Saudi Arabia's Policy Toward non-OPEC Countries

The 2008 energy crisis raises questions with regard to Saudi Arabia's status in the global oil market in general and within the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in particular. Over time, several circumstances such as disagreement amongst OPEC members, the challenge of the alternative energy industry, and the growing influence of petro-traders have restricted Saudi Arabia's influence on the oil market in general and within OPEC in particular. This commentary adds another dimension to the analysis of Saudi Arabia's status in the oil market, by defining the relations between Saudi Arabia and two leading and important oil exporters unaffiliated to any petroleum organisations: Russia and Norway.     

‘I'm glad I'm not a Saudi woman’: the First Gulf War and US encounters with Saudi gender relations

On 6 November 1990, nearly 50 Saudi women staged a protest against the ban on women operating motor vehicles in Saudi Arabia. Occurring in the midst of the First Gulf War, the women's protest was a political statement about the harsh restrictions placed on women in the Middle Eastern country which both reflected and influenced Saudi society’s encounter with their American allies during the war. When United States (US) military personnel flooded into Saudi Arabia during the war, they were shocked at the way American servicewomen were treated by their Saudi allies and the second-class status of Saudi women throughout the country. This article explores Americans' reactions to their encounter with Saudi gender relations during the war and argues that the poor treatment of women in Saudi Arabia—which Americans dubbed ‘gender apartheid’—caused many Americans to question the longstanding US alliance with the conservative Muslim country. In doing so, US journalists, military personnel, scholars and the general public began to demand that concern about women's rights should be integrated seriously into US foreign policy towards the Muslim world.     

The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy and the Role of Decision-making Processes and Actors

Abstract

Saudi Arabia has witnessed a centralisation of power in the office of the deputy crown prince, which has amounted to a shift in decision-making from consensual and deliberative to swift and adventurous, most markedly in foreign policy. This centralisation is coupled with an increase in institutionalisation. A new decision-making pattern and rising Iranian power in the region have affected the evolution of Saudi foreign policy. The Saudi crown prince’s strict handling of Shia dissidents acknowledges the perceived extension of the Iranian threat to internal security. The relationship between these two princes and Saudi political competition with Iran will affect the evolution of Saudi foreign policy in a critical manner in the future.     

Defending the ‘postwar petroleum order’: The US,Britain and the 1954 Saudi‐Onassis Tanker deal

During the early Cold War, Britain and the US fashioned a set of arrangements described collectively in this article as the ‘postwar petroleum order’, which appropriated Persian Gulf oil to fuel European reconstruction and defence. When Saudi Arabia organized a state oil‐tanker company with Aristotle Onassis in 1954, it challenged the terms of those arrangements. The affair provides a case study in contrasting British and American approaches towards oil diplomacy and Arab nationalism. Whereas London crusaded for an Anglo‐American campaign to abolish the Saudi‐Onassis company, Washington wanted the Arabian‐American Oil Company to accomplish the same objective by providing financial incentives to King Sa'ud's government.     

Russia’s Policy towards the Middle East: The Case of Yemen

ABSTRACT

Yemen occupies a peripheral place in Russian foreign policy for three reasons: lack of serious economic interest, the illusory potential of strengthening the military presence there and recognition of Saudi Arabia’s role in the Yemeni conflict. However, a deepening of the split within the Arab coalition in Yemen, primarily between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, has not only forced the Russian authorities to seek a balance between Yemeni actors, but also made Russia part of the so-called ‘Yemeni triangle’ alongside the two GCC countries. Russian involvement in the Yemeni crisis is constrained by its economic weakness and prioritisation of Russia-Gulf relations more broadly.     

A More Forward Role for the Gulf States? Combatting Terrorism at Home and Abroad

Though a vast coalition of some 75 countries has retaken much of the territory once comprising ISIS's Caliphate, the threat to the Fertile Crescent is far from over. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and a number of the other Gulf States represent a few of the many regional and global stakeholders currently engaged in this arena in the name of stability and other more personal interests. This article will explore the motivations, capabilities, and activities of the Gulf States vis-à-vis ISIS, the Fertile Crescent, and the larger threat that groups like ISIS represent more broadly.This article is part of a special project conducted by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, titled: “After the Caliphate: Reassessing the Jihadi Threat and Stabilizing the Fertile Crescent,” which includes a book, a thematic issue of Orbis: FPRI's Journal of World Affairs (Summer 2018), and a series of podcasts. Each element of the project can be found here: https://www.fpri.org/research/after-the-caliphate-project/. The author is the Project Lead.     

Playing the Diversity Card: Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy under the Salmans

ABSTRACT

Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq and the 2011 Arab uprisings, the political map of the Middle East has been in flux. Regional actors have taken advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, which have affected the outcome of this process. Saudi Arabia’s role as an aspiring regional hegemon in the region is salient: the country’s assertive course in shaping its neighbourhood coincides with a more independent foreign policy that goes beyond the traditional US alliance and seeks to diversify its international partners. This diversification of Saudi foreign policy since the ascension to the throne of King Salman in 2015 is explained by using the IR concept of hedging.     

Saudi Arabia’s Reluctant Regionalism

Saudi Arabia’s turn to regionalism during the past three years, principally in partnership with Egypt, is an expression of both its weakness and its power. Its role as the world’s swing producer in the global oil markets makes it an international power. This economic power, in turn, has allowed the Kingdom to help stabilize weaker economies in the region, like Egypt, that have been hard hit by global recession, inflation, and food insecurity. On the other hand, its military failure in Yemen and the US’s attenuating security commitment have forced it to build regional and inter-regional partnerships for protection and defense. Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), Saudi Arabia would prefer to impose its will on the region without having to build a regional consensus for its initiatives. But its lack of independent military power has constrained the Kingdom. The Saudi-Egyptian partnership therefore represents a mutual recognition of the limits of their respective power. It also raises the question not merely about who leads whom, but whether the carefully cultivated interdependency between them will hold.     

Democratic Opportunity in the Arab and Muslim World

The advance of democracy has been dramatic but not smooth, from just one democratic state 230 years ago to over 120 countries at present, accounting for two-thirds of the world's population. In recent years, the last bastions of despotism have bowed before the wave of democracy. Iraq and Palestine were the first breaches in the dyke with three and four electoral experiences, respectively, in the past year alone. Saudi Arabia with its absolutist monarchy saw its own local elections, while in Egypt presidential elections with at least nominally contesting candidates were held. The people of Iraq and Afghanistan braved bombs and defied terrorists to come out in large numbers to vote for a better future for their generations. Although the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world might lead to popular but anti-American governments in the short run, it is in the long-term interests of the US to promote democracy, a business which USAID has been in for a long time now.     

Strategic Display of Anger and Happiness in Negotiation: The Moderating Role of Perceived Authenticity

Emotional display is often used as a strategy in negotiation to manipulate one's counterpart's behavior. Previous research has examined the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation, but the evidence so far has largely focused on the perspective of the negotiator displaying the emotion with little attention paid to the impact of the emotional display on that negotiator's counterparts. In this study, we conducted two experiments to examine whether a negotiator's perceptions about the authenticity of his or her counterpart's displayed emotions of anger and happiness moderate the impact of those emotions on the negotiator. In Experiment One, we manipulated the perceived authenticity of the counterpart's anger as a between‐subjects factor (authentic versus inauthentic). Negotiators who perceived their counterpart's anger as inauthentic conceded less than did negotiators who perceived it as authentic. In Experiment Two, we corroborated this finding with a two‐variable (counterpart's emotion: anger versus happiness) times three‐variable (perceived authenticity of counterpart's displayed emotion: authentic versus ambiguous versus inauthentic) between‐subjects design. Negotiators conceded more to an angry counterpart than to a happy one when they perceived their counterpart's emotion as authentic, but we found the reverse pattern among negotiators who perceived their counterparts' emotions as inauthentic. Negotiators who perceived their counterparts' emotions as ambiguous in authenticity did not differ in concessions whether the counterpart displayed anger or happiness. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Iranian Involvement in Yemen

For at least a decade, there have been numerous Yemeni, Saudi, and other countries’ assertions that Iran has been involved in supporting northern Yemeni rebels seeking autonomy from the Sana’a government. Iranian diplomatic and political support for this rebellious group (known as the Houthis) is undeniable, but Iranian military assistance for them has not always been easy to prove. This situation appeared to change in 2011 when Iran's increased involvement in Yemen occurred in response to both the chaotic situation there during the final year of the Saleh regime and the danger that the Arab Spring revolutions would leave Iran increasingly isolated. Evidence of Iranian efforts to supply weapons to the Houthis now seems overwhelming in contrast to uncertain reports prior to 2011. In addition, at least some of Yemen's southern secessionists also appear to be receiving at least limited Iranian financial support.     

Strategy,Security, and War in Iraq: The United States and the Gulf in the 21st Century

Over the course of events taking place in and around the Persian Gulf over the last three years, the United States has used force to replace a despotic dictator who once served Western interests, placed considerable distance between itself and its erstwhile regional partner Saudi Arabia, and reduced its role as arbiter in the Arab–Israeli dispute. Operation Iraqi Freedom would seem to reveal that the United States has chosen a broader vision for the role that force could play as part of a more aggressive security strategy. The Gulf littoral's forward-deployed footprint, set into place during the first Gulf War, enabled effects-based capabilities to be tested in Iraq that have come online since the 1990s, enabling the US military to begin to operationalise what was initially dubbed the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and now is called ‘Transformation’. As such, the Gulf infrastructure provides the US with a model to emulate around the world as it seeks to realign its forces to better address new threats in the global theatre. The Gulf facilities will become central hubs in the network of bases stretching throughout Central and South Asia and the Horn of Africa which will perform missions associated with the global war on terror. Operation Iraqi Freedom represents only the beginning of this phenomenon in an emerging new global defense strategy that may see forward-deployed forces around the world used with increased frequency to manage an uncertain security environment.     

Questioning Thomas Pogge's Proposals to Eradicate Global Poverty

Moral cosmopolitanism has often been criticised for being too demanding and not offering a viable solution to the problem of extreme global poverty. Thomas Pogge has responded to both these concerns by arguing that it is possible to eradicate most global poverty through relatively light international-level actions. Pogge's proposals can be divided into two broad categories: financial transfers to the poor and international institutional reforms (which include changing the rules of global trade and restricting the ability of undemocratic governments to borrow internationally or sell off their country's natural resources). However, Pogge's proposed international-level actions are unlikely to eradicate global poverty as he has underestimated the tenacity of poverty-causing local practices. More specifically, this article will question the workability of Pogge's plans against the backdrop of sub-Saharan Africa. Confronted with a gap between what Pogge's proposed international-level reforms are able to accomplish and what they aim to accomplish, the final part of the paper considers Pogge's three options (or some combination of them): one, settle for a more modest reduction of global poverty; two, expect greater endeavour from the poor and their governments; or (and) three, demand a deeper involvement and sacrifice from citizens of well-off countries.     

G20视角下的沙特与全球经济治理

沙特阿拉伯于20世纪30年代发现石油，自70年代以来，随着石油价格的暴涨和世界石油需求量的猛增，使沙特迅速富有，一跃成为G20成员国，在全球经济治理中占有重要一席。由于沙特经济发展对国际市场和世界经济发展具有极强的依赖性，因此，在未来的全球经济治理中，沙特还会发挥更大的作用和影响力。     

Fluctuating Saudi and Emirati Alignment Behaviours in the Horn of Africa

ABSTRACT

The overthrow of Omar al-Bashir after three decades of rule has brought to light a dynamic that has been present for years: an interweaving of political, economic and security issues between the states of the Horn of Africa and the Gulf monarchies. Since 2011, the most active powers are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which seek political support to counter both Iran’s influence and the growing Turkish presence. The two Gulf monarchies’ search for alignments with African counterparts has favoured the continuous reshuffling of alliances with direct effects on the local actors’ strategic choices. These dynamics need to be considered to understand the determinants behind the currently increasing instability in the Red Sea area.     

The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East

The contest between Saudi Arabia and Iran played out in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, postwar Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Yemen and Bahrain, has shaped the geopolitics of the region since the 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq. The Arab uprisings intensified this geopolitical contest and spread it to Syria. The sectarianisation of the region’s geopolitical battles, and the instrumental use of some of the uprisings for geopolitical ends, has hardened sectarian sentiments across the region, complicated post-authoritarian democratic transitions, and, at least in Syria’s case, transformed its popular uprising into a veritable civil war.     

Regime Instability,Leader's Affiliation,and Organizational Culture: Why Are Military Dictatorships More Likely to Initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes? An Empirical Analysis, 1975–2006

Prior studies find that military dictatorships display a high propensity to initiate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Yet, there is little agreement on which feature of military regimes can best explain this behavior. This article distinguishes between three potential causes: coup risk, the dictator's affiliation with the military, and the military's influence on politics. Using recent data on authoritarian regimes, I find that, whereas coup risk is a strong predictor of conflict initiation, the dictator's affiliation does not affect his foreign policy. Furthermore, I find tentative evidence that the military's influence on domestic politics has a negative effect on MID initiation. These findings thus challenge the view that military regimes' foreign policy is due to the military's organizational culture: the relationship between military regimes and dispute initiation seems to be due to factors that simply happen to add up in military autocracies but are essentially unrelated to regime type.     

The meaning of post-apartheid Zulu media

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between certain South African media corporations, growing post-apartheid Zulu media platforms, the size and diversity of Zulu-speaking media consumers, and the historical socio-cultural construction of ‘Zuluness’. This relationship, this author observes, manifests largely through media corporations’ increasing recognition of Zulu people's pride in Zulu (i.e. the language) and ‘Zuluness’ – all of which are historical products of various forms of socialisation. Coopting this pride, profit-driven media corporations are commodifying Zulu and ‘Zuluness’. This commodification via the establishment of Zulu media outlets is paradoxical: 1) it is a transformation of a public and open Zulu cultural sense of ‘being’ into institutionally determined commodities exchangeable for revenue, for the ultimate benefit of media owners other than the masses of Zulus themselves; 2) it is a form of commoditisation that gives Zulu a linguistic profile that has historically been accorded only to English and Afrikaans. This article's argument is further briefly articulated through various intellectual frames: Graham Murdoch and Peter Golding's conceptualisation of critical political economy of communications and culture (2005); John and Jean Comaroff's anthropological analysis of commercialisation of ethnicity (2009); and, for South African specificity and precedent, through Herman Wasserman's reading of Afrikaans media corporations’ commercialisation of Afrikaans language and identity. Then the question is: What does the explored relationship mean for South Africa's multilingualism?     

From Friendship to Patronage: France–Israel Relations, 1958–1967

The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967—Charles de Gaulle's presidency—there was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulle's rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests.     

Hizballah in Lebanon ‐ at the crossroads

Hizballah, the Party of God, burst onto the Lebanese scene in a whirlwind of violence at the end of 1983. Since then, it has become a power with considerable clout in the Shi'i community of Lebanon. At the end of the 1980s it reached the height of its strength when it gained control of most parts of the Shi'i concentrations in Lebanon. However, since then, Hizballah has faced a series of challenges which threaten its continued activity, if not its very existence, including the Ta'if agreement, the Middle East peace process and Iran's increasing inability to support Hizballah. In the face of these challenges, Hizballah appears pragmatic, willing, it seems, to abandon its goals, at least for the time being. This, however, raises a key question: Can the organization truly change course and turn away from the ideological commitment and path of violence that have characterized it to date? Or do those aspects indeed define the organization? It is still too early to lay odds on the organization's future, but it seems that it may be in jeopardy.