How practices do not matter

Abstract

In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practice-dependence. Instead of claiming that principles of justice must be practice-dependent, he now expresses his claim in a modal form, arguing that there are several ways in which practices may matter. While merely mapping out the logical space of possibilities seems to look like a modest ambition, the conditions for when practices do matter according to Sangiovanni’s analysis are easily met in actuality. Consequently, if he is right, the practice-dependent approach covers a significant number of political theories. Sangiovanni’s main claim is that higher-level principles with an open texture, which include most higher-level principles in political philosophy, justify a practice-dependent method in the form of a mode of application called ‘mediated deduction,’ according to which a thoroughgoing investigation is made of the nature of the target practice. Our task in this paper is to reject this claim. This is done in two steps. First, we question Sangiovanni’s distinction between instrumental application and mediated deduction, arguing that it remains unclear whether it marks out two sufficiently distinct ‘modes’ to do any theoretical work. Second, we argue that the practice-dependent method is not required even if two such modes are established.     

Methodological development: structured outcome assessment and community risk monitoring (SORM)

This paper describes an effort to develop a clinical tool for the continuous monitoring of risk for violence in forensic mental health clients who have left their institutions and who are dwelling in the community on a conditional release basis. The model is called Structured Outcome Assessment and Community Risk Monitoring (SORM). The SORM consists of 30 dynamic factors and each factor in SORM is assessed in two ways: The current absence, presence or partial och intermittent presence of the factors, which is an actuarial (systematized and 'objective') assessment. Secondly, the risk effect, i.e. whether the presence/absence of factors currently increases, decreases or is perceived as unrelated to violence risk, is a clinical (or impressionistic) assessment. Thus, the factors considered via the SORM can be coded as risk factors or protective factors (or as factors unimportant to risk of violence) depending on circumstances that apply in the individual case. Further, the SORM has a built-in module for gathering idiographical information about risk-affecting contextual factors. The use of the SORM and its potential as a risk monitoring instrument is illustrated via preliminary data and case vignettes from an ongoing multicenter project. In this research project, patients leaving any of the 9 participating forensic hospitals in Sweden is assessed at release on a variety of static background factors, and the SORM is then administered every 30 days for 2 years.     

Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006

This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951–2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.     

Who wants to pay more? The European Union's military operations and the dispute over financial burden sharing

In 2014, the European Union (EU) launched the sixth review of the Athena mechanism that finances the common costs of military operations launched in the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In the run up to the review, there were expectations that it would improve financial burden sharing in CSDP operations by expanding common funding for them. However, these hopes were disappointed; the review became a diplomatic tug of war between France, the strongest supporter of expanded common funding, and the UK, its strongest opponent. In the end, France agreed to the UK's terms to ensure that the existing level of common funding would not decrease. This article analyses the Athena review from a neoclassical realist perspective. It argues that the review's outcome was due to the imbalance of influence among EU member states and the diverging preferences of their Foreign Policy Executives (FPEs). These factors caused the Athena review to remain in the hands of a small group of member states that had diverging utility expectations and ideological preferences. Thus, the article shows that a surprisingly intense burden-sharing dispute has emerged within CSDP.     

Making sense of the EU’s response to the Arab uprisings: foreign policy practice at times of crisis

ABSTRACT

The Arab uprisings of 2011 put into question previously held understandings about the stability of authoritarian regimes in North Africa as well as the European Union’s (EU’s) relations with countries in its southern neighbourhood. Despite early calls on behalf of the EU to change its policies, the Union’s responses in the early stages seemed mostly characterised by continuity. This article claims that certain dispositions and background knowledge developed over several decades vis-à-vis EU’s Mediterranean policies served as a baseline from which EU officials and diplomats acted. Drawing on insights from practice approaches, the article argues that the practical understandings on what the EU can (and cannot) do vis-à-vis partner countries in North Africa create a kind of power politics of practical dispositions. The article focuses on the European Neighbourhood Policy - the EU’s flagship initiative - and builds on a unique set of data that combine policy documents and interviews with about 30 EU officials and national diplomats from before and after the Arab uprisings. In this way, it illustrates how practice relates to change in that even though the EU’s responses drew on an established repertoire of practice, enacting it in a new context opened up new possibilities for action.     

Moral judgement,cognitive distortions and empathy in incarcerated delinquent and community control adolescents

Abstract

Immature moral judgements, cognitive distortions and low empathy could contribute to criminal offending and are often targeted in interventions aimed at reducing risk of recidivism. We compared 58 delinquent 13–18-year-olds, incarcerated in youth homes in Sweden (29 males, 29 females) with 58 (29 males, 29 females) community control adolescents individually matched on age, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic position. Self-report questionnaires examined moral judgement, cognitive distortions, and empathy. Delinquent adolescents exhibited less mature moral judgements and more cognitive distortions than control adolescents. However, no association between delinquency status and self-reported empathy was found. In addition, girls reported more mature moral judgements, less cognitive distortions and more empathy than boys did. Moral judgement and empathy were positively correlated and both measures were negatively correlated with cognitive distortions. Our data support the idea that moral judgement and cognitive distortions are important treatment targets for juvenile delinquents, whereas empathy may be less meaningful to address directly.     

Democracy and countries with Muslim majorities: a reply and update

My empirical results in Potrafke (2012) confirm past conclusions that Muslim-majority countries are less likely to be democratic. Hanusch takes issue with my results—and by inference with all past empirical results on the relation between Islam and democracy. In his comment on my study, Hanusch indicates that he believes I was using the POLITY IV index. He has not realized, as I made most clear, that the purpose of my study was to show results based on new data from Cheibub et al. (2010). Hanusch claims to have reversed the conclusion that having a Muslim majority is associated with having autocratic government. He establishes his conclusion by excluding the heartland of Islam from the estimation sample. For his estimates, Hanusch moreover uses data that do not appear to exist, at least in the claimed sources. I update my estimates to address issues that Hanusch raises. My new results confirm the conclusion that countries with Muslim majorities are less likely to be democracies. In deriving this result, I do not follow the strategy proposed by Hanusch of excluding from the data sample the countries in the heartland of Islam.     

Amalgamation Impacts on Local Public Expenditures in Sweden

This paper concerns amalgamation impacts on local public expenditures. The empirical analysis is based on the extensive 1952 municipal reform in Sweden. The 1952 reform amalgamated municipalities in a way that they had at least 2,000–3,500 inhabitants. This was done in the belief that larger municipalities would improve administration efficiency and public services by exploiting economies of scale. The results show that the reform had a negative impact on expenditures as long as the municipalities did not exceed a critical size.     

Sino–Russian Relations at the Start of the New Millennium in Central Asia and Beyond

Sino–Russian relations have swayed considerably in the second millennium. During the Yeltsin era, China–Russia relations were still strong, but this changed abruptly after Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000 and his initial pro-Western adventures. This was, in no small part, due to Russia's involvement in the war on terror, together with Russia's complicity in a US military presence in Central Asia which did not go down well in Beijing. Putin's domestic constituency found his swing into Washington's fold equally awkward, which created no small amount of criticism in Russia. Convinced that things could not get much worse, Putin's acceptance of NATO's expansion into the Baltics, his approval of US withdrawal from the ABM-treaty, and his quiet consent for an American military presence in Georgia raised additional fears in the Duma, within Russian public opinion, and to some extent among the Chinese. This was perceived as a direct surrender to American superiority and aggression, and it would not last for long.     

Do Anti‐immigration Parties Matter? The Case of the Sweden Democrats and Local Refugee Policy

With the increased electoral success of anti‐immigration parties, questions regarding what impact the parties actually have naturally follow. Previous research has rarely explored this question. Furthermore, within this body of research, one is given different answers. While some argue that anti‐immigration parties have made an impact on public policy, others find no such evidence. This article shows that some of this inconsistency is a consequence of the methodological strategies that have been employed. Previous studies are either single case studies or comparisons of a small number of countries. Consequently, different parties in different institutional settings are compared, making it difficult to estimate the actual impact of the party of interest. In order to circumvent such methodological problems, this article explores the question of anti‐immigration party impact on a local level and asks if the Sweden Democrats (SD) have managed to influence decisions on refugee reception in Swedish municipalities. The analysis shows mixed results. First, while unable to find an independent effect of the size of the representation of the SD, it appears that the party's impact is conditioned by them holding the balance of power. Second, the SD's impact is not dependent upon whether there is right‐wing or left‐wing rule, although local migration policy is stricter when the main right‐wing party has strong support.