholders in the field. According to them, any attempt to introduce a political integration model in this highly sensitive issue area in the politically fragmented MENA region might run the risk of hurting the incremental technical integration process that has slowly emerged over the past few years.     

The Unintended Consequences of a European Neighbourhood Policy without Russia

ABSTRACT

After Russia’s retreat from the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU’s policy towards its eastern neighbours was split up. The internal unintended consequence of the EU’s choice to leave its policy unaltered was a tension between the objective of privileged relations with ENP countries and a promise to recognise the interests of Russia as an equal partner. Externally, the unintended outcome was that this fostered two opposing strategic environments: a cooperative one for the EaP and a competitive one with Russia. In terms of the management of unintended consequences, the EU has actively sought to reinforce its normative hegemony towards EaP countries, while at the same time mitigating certain negative unintended effects.     

Framing the EU’s policy towards the neighbourhood: the strategic approach of the Seventh European Parliament (2009–2014)*

The Lisbon treaty afforded the European Parliament (EP) increased powers in foreign policy. These have included new legislative competences in the area of international agreements or the European Union’s (EU) relations with third party states. This article analyses the way the last mandate of the EP, which was the first to benefit from the changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty, framed EU foreign policy. More specifically, it explores the way in which the EP strategically framed the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood countries. The focus on the neighbourhood is justified by the fact that it is the most salient area of the EU’s foreign policy. The article shows that the EP pushed for the EU to have a stronger presence in the neighbourhood. The EP also strategically aimed that it should have a more central role in shaping the EU’s approach towards the neighbourhood.     

Fostering Security in Southeastern Europe: A Role for the EAPC

China’s regional policy is mainly centred on its efforts to forge a friendly, stable and prosperous neighbourhood. To achieve this end, China has developed an approach combining both partnership bilateralism and tailored regional multilateralism. By and large, China does not consider its neighbourhood as a whole and has been very cautious and hesitant to engage in overarching ‘region-building’. China has relied mostly on soft (attractive) use of power, particularly economic power, supported by cultural and assurance diplomacy, even though diplomatic and economic coercion have been exercised occasionally. China has once again become the biggest economy in Asia. Yet, neither the new power configuration in Asia nor China’s own ambitions point to a return to the old ‘Middle Kingdom’ with China holding a dominant position in its neighbourhood. China will most probably continue to see itself as a self-restrained regional power in the foreseeable future.     

By‐laws of I.A.I.

The launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) marks the most significant change to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) since it was launched in 2004. In the wake of the Georgia war in August 2008 and yet another gas crisis in January 2009, the EU clearly needs a more constructive policy towards Eastern Europe. But both the ENP and EaP are based on a contradiction. They offer only the remotest possibility of eventual accession to the EU, but are still based on “accession-light” assumptions, applying the conditionality model of the 1990s to weak states that are a long way from meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The priority in the eastern neighbourhood is not building potential members states but strengthening sovereignty, in the face of an increasingly assertive Russian neighbourhood policy. The game is playing the west off against Russia for geopolitical reward.     

Interregional relations and legitimacy in global governance: the EU in ASEM

This article explores the ramifications of the European Union’s (EU) internal legitimacy debate for its external relations. It applies the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) as a case study to examine the EU’s attempts to promote legitimacy in global governance, more specifically in interregional institutions. The article’s theoretical framework draws from the EU’s legitimacy debate. It identifies three key sources of legitimacy, namely, (i) input legitimacy or democratic control and accountability, (ii) output legitimacy or performance and achievement of core purposes, and (iii) the degree of common identity as externalised through collective representation and the articulation of shared norms and values. The empirical analysis thereafter leads to three observations. First, the EU’s presence has contributed to an increased democratic involvement by ASEM’s different stakeholders including parliaments and civil society. Second, purely from an institutional legitimacy perspective ASEM achieves its purpose as a forum to ‘constructively engage’ with Asian countries and address issues relating to global governance. Third, ASEM reveals the EU’s dual identity as an intergovernmental grouping and an organisation with a gradually increasing capacity of collective representation. However, the advancement of the EU’s normative objectives through ASEM has been problematic, leading to a more interest-based and pragmatic policy path. The article concludes that the EU’s legitimacy debate has had a bearing on relations with Asia and, in particular, with ASEM. Importantly, and given the EU’s setbacks, some elements of the ‘EU’s way’ have proven successful in promoting democratic notions of legitimacy beyond the state.     

The European Union’s trade and investment policy in Asia: new challenges and opportunities in a changing global environment – or: following individual roadmaps

Asia is Europe’s largest trading partner and EU-Asia trade relations have undergone a rapid change since the global financial crisis. On a global scale, the new multilateral trade agreements such as the now stalled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) involving European Unions’ (EU) major trading partners such as Japan, Singapore and Vietnam also have the potential to change the trade equations. In this paper, we evaluate the new EU trade policy which has been designed to ensure that the EU benefits from the changing global trade scenario and also look at the steps which have been taken by the EU to promote trade relations with its major trading partners in Asia in the predicted ‘Asian century’. We look into the Free Trade Agreements, which are being negotiated with its Asian partners and seek to understand the reasons which have resulted in delays in their signing and negotiations. We evaluate new policies pushed forward by its Asian partners such as the One Belt One Road policy by China and Japan’s policy of securing a large number of trading agreements in the America. Moving ahead, we also shed light on the indirect factors that may influence the success of EU trade negotiations in Asia such as the EU policy on granting China market economy status and the commencement of the ‘Brexit’ process. Lastly, we try to present a list of immediate priorities for EU in Asia, which will ensure that it secures a toehold in trade with the region. All in all, it is shown that the EU has not one and the same approach for all Asian countries but it negotiates flexibly and individually country by country. Because of this “country by country approach” the EU is also not ready to enter into general EU-ASEAN trade negotiations again.     

Visa liberalization processes in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood: understanding policy outcomes

Focusing on EU visa liberalization policy with Russia and Eastern Partnership countries as a case study, this article seeks to investigate the drivers of EU external migration policy in regards to its neighbourhood. In doing so, the article seeks to understand whether policy objectives and instruments employed by the EU emphasize security or normative considerations, or both. It also scrutinizes the factors behind this emphasis. In particular, it examines the degree to which EU external migration policy is framed by intra-EU bargaining and interaction with partner countries. The hybrid nature of EU visa policy towards its neighbourhood stems first and foremost from persisting differences in the prioritization of security and values among the major EU actors involved in the policy process. Yet as the article argues, interaction with partner countries crucially shapes the outcomes of the visa liberalization policy, thereby altering the balance between normative and security considerations that results from negotiations between EU actors.     

Rising to the Challenge: Europe’s Security Policy in East Asia amid US-China Rivalry

ABSTRACT

China’s growing power and assertiveness towards its smaller and weaker neighbours has been a wakeup call for the European Union and its member states which, as a result, have stepped up their involvement in East Asia. EU security policy in the region shows many elements of alignment with the United States, but also differences. In North East Asia, the EU has adopted harsh sanctions against North Korea but, contrary to the Trump administration which continues to seek regime change, has left the door open for dialogue. Moreover, the EU supports the process of trilateral cooperation among China, Japan and South Korea, while Washington has traditionally been lukewarm towards a process that excludes the US and risks being dominated by Beijing. The transatlantic allies also show differing approaches with regard to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. While EU security policy in East Asia is largely complementary to that of Washington, in some cases Europe tends – albeit inadvertently – to favour Beijing.     

A Game Changer in EU-Turkey Relations: The Opportunities and Pitfalls of Migration Policy

ABSTRACT

The mass migration from Syria has been a major turning point and an important ‘game changer’ in EU-Turkey relations, as it marks a watershed in immigration and asylum between two periods: from 1999 to 2011 and from 2011 to the present. During the first period, the EU was one of the driving forces of change in Turkey’s immigration and asylum policy, along with significant migration movements from the Middle East. Although EU demands were largely implemented due to the country’s changing migration profile, there was also ongoing resistance and reluctance towards the EU, thus a certain degree of conditionality. With the Syrian mass migration in 2011, however, and in particular the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ in 2015, Turkey started to use migration as a foreign policy tool with which to oppose EU conditionality.     

The substance of EU democratic governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation with the Eastern neighbourhood

Existing studies of the European Union’s (EU) democratic governance promotion via transgovernmental cooperation in the EU’s neighbourhood seem to take the substance of what is being promoted by the EU for granted. In filling this gap, this article examines the substance of EU democratic governance promotion by assessing (1) to what extent norms of democratic governance appear in EU Twinning projects implemented in the Eastern neighbourhood, and (2) what factors account for differences in the presence of democratic governance norms across those projects. To explain possible variation, the article hypothesizes that the democratic governance substance of Twinning projects will vary with the country’s political liberalization, sector politicization, sector technical complexity, and EU conditionality attached to reform progress in a given policy sector. Data are retrieved from a content analysis of 117 Twinning project fiches from the Eastern neighbourhood and analysed via standard multiple regression. The article finds that the EU mostly promotes moderate, mixed democratic governance substance, which varies across different projects. This variation may be best explained by the level of political liberalization of the beneficiary country and the politicization and technical complexity of the policy sectors and institutions involved in respective Twinning projects.     

Making sense of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings: foreign policy practice at times of crisis

ABSTRACT

The Arab uprisings of 2011 put into question previously held understandings about the stability of authoritarian regimes in North Africa as well as the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with countries in its southern neighbourhood. Despite early calls on behalf of the EU to change its policies, the Union’s responses in the early stages seemed mostly characterised by continuity. This article claims that certain dispositions and background knowledge developed over several decades vis-à-vis EU’s Mediterranean policies served as a baseline from which EU officials and diplomats acted. Drawing on insights from practice approaches, the article argues that the practical understandings on what the EU can (and cannot) do vis-à-vis partner countries in North Africa create a kind of power politics of practical dispositions. The article focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy - the EU’s flagship initiative - and builds on a unique set of data that combine policy documents and interviews with about 30 EU officials and national diplomats from before and after the Arab uprisings. In this way, it illustrates how practice relates to change in that even though the EU’s responses drew on an established repertoire of practice, enacting it in a new context opened up new possibilities for action.     

Liberalism and geopolitics in EU–Russia relations: rereading the “Baltic factor”

Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.     

The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran

Abstract

This paper explores EU policy towards Iran to challenge the common implicit or explicit notion that the EU's ‘actorness’ in the international system rests primarily, or solely, on its Pillar I external relations. Utilising criteria developed to examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU, the article explores this policy area to demonstrate that the EU's ‘actorness’ resulted not only from the ‘Community’ aspects of foreign policy, but also from its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).     

The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries

This article assesses how and to what extent the European Union (EU) uses a security perspective to define and shape its relationship with the developing world. In order to evaluate the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries we link the concept of ‘security–development nexus’ with the concept of ‘securitization’. The article examines whether securitization can be observed with regard to four dimensions: discourse, policy instruments, policy actions and institutional framework. The analysis demonstrates a securitization of the EU's development policy and its relations with developing countries, particularly in Africa. However, paradoxically, the securitization's extent and nature suggest that the EU can also use it as a way to avoid a more direct involvement in conflict areas.     

Europe’s engagement with China: shifting Chinese views of the EU and the EU-China relationship

This article discusses the dramatic recent shifts in Chinese policy perspectives on the European Union (EU) and on EU-China relations. Whereas for more than a decade, policy makers and Europe specialists in China had regarded the EU as an exemplar of regional integration and as a promising new ‘pole’ in the global order, a recent survey shows that today, in the wake of the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and the ‘Brexit’ referendum, many perceive the EU as a troubled actor unfit to deal with the existential challenges confronting it, let alone play a credible leadership role beyond its own borders. Despite this, Beijing’s ambitious international agenda at a time of increasing global uncertainty guarantees China’s ever-growing stake in building a reliable, long-term partnership with the EU, even though recent Chinese diplomatic and economic initiatives are gravitating toward the Union’s periphery, targeting subregional groupings of Member States along Europe’s re-emerging, traditional fault lines. Based on the research findings presented in this paper, the authors argue that the EU and the Member States need to rethink the basic assumptions underlying their China policies in the so-called ‘New Era’ and explore new approaches of engagement that match these shifting perceptions, policies and political realities.     

The European Union Global Strategy: What Kind of Foreign Policy Identity?

Some dismiss the recent EU Global Strategy as a “triumph of hope over experience”, an impracticable and therefore ultimately irrelevant statement; others are enthusiastic about what they see as perseverance and renewed ambition in the face of the present crisis. Although the 2016 Strategy appears more modest than its 2003 predecessor in operational terms, the range of deliberations that fed into it and the quality of the document itself demonstrate a greater maturity of reflection on foreign policy. A critical reading of the document shows that concepts such as normative power and differentiated inclusion of neighbours in the EU’s system of governance have all but disappeared. The emerging EU identity appears to be debilitated by the centrifugal processes of internal contestation and a drastically downsized claim for external power projection. An alternative plan for action will have to deal with the Union’s vulnerabilities and carve out a role that is distinct, yet in line with this new self-understanding.